China proposed division of Pacific, Indian Ocean regions, we declined: US Admiral

Since this thread was about dividing the pacific between chinese and US, I thought I’d post another article about something else that could have been divided.:)

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KE29Ad01.html
China says ‘no thanks’ to G-2
By Jian Junbo

SHANGHAI – At the Sino-European Union (EU) summit in Prague last week, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao rejected the concept of a Group of Two (G-2) comprising China and the United States, saying “it is totally ungrounded and wrong to talk about the dominance of two countries in international affairs”.

It was the first time a Chinese leader has publicly commented on the notion of a G-2, though Wen and a number of Chinese officials and think-tanks had cast doubt on the practicability of past notions of a “Chimerica”.

The idea of a G-2 was first forwarded by US academic circles in 2006, but it was raised again by Zbigniew Brzezinski, an influential specialist in international relations and national security advisor to former US president Jimmy Carter, in Beijing in Januaryas the two countries celebrated the 30th anniversary of establishing formal diplomatic ties.

Similar to “Chimerica”, which would put the US and China at the forefront of international affairs, the idea of a G-2 grouping has attracted wide attention, especially as Brzezinski was an advisor to President Barack Obama during the presidential elections.

In the Group of 20 (G-20) summit in London last month, the G-2 was floated again in the Western media and academic circles. Then after several weeks, on the eve of this month’s just-concluded 11th Sino-EU summit, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband predicted that over the next few decades, China would become one of the two “powers that count”.

He said, “China was becoming an indispensable power in the 21st century in the way [former US secretary of state] Madeleine Albright said the US was an indispensable power at the end of the last century”. He also argued it would be up to Europe if it wanted to change the G-2 into a G-3.

While widely discussed, the concept of a G-2 has not been clearly defined. According to Brzezinski, G-2 described the current reality, yet for Miliband, G-2 was a possibility in the foreseeable future.

How is asking the US Navy a non-starter to give it the Indian Ocean (an lake dominated by the US Navy even more so than the Atlantic and Pacific) suit China’s interest?

Care to put that it in English? You just mangled that sentence in a million ways and made it incomprehensible.

And only India would think to be bothered? Only nations with little or no geo-political impact and is trying desperately to find some “rival” would be bothered by this, I guess.

The US seems to be bothered, or rather amused enough to mention it to India. The US has “Little or no geo-political impact and is trying desperately to find some “rival””, indeed. LOL.

This “news” wasn’t reported in China or much in the US.

LOL, “much”, sure seems to be have been reported by the US & is being regarded as a matter of note by Admiral Keating.

Take it up with him, given how upset you are about the whole thing. Bad bad Admiral Keating.

Uhm Scooter, that Heritage Foundation article is available as PDF and on www. Makes for a lot shorter post. 😎

Indian-China Relationship

November 25, 2008
U.S.–India Relations: The China Factor
by Lisa Curtis

With the completion of the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement earlier this year, Washington’s ties with New Delhi stand on the threshold of great promise. China’s attempt to scuttle the agreement at the Sep*tember 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting was evidence for many Indians that China does not willingly accept India’s rise on the world stage, nor the prospect of closer U.S.-India ties.

As the relationship between the world’s oldest and the world’s largest democracies develops, Washington will need to pay close attention to the dynamics of the India-China relationship. The future direction of rela*tions between China and India, two booming econo*mies that together account for one-third of the world’s population, will be a major factor in determining broader political and economic trends in Asia directly affecting U.S. interests.

While on the surface Indian-Chinese relations appear to be improving (trade has increased eightfold in the last six years to almost $40 billion), both sides harbor deep suspicions of the other’s strategic inten*tions. Signs of their deep-seated disagreements have begun to surface over the last two years and it is likely that such friction will continue, given their unsettled borders, China’s interest in consolidating its hold on Tibet, and India’s expanding influence in Asia. China has moved slowly on border talks and conducted sev*eral incursions into the Indian states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh since January 2008.[1]

Some Indian analysts believe that China is pursu*ing a two-pronged strategy of lulling India into com*placency with greater economic interaction while taking steps to encir*cle India and undermine its security. China is strengthening ties to its tradi*tional ally Pakistan and slowly gaining influence with other South Asian states. Beijing is developing strategic port facilities in Sittwe, Burma; Chit*tagong, Bangladesh; Hambantota, Sri Lanka; and Gwadar, Pakistan, in order to protect sea lanes and ensure unin*terrupted energy supplies. China also uses military and other kinds of assis*tance to court these nations, especially when India and other Western states attempt to use their assistance pro*grams to encourage respect for human rights and democracy.
Tibet and Border Tensions

Despite improvements in economic ties and trade relations, border dis*putes continue to bedevil Chinese- Indian ties. India accuses China of ille*gally occupying more than 14,000 square miles of its territory on its northern border in Kashmir, while China lays claim to more than 34,000 square miles of India’s northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh. India is a long-term host to the Dalai Lama and about 100,000 Tibetan refugees, although the Indian government for*bids them from participating in any political activity.

Out of concern for Chinese sensi*tivities, the Indian government placed restrictions on Tibetan protesters in India last spring during the uprising in Tibet, and Beijing praised New Delhi for preventing Tibetans from march*ing to the Tibetan capital of Lhasa. The Indian political opposition, however, criticized Indian Prime Minister Man*mohan Singh for appeasing the Chi*nese and for not defending Tibetans’ human rights. Renewed tensions in Tibet would likely put pres*sure on New Delhi to show greater solidarity with the Tibetan people. China has recently started to raise the issue of the Dalai Lama’s status in India in diplomatic talks for the first time in several years, indicating its increased concern over the issue.

The two sides have achieved little in the ongoing border talks that opened in the early 1980s. In 2003, each side appointed “special representa*tives”–a national security adviser for India, a vice foreign minister for China–to upgrade and regu*larize the border discussions. New Delhi has tried to reassure China that it respects the Chinese position on Tibet by recognizing the “Tibetan Autonomous Region” as part of China, while the Chinese Foreign Ministry in 2003 recognized the trade route through the Nathu La Pass on the Chinese border to the Indian state of Sikkim and stopped listing Sik*kim as an independent country on its Web site, implicitly recognizing it as part of India.

Nevertheless, China’s increasing assertiveness over the past two years has led to a near freeze of the border talks.[2] The 12th round of the special-repre*sentative talks held in mid-September in Beijing ended without any specific agreements, and with both sides merely stating they would fulfill the guidelines of their leaders and negotiate a “fair and reasonable” solution.[3]

The Chinese have recently toughened their posi*tion during border talks by insisting that the Tawang district–a pilgrimage site for Tibetans in Arunachal Pradesh–be ceded to China. The Indi*ans refused the demand and reiterated their posi*tion that any areas with settled populations would be excluded from territorial exchanges. In what could be an attempt to pressure the Indians on the issue, the Chinese have been strengthening their military infrastructure along the border and establishing a network of road, rail, and air links in the region.[4]

Beijing also stirred controversy in May 2007 when it denied an entry visa to an officer of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) from the state of Arunachal Pradesh on the grounds that he was from territory the Chinese officially recognize as their own, prompting India to cancel the visit of the entire group of more than a hundred IAS officers to China for a training program.[5]

India has recently begun to reinforce its own claims in the border areas that are in dispute with China. New Delhi is augmenting forces in the east*ern sector along the border of Arunachal Pradesh. It also re-deployed elements of its 27th Mountain Division from Jammu and Kashmir to the 30-km-wide Siliguri corridor at the intersection of India, Tibet, and Bhutan that links India with the rest of its northeastern states.[6] The area, referred to as the Chicken Neck, is a vulnerable point of the border– losing control of it would separate India from its entire northeast region.

The Indian army is also planning to raise a new mountain strike corps for Arunachal Pradesh.[7] Prime Minister Singh visited Arunachal Pradesh in late January 2008 and announced development plans for the region, including construction of a highway connecting the controversial Tawang dis*trict with the city of Mahadevpur, underlining India’s non-negotiable stance on maintaining Tawang within its boundaries.

India is also taking steps in what is referred to as the Western Sector (in the state of Jammu and Kash*mir), such as building roads and re-opening air bases along the borders. India re-opened an airstrip in Daulat Beg Oldie in the Ladakhregion in June and may re-open another in eastern Ladakh close to the Line of Actual Control (the de facto border), which would help supply troops posted in the area.

——-

Indian Lessons from the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War

The history of events leading up to the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 and the severe Indian disillusionment with the Chinese in the aftermath of that conflict provides a useful context for assessing current developments in Chinese-Indian relations. Even after China invaded and annexed Tibet in 1950, India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, believed that India should seek a close relationship with China. Nehru was convinced that an India-China friendship could be the basis of an Asian resurgence.[8] Nehru apparently wanted to give the Chinese the benefit of the doubt since they were, like the Indians, also emerging from the colonial era. Many fellow Indians, including members of Nehru’s cabinet, believed otherwise. They cautioned Nehru to view the event as a sign that China could pose a danger to India’s own territorial integrity and that India should, therefore, begin to prepare its defenses accordingly.[9]

Nehru’s trust of China cost India dearly in 1962 when the Chinese simultaneously invaded the eastern and western sectors of their shared borders. The Indian parliament accused Nehru of turning a blind eye to Chinese construction of a road through what was then Indian territory in the Aksai Chin. After the invasion and defeat by the Chinese, Nehru declared that China had revealed itself as “an expansionist, imperious-minded country.”[10] A feeling of betrayal from a country that they had supported in the international arena permeated the Indian psyche for years to come.

Indian strategic analysts, remembering the 1962 border war, now warn Indian officials not to make the mistakes of the past by downplaying Chinese border aggression. They argue that if New Delhi publicly downplays provocative Chinese actions in the border areas (as it did with construction of the road through the Aksai Chin in the early 1960s), the Chinese will interpret the silence as a sign of weakness and exploit it.[11]

——-

At the same time that border tensions are sim*mering, however, the two countries are beginning to conduct joint military exercises. Holding even minor joint military exercises–as long as they are reciprocal in terms of exposure–can help build confidence and increase transparency between their militaries, helping to keep border tensions in check. Last December, for example, 100 troops from each country engaged in a joint anti-terrorism military exercise in China’s southwestern province of Yunnan.

Civil Nuclear Deal Brings Out India-China Competition

Increasing U.S. attention paid to India over the past five years–especially Washington’s decision to extend civil nuclear cooperation to New Delhi– surprised Chinese policymakers and caused them to reassess their policies toward India. Chinese offi*cials have developed a more serious policy toward India and now acknowledge that India is becoming a major Asian power.

China’s apparent attempt to scuttle the U.S.- India Civil Nuclear Agreement at the September 2008 NSG meeting was evidence for many Indians that China does not willingly accept India’s rise on the world stage. The Chinese–buoyed by the unexpected opposition from NSG nations like New Zealand, Austria, and Ireland–threatened the agreement with delaying tactics and last-minute concerns signaled through an article in the Chinese Communist Party’s English language paper, The Peo*ple’s Daily.[12] The public rebuke of the deal followed several earlier assurances from Chinese leaders that Beijing would not block consensus at the NSG.

Indian observers claim the Chinese tried to walk out of the NSG meetings in order to prevent a consensus, but that last-minute interventions from senior U.S. and Indian officials convinced them that the price of scuttling the deal would be too high, forcing them to return to the meeting.[13] Indian strategic affairs analyst Uday Bhaskar attrib*uted the Chinese maneuvering to longstanding competition between the two Asian rivals. “Clearly, until now China has been the major power in Asia,” said Bahskar. “With India entering the NSG, a new strategic equation has been introduced into Asia and this clearly has caused disquiet to China.” In a recent speech, Indian Finance Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram, citing China’s position within the NSG, said that, “From time to time, China takes unpredictable positions that raise a number of questions about its attitude toward the rise of India.”

China is also wary of the potential for stronger U.S.-India military cooperation. India has em*barked on an ambitious military modernization ef*fort and is increasingly looking to the United States to purchase advanced weaponry. The completion of the civil nuclear deal will likely raise the confidence of the Indian defense establishment in the U.S. as a reliable supplier and, therefore, set the stage for a much broader and deeper defense relationship be*tween the U.S. and India over the next several years. Following are some major milestones in the U.S.-India defense trade relationship:

The recent sale of six C130-J Hercules military transport aircraft worth $1 billion is the largest U.S. military sale to India to date.
In 2006 the U.S. Congress authorized the trans*fer of the USS Trenton amphibious transport dock to India.
U.S. firms are also competing with Russian and European firms to fulfill an Indian request for 126 multi-role combat aircraft worth close to $10 billion.
U.S. companies are bidding to supply 197 light observation helicopters and 22 combat helicop*ters to the Indian Air Force and the Army Avia*tion Corps at a cost of about $1.5 billion.[14]
In 2005, India and the U.S. signed a 10-year defense framework agreement that calls for ex*panded joint military exercises, increased defense-related trade, and the establishment of a defense and procurement production group. The U.S. and India have conducted more than 50 military exer*cises since 2002, demonstrating how far the mili*tary partnership has progressed in a relatively short period.

One of the most significant of these exercises was held in September of last year and involved three other nations–Japan, Australia, and Singapore–in the Bay of Bengal.This exercise raised concern in Beijing about the development of a democracy axis aimed at countering China’s influence. To reassure the Chinese of its intentions, the new Australian government led by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd backed away from a diplomatic quadrilateral initia*tive begun in 2007 among the U.S., Australia, Japan, and India.

Other Areas of Potential China-India Conflict

Energy is also increasingly becoming a source of friction between China and India. They are two of the world’s fastest-growing energy consumers, with China importing about 50 percent of its energy needs and India importing 70 percent. China has consistently outbid India in the competition for energy sources, and these bidding wars have inflated energy prices, prompting the two countries to agree to joint bidding on certain contracts. The Chinese provide monetary and diplomatic entice*ments to secure energy-supplier contracts and largely ignore international concerns over issues like human rights and democracy.

Energy competition between India and China is also reflected in the two countries’ assertions of naval power. As India reaches into the Malacca Strait, Beijing is surrounding India by developing strategic port facilities in Sittwe, Burma; Chittagong, Bangladesh; Hambantota, Sri Lanka; and Gwadar, Pakistan, to protect sea lanes and ensure uninter*rupted energy supplies.

Water also has the potential to become a divi*sive issue in India’s bilateral relations with China. New Delhi is concerned about the ecological impact that the Chinese plans to divert the rivers of Tibet for irrigation purposes in China will have on India. With China controlling the Tibetan plateau, the source of Asia’s major rivers, the potential for conflict over increasingly scarce water resources remains a concern.[15]

China’s Relations with Other South Asian States

China is strengthening its ties to India’s historical rival Pakistan and slowly gaining influence with other South Asian states that border India. The South Asian nations view good ties with China as a useful counterweight to Indian dominance in the region. China uses military and other assistance to court these nations, especially when India and other Western states try to use their assistance programs to encourage respect for human rights and democracy.

Pakistan: Pakistan and China have long-stand*ing strategic ties, and China is Pakistan’s largest defense supplier. China transferred equipment and technology to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and bal*listic missile programs throughout the 1980s and 1990s, enhancing Pakistan’s strength in the South Asian strategic balance. Stephen Cohen, an expert on the Indian and Pakistani militaries, describes China as pursuing a classic balance of power by supporting Pakistan in a relationship that mirrors the relationship between the U.S. and Israel.[16] The most significant development in China-Pakistan military cooperation occurred in 1992 when China supplied Pakistan with 34 short-range ballistic M-11 missiles.[17]

China has helped Pakistan build two nuclear reactors at the Chasma site in the Punjab Province and continues to support Pakistan’s nuclear pro*gram, although it has been sensitive to international condemnation of the A. Q. Khan affair and has cal*ibrated its nuclear assistance to Pakistan accord*ingly. In the run-up to Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Pakistan in November 2006, media reports speculated that China would sign a major nuclear energy cooperation agreement with Pakistan. In the end, however, the Chinese provided a general pledge of support to Pakistan’s nuclear energy program, but refrained from announcing plans to supply new nuclear reactors. During Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari’s visit to Beijing in mid-October 2008, Beijing did come through with a pledge to help Pakistan construct two new nuclear power plants at Chasma, but did not propose or agree to a major China-Pakistan nuclear deal akin to the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement.

China is also helping Pakistan develop a deep-sea port at the naval base at Gwadar in Pakistan’s province of Baluchistan on the Arabian Sea. The port would allow China to secure oil and gas sup*plies from the Persian Gulf and project power in the Indian Ocean. China financed 80 percent of the $250 million for completion of the first phase of the project and reportedly is funding most of the sec*ond phase of the project as well.[18]

Nepal: Nepal occupies a strategic location along the Himalayan foothills dividing China and India. China provided military supplies to Nepalese King Gyanendra before he stepped down in 2005 while India and the U.S. were restricting their military assistance in an effort to promote political reconcil*iation within the country. Nonetheless, it does not appear that Nepal’s new prime minister, Prachanda, holds a grudge against the Chinese for their previ*ous support of the king. Prachanda’s Maoist move*ment patterned itself after Mao Zedong’s “people’s war” principles, and upon his assumption of power in August, Prachanda promptly paid a visit to Beijing where he met President Hu Jintao.

Over the past two years, Nepal has begun to crack down on Tibetan refugees on its territory in an apparent attempt to appease the Chinese. Last spring, Nepal’s government ordered a raid on a cen*ter for Tibetan refugees and deported one of them shortly before the visit of China’s Assistant Foreign Minister to Kathmandu. The center, funded by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, acts as a transit point for Tibetans fleeing to India. In 2005, Nepal closed down the Tibetan Welfare Office in Kathmandu, which had been established in the 1960s. About two to three thousand Tibetans travel through Nepal every year. During the wide*spread unrest and demonstrations in Tibet from March to June 2008, the Nepalese banned all pro*tests and heavily patrolled their border with Tibet.

Sri Lanka: Chinese assistance to Sri Lanka has increased substantially over the past year and may now even eclipse that of Sri Lanka’s longtime biggest aid donor, Japan.[19] The Chinese are building a highway, developing two power plants, and con*structing a new port facility at Hambantota harbor. Chinese analysts say the port is strictly a commer*cial venture, while Indian analysts warn it could be used as a Chinese naval base to control the area.

China wants to expand political and security ties with the countries of the South Asia-Indian Ocean region to ensure the safety of Chinese sea lines of communication across the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka, for its part, needs Chinese assistance–especially military aid–as it fights a civil war with Tamil insurgents with whom it recently officially broke a six-year cease-fire. The U.S. and India have cur*tailed military supplies toSri Lankabecause of human rights concerns, and Chinese aid to Sri Lanka comes with no strings attached.

Bangladesh: Total trade between China and Bangladesh was around $3.5 billion in 2007, up about 8.5 percent from the previous year. China is an important source of military hardware for Bang*ladesh and increasingly is investing in Bangladesh’s garment sector. With natural gas deposits in Bang*ladesh estimated at between 32 trillion and 80 tril*lion cubic feet, Bangladesh has gained strategic importance for both China and India as a potential source of energy. Bangladesh turned down India’s proposal for a tri-nation gas pipeline with Burma.

India’s Relationships with Southeast Asian States

India established a “Look East” policy in the early 1990s, but it has only recently begun to build polit*ical and economic ties with the states of Southeast Asia, which generally welcome India’s involvement to balance growing Chinese influence. Most coun*tries in the region that are wary of China do not have the same apprehensions toward India.[20]

India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity agreement on November 11, 2004, marking a significant step in the development of relations between India and the countries of Southeast Asia. India became a full dia*logue partner of ASEAN in 1995, joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996, became a summit partner of ASEAN (called ASEAN Plus One) in 2002, and became a member of the East Asia Sum*mit in December 2005.

In another step toward building its economic relations with the region, India will sign a free trade deal with the ASEAN countries in December 2008 after four years of talks. New Delhi says it wants to raise two-way trade with ASEAN to $50 billion by 2010, up from its current level of $38 billion.The India-ASEAN free trade agreement will reduce or eliminate import tariffs on 96 percent of items traded between the two starting in January 2009. India has also enhanced its naval profile in South*east Asia to strengthen its Look East policy and to disrupt the flow of arms across the Bay of Bengal to insurgents in India’s northeast and to the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.[21]

In addition to integrating with the multilateral institutional structures of Southeast Asia, India has focused on building stronger bilateral relationships in the region, especially with Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia. India holds periodic naval exercises with these countries and participates in a biannual gathering of regional navies, called the Milan. India has also entered into bilateral defense cooperation agreements with Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Laos, and Indonesia.

Burma: India is particularly concerned about growing links between China and Burma, with which it shares land and maritime borders. New Delhi in recent years has de-emphasized its support for democracy there in order to build ties to the mil*itary junta, a policy that is causing friction between New Delhi and Washington. India was a strong pro*ponent of the democracy movement in Burma throughout the 1980s and gave sanctuary to thou*sands of Burmese refugees following the military junta’s assumption of power in 1988. India changed its position, however, to one of “constructive engage*ment” when it sought Burmese cooperation against insurgents across their porous frontier in the mid-1990s and has more recently sought to counter growing Chinese influence and secure oil and gas deals with Burma to fulfill its growing energy re*quirements.[22] In the fall of 2007, attempts of the Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL) and other Indian companies to tap Burmese oil and gas were thwarted by Chinese pressure on Burmese authorities.[23]

In response to the September 2007 crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators, India placed arms sales to Burma under “review,” halting them at least temporarily. Prime Minister Singh hosted the second-in-command of the military junta General Maung Aye in New Delhi six months later, however, and announced a deal to refurbish the Sittwe port as part of a larger project to allow sea access to India’s northeastern states.

What This Means for U.S. Policy

As China and India rise politically and economi*cally on the world stage, it is natural that they com*pete with one another for influence. Although China’s economic rise will continue to be faster than India’s, Beijing may seek to counter New Delhi’s political and geo-strategic influence. Rivalry between the two nations will be fueled especially by each country’s efforts to reach into the other’s tradi*tional spheres of influence, for example, China in South Asia and India in Southeast Asia. China’s will*ingness to overlook human rights and democracy concerns in its relations with the smaller South Asian states will at times leave India at a disadvan*tage in asserting its power in the region, as was seen recently in Nepal and Sri Lanka.

China is wary of U.S. plans to support India’s position in Asia and will seek to blunt Washington’s overtures toward New Delhi. Beijing may discuss in private and public forums the importance of simul*taneous development of both China and India to try to show it welcomes India’s rise. New Delhi, how*ever, will pay closer attention to Beijing’s actions along the disputed China-India border to gauge Chinese overall strategic intentions toward India. China’s unhelpful stance at the recent NSG meetings on the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement was a reminder that Beijing remains uncomfortable with India’s growing global role.

The U.S. should:

Continue to build strong, strategic ties to India by encouraging India to play a more active political and economic role in the region. To help India fulfill that role, Washing*ton should continue to seek a robust military-to-military relationship with New Delhi and enhance defense trade ties. Washington should also develop an Asian dialogue with India to dis*cuss developments in the broader Asia region more formally and regularly.
Encourage India’s permanent involvement in values-based strategic initiatives like the U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral dialogue. Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had proposed that Japan, India, Australia, and the U.S. formalize a four-way strategic dialogue. The new government in Canberra led by Kevin Rudd, however, has since backed away from the initia*tive. Washington should convince Canberra of the benefits of reviving and elevating a quadrilat*eral forum focused on promoting democracy, counterterrorism, and economic freedom and development in Asia. In the meantime, Washing*ton should continue to build the bilateral com*ponents of such a grouping–U.S.-Japan, U.S.- India, and U.S.-Australia relations–and work on a meaningful trilateral agenda among the U.S., Japan, and Australia that can accommodate additional partners down the road. The U.S. can also pursue U.S.-Japan-India trilateral initia*tives, especially in the areas of energy and mari*time cooperation, and through the institution of regular dialogue on Asian security issues. Indian- Japanese relations have been strengthening in recent years, as demonstrated by Prime Minister Singh’s late October visit to Japan, where he signed a joint declaration on security coopera*tion and accepted a $4 billion Japanese loan commitment for infrastructure projects in India. The security agreement was the third such pact Japan has ever signed, including one with the U.S. and one with Australia.
Collaborate more closely with India on initia*tives that strengthen economic development and democratic trends in the region and work with India to counter any Chinese moves that could potentially undermine such trends in order to ensure the peaceful, democratic development of South Asia and Southeast Asia. This will require close coordination on developments in both South and Southeast Asia and increasing mutual confidence between India and the U.S. on each other’s strategic intentions in the region. The U.S. should, for example, encourage India’s role in helping Afghanistan develop into a stable democracy by encouraging Indian assistance for strengthening democratic institutions in Afghanistan, deepening U.S.- Indian exchanges on developments in Afghani*stan, and ensuring that India has a role in any regional efforts to stabilize the country.
Help India strengthen its cooperative activi*ties with the International Energy Agency to coordinate response mechanisms in the event of an oil emergency. The U.S. has a major stake in how India copes with its increasing energy demand and how it pursues competition with China for energy resources. The U.S. should work closely with India as it develops its strategic oil reserves to ensure that the major energy-con*suming countries are prepared to cooperate to resolve any potential global energy crises.
Avoid any potential India-China military conflict over unresolved border issues given the U.S. interest in ensuring stability in the region. Washington should watch their ongoing border talks closely without trying to medi*ate. The two sides are unlikely to reach any breakthroughs in their discussions in the near future, but Washington should remain watchful for any signs that tensions are ratcheting upward.
Conclusion

As the relationship between India and the U.S. develops, Washington will need to pay close atten*tion to the dynamics of the India-China relation*ship and be smart about its approach: Even though Washington and New Delhi share similar concerns regarding China, Indian officials will balk at any U.S. overture that appears to use New Delhi to con*tain or directly counter Chinese influence. Tensions between the two Asian giants could increase, espe*cially over their disputed borders and as they com*pete in each other’s regional spheres of influence. But there are other, positive trends in Sino-Indian relations, such as improving economic ties, closer coordination on some common global political interests, and more frequent diplomatic exchanges. India and China have a long history and a compli*cated relationship. Any misstep by the U.S. that puts India in an awkward political situation has the potential to damage overall U.S. interests in the region and limit the prospects for the U.S.-India relationship.

Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

China is opaque as and when it suits her interests..

How is asking the US Navy a non-starter to give it the Indian Ocean (an lake dominated by the US Navy even more so than the Atlantic and Pacific) suit China’s interest?

The newstory is actually American & now reiterated by an Indian paper on account of Keating. And I think the rest of the world is least bothered as they know the likelihood of this happening …LOL.

And only India would think to be bothered? Only nations with little or no geo-political impact and is trying desperately to find some “rival” would be bothered by this, I guess.

This “news” wasn’t reported in China or much in the US.

The Pentagon report says China is opaque. Why would it go and be so totally open to the Pentagon on “dividing” the Pacific and Indian Ocean?

China is opaque as and when it suits her interests..

What’s irrelevant is this Indian news story. For something as major as dividing the oceans between China and the US, it should be on page one of every newspaper in the world.

The newstory is actually American & now reiterated by an Indian paper on account of Keating. And I think the rest of the world is least bothered as they know the likelihood of this happening …LOL.

This is not the first time this has been reported.

Read YourFathers post/s above.

Your Pentagon report allusion is, irrelevant.

The Pentagon report says China is opaque. Why would it go and be so totally open to the Pentagon on “dividing” the Pacific and Indian Ocean?

What’s irrelevant is this Indian news story. For something as major as dividing the oceans between China and the US, it should be on page one of every newspaper in the world.

Indian Express.com

Keating said that the offer, which was made somewhat “tongue in cheek” was declined by the US but the top Chinese officer indicated that Beijing would pursue the development of aircraft carrier technology.

Well looking at the below statement it does not look like one, but Propaganda, to scare and corner India.

“(The Chinese officer said) You, the US, take Hawaii East and we, China, will take Hawai West and the Indian Ocean. Then you will not need to come to the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean and we will not need to go to the Eastern Pacific. If anything happens there, you can let us know and if something happens here, we will let you know,” Keating recalled.

This is not the first time this has been reported.

Read YourFathers post/s above.

During a May visit to China, Keating encountered a Chinese admiral who suggested that the US and China divide control of the Pacific Ocean between them, with China maintaining order in the western half while the US confined itself to the eastern half. A PACOM officer said Keating told his Chinese interlocutor: “We’re not going to give it up, and we want you to know that.”

Your Pentagon report allusion is, irrelevant.

Jonesy, severely doubt it was a joke.

Why? Logic dictates that this is either a joke or an outright fabrication.

Why would China “asks” the US about dividing the Pacific when the annual Pentagon report (and every other report out there) says China is “opaque” and “secretive” about its intentions?

You can’t be more open when you asks to “divide” the Pacific.

You can either believe the annual Pentagon report or this.

Do you have any shred of evidence that this is a lie? Or are you indulging in some self-delusion? Is all the proof you can come up with is that the US military lied before? If that is proof enough that the US military is lying on every occasion and thus this incident included, then everybody who has lied once in their life must be lying with every breath? You seriously believe that? Then you must be lying right now, or are you trying to tell us you have never lied before in your life? 😀 And so in that case you must also believe that China is a country whose authorities indulge in lies at every turn? Since I recall quite clearly China lying in the SARs incident? See, Devil’s Advocate, your logic simply fails you.

Sorry to break it to you but when you spin there’s lying involved. So stop putting a spin to spin. You don’t see the connection? I guess you can’t. The Su-33 cancellation was a lie to begin with and people like you are still trying give life to the lie by ignoring the truth. I guess the desperate will spin anything. Too bad that it takes so much for you.

And the US military doesn’t lie, right? Pat Tillman anyone? Look at how they couldn’t just say it was a simple mistake and they turned it into an embarrassing huge lie.

Lol. Everything inconvenient for you is put down as ‘spin’. First you claimed it to be something made up and not put up by ‘any legitimate press’. Now when faced with the blunt truth, you put it down as spin. What does the Su-33 stories have to do with this? Why not just admit you made a wrong claim? 😀

Ever hear of spin? Like the Chinese would actually say something serious like that to an adversary if true. I’m sure many people like you will spin it to make it what you want. Admiral Keating said a lot of stuff that had to be ‘clarified” by the PR department in later statements. Lies take a life of their own. Just like the story about the Russians cancelling the Su-33 deal with China because of copying. Then the Russians put out a statement that China never placed an order for Su-33s. Yet you still see people writing stories that the Su-33 order has been cancelled.

Interesting doing a search… the only ones talking about this are a few forums and Indians. No legitimate press reporting this. Even the little girls in the Pentagon aren’t peeing in their pants about this and they would know if it were true since it supposedly came from one of their own. Maybe they’re not taking it seriously since Keating was shooting off his mouth about everything as he was leaving the door. They did have to release statements softening his charges.

Doing a bit of checking before opening that hole will do you some good. 😀

http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2007/December%202007/1207pacific.aspx

Note the date.

December 2007

The New Line in the Pacific
By Richard Halloran

The American emphasis will be on air and sea power, with fewer boots on the ground.
In a talk he gave in September, the commander of US forces in the Pacific offered a pointed rationale for changes which have begun sweeping through his command and will continue to do so for the next 10 years.
“We must maintain the effective overmatch, the powerful overmatch, we currently enjoy,” said Adm. Timothy J. Keating, the commander of US Pacific Command, “whether it’s based on numbers, capabilities, or … a combination of both.” Keating added that PACOM’s forces “must retain the ability to dominate in any scenario, in all environments, without exception.”

He told his audience that Washington must be committed to peaceful solutions to problems, but “must always be prepared to act decisively and, if necessary, alone.”

The changes now in train will add up to the most extensive realignment of US military power in Asia since the end of the Vietnam War more than three decades ago.

Washington now is drawing a line in the water, so to speak, from the Sea of Japan southward through the Taiwan Strait and into the South China Sea. The US is withdrawing some forces from South Korea—west of that line—and concentrating on islands to the east of it—in Japan, Guam, and Southeast Asia.

The emphasis will be on air and sea power, rather than ground forces. As Keating said in an interview: “We will have fewer boots on the ground” by 2017.

Some changes will take place over the next five years but, given long planning times, more significant shifts likely will take place in the final five years. USAF Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Leaf, deputy PACOM commander, said, “Over the next decade, this will be an urgent, unprecedented military program.”

In this region, it is a long way from almost anywhere to almost anywhere else. To help ease that problem, the US is moving to turn Guam into a forward air and naval hub.

Leaf, who oversees the Guam buildup, said: “It would be easy to get daunted by the challenges we face.” The US is confronted with several potential adversaries in Asia.

China looms largest in US calculations. The uppermost question is whether the communist giant will use its armed power to attempt a conquest of Taiwan, the island over which Beijing claims sovereignty. Such a move would risk war with the US and the loss to China of a US market that will top $300 billion in 2007.

North Korea will remain worrisome. Whiffs of intelligence suggest that a succession struggle may be under way. The hermit state’s economy, long near dead, is crumbling further. Military forces lack training. Food is in such short supply that rations to the troops have been cut. Still, North Korea’s leaders are dangerous because they are ignorant of the outside world and prone to miscalculation.

Russia, US officers say, is on the rebound. The Russian Navy’s Pacific fleet, once rusting at anchor, has begun to pull itself back together and show some life, helped along by an expanding national economy.

Southeast Asia poses a triple threat of terror, piracy, and criminal smuggling. Most US officials seem resigned to the spread of terror networks and possible attacks through Southeast and South Asia. A particular concern is the vulnerability of the Strait of Malacca, through which 70,000 ships pass a year. If a supertanker were scuttled in the narrow strait, it could cause environmental, economic, and political chaos.

Key Elements
Plans for the Pacific realignment call for development of six critical elements that, taken together, might be called PACOM 2017. They are airpower, missile defense, sea power, reformed land forces, special operations forces, and engagement.

In airpower, US commanders will emphasize command and control for integrated aerial campaigns. Some airpower forces are to be stationed on land bases in the “Pacific triad” of Hawaii, Guam, and Alaska. To a lesser extent, air forces will be based in Japan and South Korea, with occasional sorties out of Singapore, Australia, and the British-owned atoll of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

Other airpower elements will be sea-based. Today, the US Navy keeps five big-deck aircraft carriers in the US Pacific Command region (between the US West Coast and the east coast of Africa). Plans call for adding a sixth big deck, USS Carl Vinson, to the US Pacific Fleet in 2010.

Moreover, the Navy will decommission the aged, conventionally powered carrier Kitty Hawk, currently forward deployed in Japan, and replace her with the nuclear-powered USS George Washington, adding a new net increment of capability.

Airpower plays a key role in overcoming vast Pacific distances because of its ability to swiftly concentrate forces and coordinate quick responses to crises. For that to happen, however, the Air Force needs to build, deploy, and protect networks linking together the disparate forces.

Lt. Gen. Loyd S. Utterback, who commands 13th Air Force at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, said the main Pacific Air Forces effort of the next five to 10 years will be to increase USAF’s ability for command and control of airpower. “We will be able to pull it all together in near real time,” said Utterback.

The heart of air operations is the Kenney Headquarters, particularly the Maj. Richard Bong Air Operations Center set up in June 2005 at a cost of $32.6 million.

Standing in the center’s dim interior, lit by the glow of several hundred computer screens, Col. Timothy L. Saffold, the center’s commander, said that Pacific Air Forces can run integrated air campaigns throughout PACOM’s area of responsibility from this air operations center. Saffold said the center could, in a contingency, report directly to the PACOM commander.

Big Changes in Guam
“We develop the strategy, do the planning, issue the operational orders, watch the execution, and assess the outcome of operations,” he said.

For the Air Force, the biggest physical changes are coming in Guam, where Andersen Air Force Base is being refurbished. B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers will be in Guam on “permanent rotation,” meaning they will be there on four-month deployments from the continental US.

Fighters, including the F-22 Raptor, will deploy to Guam frequently and three Raptor squadrons will be assigned to the Pacific—two in Alaska, one in Hawaii. Three Global Hawk unmanned surveillance aircraft will be posted on Guam in 2009; a fourth may be added later.

When it comes to assuring future air operations, Utterback said, the main concern will be to obtain tankers in sufficient numbers and quality. Air Force aerial refuelers are wearing out, he said, and replacing them is a top priority.

“We are tanker dependent,” he declared. “We need them to get there and stay there.”

Plans call for George Washington to leave its homeport of Norfolk, Va., and relieve Kitty Hawk, at Yokosuka, down the bay from Tokyo. Another tacair boost will come in 2010, when Carl Vinson, with her 85 aircraft, comes out of a deep overhaul and joins the Pacific Fleet. The F-35C Joint Strike Fighter is scheduled in 2013 to begin replacing earlier versions of the F/A-18.

Except for George Washington, America’s mammoth Pacific Ocean carriers will remain based on the US West Coast, but they will have access to berths in the western Pacific that will permit them to operate for many months away from homeport. One of these is planned for Guam. The base at Changi in Singapore has serviced carriers for almost 10 years; and Yokosuka is available for carriers other than George Washington.

A second key component in the strategy is missile defense. China, North Korea, and other nations in the region are deploying ballistic and cruise missiles. For a year, USAF Lt. Gen. Bruce A. Wright, commander of US Forces Japan, has spoken out about what he calls the urgent need for the US and its allies to build missile defenses to counter potential threats.

“Missiles,” said Wright, “are everywhere these days.”

Within the last two years, USAF set up a missile defense command center, the Army created a missile defense command, and the Navy integrated Aegis cruisers and destroyers into the defensive system.

The Air Force operations center at Hickam is responsible for coordinating missile defense in the region. It is tasked with bringing together the capabilities of all services and with integrating them into a missile defense.

The 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, at nearby Ft. Shafter, Hawaii, has just reached full operational capability. It has radar in northern Japan to track missiles headed toward the US or US forces in Asia and has posted a battalion of advanced PAC-3 air defense missiles to Okinawa in southern Japan.

In Asian nations, said a study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, policies toward missile defense range “from official antipathy to enthusiastic embrace.”

Japanese actions are being driven by a growing missile threat from North Korea. For Taiwan, missile defense offers the key to the island’s defense against China’s extensive missile systems. Japan has urged the US to speed deployment of missile defenses. Taiwan is close to desperate for assistance in this regard, because that island faces about 1,000 Chinese ballistic missiles deployed just across the Taiwan Strait.

In contrast, the study found, South Korea’s government “sees overt participation in missile defenses as antithetical to its national interests,” notably its hope of reconciliation with North Korea and good relations with China.

The United States is expanding its sea power in the Pacific. Plans call for the Navy, within the next few years, to station 60 percent of its nuclear-powered attack submarines to the Pacific, the better to counter China’s growing submarine threat and to meet other contingencies, such as the naval operations of a resurgent Russia.

Moving Parts
The Pacific Fleet in future years will deploy 34 attack submarines, up from 26 in 2007. These submarines, though based on the West Coast and in Hawaii, will have access to facilities in Japan, Guam, Singapore, Australia, and Diego Garcia. Three have already been forward deployed to Guam.

To the attack submarine fleet in the Pacific will be added two guided missile submarines, USS Ohio and USS Michigan. Both are former “boomers”—ballistic-missile-firing boats—that have been converted to carry conventional cruise missiles and sophisticated intelligence equipment.

These warships each can fire 154 cruise missiles, either singly or in salvo. They also can carry up to 66 special operations troops for many weeks to insert them into a hostile shore and retrieve them later. Each submarine will have two crews, Blue and Gold, which will permit them to mount 400-day patrols. The submarines, based in Bangor, Wash., will pull into Guam to change crews and undergo maintenance and resupply.

Land forces are undergoing a significant realignment. The Army expects to withdraw most of its troops from South Korea and to reduce, dismantle, or move the United Nations Command, 8th Army headquarters, Combined Forces Command, and headquarters of the 2nd Infantry Division.

The changes in US ground deployments will generate much attention, because the shifts being considered are politically sensitive. South Korea will see the largest change, for three reasons:

•South Korea can defend itself against North Korea.
•The US must have the flexibility to send troops where they are most needed.
•Many South Koreans have become anti-American.
By year end, the number of US troops posted in South Korea will drop to 25,000, down from the 37,000 that were deployed there not long ago. By 2017, the US could have little more than a small residual force on the peninsula.

As part of this realignment, ground forces remaining in Korea will be moved well south of Seoul to a new base that is to be built near Osan Air Base. Air Force officers say that the service will continue to maintain a force of fighters at that air base.

Combined Forces Command—the command element that is led by an American with a South Korean deputy and in which Americans and Koreans serve side by side—will disappear in 2012 when South Korea assumes control of its forces in both peace and war.

The proposals would also have the four-star general who commands US forces in Korea, currently Army Gen. Burwell B. Bell, moved to Ft. Shafter to command US Army Pacific. That would put the Army’s Pacific commander on a par with Air Force and Navy four-star commanding officers.

The Army also plans to assign two or three new Stryker brigades to Alaska and Hawaii. Almost half of the Marine Corps’ forces in Japan will move to Guam, but Marine Forces Pacific will still command two-thirds of the combat troops of the USMC.

Marine Forces Pacific will keep about the same number of troops in Okinawa, Hawaii, and California but 8,000 of the 18,000 marines in Okinawa will move to Guam in 2014 to 2015. Tokyo, which wants to reduce friction between US troops and local citizens in Okinawa, has agreed to pay between $20 billion and $30 billion for the move and associated costs. Another 9,000 Marine Corps dependents and civilian employees will also move.

A critical but so far unanswered question: Will the Air Force and Navy be able to provide airlift and sealift sufficient to move the ground forces as needed? New C-17 transports are being stationed in Hawaii and Alaska. The Navy today keeps about a dozen amphibious transport ships in the region, and plans to build more to meet the need.

Special Operators Needed
Still, some officials question whether the planned lift will be adequate, given the huge requirement.

The fifth Pacific growth area is in special operations forces. Air Force combat controllers and SOF pilots, Army Green Berets and Rangers, Navy SEALs, and similar units have been active in small, largely secret operations in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia and in fighting Islamic terrorists around the Sulu Sea.

Special operations forces have been targeting the remote islands running from the Philippines, where Muslim terrorists train, to Malaysia and Indonesia. Terrorists hop from one island to another, then fade into the population. PACOM officers contend that SOF troops are gradually breaking up the terrorist cells there.

Radical Muslim movements in Southeast Asia are homegrown but have become affiliated with the al Qaeda terrorists led by Osama bin Laden. In operations against them, said a senior officer, “we work through, by, and with local forces and citizens.”

SOF leaders expect someday to be training anti-insurgent forces in Thailand, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, all nations struggling with expanding terrorist threats. SOF units are also prepared to contribute to counterdrug and countersmuggling operations.

The special operators will be affected by the reduction of US ground forces in Asia. “The more the conventional force goes home,” said a SOF officer in Hawaii, “the more a SOF unit will be out front.” In South Korea, a handful of SOF troops are expected to stay behind after the regulars have left.

Finally, there is engagement, which sends a strategic message to allies and partners that US military forces will help defend them if needed. Engagement includes visits by the Pacific commander, military exchanges, combined training, port calls by warships, seminars to which officers from all over the Pacific are invited, disaster relief, and humanitarian operations.

PACOM is constructing a $20 million warfighting center at Pearl Harbor that will use simulations and wargames to train American officers and those of allies. The facility, scheduled to be completed in 2009, is “expected to bring thousands of visitors to Oahu from around the world to attend planning conferences and military exercises,” said a PACOM statement.

Engagement has spread to the intelligence world, where operatives are reticent about sharing anything. The United States and Malaysia in early September arranged a gathering in Kuala Lumpur of 19 national intelligence chiefs. China and Russia were invited but declined to attend.

The Malaysian chief of armed forces, Gen. Abdul Aziz Zainal, told the gathering that, given the prevalence of alienated individuals, militant organizations, and other nearly invisible enemies, “it becomes crucial for us to cooperate and share intelligence to counter them.”

Warships also undertake humanitarian missions critical to engagement. This summer, the amphibious assault ship USS Peleliu, which usually transports 1,900 combat marines, sailed on a four-month medical mission to the Philippines, Vietnam, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Marshall Islands.

No Dividing the Pacific
Engagement is also intended to deter potential adversaries. A former Pacific commander, Adm. Dennis C. Blair, once told Congress that military exchanges were intended to send China a message that, while Washington did not seek war, “don’t mess with us.”

On another occasion, a Chinese admiral was threatening military action against Taiwan that might involve the US. Blair listened for a minute, then said: “Look, you should understand that I own the water out there and I own the sky over that water. Don’t you think we should talk about something more constructive?”

During a May visit to China, Keating encountered a Chinese admiral who suggested that the US and China divide control of the Pacific Ocean between them, with China maintaining order in the western half while the US confined itself to the eastern half. A PACOM officer said Keating told his Chinese interlocutor: “We’re not going to give it up, and we want you to know that.”
The US military presence in the theater has been shrinking for nearly 40 years. Retrenchment was presaged by President Nixon in Guam in 1969. Nixon said nations in Asia should look to their own defenses. At that time, the US had in Asia 746,000 uniformed troops, of which 510,000 were in Vietnam. By the late 1970s, the number was down to about 105,000.

A turning point came in the early 1990s. The volcanic eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines in 1991 made Clark Air Base unusable. Soon after, Manila withdrew permission for the US to use Subic Bay naval base. Adm. Charles R. Larson, the Pacific commander then, proclaimed a policy of “places, not bases” and negotiated access to a naval base in Singapore.

In 1998, Singapore constructed a berth that can accommodate an aircraft carrier. The Navy found that the repairs performed there were better than those at Subic Bay. As added bonuses, the US did not pay rent and stationed only 150 people at the Singapore facility.

President George W. Bush’s first Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, began a process that would lead to greater US reliance on air and sea power in the region, simplified chains of command, and a reduction of forces.

By the end of 2006, US military personnel in Asia were down to 77,000.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has essentially continued the planned changes. The current overhaul of the US presence in the Pacific has been a long time coming, and the new direction is clearly needed.

In every joke there is a little bit of truth. In that particular case, the true part is the fact that the RN is scared of the MN, and that they would need the help of the US and of the Russians to beat us :diablo:

LOL Touche mon ami!

😀

Even then they are playing catch-up from a hell of a long way back and the deficiency is not in an area where simply the ability to build lots of ships or throw massive amounts of manpower will make any difference whatsoever.

Yeah, well, let’s not forget they’ve got the current administration working in their favor as well. I suspect they’ll do more to close the gap than the Chinese will.

Its Indian Express. Don’t take it seriously until you are told. 😉

Interesting doing a search… the only ones talking about this are a few forums and Indians. No legitimate press reporting this. Even the little girls in the Pentagon aren’t peeing in their pants about this and they would know if it were true since it supposedly came from one of their own. Maybe they’re not taking it seriously since Keating was shooting off his mouth about everything as he was leaving the door. They did have to release statements softening his charges.

Let me tell you a little story – David Hart-Dyke, CO of HMS Coventry in the Falklands, went on to serve as Naval Attache to the US in the years after the conflict. At one function he is quoted as declaring to some USN brass that he ‘hoped they, the US, could get their issue with the Soviets resolved properly so that everyone could get back to fighting the real enemy – the French!!!’.

The good Captain was not stating declared UK policy with regard to our closest continental neighbour or even suggesting a course of action he would like to see (at least I dont think so!). He was in fact telling a, modest, joke!.

In every joke there is a little bit of truth. In that particular case, the true part is the fact that the RN is scared of the MN, and that they would need the help of the US and of the Russians to beat us :diablo: