Emirates A345 tail strike at Melbourne

No need to merge, this thread was about the incident, the new thread is about the crew speaking out about it hence the discussions on what & why they did wrong. There was no need to drag this thread up that is close to 3 months old with the other one running using exactly the same post.

Thread locked

I understand that UK rules are the tightest and have been applied EU wide, at least parts of it (for example the 900hrs per year). But as I understand you both operate short haul trips, which are considerably more challenging due to several landings, time constraints, traffic, like the difference between an Autobahn ride and a one hour inner city tour.

Still, I guess if fatigue was an issue in this case we will learn it and Emirates will get spanked for it.

Interesting differences Deano. In the US we have no total Duty limits butwe are limited to 14 hours scheduled but it can be extended out to 16 hours for wx and mx. Flight time limits are 8 hours scheduled per duty period, 30 hours in a rolling 7 days, 100 hours per month and 1000 hours per year. International operations have slightly different hour limits. The 8 hours scheduled isn’t a limitation once you’ve begun your day. They saying is “legal to start, legal to finish” which means if you have delays you can fly as many hours as it takes to finish the flights as long as you don’t exceed your duty day limit. My record is 10 hours in 1 duty period thanks to thunderstorms and diversons.

Rest requirements are that we must get 8 hours between duty periods. Most airline pilot groups have negotiated slightly improved rules but not much. Our min rest is 9 hours but we can be scheduled for 8 hours if we are given 11 hours of compensitory rest during our next rest period. Nothing like the promise of future rest to make you feel better now. 😉

There are also continuous duty nights as well which go by many names depending on the company (standup overnights, illegals, etc.). Where the “rest period” is less than 8 hours so it isn’t considered a legal rest period so the whole night you are considered “on duty”. This is legal as long as you aren’t scheduled more than 14 hours of total duty time. You fly to the overnight, go to the hotel and grab a nap for a few hours and return to fly home. It’s been years since I’ve done them but I do remember quite clearly that they are absolutely miserable.

WD is spot on.

Fatigue is a nasty beast and can creep up on you without you knowing it. I’ve been fatigued once and I don’t want to go there again. If you manage 100 flight hrs in a month you have worked seriously hard trust me.

I have just come in from work, I accumulated 5½hrs flight time tonight for 8½hrs duty time, this includes 4 sectors flying of reasonable length.

Other typical days include

8hrs Duty – 4hrs Flying – 4 sectors
10hrs Duty – 5½hrs flying – 5 sectors
8hrs Duty – 3¾hrs flying – 4 sectors
7¾hrs Duty – 4¼hrs flying – 4 sectors

We’re all (In the UK at least) governed by CAP 371 (or it’s equivalent), basically stating no more than 55hrs duty in a rolling week, 95hrs in a rolling fortnight. Minimum rest of 12hrs between each duty etc, 900 flight hrs per annum.
Also the amount of duty time you can do in a day is governed by your start time and how many sectors you are doing. Some routes pick up delays and can push this to the limit very easily. You are then on minimum rest for your next duty the following day.

But I don’t like the reasoning: close to 100hrs a month => fatigue. That conclusion is drawn in that article.

I don’t think any conclusions were stated in the article, only outlining the legal and company flight time limits per month.

You can have 100 duty hours a month without having 14 hrs a day. Actually, if they fly 10 block hours with 20 hour off in between, it is 5 trips a month.

The limit is 100 FLIGHT hours, not duty hours, an important distinction. A crew can take a several hour delay for maintenance or weather before even pushing off the gate to start their flight. Every hour of delay on the ground extends there duty day while the flight time will remain unchanged.

There is difference between total flight time per month vs. duty time. I probably do 30-35 hours of duty a week for 20-23 hours of flight time per week. My duty time for the month is over 120 hours while the flight time is <100 hours.

As all people survived there is plenty of possibility to find out if crew was deprived of sleep. So I guess we’ll wait for the report to tell if the crew did remain
– within legal limits
– within commonly acceptable human limits (which I would consider at least 10 hours, preferably 12 hours between two shifts)[/QUOTE]

Obviously you don’t fly professionally nor understand what leads to fatigue. Fatigue isn’t a culmination of a months work of flying, it’s a result of events leading up to an event, hours perhaps a day before. How many hours off duty did this crew get prior to the flight in question? How many of those hours were restful? Did the hotel hold a Cinco de Mayo event outside the crews rooms leading to no sleep on there part?

Legal limitations don’t guarantee a rested crew unfortunately. Legally a crew only has to have 8 hours of rest between duty days (domestic US). Now that 8 hours isn’t really rest but 8 hours of not being on duty which is roughly from the time the door opens to 30 minutes before the next flight leaves the next day. Now the crew has to be transported to and from the hotel, check in, eat, go to bed, wake up, great ready for the new day, etc. I’ve had van rides from 2 minutes up to 30 minutes one way to the hotel. That 8 hours can easily, and legally, be nothing more than 6 hours of actual rest. Legally a crew can be scheduled for 14 hours of duty, 8 hours of rest followed by another 14 hours of duty not to mention that duty days can be extended to 16 hours for weather and maintenance. I’m sorry, but rest/duty rules suck and do little to insure a rested crew.

Fatigue is rarely used “magically” by crews. I can’t think of another accident where fatigue was mentioned by a crew as a cause. Given your attitude towards it you must have quite a list though so please share.

I am not disputing that crew rest legislation has many holes in it, and airlines really working on the legal limits can easily overwork their crews.
But I don’t like the reasoning: close to 100hrs a month => fatigue. That conclusion is drawn in that article.
You can have 100 duty hours a month without having 14 hrs a day. Actually, if they fly 10 block hours with 20 hour off in between, it is 5 trips a month.

As all people survived there is plenty of possibility to find out if crew was deprived of sleep. So I guess we’ll wait for the report to tell if the crew did remain
– within legal limits
– within commonly acceptable human limits (which I would consider at least 10 hours, preferably 12 hours between two shifts)

But if there is a limit of 100 hours monthly, and Emirates stays below it, where is the problem?

Obviously you don’t fly professionally nor understand what leads to fatigue. Fatigue isn’t a culmination of a months work of flying, it’s a result of events leading up to an event, hours perhaps a day before. How many hours off duty did this crew get prior to the flight in question? How many of those hours were restful? Did the hotel hold a Cinco de Mayo event outside the crews rooms leading to no sleep on there part?

Legal limitations don’t guarantee a rested crew unfortunately. Legally a crew only has to have 8 hours of rest between duty days (domestic US). Now that 8 hours isn’t really rest but 8 hours of not being on duty which is roughly from the time the door opens to 30 minutes before the next flight leaves the next day. Now the crew has to be transported to and from the hotel, check in, eat, go to bed, wake up, great ready for the new day, etc. I’ve had van rides from 2 minutes up to 30 minutes one way to the hotel. That 8 hours can easily, and legally, be nothing more than 6 hours of actual rest. Legally a crew can be scheduled for 14 hours of duty, 8 hours of rest followed by another 14 hours of duty not to mention that duty days can be extended to 16 hours for weather and maintenance. I’m sorry, but rest/duty rules suck and do little to insure a rested crew.

Fatigue is rarely used “magically” by crews. I can’t think of another accident where fatigue was mentioned by a crew as a cause. Given your attitude towards it you must have quite a list though so please share.

Fatigue can do amazing things. CFIT’s are a perfect example. No pilot would intentionally fly their airplane into the ground. If something as severe as that can happen due to fatigue a simple error in button pushing is nothing.

Fatigue can also be used magically in favor of any pilot in nearly any situation.

I think the pilots have some friends that help them tossing **** on Emirates, even though I think say that the accuses maybe hold some truth. But if there is a limit of 100 hours monthly, and Emirates stays below it, where is the problem? Does Emriates need to fly substantially less than the legal limit to comply with the rules?

I can hardly believe fatigue is reason for someone to mess up his take-off speed calculation. If you fly an aircraft and have some experience, you should have a “mind-map” of take-off speeds and thrust settings (FLEX correction). You wouldn’t necessarily guess it, but some numbers might look suspicious.

In the A340-500 case the crew tried to take-off with very limited thrust under full load on a hot day. That is not fatigue, that seems to be lack of airmanship.

Fatigue can do amazing things. CFIT’s are a perfect example. No pilot would intentionally fly their airplane into the ground. If something as severe as that can happen due to fatigue a simple error in button pushing is nothing.

I can hardly believe fatigue is reason for someone to mess up his take-off speed calculation. If you fly an aircraft and have some experience, you should have a “mind-map” of take-off speeds and thrust settings (FLEX correction). You wouldn’t necessarily guess it, but some numbers might look suspicious.

In the A340-500 case the crew tried to take-off with very limited thrust under full load on a hot day. That is not fatigue, that seems to be lack of airmanship.

Three Emirates pilots have spoken out about fatigue problems at the airline, saying passenger safety is under threat.

The pilots, who all currently fly for the airline, spoke separately to the Sunday Herald Sun to outline concerns about fatigue, morale and management of the United Arab Emirates-based airline.

“I don’t want to see a smoking hole in the ground with an Emirates tail on it, but the way we’re going that’s highly probable,” one pilot said.

The men’s concerns came after the Australian Transport Safety Bureau made a preliminary finding that fatigue did not appear to be a factor in the accident of an Emirates jet at Melbourne Airport on March 20.

The comments by the ATSB came even though the pilot had barely slept in the day before the accident and had flown 98.9 hours in the previous month.

He was allowed to fly a maximum of 100 hours.

One pilot insisted fatigue was a major problem for ultra-long-haul pilots, who were averaging 90 hours of flying time every 28 days and often reaching their maximum allowable limit.

The pilots who spoke to the Sunday Herald Sun asked for their names to be withheld, fearing repercussions from the airline.

Australian and International Pilots Association president Barry Jackson said Qantas ultra-long-haul pilots flew significantly fewer hours than their Emirates colleagues.

While they had a limit of 100 flying hours in 30 days, compared with Emirates’ 100 hours in 28 days, they usually averaged 60-70 hours.

Mr Jackson, a serving Qantas pilot, said Emirates’ long-haul flying policy was “a lot tougher on their pilots”.

“They would be working a lot harder than us,” Mr Jackson said.

One of the Emirates pilots urged the ATSB to examine the crew records of the pilot and first officer in charge of EK407, the flight that almost crashed at Melbourne Airport after the wrong numbers were entered into the plane’s computer.

He said all pilots were being worked incredibly hard as Emirates struggled through the global economic crisis.

“If there is going to be a fatigue-related accident, it is probably going to be Emirates,” he said.

Emirates has grounded four other pilots as a result of near-fatal blunders in the past month.

In Ghana, an Emirates crew typed the wrong take-off calculations into their aircraft when they took off from Kotoka International Airport in Accra.

The problem was discovered because the plane took off too low and a noise complaint was lodged when the plane flew over the presidential palace, a no-go zone.

In England, an Emirates flight lined up to land on the wrong runway at Manchester.

The pilot did a “go-around” – but tracked the wrong course as he climbed away from the runway.

“When people are tired, these mistakes happen,” a second Emirates pilot said, referring to the Melbourne accident.

“There is a huge issue with fatigue.”

A third pilot questioned whether Emirates took seriously the contents of any air safety reports filed by pilots.

Trying to download the official ATSB report but not having much success!!!

Seeing those pictures shows just how close to a disaster this incident came.
A few knots slower and they’d never have gotten off the ground before the approach lighting, the engines would have ingested the lighting and it’d all be over.

Latest pic release
http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/gallery/0,22010,5038774-5006020,00.html#

“But a punitive culture means people are too afraid to speak out.

“Two things, (flight safety and the punitive culture) in my view, that do not match in 2009 and in a major airline.

Quite true and recognized by insiders. As a pilot it becomes the better options to die in a crash.

As for the other claims, blaming the FLEX take-off technique is severe fraud. Any airline does it. Mistyping digits is no issue (and probably done often enough), but not double-checking take-off V1, VR and V2 is an error. That are the challenges long range operations offer and the obscene salaries paid should afford people who are able to master them.

THE pilot of the Emirates flight that nearly crashed at Melbourne Airport with 225 passengers on board had almost no sleep the previous day and was following the airline’s orders to take off at reduced power to save money on fuel.

Several sources told the Sunday Herald Sun that Emirates – like many modern airlines – ordered its pilots to take off at reduced thrust when possible to cut fuel costs, emissions and wear on the aircraft.

The thrust or power settings are determined by factors such as aircraft weight, weather conditions, the surrounding terrain and runway length.

But an Emirates source said the March 20 flight – EK407 to Dubai – was set at the “absolute minimum” thrust, leaving little room for error.

“There was no margin for error,” the source said.

“This is all about the money.”

Emirates yesterday issued a statement saying safety was a top priority for the airline.

“Safety is at the forefront of all operations within the Emirates group,” a spokeswoman said.

Sources said a report due on Thursday was expected to show the near-catastrophic accident happened after the incorrect weight was typed into the plane’s computers, causing it to set an inadequate take-off speed.

Air safety investigators are examining Emirates’ staff records, including the work rosters of some of its pilots, to see if there are systemic safety problems within the airline that could have contributed to the near disaster.

The Sunday Herald Sun learned that the pilot of the plane was also almost at the threshold of the number of hours he was legally able to fly.

Emirates pilots are permitted to fly a maximum 100 hours each 28 days.

Investigators are examining whether pilot fatigue was a factor after being told the pilot had barely slept the day before the flight.

Several sources confirmed that Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigators were also looking at whether any other “human factors” needed to be addressed.

The inspection of Emirates’ records is part of the bureau’s investigation – expected to take up to a year – into the reasons behind the error.

An Emirates source said the airline was in a risky situation because it did not have a culture that encouraged people to voice their safety concerns.

The source said some Emirates pilots were badly fatigued, but people were afraid to speak out.

“There is a limit to how far you can push people,” the source said.

“But a punitive culture means people are too afraid to speak out.

“Two things, (flight safety and the punitive culture) in my view, that do not match in 2009 and in a major airline.

Source : Herald Sun

Anyway, I see it as good news because the more bad news and f**k-ups this airline makes, the more the public will become cautious about using them. 😀

Err?? Surely mistyping digits can happen to any pilot on any airline. To try and single that out as a reason not to fly EK is bizarre. After all, have we not had in the UK an airline whose pilots inadvertently shut down the wrong engine which caused almost 50 deaths – no one said, “I’m not flying British Midland any more – their pilots don’t know their left from their right!”

Plus if EK “folds” due to passengers losing confidence in them and refusing to fly on them, I daresay both Boeing and Airbus will be hit financially with the current and future sales of large aircraft that they will lose out on. And I wouldn’t have thought this would be good for the industry?!

Surely not?
It can’t be that old or high on cycles?

It’s obviously more viable to write off than repair…i don’t think the number of hours or cycles comes into it when dollars are concerned..to look at it parked up at Tulla you’d think there was nothing wrong with it!!!

Even Boeing proved you can do a major repair out in Anchorage with a 747! 😀

Or proved that such a repair can be botched, as happened with the JAL 747, which gave way midflight a few years later after the Boeing repair and resulting in an explosive decompression and the death of 520 persons (known as JAL 123).

Frankly, if it is too damaged, scrap it.

Over-reliance on computers and tools is the modern fallacy to the aviator.

That is so true.