COMMANDING CARRIER AVIATION

Well I think we can agree on that.

I tend to agree with Nocuts. I think intentions and capability are two sides of the same coin, and influence each other. It is certainly very dangerous to have the intentions without the capability: look at what happened to the British Army in Basra.

Oh undoubtedly, it’s very difficult to rob a bank with a banana! But intention and will do trump capability. You can have the biggest baddest gun in the world but if everyone knows you won’t use it and you don’t appear to be willing to use it then that bank is going to stay unrobbed.

No, it’s not particularly realistic – but that’s because of will. It’s unlikely that a British government would have the will to do it, & political pressure from other countries is one of the reasons. But we had the capability to do it. Intentions trump capability.

You see? You’ve just demonstrated that you understand the principle, & can apply it.

Now we’ve got that out of the way, we might be able to find some common ground.

I tend to agree with Nocuts. I think intentions and capability are two sides of the same coin, and influence each other. It is certainly very dangerous to have the intentions without the capability: look at what happened to the British Army in Basra.

I can’t see that as a realistic scenario at all. The idea that we would have gone in for a two year naval blockade whilst trying to rebuild a naval air and amphibious capability is unrealistic. Can you imagine how that would have played at the UN?

No, it’s not particularly realistic – but that’s because of will. It’s unlikely that a British government would have the will to do it, & political pressure from other countries is one of the reasons. But we had the capability to do it. Intentions trump capability.

You see? You’ve just demonstrated that you understand the principle, & can apply it.

Now we’ve got that out of the way, we might be able to find some common ground.

BTW I think intentions trumps capabilities, but I rather live in a world where we had both as having intentions without capabilities gets lots of people killed as you end up in a simple battle of attrition and having capabilities without intentions results in everyone taking advantage of you as they know that you will only respond to a direct attack against your country. I expect in the next decade a situation will arise (likely one we cannot predict) which will test both.

Nods.

Of course large carriers are not infallible and all powerful. But if you have to deliver air power and have no land bases, they are all you have.

Agreed, no question. But thats not deterrent and it does come back to the original argument (way back in the mists of October) that losing the carriers is not the end of the Falklands as we do actually have a base!

As it was, Ark Royal could have launched aircraft even if 25 May could not. I believe 25 May was pretty slow by this stage, and needed a fair bit of wind over the deck. But that’s one area where the SHAR has the advantage over both types.

Yes in low wind conditions Ark would have been better off, but in high wind and big storms when Harriers were still up and the Argentinian land based stuff was still up, Ark would have been at a disadvantage. The Phantom/Gannet combo would have been infinitely better at stopping the SupEntendards and Exocet, but not if it was still on deck.

That said I would rather the RN had Ark Royal in 82 than not!

Been reading this thread with interest.

While I agree that the UK would unlikely to conduct a naval blockade for two years before retaking the islands, what the UN thought is rather irrelevant, the UN (rather than the UN security council) has passed a resolution on majority vote which states the UK and Argentina should negotiate the status of the islands (diplomatic speak for handing them over to Argentina) the UK simply refuses to pay any attention to this and the only way to make it binding is if the UN security council pass a resolution, which cannot do while the UK has a veto.

BTW I think intentions trumps capabilities, but I rather live in a world where we had both as having intentions without capabilities gets lots of people killed as you end up in a simple battle of attrition and having capabilities without intentions results in everyone taking advantage of you as they know that you will only respond to a direct attack against your country. I expect in the next decade a situation will arise (likely one we cannot predict) which will test both.

You see? It didn’t really matter if we couldn’t counter-attack immediately, as long as they believed that we would when we could. Even if we’d retired our carriers or amphibious ships, we could have (given the will) had SSNs prowling off their coast keeping their navy in port & necessitating the islands to be supplied by air for a year or two while we frantically refurbished reserve ships, modified merchant vessels, & bought ex-USN amphibious ships. That was not a result they thought worth fighting for, & nor was a bloody, hard-fought conquest thought acceptable.

I can’t see that as a realistic scenario at all. The idea that we would have gone in for a two year naval blockade whilst trying to rebuild a naval air and amphibious capability is unrealistic. Can you imagine how that would have played at the UN?

History is full of examples of bad decisions. If the ARA VdM had been equipped with SHARS and not Skyhawks then we would have seen the first carrier vs carrier battle on 1st May 1982. As it was the weather did not allow VdM to launch her skyhawks – which is a very relevant and salient point when talking about how useful Ark Royal would have been in 1982, there would have been many non-flying days, which would not have been the case for land based types. You can’t talk up large carriers as infallible and all powerful, they really aren’t.

Of course large carriers are not infallible and all powerful. But if you have to deliver air power and have no land bases, they are all you have.

As it was, Ark Royal could have launched aircraft even if 25 May could not. I believe 25 May was pretty slow by this stage, and needed a fair bit of wind over the deck. But that’s one area where the SHAR has the advantage over both types.

Didn’t see the message, hence no reply. Didn’t realise we were at war!

Oh its far more serious than that.:D

I don’t say the fleet carrier is the only deterrent, though it is a good one.

Agreed, as I have said many times I am a fan of carriers and the RN should own and operate them.

In the case of Argentine in 1977 and 1982, they would have to look at what Britain could do about an invasion of the Falklands. The only way air power could be brought to bear would be by aircraft carriers. We still had a fleet carrier in 1977, which would have been a major factor in their calculations.

But you are imbuing this single fleet carrier with an awful lot of potential that it might never have met. Yes the Argentineans would have considered it and how do you know they feared it? On paper Ark Royal was bringing 26 fighter bombers, half a dozen ASW helicopters and a flight of ancient AEW gannets. In 1982 the Argentineans had 4 times the number of aircraft and most of them were modern, useful aircraft. If like any half decent armed forces you have even a modicum of self belief then the basic maths of that comparison (we have 50 supersonic fighters they will have 12, we have 60 attack aircraft they have 14 etc) would imbue you with confidence because you would know that the UK was also doing the maths and perhaps they would decide it was futile too…i.e. the UK would be deterred by the force they have present in theatre It of course works both ways.

In 1982 we only had two light carriers with Sea Harriers, and we know the Argentines did not rate the SHAR, they evaluated it, and bought the Super Etendard instead. Clearly, not much in the way of deterrent.

History is full of examples of bad decisions. If the ARA VdM had been equipped with SHARS and not Skyhawks then we would have seen the first carrier vs carrier battle on 1st May 1982. As it was the weather did not allow VdM to launch her skyhawks – which is a very relevant and salient point when talking about how useful Ark Royal would have been in 1982, there would have been many non-flying days, which would not have been the case for land based types. You can’t talk up large carriers as infallible and all powerful, they really aren’t.

What Journeyman demonstrated was that Britain took the defence of the Falklands seriously. But you cannot say that Ark Royal did not have any effect on Argentine actions. That just makes no sense to me.

It doesn’t have to. It only needed to make sense to the Argentinean Junta and the British Government. It did in 1977, it didn’t in the British Governments case in 1981/1982 and the rest as they say is history.

If Ark Royal had still existed in 1982 and given the same political climate and decisions would Argentina have not bothered to invade?

I agree with your last paragraph in part. You have to show a willingness to fight to deter, but to suggest that intentions trump capabilities is surely wrong. Capabilities matter for deterrence to be effective.

You still don’t get it.

Of course you have to have the capabilities for deterrence to be effective. But intentions trump them, i.e. for the capabilities to deter, you have to be thought willing to use them. If you have the capability, but not the intention, what counts most? What has trumped the other? The answer is obvious.

The more willing you are to use what you have, the less you need to deter successfully. If you are thought likely to fight ferociously to defend something, then you can deter aggression as long as you have enough to cause an attacker more casualties than he is willing to accept. You don’t necessarily need to have enough strength to assure the ability to come back from an initial setback.

If, on the other hand, you show a lack of willingness to take positive action to defend a place, then an attacker can believe, with reason, that he can reverse the odds at little cost. He may think that with a coup de main, he can establish himself & deter you from a counter-attack, even though you have enough strength to assure victory, because you seem unwilling to bear the cost of that counter-attack.

The former is what happened in 1977. The latter is what happened in 1982. Perceptions of intentions trumped knowledge of capabilities. In both cases, the aggressor sought an easy victory, for domestic political reasons. We know this from their own records. The Argentineans weren’t seriously concerned in either case about our ability to retake the islands, but only about the ease of taking them. They knew that if we were completely determined to retake them, we had the money & industrial capacity to build or buy a fleet they couldn’t defeat, even if we didn’t have one at the time of the invasion. They based their actions on their perceptions of our willingness to accept casualties & costs. They took into account how heavy casualties defending the islands would inflame our opinion, & make an attempt to retake more likely, & so would only invade if convinced they could do so cheaply. They even gave orders (not fully followed) to try to minimise British casualties in the invasion. It follows that in order to deter an attack, we needed only to convince them that we would order the garrison to fight hard, & endeavour to reinforce it. Merely sending minor reinforcements could do that.

You see? It didn’t really matter if we couldn’t counter-attack immediately, as long as they believed that we would when we could. Even if we’d retired our carriers or amphibious ships, we could have (given the will) had SSNs prowling off their coast keeping their navy in port & necessitating the islands to be supplied by air for a year or two while we frantically refurbished reserve ships, modified merchant vessels, & bought ex-USN amphibious ships. That was not a result they thought worth fighting for, & nor was a bloody, hard-fought conquest thought acceptable.

All this is a matter of public record, but still, you refuse to take it into account, & instead speculate about what effects things may have had on thinking. Why? Why not just look up what actually happened? Why ignore the discussions which led up to the decisions to act? There are published memoirs from some of the main actors, official minutes, interviews – oh, loads of stuff.

Think for a moment about why Galtieri et all wanted the Falklands. It was to make themselves popular. Would a hard-won conquest, at immense subsequent cost, make them popular, when they were unpopular because they’d killed a lot of people & the economy was going down the tubes?

You haven’t thought it through.

Slight correction, in 1977 we had one fleet carrier and one Commando Carrier (Hermes), as Bulwark was paid off into reserve in 1976. At the time no one seriously expected her to recommission, the stated position was that she was being heald in fully maintained reserve as insurance against the late delivery of Invincible (as things transpired).

So the private message I sent you this morning offering a truce was to no avail? Time to wrap this up soon I think….

Your logic, as I have said before in a point you have never answered, leads to the unavoidable conclusion that a fleet carrier is the only true form of deterrent and therefore all other warships in ours and all other navies are pointless and provide little, which comes back to the original point over whether the RN still provides a useful deterrent or not, which given that carriers are just one type of ship in a whole plethora of available ships and boats and given the evidence of 1977 is patently not true.

Didn’t see the message, hence no reply. Didn’t realise we were at war!

I don’t say the fleet carrier is the only deterrent, though it is a good one. In the case of Argentine in 1977 and 1982, they would have to look at what Britain could do about an invasion of the Falklands. The only way air power could be brought to bear would be by aircraft carriers. We still had a fleet carrier in 1977, which would have been a major factor in their calculations. In 1982 we only had two light carriers with Sea Harriers, and we know the Argentines did not rate the SHAR, they evaluated it, and bought the Super Etendard instead. Clearly, not much in the way of deterrent.

His point is that as a matter of hard historical fact, Ark Royal did not have any effect on Argentinean actions when she was in the North Atlantic or Mediterranean.

We don’t need to speculate about the effect British possession of a CTOL carrier with Phantoms & Buccaneers might have had on Argentinean actions, because we know what actually happened in 1977. It did not deter them.

Intentions trump capabilities. What we had didn’t count, until we showed willingness to use it. Not theory, but demonstrated fact.

I agree with your last paragraph in part. You have to show a willingness to fight to deter, but to suggest that intentions trump capabilities is surely wrong. Capabilities matter for deterrence to be effective.

What Journeyman demonstrated was that Britain took the defence of the Falklands seriously. But you cannot say that Ark Royal did not have any effect on Argentine actions. That just makes no sense to me. If the Argentines were persuaded that Britain would fight, the next question they had to ask themselves was, what with? In 1977 Britain had a fleet carrier, plus two commando carriers, and a surface fleet of, what, sixty or so frigates and destroyers? Clearly, that was the deterrent, not two frigates and an SSN which may, or may not, have been in the area. Nineteen surface escorts and no fixed wing naval aviation does not provide the same sort of deterrent does it?

For the record, I appreciate what the historical term “fleet in being” means. My point was that you seem to be of the opinion that Ark Royal would have no bearing on Argentine planners unless or until she actually turned up in the South Atlantic.

YES! Why would she? If shes not there she can’t harm them. Yes they would consider the possibility, of course they would, I have always said that, but until she is on her way its just a possibility and can, for the time being be disregarded. If deterrence worked as you suggest there would be very few wars and Navies could hang around in home waters drinking a lot of gin.

I would argue that, although in the Med at the time, Ark Royal (and indeed Hermes, Bulwark, Intrepid, Fearless et al) was functioning as a “fleet in being”, not held in port in the classical use of the term, but equally not in the actual area of operations.

Sorry thats not what it means, they were not acting anything, they were doing the myriad of tasks and ops the RN was doing at the time. Yes as I have said a dozen times the whole RN contributes to the overall effect of deterrence, of course it does, but deterrence is not that simple as I have explained – if only it was, we could keep the wolves at bay by maintaining a very cheap “fleet in being”!

Nonetheless, a fleet in the Med could be in the South Atlantic in two weeks, and that is what the Argentines had to take into consideration: if they attacked the Falklands, they would not have to contend just with British forces in the South Atlantic, but also with the naval forces which Britain would be able to bring into the theatre of operations without undue delay.

Precisely! Two weeks. You can invade, secure and dig in during that time. It’s a window of opportunity, you know where Britain’s carrier is and whats she’s up to, you take a gamble knowing she cannot harm you for at least that time period.

The invisible SSN that may or may not be already there (and how can you know??) on the other hand….

You are assuming that the Junta would fear the aftermath of invasion and that is your deterrence, i.e. the fact that Ark might come and ‘evict’ them a few weeks latter would act as enough deterrent to prevent the initial invasion. It’s a seductive argument (one that the 5 Admirals put in their letter) but its based on our rational view point, it assumes our opponent thinks the same and fears such consequences, which of course being an unpopular, nothing to lose military dictatorship with a cavalier attitude towards its conscripts, a fetish for making people vanish and a not entirely blind faith in world and UN support, is not a good assumption.

So the private message I sent you this morning offering a truce was to no avail? Time to wrap this up soon I think….

Gibraltar is a long way from the South Atlantic,

Been trying to tell you that for two weeks. None the less a schoolboy could work out the possible permutations of time/distance even over 8,000 miles.

and there is no requirement for the carrier to use her radar is there?

Well there is if it wants to navigate safely at night, control aircraft safely in all weathers and protect itself from air attack…

That is what rader pickets and AEW are for.

And they all give off emissions that can be detected and you draw a circle around your detected AEW Gannet the size of its radius of action and bingo the carrier is in that bit of sea.

A downed MPA doesn’t tell you very much, you don’t know where it has been shot down, or even if it has been shot down, and anyway your target can move over thirty nautical miles in an hour.

A downed aircraft is a huge piece of intelligence. They are generally in regular radio contact, you would know where it was going, time it went down and bingo….and as for thirty knots, well thats not exactly a difficult piece of maths is it? “…lets see its been two hours, its moved a maxiumum of sixty miles, jeez our 300+MPH MPA will have trouble making up that distance….”

With Phantoms and Buccaneers, Ark Royal could have operated well out of the range of any Argentine aircraft, and still maintained air superiority over the Falklands, a capability which was in a different league from the plucky Sea Harriers in 1982. Nothing much for the Argentines to have to consider?

Still with the “not consider” ?- when have I ever said that? But heres the knub – it doesn’t matter, a Phantom or a Bucc could not fly deterrence patrols from over 8000 miles away and its deterrence we are talking about.

Operation Journeyman does seem to have convinced the Argentines that an invasion would be opposed. But that is only one part of deterring aggression.

Seem to have? seem to have? DID. Its not really a point of debate, its just fact.

The other part is, opposed by what? In 1977, he Argentines were successfully made aware that Britain would oppose an invasion, and had the assets to make it so.

There is no “other part” you have listed both. British Government demonstrated will and sent the assets required to back that will up.

In 1982, neither of these conditions were met.

No only one of them, which was political will, there were plenty of assets, they just didn’t use them.

Your logic, as I have said before in a point you have never answered, leads to the unavoidable conclusion that a fleet carrier is the only true form of deterrent and therefore all other warships in ours and all other navies are pointless and provide little, which comes back to the original point over whether the RN still provides a useful deterrent or not, which given that carriers are just one type of ship in a whole plethora of available ships and boats and given the evidence of 1977 is patently not true.

His point is that as a matter of hard historical fact, Ark Royal did not have any effect on Argentinean actions when she was in the North Atlantic or Mediterranean.

We don’t need to speculate about the effect British possession of a CTOL carrier with Phantoms & Buccaneers might have had on Argentinean actions, because we know what actually happened in 1977. It did not deter them.

Intentions trump capabilities. What we had didn’t count, until we showed willingness to use it. Not theory, but demonstrated fact.

Wind my neck in? About being correct with terminology? It isn’t ‘obvious’ what you meant, your use of an official doctrinal term was wrong, plain and simple – “Fleet in Being” has one meaning and it hasn’t changed for 320 years. Sorry if that makes me a smart ****, but i’m afraid it does make me right.

For the record, I appreciate what the historical term “fleet in being” means. My point was that you seem to be of the opinion that Ark Royal would have no bearing on Argentine planners unless or until she actually turned up in the South Atlantic. I would argue that, although in the Med at the time, Ark Royal (and indeed Hermes, Bulwark, Intrepid, Fearless et al) was functioning as a “fleet in being”, not held in port in the classical use of the term, but equally not in the actual area of operations. Nonetheless, a fleet in the Med could be in the South Atlantic in two weeks, and that is what the Argentines had to take into consideration: if they attacked the Falklands, they would not have to contend just with British forces in the South Atlantic, but also with the naval forces which Britain would be able to bring into the theatre of operations without undue delay.

Yes. A factor they would have considered in any reprisal but you argue her existence was enough to deter yet they were attempting to invade in 1977 so her mere existence was obviously not enough, she needed to be demonstrably deployed, but she wasn’t, Dreadnought was.

Can’t make sense of the fact that- a 53,950 ton warship (in Ark Royals case) that is electronically active, very detectable on radar and very visible when it passes through a choke point like Gibraltar, surrounded by escorts and oilers, and putting aircraft in the air that are also pretty easy to spot, is difficult to hide?

If in 1977 Ark had been ordered south she would have been spotted passing through Gibraltar. You draw a line to her destination on a map and you can calculate where she will roughly be on each day for any given speed.

You search and of course you might not find her easily, granted, the sea is still a big place, but then your Maritime Patrol Aircraft gets close enough and is intercepted by an RN fighter. Your navigator plots the maximum radius of that fighter on a map from your position and now you know the area of sea the carrier is in. Or Your MPA doesn’t return having been downed, well that tells you just as much.

Point being surface vessels, especially large ones are difficult to hide. SSNs on the other hand are the perverbial needle in the haystack. If one that is already at sea is ordered some where then your opponent has no reference point to start a possible plot, no good idea exactly which direction its coming from and from and how far away. Means they are great for bluffing, you can tell an opponent that there is one nearby and then invite them to prove you wrong. You can’t do that with a carrier battle group.

It’s not hard, really.

Gibraltar is a long way from the South Atlantic, and there is no requirement for the carrier to use her radar is there? That is what rader pickets and AEW are for. A downed MPA doesn’t tell you very much, you don’t know where it has been shot down, or even if it has been shot down, and anyway your target can move over thirty nautical miles in an hour. With Phantoms and Buccaneers, Ark Royal could have operated well out of the range of any Argentine aircraft, and still maintained air superiority over the Falklands, a capability which was in a different league from the plucky Sea Harriers in 1982. Nothing much for the Argentines to have to consider?

Operation Journeyman does seem to have convinced the Argentines that an invasion would be opposed. But that is only one part of deterring aggression. The other part is, opposed by what? In 1977, he Argentines were successfully made aware that Britain would oppose an invasion, and had the assets to make it so. In 1982, neither of these conditions were met.