Defense against Anti Radiation Missiles

Sens,

You gave the primary mission of AD. It has to defend Serbia from air attacks.

The fact is that you insist on remaining as unrealistic as when this thread started to become a thread about Allied Force. Of course Serbia’s air defence network could not “defend” agains air attacks by such a ridiculously overmatched foe. It was never designed to do this – it would be stupid to think otherwise – I don’t care what sort of logic you think you’re using. Once we accept this fact we are able to move to the idea of a new primary mission for the AD netword – personally I think UAZ has it down.

Some indication of the destruction that NATO ARMs inflicted on Serbian air-defence assets was given in something I posted earlier in this thread:

“ARMs fired against the 1S91M1 (‘Straight Flush’) radar-surveillance and missile-guidance vehicles of the 2K12M1 Kub-M1 (SA-6 ‘Gainful’) surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, seem to have hit the antennas, but done much less damage to the vehicle itself. Engineers from the Digitalni Radio company and Moma Stanojlovic aircraft repair factory in Serbia have developed replacement antennas that will allow the vehicles to be returned to service.”

Had only a small number of ‘Straight Flush’ vehicles been knocked out by antenna loss, the most economical solution for the Serbs would have been to order replacement antennas from Russia. But the number needed made it worthwhile to develop a local product and place it in production.

This wasn’t a simple task of reverse engineering, by the way. The Serbs developed a replacement antenna made from composites.

If a mobile asset such as ‘Straight Flush’ took damage to the degree that local production of replacement parts became economical, it seems likely that fixed-site and transportable radars were knocked out on an even greater scale.

Jane’s published a lengthy report on the anti-radar campaign. It cited how a 22nd FS spokesman used a May 2000, open-forum conference to outline a range of observations on the campaign.

* the use of AGM-88 was successful in both the pre-emptive and reactive roles

* SAM activity had increased during the course of the campaign, with a mixture of electro-optical targeting, ballistic launches, launch site movement and late radar illumination being used to make life difficult for the SEAD aircraft

* the number of pre-emptive HARM shots being higher than anticipated (USAF doctrine specifies approximately 25 per cent of HARM shots during a campaign should be pre-emptive) due to an inaccurate electronic order-of-battle, ‘minimal’ bomb damage assessment for AGM-88 strikes and a greater than expected support effort for the F-117

* the lack of a dedicated air superiority plan gave the enemy’s SAM systems the initiative

* the SEAD effort was hampered by DEAD tactics being off-limits for the duration of the campaign

Analysis by Jane’s concluded that in future, SEAD will have to become the DEAD in order to overcome:

* the increasing mobility of modern SAM systems

* the level of operator combat experience that has accrued outside the NATO countries

* an increasing inability to determine whether or not a targeted SAM emitter has been damaged, destroyed, switched off and/or simply moved

* the range and velocity of the latest generation of Russian Federation `double digit’ SAM systems

* a vast increase in the use of passive electro-optic/infra-red sensors for SAM targeting together with increasing moves towards the networking of early warning, target tracking and missile guidance radars in order to complete the engagement sequence without compromising any given emitter within the network.

My 2 cents on this issue:

NATO SEAD missions de-briefing:
– Primary mission: Destroying the Serb air defense network : Failure
– Secondary mission: Limiting the Serb air defenses to a “hide and snipe” mode : Success

Serb Air Defenses de-briefing:
– Primary mission: Destroying large numbers of NATO aircraft and repulsing air attacks: Failure
– Secondary mission: Limiting NATO aircraft to fly over 20,000ft and forcing to carry ECMs and use SEAD missions: Success

You gave the primary mission of AD. It has to defend Serbia from air attacks.
You claim secondary success, despite your opponent was still able to force his attacks.
Looking into the minimum military achivements possible for the military in Serbia was the following: To delay NATO-air-attacks for some time and its devasting effects to win some time for the own politicans to achive a political solution before being defeated militarily and be forced to agrree to the conditions set. That is what did happen for all to see.
The other way around the primary mission of air-power was to create enough fire-power to bring the opponent down and to give in.
The primary mission of SEAD was and is the limit the AD of the opponent.

Despite some claims here, none was intrested to conquer Belgrad or kill as many Serbs as possible. The NATO did never use its full force and had not intention to do so. The attacks were limited to exercise enough military and political pressure to force a change of mind on the Serbian leadership and its supporters. – All the spans of bridges dropped or factories damaged have to be rebuilt with EU-money in the future and were in the meanwhile. It was no war against the Serbs in general. It was against the leadership and some military supporters at first. So it is some insane behavior to claim limited military success and do not mention the conditions of that war. It is out of question, who does suffer most in an asymmetrical war. The real question is, did the Serbian military something good for their country, when delaying the predictable outcome?!

My 2 cents on this issue:

NATO SEAD missions de-briefing:
– Primary mission: Destroying the Serb air defense network : Failure
– Secondary mission: Limiting the Serb air defenses to a “hide and snipe” mode : Success

Serb Air Defenses de-briefing:
– Primary mission: Destroying large numbers of NATO aircraft and repulsing air attacks: Failure
– Secondary mission: Limiting NATO aircraft to fly over 20,000ft and forcing to carry ECMs and use SEAD missions: Success

The actions of the KLA afterwards was in no way better and in many ways worse than what the Serbs were accused of doing to make the war necessary. But then the west has always been hipocritical.

Osama would be proud of NATO. NATO bombed Serbian infrastructure to punnish the serbian police and army actions in Kosovo, and the Bosnian Serb actions in Bosnia and the Croatian Serbs actions in Croatia.

Osama blew up a couple of buildings to punnish America for the actions of its military and government world wide.

Ahhh, but Osama is a terrorist… he used innocent victims on airliners to kill more inocent victims in buildings… while NATO bombed… civilian infrastructure targets which contained innocent victims to put economic and social pressure on the Serbian governement.

Of course they aren’t completely the same… Osama probably realises what he did was a mistake… 🙂

I will no go down to such insane level.

The Abrams tanks fought Iraqs tanks at night and did succeed.

The Abrams chose to fight at night because they knew they had better night vision equipment… Thermal Imagers that can ID targets at 3km is better than II that can ID targets at less than half that range.

The NATO required HARMS for their missions and did succeed.

That really depends. In the first phase of the war I am sure NATO didn’t just want to suppress the AD, but to knock it out. In that sense they failed.

Congratulation Iraq for such clever use of weaponary.

Like Kenny Rogers says… you got to know when to hold’em, know when to fold’em, Know when to walk away, know when to run.

They couldn’t run… they had no where to run to, and walking wasn’t an option for the same reason. Hold’en them only works if you have a better hand or you can bluff. In the end folding meant they kept their shirts… and the ownership papers for their cars and houses…

Based on that logic the Rwandan genocide was an internal Rwandan genocide and no business of the outside world.

The Genocide in Rwanda was a Genocide.

The UNSC Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly adopted on 9 December 1948 defined what genocide was and that it must be dealt with as a UN matter. What happened in Kosovo was the mass deportation of an ethnic group… not to concentration camps or death camps but to their country of origin. That is not covered by the UN resolution on Genocide and is therefore neither NATOs nor the UNs business… any more than the treatment of Blacks or American Indians were in the 1950s or before.

I find it amazing that you see nothing wrong with the USSR shooting down airliners full of civilians then get all high and mighty over attempts to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing, that is one warped moral compass.

The pilots of that airliner were responsible for the deaths of those on board. No one else.

Nothing. They’re illegal and therefore irrelevant when it comes to that region’s voting or self-determination.

So deporting them the way Serbia dealt with Albanians in Kosovo that didn’t have proper identity papers is the same action as what the British would do?

Yes, it did. Effective SEAD does not mean you physically eliminate the entire air defense network, it means you curtail it to the point that you can fulfill your mission. Were NATO bombing runs still conducted? Yes. Ergo, the SEAD campaign succeeded.

Assuming it was a SEAD campaign and not a DEAD campaign. Considering the force structure and assets of each side NATO should have crushed the AD in a couple of weeks the way it did in the deserts of Iraq.
Considering they resorted to attacking Civilian infrastructure to shorten the war suggests they were unable to locate enough military targets and certainly the initial goals of the early strikes would be to kill the head and the command structure as well as the centralised AD assets… the long wave radars and large SAMs.

Apache inactivity was also due in large part to maintenance issues and the lack of a real mission requiring their presence.

The operational ceiling limiting their use to 20,000ft would have handicapped operations too.

Bottom line: every single SAM system and radar site could have survived the war, but if they were rendered ineffective and not able to function as part of the defensive network, then the SEAD campaign is a success. SEAD does not require anything to blow up to be successful.

SEAD is fine for a few strikes, but for a 70+ day campaign DEAD is much cheaper as you can transfer resources and use fewer aircraft for each mission. The fact that the only remaining superpower AND the great powers of Europe couldn’t pull Serbia into line is interesting. Trees and cover compared to barren mountains in Afghanistan make things a little harder overall.

One F117 and 2 F16’s is a remarkably low loss ratio relative to the number of missions flown, hell any major air force would accept those losses as accident attrition when conducting ops at that level of intensity.

Considering they flew above 20,000ft I am surprised they even managed to get those. The only weapons they had with such reach were so patently obsolete they would have to be fired in huge volleys… and huge volleys and mobile SAMs playing the ECM game avoiding attack is not really compatible.
(ie to fire huge volleys you would create a large target for the enemy).

It is a pity, that the people in Serbia are still cheated about the events by the own military, before, during and afterwards.

Yes, why can’t they accept those forces that went there to bomb them into the stone age if necessary are their real friends…

Why not, as long as it is successfull with that, the NATO is pleased with such a result. I hope the Serbs do feel similar with their result.

The actions of the KLA afterwards was in no way better and in many ways worse than what the Serbs were accused of doing to make the war necessary. But then the west has always been hipocritical.

Osama would be proud of NATO. NATO bombed Serbian infrastructure to punnish the serbian police and army actions in Kosovo, and the Bosnian Serb actions in Bosnia and the Croatian Serbs actions in Croatia.

Osama blew up a couple of buildings to punnish America for the actions of its military and government world wide.

Ahhh, but Osama is a terrorist… he used innocent victims on airliners to kill more inocent victims in buildings… while NATO bombed… civilian infrastructure targets which contained innocent victims to put economic and social pressure on the Serbian governement.

Of course they aren’t completely the same… Osama probably realises what he did was a mistake… 🙂

Well, sooner or later NATO will have to reconciliate with the fact that was unable to cause damage to a much smaller, older and constrained armed force. That conclusion was not only outlined in Belgrade, but also in Moscow, Beijing, Teheran and even in many western capitals. It can be accepted or not. But it cannot be changed.

Why not, as long as it is successfull with that, the NATO is pleased with such a result. I hope the Serbs do feel similar with their result.

Well, sooner or later NATO will have to reconciliate with the fact that was unable to cause damage to a much smaller, older and constrained armed force. That conclusion was not only outlined in Belgrade, but also in Moscow, Beijing, Teheran and even in many western capitals. It can be accepted or not. But it cannot be changed.

Sean, that’s your point of view. NATO bombing campaign was to succeed with or without SEAD. I saw no substantive benefits from launching lots of ARM (most of them lost or decoyed). I can accept that they could have saved a few planes, but the end would have been exactly the same with or without those hundreds HARMS. That saved most planes from SA fire was … just to fly high enough.

I have no idea how the people in Serbia do think about the well being of a single person. As long as a single surplus HARM did prevent harm of a NATO-pilot, it was worth its money at all.
I have no idea how the people in Serbia can claim that their AD-net did succeed in protecting their infrastructure. When SEAD was no success, why did the Serbs switching-off their radars at all and do hide the assets in critical times, when in need utmost. The people in their living-rooms in Begrad were not in need of such useless AD, when watching the TV-news about the events.
It is a pity, that the people in Serbia are still cheated about the events by the own military, before, during and afterwards.

Sean, that’s your point of view. NATO bombing campaign was to succeed with or without SEAD. I saw no substantive benefits from launching lots of ARM (most of them lost or decoyed). I can accept that they could have saved a few planes, but the end would have been exactly the same with or without those hundreds HARMS. That saved most planes from SA fire was … just to fly high enough.

That’s not exactly my point of view, that’s how it is in fact viewed by the USAF. That’s why we do differentiate between a SEAD campaign and a DEAD campaign (what the D stands for should be obvious!). The air campaign may have done just fine without SEAD, but the SEAD operations did produce the desired result, and from a doctrinal point of view they were therefore effective.

Also, a lot of the HARMs that missed were older models lacking GPS. They had issues with hitting radars that powered down…and if the HARM shot forced the radar to power down, that is still a success even if the missile goes on a rocket-powered romp through the countryside oblivious to SAM radar targeting.

Sean, that’s your point of view. NATO bombing campaign was to succeed with or without SEAD. I saw no substantive benefits from launching lots of ARM (most of them lost or decoyed). I can accept that they could have saved a few planes, but the end would have been exactly the same with or without those hundreds HARMS. That saved most planes from SA fire was … just to fly high enough.

Even S-400 will not prevent attacks on civillian infrastructure. Off-course it can rise the cost of such attacks.

The Serbian SA network operated, albeit with reduced efficiency, but operated. So the term “successful” doesn’t correspond to such a SEAD campaign.

Yes it was successful, for the simple reason that the air defense network was degraded and forced to operate using tactics that meant that NATO airstrikes were able to be conducted. Successful SEAD doesn’t mean you have to permanently destroy or degrade an enemy’s IADS. As long as your SEAD campaign provides enough interference to ensure that your overall mission succeeds, then the SEAD campaign itself has succeeded.

Even S-400 will not prevent attacks on civillian infrastructure. Off-course it can rise the cost of such attacks.

The Serbian SA network operated, albeit with reduced efficiency, but operated. So the term “successful” doesn’t correspond to such a SEAD campaign.

Yeap, but the Serbian military loses were also very low. And Apaches didn’t entered in Kosovo.

So this doesn’t change the facts: The targeting of the civilian infrastructure was that forced the Serbs to negotiate. But even a dozen S-300pmu would be unable to prevent the attacks on the civilian infrastructure. The SEAD campaign was largely ineffective.

The SEAD campaign was effective because it forced the Serbian air defense network to operate in a fashion that did not prohibit the strikes on the civillian infrastructure from being carried out.

Yeap, but the Serbian military loses were also very low. And Apaches didn’t entered in Kosovo.

So this doesn’t change the facts: The targeting of the civilian infrastructure was that forced the Serbs to negotiate. But even a dozen S-300pmu would be unable to prevent the attacks on the civilian infrastructure. The SEAD campaign was largely ineffective.

One F117 and 2 F16’s is a remarkably low loss ratio relative to the number of missions flown, hell any major air force would accept those losses as accident attrition when conducting ops at that level of intensity.

But, it was rendered ineffective? It operated in a “hide & snipe” mode but operated. Lets ignore the numerous planes damaged. A F-117, a couple of F16 plus 2 dozen Tomahawks downed indicate that operated. Tomahawks were consistently downed along the whole conflict. True, its efficiency was downgraded by the enormous NATO air-power, but the “hide & snipe” was the right operating mode because a frontal engagement would lead to the complete annihilation of the SAM system.

Also I accept than the maintenance subject played a role in the Apache inactivity. But the didn’t tried to support the Albanese guerrillas while these guerrillas were decimated by the VJ. Apaches also flown some carefully publicitated show-off & bragging missions … on Albania. This is a strong indicative that NATO considered Kosovo not safe enough to the Apaches.

No. It didn’t.

Yes, it did. Effective SEAD does not mean you physically eliminate the entire air defense network, it means you curtail it to the point that you can fulfill your mission. Were NATO bombing runs still conducted? Yes. Ergo, the SEAD campaign succeeded.

Serbs were more or less well aware of the situation during the whole period. Many downed Tomahawk indicate this.

Tomahawks are fired in enough numbers to account for some shot down. Plus, they are slow, cooperative targets, and not that hard to shoot down.

Also many ARM were succesfully decoyed. Apache inactivity also shows fear to low flying missiles and MANPADS.

Apache inactivity was also due in large part to maintenance issues and the lack of a real mission requiring their presence.

Bottom line: every single SAM system and radar site could have survived the war, but if they were rendered ineffective and not able to function as part of the defensive network, then the SEAD campaign is a success. SEAD does not require anything to blow up to be successful.

No, it succeeded, overwhelmingly.

No. It didn’t. Serbs were more or less well aware of the situation during the whole period. Many downed Tomahawk indicate this. Also many ARM were succesfully decoyed. Apache inactivity also shows fear to low flying missiles and MANPADS.

No. It did’t succeed. Lots ended on ground. The SEAD campaing failed.

No, it succeeded, overwhelmingly. The “S” in SEAD is for Suppression, which does not imply physical destruction. The HARM/Jammer combo proved deadly enough to force the enemy to keep the SAM systems turned off and hidden, or sporadically active. This removed them from the list of serious, immediate threats to combat aircraft operating in the area. Ergo, the SEAD campaign succeeded.

Kosovo was an internal problem for Serbia. It was nothing for NATO to get involved with.

And certainly nothing for NATO to have to call in the US to fix. The US should not have been there, and neither should NATO. Or were the Serbians plotting to take over Greece or something and actually representing a credible threat to another NATO member state that I am not aware of?

And if 2,000 illegal immigrants from Argentina move to the Falklands and then demand another referendum and the result favours a change to Argentine rule… what then?

Nothing. They’re illegal and therefore irrelevant when it comes to that region’s voting or self-determination.