FUTURE US BVR/AMRAAMC++ AND BEYOND

US Air Force eyes flight of ramjet missile

By Michael Sirak JDW Staff Reporter
Washington, DC

After decades of research, US Air Force engineers say they are now on the cusp of testing in flight a novel solid-fuelled propulsion system designed for next- generation air-to-air missiles.

However, standing in the way of them flight testing this Variable Flow Ducted Rocket (VFDR) system – a type of ramjet – is a lack of funding, since the missile work has to compete with more pressing service priorities. Nonetheless, engineers said they are hopeful that the funding will materialise in the next few years.

Developmental efforts by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) to date have matured the preliminary flight design of a VFDR-powered missile concept.

While Europe’s MBDA is developing the ramjet-powered Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile, the VFDR concept is the only US air-to-air system of this ilk.

The AFRL’s 7 in-diameter VFDR model is in the same size class as the AMRAAM, and its inlets have been sized for compact carriage in the internal weapons bays of the F/A-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, in addition to other AMRAAM carriage concepts, said Fred Davis, technical director of the directorate’s assessment and demonstrations division. The AFRL is “very encouraged” by the design, Davis told JDW.

http://www.janes.com/regional_news/americas/news/jdw/jdw050606_3_n.shtml

can someone please PM me the full article??

GOD KNOWS

I wonder if directed energy weapons will lead to large bomber type aircraft with nose and tail mounted laser turrets and lots of hypersonic stand off missiles?

pretty much due to the direct energy weapons…One thing about KP is that he has some very solid knowledge and sources to back himself up..even though sometimes u might feel that his opinions are wrong u cannot out do him..he is simply more informed..that is why i have so much respect for his veiws.

i popped this question to Kurt plummer over at ACIG and this was his response..

If you combined all my 600+ posts together I don’t think they would equal the length of that response. 🙂

Is he basically saying that conventional airpower will become obsolete over the next couple of decades?

acig is air-combat-information-group..at www.acig.org..

Well he hasn’t changed. Have to read his posts five times for it to all sink in 🙂

What is “ACIG”? Kurt seems to have disappeared from r.a.m several years ago and I’d always enjoyed reading his posts.

Thanks.

i popped this question to Kurt plummer over at ACIG and this was his response..

To my knowledge, AIM-120D will be out by 2008. It gives 2-way datalink, GPS assisted navigation and potentially the full ‘ERAAM’ 11″ expanded motor section (the current AIM-120C6/7 have a 6″ spacer blank between the warhead and C5 [5″ extension] motor segments I believe). If this is so then there should be at least one more upgrade to a VFDR (Variable Flow Ducted Rocket) or similar ramjet styled motor sometime around 2010 or 12. Past that, I expect that the driving force will be ‘antistealth and small signature’ as the potential exists through MEMS and Noise seekers to exploit much more of the signal than is currently the case while the option is also there to use multispectral attack ala the AIM-7R and later SM-2 missiles with a secondary EO adjunct. Particularly if the performance of modern IRST is all that it is said to be, the best way to kill VLOs may well end up being running a datalinked missile out to an IR point-source and then imaging it (with send-to-cockpit) to confirm valid target lock. Such is currently beyond the scope (or planning) of contempory BVR doctrine but it may well be the only option if the Raptor and JSf are all they are RF LO promised to be.

Much will depend on how the final mix of F/A-22 and F-35 works out as I don’t believe presentday RF stealth (materials and shaping) will last past it’s proliferation on the latter jet. OTOH, the rising cost, decreasing industrial participation values and general malaise of expectations vs. achievement (delivery dates, Lot-schedules vs. capability etc.) of the JSF along with increasing emphasis of small scale conflicts will push the move towards UAVs in the 70% or so of wars which are actually of very low intensity on the integrated AD scale.

In the other third of conflicts, there may well be an entire ‘class’ of purchaser nations which don’t have to worry about VLO in their neighbor’s air force, either for cost or politics, and quite a few of these (India, PRC, South Africa, Israel) already have their own roadmap towards future BVR systems in the Astra, SD-10 and Darter/SAHV upgrades. The USAF can generally beat all of these on first pole with supercruise and VLO plus offboard support but with only two weapons onboard in a typical strike configuration for either stealth fighter, there will need to be a LOT of emphasis on scoring ranged kills to assure runaway or 2nd salvo cleanup margin before risking 100-200 million dollar platforms on a radar merge (>10-15nm). And this cannot reasonably be assured without a major improvement in even the 120D’s weapon’s total pole (average Mach) and/or flyout time (peak Mach) for NEZ runaways and supersprinting threats. _Whether they attack the VLOs or go for the more visible strike/C4ISR/tanking platforms_. All of which will continue to form an exceedingly large percentage of the force structure, at least until 2010-12.

Yet by 2015 much of these assumptions will have entirely changed. Simply because DEWs (Directed Energy Weapons) will be in place in increasing numbers and the likelihood is high that they will be _rapidly_ proliferated, much as atomic weapons were. The U.S. airpower preeminency is simply too greatly unbalancing to strategic politics and in particular our views on intervening in areas which are considered the backyard of nations with vested interests (think Monroe Doctrine) such as China and her influence across SWA as well as with the four Tigers of the East Asia seaboard.

The question then being whether you will see COIL based weapons like the ABL or ‘digital’ (diode pumped) equivalents dominating the first generation as this will dictate a great deal of scaling and thus ubiquity in force structures. If you are looking at a building sized THEL as a fixed site, then the potential for swarming/short horizon tactics becomes too high for the weapon to be much more than an adjunct to the conventional SAMs which will have to defend it. If the volume enclosure is something closer to a Midgetman semi-trailer then the likelihood is high that the weapon will be employed at a division or even indepedent brigade level as a mobile, unpredictable, threat of great worry to ongoing strike ops indeed.

Similarly, while the technology is present (IMO) to handle most anaprop (surface / / up) conditions as a function of active beam control, it may well be that, especially with increased power in the 200-500KW range (100KW being about the lowest accepted level for anti-platform/vehicle work); the use of relay mirrors from HAEUAV or airships may be deemed necessary to achieve full theater coverage. This will imply an entirely new target class which may well be only reachable by ballistic lofted SAMs coming from a LONG ways out.

Lastly of course, there may well be perceptual variations of utility inherent to ‘CAVU theater’ vs. ‘Navy Sea Light’ employment. Southwest Asia and the Middle East has relatively good weather for some, operationally significant, parts of the year and a fairly high concentration of PGM equipped airpower needing a good spanking before they can employ their standoff weapons.

The sea lanes between say Sri Lanka and Japan are the most densely travelled and contiguously littoral on the planet in terms of commercial manufacture and interdiction of goods bound for dependent Western Nations. Closing them off could effectively enforce a lockdown on world markets. Were the South China Sea through to the Yellow Sea to become ‘Chinese Millpond’ challenged for navigation as a function of an expanded dispute over Taiwan or Korea, the USN might very well be faced with a PRC or ‘associate’ threat shooting everything from brilliant TBMs (imagine something which self deploys both a high-arc basin search aperture and a terminal kill vehicle cluster in a MIRV like spread while moving at 3-5,000mph) to conventional coast-defense (Alpha/Brahmos class), two-stage, cruise:aeroballistic AShM.

In -all- the above conditions, the value:value trades, both of manned airframes suffering S2A as much as A2A DEW attack as well as in cost expenditures of missile vs. missile knockdown /where possible/ (the only thing which could kill short arc TBMs would be something in the Raptor-Talon class of booster ASAS+LEAP) could become prohibitive in /not/ deploying laser weapons on the long-horizon sea or desert conditioned areas where protecting larger assets is of absolute (100% leakproof or it’s no good=rapid and continuous reengagement from the longest slant possible) necessity.

If the DCA jet cannot protect it’s parent vessel or base then it is _the friendly base_ (APOD/SPOD/CV/Fielded Force) whose value degrades that of conventional BVR missilery as much as the likelihood of airframe engagement by a laser with a 20-30km reach in direct mode and 100km in (threat) S2A relay.

Yet the fact remains that a well developed DEW biased IADS would also degrade the offensive survivability of all air platforms to a ‘coin toss’ level of stepped on snake. It’s either in your route or it’s not and the randomization of encounter mode will not necessarily go away simply with standoff sensors.

One area that remains potentially quesitonable is that of fighter packaging (ala F-35B with DEW package replacing the SDLF module) as, theoretically, the beam will propogate further through clear air going down than through turbulent/obscurrant rich surface air coming up, yielding a range discrepancy on the order of 60:40km in direct mode. But even here I feel I must question the utility of a system which can still suffer popup (ambush) engagement in any kind of companion mission (escort) role vs. what I would _expect_ from a system able to target from 100-200km over a much longer station hold time. Once we admit that A2A lasing against missiles is not as large a step as many would have us believe relative to A2G engagement. i.e. Either way you look at it, risk to loss or presence for targets of opportunity fleeting engagement; the fact of the matter is that an ATL type laser will probably be better employed from a platform that can reach the far horizon (RQ-4) from very high level in antimissile defense. Or a CC-130J (A-X) type system which can package the chemicals, command links and large mirror needed to get optimum performance in the A2G role. Not a Fighter.

Another thing which may effect the nature of the airwar prosecution is simple degradation from the high point of ‘Cold War with 21st century tech infusion’ force structure. As we have seen with the F/A-22, there is a strong perceptual willingness to believe that a mission which is not flown in active prosecution does not have a part to play in passive prevention. At least not on a numbered basis or ability to fight two MRC simultaneously. This is of course akin to saying that because SAC never fired a nuclear shot in anger, their contribution to peace was and is now unnecessary. But the drive towards this disconnect between achieved and continuing mission capability will increase so long as the U.S. faces no truly high tech threat which can challenge our belief in overwhelming national military ‘superior might=unalienable right=unchallengeable authority’ (the whole world-cop thing coming back to bite us) to intervention.

This presents another set of variable outcomes in that I don’t think a lot of nations will /want to/ fight U.S. over anything so long as we guarantee a Pax Americana in which they can get rich on lax trade and the efforts of the WTO to industrialize the world at our expense. Certainly none of Rome’s dependent conquests minded. Until they had achieved sufficient economic power that the recession of the Legions as Rome waned was more or less unimportant to their own remote or self-reliant sub-cultures.

If China attacks in the next ten years they will lose. If they attack in 20, too much will depend on unknowable strategic resource, societal and geopolitical chokepoint politics of the time to say how they will move (as a group in ‘coalition’) or what our remaining force posture will let us do in response. But given they are a lot smarter player than we are, I foresee something more akin to Taiwan-as-Cuba and a very carefully engineered set of ambush politics at the WTO as much as UN to prevent effective U.S. response. Similar to say the EP-3E engineered embarrassment incident but on a much larger scale.

If the U.S. does not have troops on the ground (something which will not be willingly engaged in after Iraq and 2008) and DEWs render conventional airpower dead, then you are back to value:value trades for a robotic platform vs. a mission role need that may well be too dense to be covered by a single airframe anyway. i.e. if we are down to some level of SOF-meets-Cyberpunk warfare for the ‘hearts and minds’ of populations within cities, the numeric count of UAV/UCAV surveillance required to maintain contiguous coverage against ‘insurgencies’ that are as much sponsored by corporate groups as countries may be so incredibly high as to make 1 AMRAAM for one Fire Scout++ another non-contender, economically. Even as the systems ability to hide in the clutter of urban sprawl will inhibit standoff engagement by high power lasers that may well cook something collateraled behind the drone too.

In this case, the big driver is apt to be sensor lookin vs. weapon reachin on more conventional ballistic/kinetic kill solutions.

Thus ‘BVR’ being more related to the ton:mile cheapness of the firing platform and it’s endurance factors. i.e. if I can fire an SM-6 ERAM from 250-400km out because my overhead or standoff sensor platform can actually see that relay mirror for a DEW (or C4ISR ‘pseudolite’) that far away, why waste the intermediate bus costs of a fighter that cannot get out of it’s own way and is /never/ less than .5-1.5hrs away from engagement vs. the missiles 10-15 minutes of hypersonic travel.

In removing the bus platform of an A2A recognizeable system (or at least consolidating it towards a ‘missileer’ endurance system of limited total inventory) I can triple the number of shots I can stock to penetrate the anti-missile defenses of a DEW oriented IADS. The question then becomes simply whether your missile is itself a hit-or-miss singleshot weapon. Or if it is itself nothing but a cheap INS/GPS container deployment system for loitering Turbo-AAM (MALI or LOCAAS like) that hunt the kinds of mini/micro-UAV that are apt to be found in just /huge/ numbers. In a world where leverage is fleeting and nobody fields large armies whose actions must be accounted for at home as well as abroad (when they can use SOF black teams and indigenous rebels on a mercenary-hire basis); you may find that your desire is to open holes in the enemy sensor coverage to enable small scale ops rather than achieve ‘air dominance’ over a broader theater area or longer term.

As such, my view of traditional BVR A2A combat as a function of mission platform exposure and theater goal objectivism is somewhat jaundiced. I tend to see the relevance of air vs. surface launch solely in terms of reactive speed of deployment. Obviously, air beats sea, especially if sea is busy, too far away from a mid-continent AO or denied access to the theater by superior landbased weapons and overhead sensor basin-coverage) and sea beats air for absolute radii and commited presence vs. deployment costs. Yet an RQ-4 has 6,000nm and 40hrs worth of flight time to achieve a 200-300km lookin with a 20million dollar platform and daily operating costs on the order of 50,000 dollars. A CVSF requires many more escorts and sea space to protect itself while being MUCH more visible to even the EOS level of overhead surveillance and having (at present) virtually NO standoff sensor HAE sensor platforms compatible with decklaunch.

Given all the above, I would therefore split my ‘anti-air’ roles between the following:

1. Reactive systems designed to put high energy, single shot, _cheap_ kill vehicles into seeker cube on such readily visible assets as HAEUAV, LEO satellites and perhaps (Standard LAM with a BROACH head) some buried/high value surface targets ‘as a class’ (common booster, different seeker/warhead/upper stage). This assumes the PS&T TLE vs. threat mobility and reentry speeds will allow it. Obviously, these may also be used defensively to pre-bus engage TBMs before they clear a local DEW horizon. And eventually intercontinental (TAV/FOBS etc.) hypersonic sling bombers where appropriate. Such will require staging upgrades ala Sprint/Spartan to move the cross track intercept speed up to 4km/sec or more and ranges from 600-1,000km more towards 3,000-3,500km using MCG targeting update by satellite or pseudolite. Cheapness will be key to destroying assets that either deploy within or are directly protected by dedicated DEW defenses of their own as swarming may be a prerequisite.

2. Saturative/Hunting systems. Designed to put low energy, longer endurance kill vehicles into conditions where they may achieve value:value equivalent hunting kills on UAVs in situations for which either an already existing or rapidly repopulateable (dense/popup) unmanned air vehicle force requires specific and/or repeated suppressionary engagement over particularly intraurban operating environments. In this case, any requirement for high speed is almost certainly due to the need to transit inwards from a long standoff launch platform and thus require nothing more than a GPS/INS stable bussing level of onboard sophistication (limited flight vehicle agility etc.). Yet costs will remain per-round high due to the clustering of multiple kill vehicles within the shell. To avoid DEW defenses, you will probably want the option to MIRV-short and push forward weapons which transit at subsonic speeds under the horizon and this may also be a necessary option for instances where you are trying to engage targets over a city and cannot afford to have high speed missile fragments falling on a collaterals rich environment. The level of hunting capability required of the kill vehicle submunition may be relatively high depending on the availability of target cue from outside sources (is everything in the volume ‘fair game’ or must kills be taken selectively?) but the use of shaped warheads in a fashion similar to the SG.500 Jagdfaust, together with the turbine engine of an endurance ‘P=patrol not Pursuit’ system, will allow persistence of local air dominance against low-value targets over a viable time window of half an hour or so. As well as surety of targeting through multiple reattack if need be.

3. Escort Drones. For the period of time that macro-scale UCAVs themselves are cost:kill viable and certainly as long as the majority of your sensorization capability is isolated in _bomber_ platforms (XTRA and EOTS on the A-45 for example) it is probable that a low cost escort capability will be generated, simply on the notion that payload volume is half that of the attack vehicles while targeting is offboard, allowing for supersonic/high G performance penalties to be acceptable so long as total endurance of mission (several hundred nm at least) is such as to present a risk factor for engagement by similar (robotic) threats over the full distance of transit in/out as well as any loiter in the target area (for which uninhabiteds are naturally advantaged). Given that most of the scaling between total-pole, ECCM and terminal effects (warhead and intercept energy) will largely zero out in the face of massively ‘theater wide’ sensor cueing and CEC as well as the absence of a pilot to care about, I doubt if this system will engender the development of many new classes of AAM so much as exploit existing stocks (of which there are /thousands/) and indeed it may well be itself carried into combat by the A-drone as a kind of parasite release system (think Chukar with teeth) in which case any weapon-on-the-weapon package may not be BVR capable in the traditional sense at all. However; given that frequently the fighter pilot’s most fleeting resource is time and thus the best defense against attack is operational maneuver space in which to maximize your positional advantages /over time/ (preset ambush geometries and offensive split teams to do push-pull pincering formation breakups etc.); I can see the need for a system which, recoverable or not, creates running room as a ‘lead time = frontal sweep’ of high-performance advantaged rate of advance. Given the difficulties that the Iraqis had with fighters ‘engaging but never finding’ 12ft TALDs in Desert Storm and the fact that you will be operating that much closer to a flashlight surface defense, active optical stealth may be a prerequisite for even these machines to be useful, in which case the defintion of ‘visual’ and ‘beyond visual’ combat may well come to be redefined anyway.

CONCLUSION:
As you can see from the above, I make almost no reference to such systems as the F-35 and other manned assets beyond 2015. Because I feel that the cost of that program has already reached a Tipping Point lemmings-off-cliff-face moment in terms of both purchaseable numbers for cost and utility under an American “Everybody owns one because we’re all friends…” system of aggressive export of VLO but constricted independence of local use (basically, unless one is Israeli, you can only employ American Weapons on American Sponsored Crusades).

Add in DEWs and I think that the entire nature of air warfare is about to undergo a drastic paradigm change as the gross misrepresentation of man as a ‘more flexible’ alternative to robotic air is seen for what it is in light of his inability to penetrate a high intensity threat defense without blink-of-eye random vaporization. While his inabiltiy to provide total lockdown _presence_ of coverage densities in OOTW/SSC conflicts will inhibit his role in that level of fighting as well. i.e. if you can’t stay on station for at least 8-10hrs after a 2-4hr transit, you are useless.

Given that the U.S. is no longer the top industrial producer, per capita, by quite a long list and is about to be second-ranked by Brazil as an agropower, our ability to act as a consumerist maw driving ‘trade’ (at an inequity of currency value whose fallen dollar will soon be matched by rising alternative market currencys) will not last much longer. A massive national debt will only hasten our descent from a unipolar superpower to a dole state kept alive solely for the value of the ‘interest payments’ (sold off corporate and landbased values) on foreign held loans which cannot be bankruptcy nationalized or forfeited as so much of our own support to the 2nd and 3rd world loans has been because the WTO and IMF will not allow it.

If you cannot use a capability and you cannot afford it. You will lose it. And what comes next will be determined as much by the economic politics as the technical realities of where the replacement (regional coalitions) nexus of strategic power come out of the vacuum of our departure as a global enforcer.

yes but the hellfire doesnt have the same manueverability and G limit requirments that top notch a2a missile needs to have..the 15cm in space of the c7 is basically used for more fuel to increase range..

I wasn’t comparing a Hellfire to a AAM.

The extra space could just as easily be used for new electronics.

The guidance system will be the only new technology, the airframe/propulsion will be based on proven technology.

Hopefully not, the JCM has 3 modes of guidance and is still similar in size but superior in performance to the Hellfire.

yes but the hellfire doesnt have the same manueverability and G limit requirments that top notch a2a missile needs to have..the 15cm in space of the c7 is basically used for more fuel to increase range..

I guess the hard part will be the seeker head layout.

And that of getting all that technology including the propulsion to fit into the rough weight and size of the AMRAAM…the seeker is always the biggest risk responsible for roughly 65% of the missile cost.

wouldnt the added capability add up more weight thereby compromising on capability.

Hopefully not, the JCM has 3 modes of guidance and is still similar in size but superior in performance to the Hellfire.

In the AMRAAM info you posted it stated that the use of modern electronics has left a 6in/15cm space in the guidance section. I guess the hard part will be the seeker head layout.

wouldnt the added capability add up more weight thereby compromising on capability.

So you’d spend nearly $1.2 million to take out three targets instead of $54,000? 😮 Doesn’t sound too good to me.

If it could be done with 3 JDAMs, of course I’d use 3 JDAMs.

What would happen when they ran out of munitions before the war was over because the stuff they bought cost twenty times as much as what they needed? Oops.

Your missing my point, the Dual Role/Range missile I am proposing is primarily a self defence weapon for a2a and anti radar use.

The GPS/INS guided ground attack capability is a useful secondary role for emergencies and targets of opportunity.

OK then, according to http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/missile.htm

a Sidewinder costs $84,000,
a AMRAAM costs $386,000,
a HARM costs $316,856,
a JDAM kit costs $18,000,
and a A-10 costs $13 million.

bring_it_on suggested my proposed missile would cost $400,000.

One of my $400,000 missiles can do the work of 3 types of single role missile costing $786,856. Sounds pretty good to me 🙂 .

So you’d spend nearly $1.2 million to take out three targets instead of $54,000? 😮 Doesn’t sound too good to me.

What would happen on a CAS mission when you have run out of bombs and your troops are pinned down by enemy artillery, you know where the guns are but you only have AAMs left?

Answer- lots of people are killed and injured while you rearm with cheap bombs.

What would happen when they ran out of munitions before the war was over because the stuff they bought cost twenty times as much as what they needed? Oops.

It comes back to $$$.

OK then, according to http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/missile.htm

a Sidewinder costs $84,000,
a AMRAAM costs $386,000,
a HARM costs $316,856,
a JDAM kit costs $18,000,
and a A-10 costs $13 million.

bring_it_on suggested my proposed missile would cost $400,000.

One of my $400,000 missiles can do the work of 3 types of single role missile costing $786,856. Sounds pretty good to me 🙂

Why fire an expensive multimode missile at a target when you can drop a cheap JDAM on it?

What would happen on a CAS mission when you have run out of bombs and your troops are pinned down by enemy artillery, you know where the guns are but you only have AAMs left?

Answer- lots of people are killed and injured while you rearm with cheap bombs.

sferrin,

Very good point about BVRAAM, most new missiles are now.

I don’t think there is a need for dedicated SRAAMs or LRAAMs at the moment for countries like the UK or USA..

We already have SRAAMs so it’s kindof a moot point. As for LRAAMs if you wait until you need them before you start development then you’re too late.

Seeing fighters carrying missiles which are unlikely to be needed and are of no use in the a2g role seems very wasteful…

I think it’s safe to say that it’s better to have them and not need them than to need them and not have them. And short ranged missiles typically have small warheads that are of limited use against ground targets. There was a limited conversion of some Sidewinders into ARMs (SideARM) but it didn’t really hold anybody’s attention, let alone interest. Not to mention an AIM-9X is a hell of a lot more expensive than a JDAM.

What I think is needed is a missile that can combine the capabilities of the AIM-9X/ASRAAM, AMRAAM/Meteor and HARM/ALARM. .

AARGM (The ramjet powered version) would make a good candidate for the Meteor/HARM replacement. It actually is being considered as a replacement for HARM at some time in the future but it’s warhead would certainly do a number on an aircraft too. But it would be too big and expensive to warrant throwing a couple on an A-10 “just in case”.

With single role missiles a Typhoon would fly a a2g mission with 2x ASRAAM, 2x ALARM, 4x AMRAAM (3 if designator a is carried), 3x fuel tanks and 2-4 smart bombs.
If it encounters no air threat, 6 hardpoints where wasted..

I think that is probably the exception rather than the rule. Generally if it’s just a self-defence concern the short range missiles aren’t displaceing land attack ordinance. Wingtip and overwing rails are perfect examples. Even on the Strike Eagle the four AAMs it normally carries are on rails that would otherwise be unoccupied. A-10s just throw a couple Sidewinders on a twin-rail launcher way out at the end of the wing were they don’t normally carry bombs and stuff anyway.

With a Dual Role/Range missile the Typhoon would have had 8x missiles for air combat or anti radar needs and could have cut back on these missiles to save weight/drag or increase bomb load.

With GPS/INS guidance the Dual Role/Range missile could have a useful fixed target attack capability too.

It comes back to $$$. Why fire an expensive multimode missile at a target when you can drop a cheap JDAM on it? Range? Drop an SDB with a wing kit on it. Suppose to be good for 60 miles.

The missile I am suggesting is basically a AMRAAM, which already has a GPS/INS unit, fitted with a IIR and anti radar sensor alongside the active radar sensor.

The JCM is the inspiration for this multi seeker head http://www.missilesandfirecontrol.com/our_products/antiarmor/JCM/product-jcm.html

It might be more expensive, but it is also more likely to be used, buying cheaper missiles that might never be used would be just as expensive.

but wouldnt the cost be too alarmingly high..i mean if we have one missle…say doing everything we would be spending close to 400000-half a mill per peice when the sidewindr is a little over 80,000…wouldnt building up an inventory be too high??

sferrin,

Very good point about BVRAAM, most new missiles are now.

I don’t think there is a need for dedicated SRAAMs or LRAAMs at the moment for countries like the UK or USA.

Seeing fighters carrying missiles which are unlikely to be needed and are of no use in the a2g role seems very wasteful.

What I think is needed is a missile that can combine the capabilities of the AIM-9X/ASRAAM, AMRAAM/Meteor and HARM/ALARM.

With single role missiles a Typhoon would fly a a2g mission with 2x ASRAAM, 2x ALARM, 4x AMRAAM (3 if designator a is carried), 3x fuel tanks and 2-4 smart bombs.
If it encounters no air threat, 6 hardpoints where wasted.

With a Dual Role/Range missile the Typhoon would have had 8x missiles for air combat or anti radar needs and could have cut back on these missiles to save weight/drag or increase bomb load.

With GPS/INS guidance the Dual Role/Range missile could have a useful fixed target attack capability too.

Well what i would want is a considerable increase in the NEZ ( a term that is itself debatable)..,2 way datalinks,better sustained speeds (maybe even upto mach 5),TVC and a brand new seeker (the specs of which i am really unable to chart out)..according to me the new missile should be revoulutionary something which the meteor is not…One of the ways to do that is go in a joint capability therefore allowing tremendous mission flexibilty but i am searching for the next big GENREATION LEAP AND WHAT IT WOULD BE (JUST LIKE THE AIM-120 AND ACTIVE BVR MISSILES WERE OVER SARH MISSILES…)