F-35B – If it get's cancelled

I guess the Harriers/LPD scenario really doesn’t do anything to bolster the need for F-35B. The example seems to suggest that STOVL wasn’t helpful until the beach head was already established. Overall the Harriers didn’t drop a significant amount of ordnance during either Gulf War. It seems Harriers were more justified by the RN because they adapted around it. In US hands it is hard to justify.

This is actually a good idea, as it shortens the disruption to air operations compared to a conventional UNREP, which even a CVN has to do every 2-3 days during combat operations.

The CVN has to shut down air ops (save for supply/rescue helos) during the several-hour approach/line hook-up/transfer/de-rig/separate cycle, while the LHA/LHD could continue air ops even during the LCAC arrival/unload/departure cycle.

The supplies could be transferred from the AOR or other supply ship either to the LPD/LSD or directly into the LCAC without disrupting the LHA/LHD operations… meaning that the LHA/LHD need onbly break from operations for replenishing the ship & aviation fuel stores, not for other re-supply functions.

The implication here is that the CVN would be useless during UNREP – not necessarily true in all cases. A single CVN may or may not have to cease flight ops while being replenished, but in a war scenario, multiple CVN’s are certain to be deployed. The CVN’s would most likely set up an operational rotation of 12 hour on station, 12 hours off station, and within the off hours, replenish fuel, ammunition, food, etc.

Sounds on the face of it a good idea, trouble is as I understand it the LHAs do not have a well deck so they, like a CVN, will have to stop operations save rescue etc, every couple of days to replenish.

Well, the depends greatly. As CVN’s are always on the move and at speed. On the otherhand LHA/LHD’s are often stationary…….:cool:

Sounds on the face of it a good idea, trouble is as I understand it the LHAs do not have a well deck so they, like a CVN, will have to stop operations save rescue etc, every couple of days to replenish.

This is actually a good idea, as it shortens the disruption to air operations compared to a conventional UNREP, which even a CVN has to do every 2-3 days during combat operations.

The CVN has to shut down air ops (save for supply/rescue helos) during the several-hour approach/line hook-up/transfer/de-rig/separate cycle, while the LHA/LHD could continue air ops even during the LCAC arrival/unload/departure cycle.

The supplies could be transferred from the AOR or other supply ship either to the LPD/LSD or directly into the LCAC without disrupting the LHA/LHD operations… meaning that the LHA/LHD need onbly break from operations for replenishing the ship & aviation fuel stores, not for other re-supply functions.

Does have some merit as one Amphibious Group is usually made up with 1-LHA/LHD and 2-LPD’s. So, the latter two could switch out either supporting the LHA/LHD and the other replenishing out to sea.

Of course I am referring to operations after the troops have gone ashore…;)

This is actually a good idea, as it shortens the disruption to air operations compared to a conventional UNREP, which even a CVN has to do every 2-3 days during combat operations.

The CVN has to shut down air ops (save for supply/rescue helos) during the several-hour approach/line hook-up/transfer/de-rig/separate cycle, while the LHA/LHD could continue air ops even during the LCAC arrival/unload/departure cycle.

The supplies could be transferred from the AOR or other supply ship either to the LPD/LSD or directly into the LCAC without disrupting the LHA/LHD operations… meaning that the LHA/LHD need onbly break from operations for replenishing the ship & aviation fuel stores, not for other re-supply functions.

That will be interesting to hear the story behind that. The LPD isn’t exactly made for that role. I’d think it would be awfully difficult for one to support 24 Harriers due to the nature of its load out, its limited internal space for that kind of stuff, and its already difficult role supporting a beach head. Please, enlighten everyone how that worked.

I believe LCAC’s took supplies from the LPD to the LHD as needed.

As I understand it the 2 LHDs that acted as Harrier Carriers initially docked in Kuwait and landed their embarked marines, their helicopters, their heavy equipment etc then were left with only the Harriers on board, so went a few miles offshore and took up the role of Harrier Carrier.
I am sure that they did a good job as a Harrier Carrier, it cannot be used though as a good example of how an LHA / LHD can act as an F35 or Harrier Carrier. It I feel would be wishful thinking that all locations that the USMC wants to attack has a well equiped friendly state with a land border next to it….

The deck did, they had had some difficulty in hanger space and magazine. They were design for helicopter munitions and weren’t designed to supply fighters for a prolonged period. They were using the LCACs to resupply the ships.

Not true the 24 Harriers deployed on the USN LHD’s was supplied by a LPD to support its Air Operations. It had nothing to do with Kuwait………..

As a matter of fact the lesson learned from that operation. Likely influenced the design of the USS America.

As I understand it the 2 LHDs that acted as Harrier Carriers initially docked in Kuwait and landed their embarked marines, their helicopters, their heavy equipment etc then were left with only the Harriers on board, so went a few miles offshore and took up the role of Harrier Carrier.
I am sure that they did a good job as a Harrier Carrier, it cannot be used though as a good example of how an LHA / LHD can act as an F35 or Harrier Carrier. It I feel would be wishful thinking that all locations that the USMC wants to attack has a well equiped friendly state with a land border next to it….

Not true the 24 Harriers deployed on the USN LHD’s was supplied by a LPD to support its Air Operations. It had nothing to do with Kuwait………..

That will be interesting to hear the story behind that. The LPD isn’t exactly made for that role. I’d think it would be awfully difficult for one to support 24 Harriers due to the nature of its load out, its limited internal space for that kind of stuff, and its already difficult role supporting a beach head. Please, enlighten everyone how that worked.

Rvf harrier,
1) the flight deck is axial and narrow. Parking is starboard only.
2) chucky doesn’t have a battalion of marines. This is a troop transport not a carrier and she may be the only one of her kind.

They were only able to do that because of prior logistics buildup in Kuwait. If the logistics in Kuwait didn’t exist and had to be brought to the Marines ashore directly from ship, the Gators would have been too busy with Frogs and Stallions to waste deck space on Harrier operations.

The bottom line is the reason for the B is to protect turf — STOVL capability. But when you step back, look at the big picture and ask “What is the best method for fire support of Marines ashore?”, the answer is artillery owned by the Battalion.

• Can STOVL provide fire support within 30 seconds? No, but arty can.
• Can STOVL be there 24/7/365? No, but arty can.
• Can STOVL provide fire support at 2 or 3 different locations simultaneously? No, but arty can.
• Can STOVL deliver precision HE? Switch to DPICM? Then smoke? Then illumination? Then mines? No, but arty can.

Not true the 24 Harriers deployed on the USN LHD’s was supplied by a LPD to support its Air Operations. It had nothing to do with Kuwait………..

As a matter of fact the lesson learned from that operation. Likely influenced the design of the USS America.

Really? ‘Only’ twenty? Forgive my ignorance on this, but shouldn’t a 260m ship weighing in at 45,000 tonnes, with aviation as its raison d’être, be able to operate a larger airwing than that? Or am I missing something more subtle? Is it due to an insufficient hangar/deck park or is it because an F-35B has a large logistics footprint in terms of munitions and fuel stowage?

USN LHA’s and LHD’s don’t have the hanger, weapons, and fuel facilities to support a large wing of F-35B’s. Which, is likely why the USS America was completed without a dry dock. So, it could support the latter more efficiently.

I’d like to see some sea trials – that would be interesting.

The Marines say they need down in the dirt CAS and austere basing options – both could be satisfied by either the ST or AT-6B. Sea basing is a nice to have option, but first-day(weeks really)-of-war strikes would be flown by Navy and USAF aircraft. Using F-35B’s (or any stealth aircraft) for CAS is a ridiculous waste of money.

CAS would be just one mission that the F-35B would perform. Plus, many of those missions couldn’t be effectively done by the types you listed.

Scooter do you honestly believe that there are no circumstances under which the F35B part of the F35 project could be cancelled?
There seem to be a number of “issues” that need rather serious work on to fix.
Do you happen to know what weapons payload an F35B can take off from an LHA or LHD with a full internal fuel load?

Sure the F-35B has issues. Yet, many of the problems have already be resolved and many of the other have fixes on the way. Regardless, I never said the F-35B couldn’t be canceled under any circumstances. “I said the odds are in its favor that it won’t be canceled” Which, I stand by….:cool:

You are probably right on this. Then again, an LHA is as big as the Charles de Gaulle, and can carry up to 20 F35Bs.

Really? ‘Only’ twenty? Forgive my ignorance on this, but shouldn’t a 260m ship weighing in at 45,000 tonnes, with aviation as its raison d’être, be able to operate a larger airwing than that? Or am I missing something more subtle? Is it due to an insufficient hangar/deck park or is it because an F-35B has a large logistics footprint in terms of munitions and fuel stowage?

The arsenal ship concept wasn’t a simple cruise missile battery. It offered quite a flexible mission profile. No doubt it wouldn’t be better with today’s tech.

Its politics though isn’t it? The USN does not want to run even the slightest risk of losing its new supercarrier programme; if gators have skijumps and look like the carriers being used by RN, PLAN and Russian Navy there is a (real or perceived) danger that USN will be told that it already has the aircraft carriers which it needs.

On a technical note I’d fully agree that the loss of helo spots would be a price worth paying for the extra effectiveness of the embarked JSFs. But of course I don’t have to fight the funding battle ………….

You are probably right on this. Then again, an LHA is as big as the Charles de Gaulle, and can carry up to 20 F35Bs. It’s a flat top. It already looks like a carrier, and is bigger than most carriers. Adding a ski jump which would enable the F35B to take off with a decent load of bombs and fuel will hardly turn an LPH into a rival to the CVN will it? It seems more like “not invented here” syndrome to me.

Artillery?. Are you people serious?.

You are unaware of the most fundamental limits imposed by the laws of physics?. Artillery requires clear arc’s of fire to target or its useless. How do you drop 6 inch shells on a hardened fighting position in a built up area masked with office blocks in the way?. Call down fire in 30 seconds when you need to find a clear site, secure it and relocate your battery?. 30 seconds you reckon?.

Why wouldn’t STOVL be present in theatre 24/7?. The CSG is the element that needs to be free to exploit its theatre mobility not the ESG!. You place an LHA with the ESG and you have persistent presence complete with organic logistic support.

Do we even have to talk about the variation in target effects between artillery and tacair?. Or the fact that tacair isn’t limited to just CAS but can also do BAI, recon, SEAD/DEAD and can even provide airspace denial over the fighting front if not true fleet air defence.

Artillery is no replacement for tacair by any description.

Aardpiglet, aardpiglet, aardpiglet. Have been saying so on this board since 2004…