Focus on Joint Force Harrier operations during Operation 'Telic'

Focus on Joint Force Harrier operations during Operation ‘Telic’

By Edward Downs, Editor, Jane’s Avionics

During the recent Gulf War, designated Operation ‘Telic’ by the UK armed forces, elements of Nos. 1(F) and IV(AC) Squadrons deployed their Harrier GR7 aircraft to Ahmed Al Jaber airbase in Kuwait, which was also home to US Marine Corps AV-8Bs and F-18Ds and USAF F-16s and ANG A-10s.

Flying round-the-clock missions in support of the liberation of Iraq, pilots employed a variety of weapons, including the Maverick air-to-ground missile and both conventional Paveway II (PWII) and Enhanced Paveway (EPII) laser-guided bombs (LGBs), against a wide variety of fixed and mobile targets. Designation duties were taken care of within formations, with one or more of the attack formation carrying the BAE Systems Thermal Imaging Airborne Laser Designator (TIALD) pod. Although the performance of TIALD, at least in its current Series 400 guise, compares less than favourably with the latest breed of laser designation systems such as the Northrop Grumman Litening ER (fitted to US Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier IIs), the pod facilitated precision bombing of enemy targets in accordance with the strict rules of engagement (RoE) imposed to avoid collateral damage.

Many missions involved air-to-air refuelling (AAR) against RAF Tristar, VC-10 and US KC-10 tankers, often conducted over Iraq. While all GR7 night missions were conducted with the aid of night vision goggles, the incompatible external lights of the tankers necessitated pilots removing their goggles prior to taking on fuel.

Enjoying complete air supremacy over Iraq, coalition aircraft were able to patrol at will in the target areas and closely monitor the ground situation to provide air support to ground forces at extremely short notice, providing commanders with the ability to react in near real time to the developing tactical scenario. While Iraqi anti-aircraft fire around Baghdad can at best be described as ‘spirited’, it did not hinder the Harriers in their extended ‘loiter’ missions over the capital, making PWII and EPII LGB attacks by day and night. Indeed, perhaps a more pressing problem for the pilots was maximising their time ‘on station’ in the area.

The accuracy of the Harriers’ attacks was generally very good, with the lead pilot using hand-held binoculars to positively identify (PID) the target by day and utilising the TIALD pod by night. It is perhaps in this area of target PID capability that the TIALD pod lags behind its more modern US counterparts, particularly at the extended stand-off ranges that are possible with the latest LGBs dropped from medium altitude. However, from the Harrier squadrons’ perspective, the success story of the conflict was the GPS-aided EPII LGB, which provided pilots with far greater tactical flexibility in the target area, allowing for precision attack of fixed targets in poor weather (GPS guidance) and fixed or mobile targets in good weather (GPS guidance with laser refinement of Desired Mean Point of Impact). In this respect, the EPII was considered superior to the US JDAM, which offers no laser homing capability and thus relies on accurately mensurated target co-ordinates against fixed targets only.

The images in the gallery accompanying this editorial provide a unique view of Harrier air operations during Operation ‘Telic’, as seen from a pilot’s perspective.