DCNS's new frigate design – what LCS should have been?

The New Rules of War
The visionary who first saw the age of “netwar” coming warns that the U.S. military is getting it wrong all over again. Here’s his plan to make conflict cheaper, smaller, and smarter.
BY JOHN ARQUILLA | MARCH/APRIL 2010

Rule 1: “Many and Small” Beats “Few and Large.”

The greatest problem traditional militaries face today is that they are organized to wage big wars and have difficulty orienting themselves to fight small ones. The demands of large-scale conflicts have led to reliance on a few big units rather than on a lot of little ones. For example, the Marines have only three active-duty divisions, the U.S. Army only ten. The Navy has just 11 carrier strike groups, and the Air Force about three dozen attack aircraft “wings.” Almost 1.5 million active service members have been poured into these and a few other supporting organizational structures.

It is no wonder that the U.S. military has exhausted itself in the repeated deployments since the 9/11 attacks. It has a chronic “scaling problem,” making it unable to pursue smaller tasks with smaller numbers. Add in the traditional, hierarchical military mindset, which holds that more is always better (the corollary belief being that one can only do worse with less), and you get massive approaches to little wars.

This was the case during the Vietnam War, too, when the prevailing military organizational structure of the 1960s — not much different from today’s — drove decision-makers to pursue a big-unit war against a large number of very small insurgent units. The final result: 500,000-plus troops deployed, countless billions spent, and a war lost. The iconic images were the insurgents’ AK-47 individual assault rifles, of which there were hundreds of thousands in use at any moment, juxtaposed against the U.S. Air Force’s B-52s, of which just a hundred or so massed together in fruitless attempts to bomb Hanoi into submission.

The same problem persists today, the updated icons being the insurgents’ thousands of improvised explosive devices and the Americans’ relative handful of drones. It is ironic that the U.S. war on terrorism commenced in the Afghan mountains with the same type of B-52 bombers and the same problematic results that attended the Vietnam War.

The U.S. military is not unaware of these problems. The Army has incrementally increased the number of brigades — which typically include between 3,000 and 4,000 trigger-pullers — from less than three dozen in 2001 to almost 50 today. And the Marines now routinely subdivide their forces into “expeditionary units” of several hundred troops each. But these changes hardly begin the needed shift from a military of the “few and large” to one of the “many and small.”

That’s because U.S. military leaders have not sufficiently grasped that even quite small units — like a platoon of 50 or so soldiers — can wield great power when connected to others, especially friendly indigenous forces, and when networking closely with even a handful of attack aircraft.

Yet the evidence is there. For example, beginning in late 2006 in Iraq, the U.S. command shifted little more than 5 percent of its 130,000 troops from about three dozen major (i.e., town-sized) operating bases to more than a hundred small outposts, each manned by about 50 soldiers. This was a dramatic shift from few-large to many-small, and it soon worked wonders in reducing violence, beginning well before the “surge” troops arrived. In part this happened because the physical network of platoon-sized outposts facilitated social networking with the large numbers of small tribal groups who chose to join the cause, forming the core of the “Awakening” movement.

The Pentagon’s reluctance to see the new possibilities — reflected in the shrilly repeated calls for more troops, first in Iraq, then in Afghanistan — stems in part from the usual generalized fear of change, but also from concern that a many-and-small force would have trouble against a traditional massed army. Say, like North Korea’s.

Then again, perhaps the best example of a many-and-small military that worked against foes of all sizes was the Roman legion. For many centuries, legionary maniples (Latin for “handfuls”) marched out — in their flexible checkerboard formations — and beat the massive, balky phalanxes of traditional foes, while dealing just as skillfully with loose bands of tribal fighters.

Rule 2: Finding Matters More Than Flanking.

Ever since Theban general Epaminondas overloaded his army’s left wing to strike at the Spartan right almost 2,400 years ago at Leuctra, hitting the enemy in the flank has been the most reliable maneuver in warfare. Flank attacks can be seen in Frederick the Great’s famous “oblique order” in his 18th-century battles, in Erwin Rommel’s repeated “right hooks” around the British in North Africa in 1941, and in Norman Schwarzkopf’s famous “left hook” around the Iraqis in 1991. Flanking has quite a pedigree.

Flanking also formed a basis for the march up Mesopotamia by U.S. forces in 2003. But something odd happened this time. In the words of military historian John Keegan, the large Iraqi army of more than 400,000 troops just “melted away.” There were no great battles of encirclement and only a handful of firefights along the way to Baghdad. Instead, Iraqis largely waited until their country was overrun and then mounted an insurgency based on tip-and-run attacks and bombings.

Thus did war cease to be driven by mass-on-mass confrontation, but rather by a hider-finder dynamic. In a world of networked war, armies will have to redesign how they fight, keeping in mind that the enemy of the future will have to be found before it can be fought. To some extent this occurred in the Vietnam War, but that was a conflict during which the enemy obligingly (and quite regularly) massed its forces in major offensives: held off in 1965, defeated in 1968 and 1972, and finally winning in 1975.

In Iraq, there weren’t mass assaults, but a new type of irregular warfare in which a series of small attacks no longer signaled buildup toward a major battle. This is the path being taken by the Taliban in Afghanistan and is clearly the concept of global operations used by al Qaeda.

At the same time, the U.S. military has shown it can adapt to such a fight. Indeed, when it finally improved its position in Iraq, the change was driven by a vastly enhanced ability to find the enemy. The physical network of small outposts was linked to and enlivened by a social network of tribal fighters willing to work with U.S. forces. These elements, taken together, shone a light on al Qaeda in Iraq, and in the glare of this illumination the militants were easy prey for the small percentage of coalition forces actually waging the campaign against them.

Think of this as a new role for the military. Traditionally, they’ve seen themselves largely as a “shooting organization”; in this era, they will also have to become a “sensory organization.”

This approach can surely work in Afghanistan as well as it has in Iraq — and in counterinsurgency campaigns elsewhere — so long as the key emphasis is placed on creating the system needed for “finding.” In some places, friendly tribal elements might be less important than technological means, most notably in cyberspace, al Qaeda’s “virtual safe haven.”

As war shifts from flanking to finding, the hope is that instead of exhausting one’s military in massive expeditions against elusive foes, success can be achieved with a small, networked corps of “finders.” So a conflict like the war on terror is not “led” by some great power; rather, many participate in it, with each adding a piece to the mosaic that forms an accurate picture of enemy strength and dispositions.

This second shift — to finding — has the potential to greatly empower those “many and small” units made necessary by Rule 1. All that is left is to think through the operational concept that will guide them.

Rule 3: Swarming Is the New Surging.

Terrorists, knowing they will never have an edge in numbers, have pioneered a way of war that allows them to make the most of their slender resources: swarming. This is a form of attack undertaken by small units coming from several directions or hitting many targets at the same time. Since 9/11, al Qaeda has mounted but a few major stand-alone strikes — in Bali, Madrid, and London — while the network has conducted multiple significant swarming campaigns in Turkey, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia featuring “wave attacks” aimed at overloading their targets’ response capabilities. Such attacks have persisted even in post-surge Iraq where, as Gen. David Petraeus noted in a recent speech, the enemy shows a “sophistication” among the militants “in carrying out simultaneous attacks” against major government targets.

Perhaps the clearest example of a terrorist swarm was the November 2008 attack on Mumbai, apparently mounted by the Lashkar-e-Taiba group. The assault force consisted of just 10 fighters who broke into five two-man teams and struck simultaneously at several different sites. It took more than three days to put them down — and cost the lives of more than 160 innocents — as the Indian security forces best suited to deal with this problem had to come from distant New Delhi and were configured to cope with a single threat rather than multiple simultaneous ones.

In another sign of the gathering swarm, the August 2008 Russian incursion into Georgia, rather than being a blast from the Cold War past, heralded the possibility that more traditional armies can master the art of omnidirectional attack. In this instance, Russian regular forces were augmented by ethnic militias fighting all over the area of operations — and there was swarming in cyberspace at the same time. Indeed, the distributed denial of service attack, long a staple of cyberwarriors, is a model form of swarming. And in this instance, Georgian command and control was seriously disrupted by the hackers.

Simultaneous attack from several directions might be at the very cutting edge in conflict, but its lineage is quite old. Traditional tribal warfare, whether by nomadic horse archers or bush fighters, always featured some elements of swarms. The zenith of this kind of fighting probably came with the 13th-century Mongols, who had a name for this doctrine: “Crow Swarm.” When the attack was not carried out at close quarters by charging horsemen, but was instead conducted via arrows raining down on massed targets, the khans called it “Falling Stars.” With such tactics, the Mongols carved out the largest empire the world has ever seen, and kept it for a few centuries.

But swarming was eclipsed by the rise of guns in the 15th century, which strongly favored massed volley fire. Industrial processes encouraged even more massing, and mechanization favored large flank maneuvers more than small swarms. Now again, in an age of global interdependence replete with advanced information technologies, even quite small teams of fighters can cause huge amounts of disruption. There is an old Mongol proverb: “With 40 men you can shake the world.” Look at what al Qaeda did with less than half that number on Sept. 11, 2001.

This point was made by the great British strategist B.H. Liddell Hart in his biography of T.E. Lawrence, a master of the swarm in his own right. Liddell Hart, writing in 1935, predicted that at some point “the old concentration of force is likely to be replaced by an intangibly ubiquitous distribution of force — pressing everywhere, yet assailable nowhere.”

Now, swarming is making a comeback, but at a time when few organized militaries are willing or able to recognize its return. For the implications of this development — most notably, that fighting units in very small numbers can do amazing things if used to swarm — are profoundly destabilizing. The most radical change is this: Standing armies can be sharply reduced in size, if properly reconfigured and trained to fight in this manner. Instead of continually “surging” large numbers of troops to trouble spots, the basic response of a swarm force would be to go swiftly, in small numbers, and strike the attackers at many points. In the future, it will take a swarm to defeat a swarm.

Almost 20 years ago, I began a debate about networks that blossomed into an unlikely friendship with Vice Adm. Art Cebrowski, the modern strategic thinker most likely to be as well remembered as Alfred Thayer Mahan, the great American apostle of sea power. He was the first in the Pentagon power structure to warm to my notions of developing fighting networks, embracing the idea of opening lots of lateral communications links between “sensors and shooters.” We disagreed, however, about the potential of networks. Cebrowski thought that “network-centric warfare” could be used to improve the performance of existing tools — including aircraft carriers — for some time to come. I thought that networking implied a wholly new kind of navy, one made up of small, swift vessels, many of them remotely operated. Cebrowski, who passed away in late 2005, clearly won this debate, as the U.S. Navy remains heavily invested in being a “few-large” force — if one that is increasingly networked. In an implicit nod to David Ronfeldt’s and my ideas, the Navy even has a Netwar Command now.

Swarming has also gained some adherents. The most notable has been Marine Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper, who famously used swarm tactics in the last great Pentagon war game, “Millennium Challenge 2002,” to sink several aircraft carriers at the outset of the imagined conflict. But rather than accept that something quite radical was going on, the referees were instructed to “refloat” the carriers, and the costly game — its price tag ran in the few hundred millions — continued. Van Riper walked out. Today, some in the U.S. military still pursue the idea of swarming, mostly in hopes of employing large numbers of small unmanned aerial vehicles in combat. But military habits of mind and institutional interests continue to reflect a greater audience for surges than swarms.

What if senior military leaders wake up and decide to take networks and swarming absolutely seriously? If they ever do, it is likely that the scourges of terrorism and aggression will become less a part of the world system. Such a military would be smaller but quicker to respond, less costly but more lethal. The world system would become far less prone to many of the kinds of violence that have plagued it. Networking and swarming are the organizational and doctrinal keys, respectively, to the strategic puzzle that has been waiting to be solved in our time.

A networked U.S. military that knows how to swarm would have much smaller active manpower — easily two-thirds less than the more than 2 million serving today — but would be organized in hundreds more little units of mixed forces. The model for military intervention would be the 200 Special Forces “horse soldiers” who beat the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan late in 2001. Such teams would deploy quickly and lethally, with ample reserves for relieving “first waves” and dealing with other crises. At sea, instead of concentrating firepower in a handful of large, increasingly vulnerable supercarriers, the U.S. Navy would distribute its capabilities across many hundreds of small craft armed with very smart weapons. Given their stealth and multiple uses, submarines would stay while carriers would go. And in the air, the “wings” would reduce in size but increase in overall number, with mere handfuls of aircraft in each. Needless to say, networking means that these small pieces would still be able to join together to swarm enemies, large or small.

Is such a shift feasible? Absolutely. Big reductions in the U.S. military are nothing new. The massive demobilization after World War II aside, active forces were reduced 40 percent in the few years after the Vietnam War and by another third right after the end of the Cold War. But the key is not so much in cutting as it is in redesigning and rethinking.

But what happens if the status quo prevails and the potential of this new round of changes in strategic affairs is ignored or misinterpreted? Failure awaits, at ruinous cost.

The most likely form catastrophe could take is that terrorist networks would stay on their feet long enough to acquire nuclear weapons. Even a handful of warheads in Osama bin Laden’s hands would give him great coercive power, as a network cannot be targeted for retaliation the same way a country can. Deterrence will lie in tatters. If there is ever to be a nuclear Napoleon, he will come from a terrorist network.

Within the U.S. military, the danger is that senior commanders will fall back on a fatalism driven by their belief that both congressional and industrial leaders will thwart any effort at radical change. I have heard this objection countless times since the early 1990s, repeated mantra-like, all the way up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus the mighty U.S. war machine is like a Gulliver trussed up by Lilliputian politicians and businessmen.

The irony, however, is that the U.S. military has never been in a better position to gain acceptance for truly transformational change. Neither party in Congress can afford to be portrayed as standing in the way of strategic progress, and so, whatever the Pentagon asks for, it gets. As for defense contractors, far from driving the agenda, they are much too willing to give their military customers exactly what they demand (rather than, perhaps, something better). If the U.S. armed forces call for smaller, smarter weapons and systems to support swarming, they will get them.

Beyond the United States, other countries’ security forces are beginning to think along the lines of “many and small,” are crafting better ways to “find,” and are learning to swarm. Chinese naval thought today is clearly moving in this direction. Russian ground forces are, too. Needless to say, terrorist networks are still in the lead, and not just al Qaeda. Hezbollah gave quite a demonstration of all three of the new rules of war in its summer 2006 conflict with Israel, a virtual laboratory test of nation versus network — in which the network more than held its own.

For the U.S. military, failing a great leap forward in self-awareness of the need for radical change, a downward budgetary nudge is probably the best approach — despite President Barack Obama’s unwillingness to extend his fiscal austerity program to security-related expenditures. This could take the form of a freeze on defense spending levels, to be followed by several years of, say, 10 percent annual reductions. To focus the redesign effort, a moratorium would be declared on all legacy-like systems (think aircraft carriers, other big ships, advanced fighters, tanks, etc.) while they are subjected to searching review. It should not be assumed that the huge sums invested in national defense have been wisely spent.

To most Americans who think that being strong on defense means devoting more resources and building bigger systems, this suggestion to cut spending will sound outrageous. But being smarter about defense might lower costs even as effectiveness improves. This pattern has held throughout the transformations of the last few decades, whether in farming or in industry. Why should the military be exempt?

Interesting article that fits in the debate we seem to be having about the LCS http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/the_new_rules_of_war?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full.

Although the author seems to deride the aluminium hulled LCS at the start of the report he is encouraging smaller Naval vessels to cover more ground be linked up by network and attack in swarms. Which is perfect behaviour for this ship. Just because it is called a literal combat ship does not mean it can not be used for other roles.

Combined the speed and range of the LCS with the news below and one could imaging some very interesting scenarios being played out and used to gain overal control of the oceans by the US navy in a new manner.

It is not a bad time for the USN to realise that they will not always carry on being the big spenders and afford to have expensive ships that are expensive to man and expensive to replace.

A fleet of 4 or five of these boats, 2 with missiles 1 with anti sub torpedo and another with a long range radar system could make things interesting for a traditionally armed and shipped adversary.

I hope they do not cancel the LCS it would be a grave error .

U.S. 7th Fleet Controls Tomahawk Launch from 5,000 Miles Away

(Source: US Navy; issued May 14, 2010)

USS CHEYENNE, At Sea — Los Angeles-class attack submarine USS Cheyenne (SSN-773) in conjunction with Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet and members of Naval Special Warfare Group (NSWG) 3 successfully fired a Block IV-E Tomahawk Land Attack Missile May 5.

The missile launch took place off the southern coast of California into China Lake Test Range and marks the first time a forward-deployed operational command acted as the Tomahawk strike coordinator and primary missile controller for an operational test launch.

“The Navy’s ability to conduct strike operations on re-locatable targets is currently very challenging,” said Master Chief Fire Controlman (SW) David Brewer, U.S. 7th Fleet Tomahawk strike coordinator. “By proving an operational commander’s ability to use the Tactical Tomahawk Command and Control System’s ability to receive real-time targeting coordinates and applying them to a tactical Tomahawk missile in flight will significantly improve the Navy’s ability to shape the battlefield and project power from the sea, particularly when naval surface strike is the only fires option available to the commander.”

“I am proud of the work we have accomplished during this exercise,” he said. “With this being the staff’s first time providing real time operations in flight, the job by the entire team was exceptional. The training value gained from a live firing event has no substitute, and will absolutely improve C7F’s ability to conduct actual launch operations when required.

NSWG-3 provided updated target data used by 7th Fleet to modify the missile’s flight path, resulting in a destroyed target. The test launch demonstrated a complex strike capability and was a tremendous success for all involved.

“Teamwork is critical in naval fires,” Brewer said. “This test launch is the ultimate use of different operational assets we provided during this exercise to achieve common goal.”

This test continues the Navy’s formal government testing of the Tactical Tomahawk Weapons Systems from surface/sub-surface launch platforms.

The Tomahawk missile is ship- and submarine-launched and was first employed operationally during Desert Storm. Since then, the missile has been heralded for its accuracy and lethality in numerous operations. The tactical Tomahawk boasts several enhancements as demonstrated today, which increase warfighter effectiveness and responsiveness, while significantly reducing acquisition and life cycle costs.

-ends-

Sorry what do you mean by OHP? ….

Oliver Hazard Perry – the name ship of the USNs Perry class frigates.

No, it wasn’t.

Yes it was.

You are talking about “Streetfighter”, which was viewed much like a modern motor torpedo boat *. It was intended for “presence” missions, like maritime interdiction and sanctions enforcement missions (enforcing shipping embargoes, anti-smuggling, etc). And yes, it was supposed to be transported to its area of operations, and yes, it had been sometimes referred to as “littoral combat ship”… just like a 9,000 ton Prince William class CVE and a 45,000 ton Midway class CVB were both called “aircraft carriers” during WW2.

There are similarities, to be sure, but the current LCS is a very different design, one intended to perform a number of roles Streetfighter was never planned for, like mine-sweeping/clearance and ASW.

The LCS we ‘know’ today originated from the “Streetfighter” concept.

Designed to operate in the most dangerous arena in naval warfare yet in an armament contest come up second best to a wet teabag…

Too much emphasis on speed, as such LCS has been subject to severe over-engineering; 36~38kts would have presented a much more reasonable target for a 3,000ton vessel

Designed to operate spitting distance from the shore but lack even a basic as commodity as a real medium calibre weapon (argue all you like that NGS isn’t a goal, that’s as maybe but the more missions you remove from the list the less justifiable LCS as a programme becomes)

Not an OHP replacement but because there is NO OHP replacement it’s now unnecessarily large and unwieldy and instead of it’s original guise it’s now akin to a modern take of a Type 81 frigate with rocket boosters and a nice big space at the back for helicopters :rolleyes:

Sorry what do you mean by OHP? Am i mistaking the idea of the ships? Arent the mission modules mean that you do not need to have fixed weaponry on the ship?

Surely people cant claim to know what is contained in all the modules or be able to predict what will happen to the ship in the future. Remember at this stage it is still development. A lot could change. Would not be surprised to see Tomahawks or AGM 84’s

just got this from Wikipedia and I can not see anything alarming in the idea of what it is supposed to be.

The design for Independence (LCS 2) is based on a high-speed trimaran (Benchijigua Express) hull built by Austal (Henderson, Australia). The 418-foot (127-meter) surface combatant design calls for a crew of 40 sailors, while the trimaran hull should enable the ship to reach sustainable speeds of nearly 50 knots (60 mph; 90 km/h) and range as far as 10,000 nautical miles (19,000 km).[citation needed]

With 11,000 cubic meters of payload volume, the ship is designed with enough payload and volume to carry out one mission while a separate mission module is in reserve. The large flight deck, 1,030 m2 (11,100 sq ft), will support operation of two SH-60 Seahawk helicopters, multiple UAVs, or one large CH-53 Sea Stallion-class helicopter (which is larger than a V-22 transport). The stable trimaran hull will allow flight operations up to sea state 5.[9]

Fixed core capabilities will be carried for self-defense and command and control. However unlike traditional fighting ships with fixed armament such as guns and missiles, innovative and tailored mission modules will be configured for one mission package at a time. Modules may consist of manned aircraft, unmanned vehicles, off-board sensors, or mission-manning detachments – all in an expandable open systems architecture.

The large interior volume and payload is greater than larger destroyers and is sufficient to serve as a high-speed transport and maneuver platform. The mission bay is 15,200 square feet (1,410 m2), and takes up most of the deck below the hangar and flight deck.[10]

In addition to cargo or container-sized mission modules, the bay can carry four lanes of multiple Strykers, armored Humvees, and their associated troops. An elevator allows air transport of packages the size of a twenty-foot long shipping container that can be moved into the mission bay while at sea. A side access ramp allows for vehicle roll-on/roll-off loading to a dock and allows the ship to even transport the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.[11]

The habitability area is under the bridge with bunks for many personnel. The helm is controlled by joysticks instead of traditional steering wheels.[12]

The Independence also has an integrated LOS Mast, Sea Giraffe 3D Radar and SeaStar Safire FLIR. Side and forward surfaces are angled for reduced radar profile. In addition, H-60 series helicopters provide airlift, rescue, anti-submarine, radar picket and anti-ship capabilities with torpedoes and missiles.

The Raytheon Evolved SeaRAM missile defense system is installed on the hangar roof. The SeaRAM combines the sensors of the Phalanx 1B close-in weapon system with an 11-missile launcher for the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), creating an autonomous system.[13]

To reduce the risk of fire on the all aluminum ship, many parts are protected from fire, and smoking is not permitted on board.[14]

Northrop Grumman has demonstrated sensor fusion of on and off-board systems in the Integrated Combat Management System (ICMS) used on Independence.[15]

Independence has a Interior Communications Center that can be curtained off from the rest of bridge instead of the heavily protected Combat Information Center found on Navy warships.[16]

Austal contends that the Independence will use a third less fuel than Freedom, but the Congressional Budget Office found that fuel would account for 18 percent or less of the total lifetime cost of Freedom while it was unable to judge the fuel usage of Independence and it any case the higher purchase price of Independence would dominate its lifetime costs.[17]

I do not understand why the LCS is supposed to be such a bad design?

Surely the power to weight ratio is a bonus.

What are the main concerns?

Designed to operate in the most dangerous arena in naval warfare yet in an armament contest come up second best to a wet teabag…

Too much emphasis on speed, as such LCS has been subject to severe over-engineering; 36~38kts would have presented a much more reasonable target for a 3,000ton vessel

Designed to operate spitting distance from the shore but lack even a basic as commodity as a real medium calibre weapon (argue all you like that NGS isn’t a goal, that’s as maybe but the more missions you remove from the list the less justifiable LCS as a programme becomes)

Not an OHP replacement but because there is NO OHP replacement it’s now unnecessarily large and unwieldy and instead of it’s original guise it’s now akin to a modern take of a Type 81 frigate with rocket boosters and a nice big space at the back for helicopters :rolleyes:

I do not understand why the LCS is supposed to be such a bad design?

Surely the power to weight ratio is a bonus.

What are the main concerns?

Also I can appreciate the cost of the first two ships being high but this is always the case with development. Once they know what they want the rest of the 50+ ships will be a lot cheaper.

Which means the USN can carry on having a large number of boats.

I appreciate these are a lot bigger but they remind me of the WW2 era PT boats but with a lot more punch and capability. I am sure the IN would have loved to have these in the 1970’s.

Surely fast moving 1 or 2 boats with long range and a lot of missiles could cause mayhem not only for shore based enemy combatants but also enemy groups.

Actually, the original concept for the LCS was ‘just’ 500-600 tons. But…the demand for LCS to self deploy & to operate at least one SH-60 (among other things) caused the size to grow considerably.

No, it wasn’t.

You are talking about “Streetfighter”, which was viewed much like a modern motor torpedo boat *. It was intended for “presence” missions, like maritime interdiction and sanctions enforcement missions (enforcing shipping embargoes, anti-smuggling, etc). And yes, it was supposed to be transported to its area of operations, and yes, it had been sometimes referred to as “littoral combat ship”… just like a 9,000 ton Prince William class CVE and a 45,000 ton Midway class CVB were both called “aircraft carriers” during WW2.

There are similarities, to be sure, but the current LCS is a very different design, one intended to perform a number of roles Streetfighter was never planned for, like mine-sweeping/clearance and ASW.

* Fairmile D MTB (common RN MTB of WW2) – 102 tons
“U/V” class DD (common RN destroyer of WW2) – 2,058 tons

Streetfighter – ~550 tons
Flight IIA Burke-class destroyer – 9,200 tons

ratios:
MTB : Streetfighter = 1:5.4
“U/V” : Burke = 1:4.5

comparable class growth rate

At least the French got the size right with roughly 4.000 ts. Only thing I really like about both LCS is the huge aviation complex.

Yes, 4,000t is the sweetspot IMHO. The volume available is sufficient to perform both the escort and mothership roles:

– Bow: 76mm or 127mm gun + 32 VLS
– Midship: 2 RIBs + 2 containers + 8 SSMs or more VLS
– Hangar: 2 helos or 1 helo + 3 UAVs
– Stern: Mix of 4 RIBs/containers or towed sonar + torpedoes

Also I wonder if their propulsion mix would enable them to keep up with a fast(er) task group w/o using thirsty turbines, like the LCS has to.

I think 20kts on diesel is sufficient, since frigates will be on the carrier’s outside perimeter, so they don’t have to maintain perfect position even when the carrier speeds up to 30kts for launching.

Speed on diesels only
LCS 1: 18kts?
LCS 2: 28kts
FM400: 23kts

LCS Mission Modules might work some day if there are enough extra modules bought and enough extra specialised crews trained. Not confident that either will happen. Btw, Netfires is dead, right?

At least the French got the size right with roughly 4.000 ts. Only thing I really like about both LCS is the huge aviation complex. Also I wonder if their propulsion mix would enable them to keep up with a fast(er) task group w/o using thirsty turbines, like the LCS has to. (Then again, maybe the French would build for different doctrines).

And funny they still have the extra launchers for Exocets, or whatever is supposed to be in there. Block III is VL capable, provided they put a couple of long Sylver cells in.

The whole idea of moving to pilotless platforms in the air is to decrease their size and increase their basing options. You shouldn’t need SH-60 on the LCS. Did the helicopter lobby influence that decision?

Flight 0 requires a port – future plans call for Flight 1 to be swapped at sea bases.

LCS is designed to swap out mission modules on the go- meaning that a Sea Lift ship could swap out a module or two while at sea- something no other vessel can do- not even a StanFlex!

Mission modules are designed to be like peripherals on a computer- plug an play instantly, Stanflex does require some rewiring in places due to modules having various power ports in differing spots- hence the extra time in port.

Don’t think it was “designed to be swapped out at sea” Ja.

NAVSEA says: “The Mission Module components, packaged in ISO Containers, arrive at a friendly, yet undeveloped, port. The components are unpacked, assembled, checked out, and readied for installation, anticipating the LCS arrival into port. When the ship arrives, the mission package will be installed and chechked out in 1 day (objective) or no greater than 4 days (threshold).”

Transfering ISO containers at sea or swapping out 30mm guns and (with some luck) NLOS-LS VLS was not built into the design from what I can see.

You have to go by dimensions, not displacement in at least the case of LCS-2. An alluminium hulled warship of the same dimensions as a steel hulled warship will weight considerably less.

And yes, LCS is of similar size to most previous generation frigates (before navies started calling 5,000-6,000t ships frigates).

Again, others already showed the dimension comparison of both LCS designs to Corvettes & Frigates. I did tonnage to remain consistant with the original concept of LCS being a 500-600 ton ships & to demonstrate that the LCS are ‘Frigates class ships’ not only by dimensions but by tonnage as well.

Actually, the original concept for the LCS was ‘just’ 500-600 tons. But…the demand for LCS to self deploy & to operate at least one SH-60 (among other things) caused the size to grow considerably.

Others have already pointed out that the >2500 tons LCS are in fact the size of many Frigates. Most Corvettes are <2,000 tons.

You have to go by dimensions, not displacement in at least the case of LCS-2. An alluminium hulled warship of the same dimensions as a steel hulled warship will weight considerably less.

And yes, LCS is of similar size to most previous generation frigates (before navies started calling 5,000-6,000t ships frigates).

This is a joke right? LCS was never intended as a replacement for the Cyclone class nor any other class of vessel, where did that idea come from? It’s armed like a patrol boat because it’s main threat will be coastal speed boats such as those operated by the Iranians. As for the size, last time I was aboard an FFG (HMAS Sydney to be exact) it was more than 138 meters long (Freedom is 115 Meters long and Independance is 127 Meters long). The power is needed for the fast get aways involved with Special Forces especially when facing the previously mentioned High Speed power boats of Iran. Bad Joke- the only bad joke is people pretending to rubbish what they don’t understand!

Actually, the original concept for the LCS was ‘just’ 500-600 tons. But…the demand for LCS to self deploy & to operate at least one SH-60 (among other things) caused the size to grow considerably.

Others have already pointed out that the >2500 tons LCS are in fact the size of many Frigates. Most Corvettes are <2,000 tons.

OMG Swerve, not you too :(- you of all people should know that I know what i am talking about! StanFlex- ok show me where the Dane’s have done it in this short time! I have spoken to some RDN personnel and they have served on StanFlex 300 vessels and have told me that what is stated and what is actual are two very different things! Thus my comment on days!

Also add to your point the quote about Commercial ports and Cranes- how many commercial ports do you know are free to allow ANY naval vessel in to do a module swap- because I know of none! Why do you think all navies in the world have their own bases (sometimes attached to the ends of commercial ports, but most of the times away from commercial ports!

LCS is designed to swap out mission modules on the go- meaning that a Sea Lift ship could swap out a module or two while at sea- something no other vessel can do- not even a StanFlex!

Mission modules are designed to be like peripherals on a computer- plug an play instantly, Stanflex does require some rewiring in places due to modules having various power ports in differing spots- hence the extra time in port.

Add me to the list of LCS sceptics. The countries who have experience with the rapid switch mission module concept are not really using it but I can still see some merit with it. Give it a go by all means, but the expectation that during a conflict an LCS could race to a nearby staging post, drop old module, insert new module, and be back in the fight within 24 hours (+transit) I something that I fear may never be realised. Too many logistics, too many personnel challenges. In a week? I can see that.

But all that could equally be achieved with a steel-hulled 3-4,000 ton hull that is more conventional and “only” does 30 kts. Given how career limiting groundings tend to be these days will there be an appetite among LCS drivers zooming about truly shallow (and possibly uncharted and unknown) waters at 40+ kts? For that you want something that is lower draft still (and some local knowledge). LCS could have been a system of systems, providing mission packages and the variety of host platforms that are best suited for blue water (a FFG(X) of sorts), littoral (something SES maybe, think T-Craft with guns), and even riverine warfare. Maybe throw in an OPV of sorts for persistent low threat scenarios and all that Partnership Stations activity in place of JHSV. And the supply chain tender/mothership.

BTW, what would a DCNS go for cost wise? $1billion USD?

Well under that, and less than LCS. Remember, LCS is frigate sized, has a cruiser propulsion and all the expensive bells and whistles to try to keep it within its weight margins. Overall a fairly expensive proposition compared to a normal frigate.

I think FM400 would probably cost about $350MM with a large (10 hull+) production run. DCNS originally guaranteed a unit price of €280MM (excluding one-time design costs) for the 6,000t FREMM land attack variants. FM400 should be slightly cheaper due to the smaller hull & propulsion fit. Not much savings in the electronics & weapons fit though, since FREMM AVT already had the bare minimum for a frigate.

As another data point, the 2,000t German Meko A-100s cost ~$300MM for small production runs in Israel. Their equipment fit and propulsion is not that different from a larger frigate, but smaller hull of course.

The problem ultimately isn’t the hull’s cost. It’s the US shipyard + systems integrator premium. Somehow they always seem to add billions to any program. IMHO, the USN should keep the LCS combat system and mission modules (the development dollars have already been spent), and just plop them into a modified frigate design licensed from TKMS or DCNS.

I have checked the size difference and from where I sit and given my experience, These vessels are more akin to Corvettes than Frigates..

Frigates –
ANZAC class – 118 x 14.8 x 4.4 metres
Formidable – 114.8 x 16.3 x 6.0
Type 23 – 133 x 16.1 x 5.5
Lafayette – 125 x 15.4 x 4.1
Valour – 121 x 16.3 x 5.9

LCS –
Freedom – 115.3 x 17.5 x 3.9
Independence – 127.4 x 31.6 x 4.0

Corvettes –
Braunschweig – 89.1 x 13.3 x 3.4
Heybeliada – 99 x 14.4 x 3.75
Espora – 91.2 x 11.1 x 4.5
Kasturi – 97.2 x 11.3 x 3.5
Baynunah – 71.3 x 11 x 2.8
Sa’ar 5 – 85.6 x 11.9 x 3.2

LCS is corvette-sized the way an 18000 ton full load Hyuuga-class is destroyer-sized.

With this comment it is clear that you do not understand the principle behind a Mission Module when compared to a Modular building type- Mission modules are designed to slip in and out in a matter of hours, Modular construction requires days for change over and that is provided you have the right module available and the technicians to install it- then you need the staff to operate that module

He referred to Stanflex, i.e. standard flexible modules, which are containerised weapons modules with standard ship connections which can be (& this is an actual, real, practiced capability, not theoretical) swapped in a couple of hours, at any wharf where the ship can come alongside & where there is a large enough crane – i.e. any commercial port. You have proved by your arguments that you do not know what Stanflex is. By accusing Badger of not understanding the principle you lay yourself open to ridicule.

The bolded part of your statement above also applies to mission modules.

I’d say that’s a pretty fair overall rebut, H.K.

I tend to agree that LCS is more of a doctrinal flaw (e.g. flawed acquisition policy/strategy from inception) – steering the requirement for 55 hulls et al. It just smells fishy to me and has more of a derived ‘ship building industrial complex smell’, over anything. (i.e., Marketed as a ‘cheap’ multi-purpose surface/littoral combatant to be simply banged out in high numbers… although in reality we find: not so cheap afterall and a ship w/ shrinking capabilities and fewer suitable missions)??

Other than that, I think it’s a well-intentioned concept and very cool/modern looking for an American concept. IMHO, the speed could probably best be exploited for evading rare torpedoes fired first by some pesky littoral lurking sub (or mine), even more than escaping fast boats – swarming from all directions not just one, yikes.. But still, I don’t think the concept is justified – at least at this point – with the mission in mind.

Hence, put me in the camp of supporting reallocated (limited and imminently shrinking) USN ship procurement funds – for a better multi-mission ship with better light/supplemental ‘escort’ ability but with ASW/AMW mission module capability and spec ops module too.

So realistically, perhaps procure 8-10 LCS, cut losses and call it a day – with 3-4 dedicated for US SOCOM and 3-4 dedicated for primarily ASW/AMW. (and/or Perhaps a couple RAM-less ships transferred to USCG for Caribbean anti-drug and natural disaster rapid response as well)?

Back to thread… so would a DCNS frigate (or alternative corvette/Frig) be something to which USN reallocate this longer-term LCS budget? Or perhaps even mixing a few M88 type ships to the list for good measure? I wouldn’t be able to speculate on any exact ship’s validity, but the basic principle sounds to be on track. BTW, what would a DCNS go for cost wise? $1billion USD?