California CGN and Mk 13/SM2MR?

When the Mk13 was faired over, I had assumed that they were going to receive something along the lines of a Mk49 21-cell RAM launcher. This would have lacked the range of the old SM-1MRs, but certainly would have been enough for a lot of purposes – heck, it is supposed to be sufficient for the LCS! 🙂

Would there be enough room for an 8-cell Self-Defense length Mk41 for 32 ESSMs?

Excellent information HK, thank you very much!

I have to agree, it would seem to have been a logical choice for the Adelaide class (and of course the remaining USN Perrys). Since most of the costs were sunk for the NTU project, and this would basically be a re-working of old code (etc) onto new hardware through an emulator, I don’t really see it costing the Earth! In effect, the Aussie solution, as you indicate, seems to have opted for a customised system to do no more than the old system, performance wise. I know the new AWDs are being built in a few years, but it seems to me that there is still a need for interim AAW capability. Notably, without the mid-course updates (allowing much greater range due to autopilot fly-out on a ballistic style path), the SM-2MRs will not have too much advantage over the Evolved SeaSparrows!

Modern consoles fitted with an emulator would seem to be a pretty attractive way to have improved the Perry class. The somewhat worrying thing is of course that the OHPs now lack any kind of non CIWS based air defences. When the Mk13 was faired over, I had assumed that they were going to receive something along the lines of a Mk49 21-cell RAM launcher. This would have lacked the range of the old SM-1MRs, but certainly would have been enough for a lot of purposes – heck, it is supposed to be sufficient for the LCS! 🙂

Your wish is my command… 😉

There was a proposal to replace some of the Perrys’ hardware with COTS components that could emulate NTU and enable full integration of SM-2MR. However, it looks like that modernization has been abandoned. I don’t know why – it would make so much sense. Instead, it appears that the Australians have done a bare-bones integration of SM2-MR, requiring illumination before launch (no autopilot), which means SM2-MR should have no performance improvements over SM1-MR.

The reason for that is that the RAN understands that their FFGs are stopgaps intended to provide AAW capability until the arrival of the Hobart class Aegis-equipped destroyers and the frigate replacement project still being formulated.

Rather than spend a fortune coming up with a sole source system, the RAN decided to basically support the FFG’s AAW capability with a missile system that the US was still supporting (SM2) instead of one no longer supported (SM1).

It was a pragmatic decision based on financial imperatives in a navy in the process of introducing four new ship classes (Hobart class DDG, Adelaide Class LPA, Armidale class PB, Sirius class AO) and two new helo types (MH90 & Super Seasprite).

Unicorn

Does anyone have any info on proposals for a similar NTU for the Perry class? I would have assumed that they would have been logical recipients (albeit somewhat limited in the upgrade stakes) for the SM-2MR, allowing the SM-1MR to be replaced.

Your wish is my command… 😉

There was a proposal to replace some of the Perrys’ hardware with COTS components that could emulate NTU and enable full integration of SM-2MR. However, it looks like that modernization has been abandoned. I don’t know why – it would make so much sense. Instead, it appears that the Australians have done a bare-bones integration of SM2-MR, requiring illumination before launch (no autopilot), which means SM2-MR should have no performance improvements over SM1-MR.

Here are the details, including a graphic of the proposed modernization. From Norman Friedman’s “The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems, 1997-1998”

Vitro’s proposed modernization of the Perry-class CDS shows the effects of COTS technology and of modern buses. The objective was to minimize cost and and complexity, and to retain as much existing software as possible. VisiBridges are COTS boxes capable of emulating UYK-7s. 44EP is a single-board equivalent to a UYK-44. Vitro split the weapon-control element of the system in two to exploit WDS Mk 14 software it had written as part of the New Threat Upgrade program. In turn, it argued that providing NTU software to the frigate would make it easier to adapt the ship’s combat system to the SM-2 missile, in a form of NTU. Such adaptation would considerably increase the frigate’s firepower. Instead of leading search radar video through an RVP/ADT box, Vitro simply digitized it so that it could be sent along the system LAN. An automatic detector/tracker can pick video off the video bus, sending its output of target vectors onto the main system digital LAN (FDDI). The various consoles of the earlier system are all replaced by UYQ-70s. They are all interchangeable, offering the ship some insurance against system failure. In theory, the next step would be to abandon the the VisiBridges and the 44EP in favor of a fully distributed system. To do that, however, would require considerable entirely new software; the emulation approach is attractive precisely because it requires little new software, and therefore little retesting.

Here’s confirmation that NTU includes SYS-2 IADT. From Norman Friedman’s “The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems 2006”.

In US NTU ships, existing air search radars were replaced by SPS-48E and SPS-49(V)2, and a new SYS-2 IADT fed NTDS, which in turn fed a new WDS Mk 14. NTU sensor hardware and, possibly, software from stricken NTU cruisers were transferred to LHAs as they refitted.

The Terrier or SM-2 (ER) version of NTU is now extinct; the Tartar or SM-2(MR) version survives. In this version, NTU uses CW acquisition and tracking (CWAT) to improve performance against high-altitude, supersonic, steeply diving missiles.

As of late 2002, the Royal Australian Navy planned to buy SM-2 missiles, but only in a homing-all-the-way variant, and only because the US Navy is no longer supporting SM-1.
(Page 326)

New Threat Upgrade (NTU) WDS Mk 14

NTU is usually characterized as a “poor man’s Aegis,” in that it exploits the commandable autopilot of the SM-2 missile to increase firepower without requiring a precision radar. NTU was originally associated with weapons direction system Mk 14. Because there is no external indicator that NTU is present on board a ship, it is not entirely clear which ships have it. No US NTU ships survive.

Like Aegis, NTU entails target illumination only near the target; up to that point, the missile is intermittently command-guided on the basis of search radar (track-while-scan) data. The lack of precision in the ships’ main radars (compared with SPY-1) reduces firepower in two ways. First, command guidance is less precise, so the missile is not brought as close to the target before switching to semi-active guidance. Second, NTU ships cannot use the slaved illuminators of that system. Instead, illuminating radars have to search for and lock onto targets for terminal illumination. That increases the time per target and reduces overall firepower compared with Aegis. Even so, NTU drastically increases the efficacy of non-Aegis missile ships.

WDS Mk 14 incorporates two UYK-20A or -44 computers and two or three OJ-194(V)4 consoles to control one missile battery, including two trackers. The Korean KDX-II destroyers have a Mk 14 emulator card embedded in their non-NTDS combat direction system. Others, listed under NTU, presumably have similar emulators. It is interesting that accounts of the Royal Australian Navy decision to adopt SM-2 in place of the current SM-1 on board their Perry-class frigates seem to envisage new development to disable the autopilot on board the missile and clearly do not envisage an NTU-like system. Presumably, that is because the Australians do not plan to replace their UYK-7 computers, which lack the capacity for NTU.

Users: Canada (TRUMP); Italy (Luigi Durand De la Penne class); Korea (KDX-I/II); Japan (Takanami class); Taiwan (Kidd class). The Italian destroyers were presumably upgraded after a July 2000 request for SM-2 Block 3A missiles and Mk 74 Mod 15 missile fire control systems.

Page 121

And more information from the 1997 edition about why SM-2ER was abandoned on NTU ships:

One reason for the abandonment of the expensive NTU(ER) system was that the naval environment had changed drastically. Had the Cold War turned hot, the US Navy would have faced large-scale air attacks launched from a great range. The problem would have been to deal with saturation at long range. Launch rate would not have been as important as the ability to handle multiple targets per ship. In the post-Cold War world, it is far more likely that ships will be suddenly attacked at relatively short range, so reaction time is much more important. The two- stage ER missile could not be launched very quickly (it had to be manually finned just before being rammed onto the launcher). The single-stage MR missile needs no such preparation.

Does anyone have any info on proposals for a similar NTU for the Perry class? I would have assumed that they would have been logical recipients (albeit somewhat limited in the upgrade stakes) for the SM-2MR, allowing the SM-1MR to be replaced. The Perry class weren’t particularly old when all these decisions were being made, and though far from being high end Aegis-equipped ships, they were certainly numerous!

Did the NTU include ANA/SYS-2 IADT?

Is ANA/SYS-2 IADT the same as plain vanilla SYS-2? If so, then the answer’s yes. This is according to Norman Friedman’s “US Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History” – Google Books is your friend.

The program was called New Threat Upgrade (NTU). In a Terrier ship, NTU was credited with at least doubling the number of engagements.

NTU was not quite equivalent to Aegis. The rotating search radars of other missile systems were not nearly as precise as the SPY- 1 of an Aegis system. They could not, then, control slaved illuminators. Instead, the illuminators of the modified systems had to be coached toward the target, for which they then had to search before locking on. That took some time, so a modified version of the earlier Tartar could not quite match Aegis firepower. Moreover, as the Soviets fielded faster lower-flying missiles such as SS-N-22 (Moskit), available reaction time shrank dramatically. The rotating search antenna of an NTU ship would get only a glimpse of such a missile as it approached, whereas the fixed, electronically scanned SPY-1 of an Aegis, which was staring at the horizon all the time, was much more likely to detect the weapon and then to track it precisely enough to engage. Aegis probably would not get multiple shots at such a target, but it had a much better chance of seeing it in the first place. Too, the tight integration of search and fire control functions in Aegis made for much faster reaction to a nearby target. However, in the 1980s, when the main threat was massive Soviet stand-off missile attacks, that distinction was not vital. That changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the only remaining important antiship threats were sea-skimming missiles such as Exocet.

In a Terrier ship, NTU was coupled with a major refit, which was expected to extend the lives of the early nuclear cruisers (CGN 9, 25, and 35) to 40 years, and the life of conventional cruisers (Leahy and Belknap classes) to 35 years. Ships were fitted with improved radars (SPS-48E and auto- detecting SPS-49[V]5 with SYS-2 track management systems), and they could use the new Block II version of SM-2, which was intended to engage the new generation of fast steep-diving air to surface missiles. As of 1984, plans called for completing NTU installation in Terrier ships by the end of FY92.

The newer Tartar ships were also scheduled for NTU refits: Virginia- and California-class nuclear cruisers and Kidd-class destroyers. Presumably the Adams-class destroyers could not accommodate the necessary electronics; they never figured in lists of potential NTU ships.

The end of the Cold War interrupted this program. Of the nuclear Terrier cruisers, Long Beach was retired in 1994 instead of being refitted, as planned, in FY 93. Of the other nuclear cruisers, only Bainbridge and Truxtun were refitted. The Leahys were all refitted, beginning with CG 16, 17, and 19 in FY 87-88, the last being CG 23. So were the Belknaps, beginning with CG 34 (completed July 1987). Four Farragut- class destroyers (ex-DLGs) were considered for NTU refits.
Page 405

On Page 389, he also states that Aegis cost $50 to $100 million per ship more than NTU.

Did the NTU include ANA/SYS-2 IADT?

The NTU upgrades were done during FY89 and FY90 respectively. SM-2MR would have been part of that upgrade – NTU doesn’t get you much without it.

The California’s appear to have retained Mk 86 Mod 3 GFCS and therefore may or may not have had CWI – likely not – but I can’t confirm either way. The Virginia’s and Kidd’s got Mod 5 with CWI along with their NTU upgrades.

This photo shows an SM2MR being fired from the Californias’ Mk 13 launcher: http://navysite.de/cg/cgn36_9.jpg

SM1MR has a small gap between mid-body strakes and aft fins, red band under strakes: http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/rtnwcm/groups/rms/documents/content/rtn_rms_ps_sm1_datasheet.pdf

SM2MR has a larger gap ( extra motor propellant) with red band behind teh strake: http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/rtnwcm/groups/rms/documents/content/rtn_rms_ps_sm2_datasheet.pdf

Not too sure whether NTU adds CWI to the SPG-60 – this would give a 5th director (although ‘limited’ to 50 nm)

SM-2 was associated with Aegis and the NTU (New Threat Upgrade) ships. The Leahy and Belknap classes got the NTU upgrade and used it with the SM-2ER (RIM-67). According to Wikipedia (forgive me :o) the California class got the NTU upgrade so it’s likely they also got the SM-2MR to go with it.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Threat_Upgrade

If you search sci.military.naval (usenet) archives for “NTU” you’ll find posts by some who worked with it that claimed it was superior to Aegis in some respects. (Probably because SM-2ER had such a long range).

http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-66.html
http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-67.html

Come to think of it sci.military.naval would probably be the best place to ask about California/SM-2/NTU Seemed like there was always someone around who had first hand experience about damn near anything.