Flight BristishAirtours 28M

Have included a clarifying word in my post

I would hardly call this a crash though. It was an engine fire.
Crashing suggests out of control, hitting object, careening of the runway etc.

Hi Bemused55

I have included a clarifying word in my post above to include incidents, which you correctly identified the above as being a serious fire and not a crash.

I would hardly call this a crash though. It was an engine fire.
Crashing suggests out of control, hitting object, careening of the runway etc.

Daylight tragedies at airports have a profound effect on all eye witnesses

Daylight incidents/crashes at airports especially those involving loss of lives have very profound effects on all eye witnesses.

They have a positive side too in that investigative evidence is easier to gather and is usually more accurate in the form of eye witness accounts.

It was a shocking sight to see the Airtours 737 still smoking when i saw it on the tarmac at Ringway,cannot believe it was 25 years ago.

Every failure or tragedy in Aviation has a learning aspect

From every aviation tragedy, incident, near miss or crew error should and in many cases do come learning aspects.
The important thing is that logs, incident reporting documents must be completed accurately even when the problem/incident is minor as on another future occasion the problem may manifest under different conditions and the impact be far, far worse.
These reports often develop into safety enhancements whether in product design/re-design, better training or operational instructions.
No enhancements to existing operational aircraft or new production aircraft come cheap though, as all aspects of changes have to assessed, documented and tested thoroughly before implementation.
In developed countries aviation safety is taken very seriously and many of us must be grateful to be part of this safety concious society.

It wasn’t just the instructions that may have been at fault when it came to operating the overwing exit.

Tests afterwards showed that with the right incentive (in this case cash for the first 15 out) folks would forget the clear instructions given to them beforehand. Namely: “Open the hatch like so, then throw the hatch out of the opening like so”.
In calm tests with no incentive, the test subjects did precisely that. Upon the blow of the whistle, they opened the hatch, threw it out and exited.
However, once the incentive was introduced, the hatch was discarded inside the aircraft and partly blocked the exit. The person operating the hatch would forget the instructions and did whatever they felt would get them out the quickest.
It is suggested this may have happened on the fateful day in Manchester and might have claimed some lives.

The 737 NG series now has an overwing exit that pops open and hinges outward and upward on its own, with minimal input by the user who need only pull the “open” handles. A much better system.

The overwing exits on the 737-1/2/3/4/500 are awkward things to open as they fall inwards first and they are heavy. How they got them and the A318/19/20, B757 and B767 past the regualtory authoritys I don’t know.
Also I think there was an issue with the way the opening sequence was discriber on the safety cards. The card used to show the hatch being removed and left inside the aircraft. Now it is shown being ejected out of the hole.
Interestingly the 737-6/7/8/900 have a re designed exit that opens outward and upward.
Personaly, having removed them for maintenance loads of times I would NEVER choose to sit in that row. I imagine myself trapped between the door and the passengers surging towards the hole! Also it is a reasonable drop from the wing to the ground. You would need the flaps fully down and you need to slide down them (On the 737) I would not fancy jumping or being pushed of the wing. Mind you I fancy being burnt alive less:D

Rgds Cking

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19850822-0
“Immediately after the ‘thud’ an intense fire developed on the left-hand side of the plane, causing some cracking and melting of windows with some associated smoke in the aft cabin. This caused some passengers to stand up in alarm and move into the aisle. Immediately after coming to a halt the purser tried to open the right front door (R1) but the escape slide container jammed on the doorframe, preventing further movement of the door. He then crossed to the L1 door and opened it (25 seconds had passed since the aircraft had stopped). The purser then returned to the R1 door and managed to clear the obstruction and was able to open the door 85 seconds after the aircraft had stopped. Meanwhile passengers had managed to open the right hand overwing exit. The R2 (right rear) door had also been opened but no one escaped through this exit. In total 17 surviving passengers escaped through the L1 door, 34 through R1 and 27 through the overwing exit.”

Also see AAIB Report and especially Appendices 1 to 3 at http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/formal_reports/8_1988_g_bgjl.cfm

It is well documented as it all happened on the ground at Manchester Airport and evidence was available. Ofcourse 25 years have passed since and we know a lot more about safety and this tragic accident has contributed to our knowledge of aircraft operational safety.