Does the LCA program make sense?

The LCA is taking a long time to develop. So far it has managed only 140 hrs of flying and will take a long time to develop. Does it make sense to continue with the LCA program when better fighters are already available on the international market? Why not cancel the LCA and buy the Mirage 2000? France is offering transfer of technology and licensed manufacturing. Why not completely replace the LCA program with the Mirage 2000? Isn’t that what the Indian air force wants? Why force the Indian air force to accept the LCA? What are the advantages or disadvantages of continuing with the LCA program?

(Moderators, this is a valid discussion topic. If someone posts flames then delete his posts. But don’t delete the entire thread!)

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The Light Combat Aircraft(LCA)

by K.T.R. Sebastian

The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) was recently named Tejas, after over 17 years of development, by the Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee a little while ago at Bangalore. For a project conceived way back in 1983, it certainly took a long time to come out with a name.

A retired Air Marshal on being queried about what he thought of the LCA slated for induction into the Air Force in 2007 said, “The Air force should rather have something off-the-shelf immediately for sustaining operations, while the LCA (Tejas) tries to catch up with several off-the-shelf world-class aircrafts currently available in the international market.”

This is indeed the typical refrain from the defence personnel acutely concerned about the gnawing need for operational sustainability above anything else. The general lack of confidence and impassivity to indigenous production by the end-users is a dampener, given the general fanfare surrounding the Prime Minister’s show of appreciation to the LCA team for progressing with the project despite all odds.

The LCA project finding a name after 17 long years of development — and after serious time and cost overruns — has raised a few eyebrows among several of the primary users, who have by now become less enthusiastic and more cynical with each passing day.

They would simply like to have something operational and workable, immediately, rather than have to wait several more years, and several billion rupees later, only to be told that it’s a non-starter, as in the case of the Trishul missile system. The Trishul project was officially scrapped in March 2003; the reason given was that its technology had become obsolete and that it had a dysfunctional command guidance. The Trishul missile did not become obsolete overnight but after 20 long years and after several periodic tests were reported in the media as being successful.

The common question among the end-users is: What’s the assurance that LCA (Tejas) will not go the way of the notionally unassailable Arjun Tank or the now scrapped Trishul Missile system (easily making it the most expensive and effort-consuming firecracker ever at 3 billion rupees and 20 years of development)?

It is indeed alarming that in the name of furthering indigenous technology, the defence services have been forced to operate with less than world-class state-of-the-art equipment. Almost certainly, the best test of developed equipment worthiness would be in being able to find willing buyers from other countries. Perhaps it’s time the defence services procurement are subjected to more open market forces — plainly, the defence production facilities should not depend primarily on the Indian armed forces to bail them out with the products they produce. They should be able to profitably find a demand for the equipment they produce in the international market before making itself an albatross around the hapless Indian defence force.

For instance, an unenthusiastic army placed an order for Arjun tanks even though it has been proven deficient in several aspects when compared to the proven Russian tank available off-the-shelf. The Defence Minister, George Fernandes who is also responsible for the performance of defence production happily informed the parliament that the army was indeed satisfied with the Arjun tank’s performance, and had placed an order for 124 more such tanks. Sure, by ensuring that the army bought the Arjun tank the nation benefited in the sense that it meant employment and utilization of heavily unutilized capacity in the defence production workshops, but it is also certainly cost the nation dearly in not being able to provide our defence forces with the very best of cutting edge technology available internationally at comparable cost.

When the Trishul project was envisaged in 1983, the goal was to provide an indigenous and superior SAM (Surface to Air Missile) system — the envisaged system was to be superior to the then available Russian Osa — K / M Surface to Air Missile system by Year 1993. There must have been a design plan in place that would constantly upgrade the system design to incorporate newer features, technologies and developments to what would be relevant at the time of delivery and beyond. If that was the case, then why was the system termed obsolete for use after 20 years? Should there not be an enquiry into the scrapping of the Trishul project? Would the people ever come to know how the taxpayers’ money was indeed squandered, in the name of achieving indigenous capability?

Has the opportunity cost on the operational efficiency of the forces ever been quantified every time we have a design or requirement mismatch with the delivered product, a time overrun, or a cost overrun when compared to the procurement of off-the-shelf state-of-the-art equipment?

Even today, the dragging of feet over the purchase or indigenous production of an advanced fighter jet trainer is costing the Air Force dearly in terms of combat aircrafts and pilots lost and their cumulative effect on the morale of the Air Force personnel, of both the technical and the executive cadres, is immense with the burden of innumerable enquiries after each occurrence of malfunction or failure.

DRDO has promised to deliver over 1000 different products with the ‘Made in India’ tag. How many of them would actually meet the specifications of the design and be within the limits of the envisaged delivery date, quality and cost criteria? One must certainly admire the bravado shown by DRDO in attempting to make indigenous almost everything that a superpower would possibly do, on a shoestring budget against all likelihood of it being successful. Would it not be less foolhardy to attempt and make successful one project at a time given our meager financial muscle?

Repeated trials and testing, with the end mostly in a haze, is the curse of several such projects — this is indeed demoralizing to the services. Added to that, is the fait accompli of it being forced upon the services, when superior off-the-shelf products could have been procured at a comparable cost.

The staffing and recruitment at the DRDO have shown they have in their midst individuals of extraordinary brilliance and determination, yet time overruns, cost overruns and end-user dissatisfaction is an recurring gripe against the organization.

Probably, the solution to this malady is a healthy dose of privatization and accountability of the production workshops to the extent that profitability and ender-user delight becomes the sole mantra for their continued existence. A persuasive transparency that each individual and team will be held accountable in the making of the product that needs to necessarily delight the end user in design, time and cost attributes should go a long way in curing them of this malady.

After several wars, have we learnt any lessons from lost human lives and poor morale of the defence personnel due to use of apologetic and deficient equipment? If we do intend to learn lessons, then it’s time we translate them into the philosophies of: shape up or ship out, export or perish, and inculcate the fact to the production units that their very existence is dependent on the unit’s earnings — for the general good of the nation.

CNN and Fox have beamed us live the images of the Iraqi war involving marines and their hardy equipment designed to fit the marines like a glove, the smart bombs, the laser-guided missiles and patriot missile defense systems that have mostly worked. Can the Indian defence personnel boast of similar unrivaled capability in equipment and technology made available and operational for training, well ahead of the actual combat deployment, from the stables of our defence production units? Or, is this asking for too much?