conventional SUBMARINES vs ASW systems

some interesting articles about the subject…
http://www.global-defence.com/2000/pages/antisub.html
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/n87/usw/autumn98/anti.htm
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_491.shtml

If discovered does a SSK have much hope of escape? 🙁

I would assume that depends on what they are up against. A single frigate with no helicoptersupport or a fleet of ASW-ships with helicopters. In the first case there is a big chance of escaping but in the second scenario I suppose you can surround the sub and just bomb the whole area with depth-charges, the sub can´t hide in the depths. The tricky part is to find it. Another thing to remember is that a thing like a MAD-system does´nt work in shallow waters (at least not in the baltic sea) because the seabed rocks contains metall and confuses it.

Speaking of the swedish subwar the navy first had a very hard time finding the subs. One must remember that often (most of the times?) mini-subs were used wich are even more difficult to locate. When they eventually mastered that part the weapons was quite ineffective – the torpedoes where not optimized for shallow waters, the ELMA ASW-grenade had an idiotic aim (IIRC you basicly had to aim the whole ship to aim the grenade launcher) and depth-charges and mines are pretty rough weapons if you just want to damage the submarine. When all things were perfect (tactics, sensors, sonars and weapons) the subwar ended.

As a sidenote there were also another type of war on the islands surrounding the area where the sub-hunt took place. Swedish coastalrangers searching the islands for enemies, but there where never any firefights. Some of the evidence I remember they collected where scubagear hided and footprints in the sand leading out to the water.

If discovered does a SSK have much hope of escape? 🙁

I again refer you to Swedish submarine ops doctrine. The fact that they have invested quite substantially in SSKs over the years even though the operational area is the Baltic, shallow and very small by comparison to pretty much any other sea, and thus not ideally suited for submarines should make one wonder. But with shallow water, bottom features and wrecks sonar detection is difficult and visibility is similarly not good enough to allow visual detection from the air. Similar conditions exist in the Persion Gulf and explain why the introduction of a few Kilo class subs by Iran in the 1990s (and now efforts to build boats themselves) caused quite a stir in the area and resulted in proliferation of ASW equipment.

But there are some things that makes finding subs in the Baltic Sea much more difficult than in the Persian Gulf I would guess. In the Baltic Sea you have a unique mix of saltwater/freshwater (a narrow strait to the atlantic for saltwater to enter and thousands of rivers filling it with freshwater), this makes several of confusing layers of different waters and hard to detect a sub. The visuability is zero and no chance of detecting a sub from the air, compared to the persian gulf wich I would guess has pretty clear waters. In the archipelago regions (specially along the coastlines of Sweden and Finland) a sub have thousands of underwater mountains, ravines etc. to hide at.

I would guess that the swedish navy is (or at least was) the best littoral ASW-navy in the world. They fought an over 15 year old war against intruding subs in their archipelagos (roughly between 1980-1995). IIRC they launched over a hundred live depth-charges, dozens of mines and ASW-grenades and a couple of torpedoes. The subwar offcourse started much earlier than that but back then the Swedish navy were more focused on a bluewaternavy, technologyimprovements and other reasons made the intrusions really take on in the 80´s. At first the navys ASW-capabilities was at a terrible state but new ships (the coastalcorvettes), new sensors and new weapons (such as ASW-grenade ELMA with a shaped charge. After all, they just wanted to damage the sub and force it to surface or force it to leave our waters. It would not be such a good idea to destroy a sub and have dozens of dead russians sailors as a result) gave the navy the upper hand. They also produced a mini-sub to act as target. And just as the ASW-capabilities was at its highest USSR fell apart and the intrusions ended in the mid 90´s. But before that at least one damaged surfaced russian sub was photographed heading for home with a long trail of oil after it…

http://www.e.kth.se/~eskil/photos/utflykter/ubatsjubel/img_0779.jpg
(the mini-sub “Spiggen”)

I again refer you to Swedish submarine ops doctrine. The fact that they have invested quite substantially in SSKs over the years even though the operational area is the Baltic, shallow and very small by comparison to pretty much any other sea, and thus not ideally suited for submarines should make one wonder. But with shallow water, bottom features and wrecks sonar detection is difficult and visibility is similarly not good enough to allow visual detection from the air. Similar conditions exist in the Persion Gulf and explain why the introduction of a few Kilo class subs by Iran in the 1990s (and now efforts to build boats themselves) caused quite a stir in the area and resulted in proliferation of ASW equipment.

Question: With SSK’s operating in the Littorals. Wouldn’t that greatly narrow the search area? Which, would make it much easier for ASW Units to locate and destroy them………….. :rolleyes:

Scooter, I agree that in theory the smaller geographical area should make the SM easier to find, however Petros is right that there are many bottom features and oceanographic conditions that aid the SM and hinder everyone else. Exercises on the English South Coast have demonstrated regularly the difficulty in detecting SSKs in the littoral. Indeed, unless the SM is instructed to remain in the vicinity of a certain position there is frequently no interaction as no one can detect him.

Question: With SSK’s operating in the Littorals. Wouldn’t that greatly narrow the search area? Which, would make it much easier for ASW Units to locate and destroy them………….. :rolleyes:

Not necessary. How to locate a sub, when it is hinding among rocks and irregular bottom of the sea. Further more the main question, is who is going to find whome first.

SAM mines need to be developed which can be dropped by sub in likely LRMP patrol areas. when the IFF or ESM shows hostile a/c the mine will release a python5 or vl-micaIR type missile. the playing field needs to be levelled.

I believe the SSK still retains the advantage. The developments in their sensors and AIP mean they can remain at range to detect and classify contacts. Invariaby they will operate in littoral waters where background water noise is louder masking their signature and degrading surface ship/helo sonars, enabling them to get close without detection for torpedo launch. Anti-ship missile launch presents greater problems for the SM as he will have to rely on third party targeting to refine his FCS.

The one thing that can swing things in favour of the surface units is the presence of Maritime Patrol Aircraft. If fitted with quality surface search radar and good electro optic devices their presence will greatly deter the SM from returning to PD for periscope/EW/comms mast exposure as the risk of detection is much higher.

The SM’s greatest problem is once detected evasion is difficult, especially with helo dippers. The SSK is also less likely to be able to use thermal layers to escape.

Question: With SSK’s operating in the Littorals. Wouldn’t that greatly narrow the search area? Which, would make it much easier for ASW Units to locate and destroy them………….. :rolleyes:

Sorry for going off topic but does anyone know the advantages / disadvantages of single hulled vs double hulled subs?

I believe the SSK still retains the advantage. The developments in their sensors and AIP mean they can remain at range to detect and classify contacts. Invariaby they will operate in littoral waters where background water noise is louder masking their signature and degrading surface ship/helo sonars, enabling them to get close without detection for torpedo launch. Anti-ship missile launch presents greater problems for the SM as he will have to rely on third party targeting to refine his FCS.

The one thing that can swing things in favour of the surface units is the presence of Maritime Patrol Aircraft. If fitted with quality surface search radar and good electro optic devices their presence will greatly deter the SM from returning to PD for periscope/EW/comms mast exposure as the risk of detection is much higher.

The SM’s greatest problem is once detected evasion is difficult, especially with helo dippers. The SSK is also less likely to be able to use thermal layers to escape.

Whoever has the most assets has the advantage in my opinion.

If it’s a case of one SSK armed with torpedos, mines, anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles versus one ASW warship with 2x ASW helo’s it could go either way.