Defer Combat Aircraft

This comes fom http://www.fas.org/man
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Defer Combat Aircraft
[F-22, F/A-18, JSF]

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Cost: The Defense Department has requested nearly $6 billion for new fighter aircraft in the FY1999 budget submission. In 1997 the costs of these programs included $70,8 billion for purchasing 440 F-22s, as much as $79.5 billion for as many as 1,000 F/A-18E/Fs and $23 billion for developing the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, and at least $100 billion for producing nearly 3,000 aircraft [though by some estimates the eventual price could be twice this amount]. The Quadrennial Defense Review imposed modest reductions in the total procurement of these aircraft, and slowed their production, but did not impose major changes in overall plans.

F-22
The Air Force’s F-22 is a stealth aircraft that is designed to give the United States superiority in air-to-air and air-to-ground battles. The F-22 is intended to replace the F-15 as the high performance U.S. fighter for the late 1990s and beyond.

The FY 1999 budget request of $2.9 billion provides for continued development funding and the first production buy of two aircraft. The F-22 conducted its first flight test in September 1997, and a total of nine flight-test aircraft are being manufactured, the second of which is scheduled to become available in mid-1998. Flight testing began in May 1998 and will run through 2001. Funds for the first two production aircraft are requested in FY 1999, leading to a gradual buildup in the production rate to 36 aircraft per year by FY 2004. Initial operational capability is slated for FY 2006. The present acquisition plan will provide three wings of F-22 aircraft by about FY 2013

The Quadrennial Defense Review decreased the total procurement of the F-22 from 438 to 339 aircraft. The Defense Department slowed the our ramp-up to full production of the aircraft, and decided to buy 12 fewer F-22s during Low-Rate Initial Production, thereby decreasing concurrency in the program. Under the new plan, the F-22 program will build to a maximum production rate of 36 aircraft per year, down from the original planned rate of 48 per year

When the F-22 was begun, deep in the Cold War, its mission was to “Maintain the combat advantage of our fighter forces against the continually evolving threat.” The “continually evolving threat” was future Soviet aircraft that were never built. The U.S. “combat advantage” in the air has, if anything, increased since 1981. No countries are developing air forces that will even approach current extensive U.S. air capabilities. The complementary, integrated U.S. mix of airborne radar aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, refueling aircraft, ground surveillance aircraft, antiradar aircraft, ground attack aircraft, and satellites already gives the U.S. an unrivaled ability to dominate air combat without the unproven technology of the expensive F-22.

The United States currently has the best air-to-air fighter in the world, the F-15, which will maintain U.S. Air Force superiority well into the next century. Studies by the General Accounting Office concluded that “…the current inventory of F-15s can be economically maintained in a structurally sound condition until 2015 or later.” Under current plans in the first decade of the next century several hundred (F-15) fighters will be retired before their service lives are over in order to make room for new F-22 fighters.

The F-22 would be the most expensive fighter aircraft ever bought at $166 million per plane. In contrast, the F-117 “stealth” fighter/bomber costs approximately $43 million per plane; the F-15 sells for $28 million, and the F-16 Falcon costs a mere $17 million each. Buying the 339 F-22s that the Air Force has deemed its top priority weapon will cost taxpayers about $56.5 Billion. Elimination of the F-22 program now, before the program begins receiving procurement funds, would produce dramatic savings of up to $4 billion a year.

The F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet Upgrade
The F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet is the upgraded version of the F/A-18 C/D, the Navy’s dual purpose attack and fighter jet. The E/F version is supposed to enable the Navy to conduct longer sorties, carry larger payloads and more weapons, and be less detectable than current C/D’s. The Navy’s plans are to phase out the C/D aircraft and replace them with the E/F upgrades. This plan, however, is neither tactically necessary nor economically wise. A more prudent course of action would be for the Navy to defer the production of the upgrades and continue to purchase the F/A-18 C/D’s.

Although the fiscal year 1998 request of $2.1 billion was eventually approved by Congress, the House National Security Committee recommended $1,348.9 million for the continued production of the F/A-18 E/F, which was $752.2 million less than the Defense Department requested. Previously contracted production of the initial lot of 12 FY 1997 aircraft and advance procurement for the FY 1998 aircraft are currently under way. Contracting for advance procurement items for the FY 1999 aircraft and full funding for 20 FY 1998 aircraft are contingent upon resolution of all significant technical problems -— including the so-called wing-drop phenomenon -— identified during flight testing accomplished thus far. The Defense has requested $3.0 billion to purchase 30 aircraft for FY 1999.

The Quadrennial Defense Review reduced Navy procurement plans from 1,000 F/A-18E/Fs building at a peak rate of 60 aircraft per year to a minimum of 548 F/A-18E/Fs building at a maximum rate of 48 aircraft per year. The ramp up to the full production rate of 48 per year was delayed two years, from FY 2000 to FY 2002. Transition to the JSF may begin as early as FY 2008, when initial production of the JSF is planned for the Navy. But if JSF development is delayed, a total of as many as 785 F/A-18E/F may procured.

The Navy has pursued production of the F/A-18 E/F since 1991, arguing that one of the benefits of this upgrade includes an increased payload capacity for weapons or the ability to carry the same load of weapons 40% further than the current C/D version. The C/D version, however, could fly further with a heavier load than is presently practiced. The payload capacity of the F/A-18 C/D has also proven to be greater than originally anticipated. The F/A-18 C/D was slated to carry payloads of 6,300 pounds, but while operating in Bosnia, the C/D version was able to carry payloads of 7,166 pounds.

Even if the F/A-18 E/F were to provide greater technological improvements over the F/A-18 C/D, a threat that would necessitate such an endeavor simply does not exist. The Navy devised the F/A-18 upgrade during a time when the former Soviet Union was still a formidable military threat.

Despite the scant benefits of the F/A-18 upgrade, this new version of the aircraft will be about 39% more expensive than its predecessor. The GAO had estimated that the total upgrade program would cost an estimated $85.15 billion for the initially planned 1,000 aircraft. More recently the Defense Department has decided to reduce the number of F/A-18 E/Fs to be procured. The Quadrennial Defense Review decided that the Navy should procure a minimum of 548 F/A-18 E/Fs, with production increasing to 48 aircraft per year starting in fiscal year 2002. However, if the transition to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is delayed, the Navy may procure as many as 785 F/A-18 E/F aircraft.

The upgraded F/A-18 does not provide a significant technological advantage over the current F/A-18 C/D that would warrant such an increase in spending. If the Pentagon plans to replace F/A-18 E/Fs with the more advanced JSF aircraft in a little over ten years, then the military could continue to purchase the current F/A-18 C/Ds and wait for the JSF model to reach its technological peak.

The Joint Strike Fighter

The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is a family of fighter aircraft that the Pentagon intends to use for three branches of the military. Variants of the core all-purpose design are intended to permit deployment by the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, thereby saving money. Designed to carry a minimum of two air to ground weapons and two medium-range air to air missiles internally, the JSF would have a low aircraft signature (which would increase its survivability rate in combat). The JSF would replace the F-16 and A-10 aircraft for the Air Force, the AV-8B and F-18 for the Marine Corps, and provide the Navy with a first-day-of-the-war strike capability.

The FY 1999 budget request of $919 million supports the pre-engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) concept demonstration phase that will last through FY 2001 involving two competing aircraft designs by Boeing and Lockheed Martin. The subsequent engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase is slated to begin in mid-FY 2001. Procurement of the aircraft is scheduled to commence in FY 2005. Initial production of the aircraft would start in fiscal year 2005 and would be operational by fiscal year 2008. The Defense Department initially planned to purchase 2,852 Joint Strike Fighters, making the JSF acquisition program the Department’s largest. But the Quadrennial Defense Review reduced the total procurement of the JSF reduced to 2,852 aircraft, and delayed the maximum planned production rate of 194 aircraft to 2012 rather than 2010.

The Marine Corps wants its JSF version to have a short take-off and vertical landing capability. The Navy variant would have carrier landing and take-off capabilities. Furthermore, the Navy has requested a more stealthy version of the aircraft than has been previously designed. These different requests might actually increase the cost of the JSF program even though the aircraft is based on a core model. The Pentagon has a history of expecting joint cooperation that never materializes.

Recommendation:
Cancel F-22 procurement. Use existing highly capable F-15.
Cancel F/A-18E/F procurement. Use surplus F/A-18A/B aircraft from inactivated Navy squadrons as well as Marine Corps assets to sustain reduced eight-wing force structure.
Defer production plans for the JSF, while continuing research on advanced fighter technology.

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