Hindsight on the

[updated:LAST EDITED ON 24-03-02 AT 07:07 AM (GMT)]

Years ago, a politician criticized the problems surrounding the IDF project, calling it the “I Don’t Fly” fighter, giving government critics a new catch phrase to live by.

Now, this politican, who now is the President of Taiwan, has gleefully taken by his words, in the face of one of the most amazing safety records of a new fighter, to call the IDF, the “I Do Fly” fighter.

It started in 1979, when the US literally dumped Taiwan off the diplomatic track, replacing it with a “defense agreement”. An attempt to buy the F16, or the then export variant, the F16/79, was rebuffed. The final straw came around 1982, when the Reagan Administration refused the $1 billion dollar purchase for 100 F20 Tigersharks. Taiwan wanted to license produce the F20 from Northrop to get around this restriction, but again the US government refused.

The feeling in Taiwan was bleak—their so called biggest ally and friend has turned its back on them. At the same time, China has begun acquiring Western assets, including technology, that could boost their air force. Without qualitative air superiority over the Staits of Taiwan, Taiwan is doomed in the face of China’s superior numerical might. The F20 refusal, amounted to a knife on their back. The fighter was necessary for their national survival.

The only route available, was the hardest and the unthinkable. They must have their own fighter, hopefully equal to the West, and technologically superior to those across the Straits.

The route to developing a new fighter isn’t going to be smooth, especially for a small island of 20 million, diplomatically isolated as a “renegade province”, which has no previous experience in designing a fighter, and no previous experience in building one, except for the technically modest F5s they have under license. Much less a sophisticated third generation fighter.

As no one can do this without some help, the assistance from US contractors like General Dynamics, Northrop, and Allied Signal were pretty much private and unofficial. Officially, the US government frowned upon the effort, afraid to jeopardize relations with Beijing, viewed as an ally to counter Soviet hegemony. Privately, the US turned a blind eye to the efforts of these contractors.

The embargo on the advanced jet engines meant that a brand new engine had to be developed, and built on the island. Paul Dodge of Allied Signal (now Turbosolve) was put behind this project starting in 1982, this becoming the TFE1042.

The avionics of the plane, called the GD53 (Golden Dragon) was heavily based on the APG67 used on the Tigershark. It does not appear to be the same or an export version—the GD53 appears reworked to fire indigenous Taiwan missiles.

The construction of the plane was quite ambitious in its time and even today, heavily using composites to save weight and employing the blended body design similar to the F16. Controls too, are state of the art, with digital fly by wire to give the plane exceptional maneuverability.

The overall design of the plane appears like a mix of different concepts—the blended body of the F16, the engine intakes of the F18, and the nose of the F20. This may partly be due to the influence of US contractors in the project, but it also appears to me, that the design is a reflection—and a culmination—of the Taiwanese desire for these three US fighters. Many of the proposed designs included a delta, a twin rudder proposal that looked like an F18 with squarish intakes underneath, and even a blueprint of a basic F5 design with a delta and canards, a design that coincidentally, looked like a Saab Grippen.

The roll out of the first prototype was in December 1988, and the first flight, around May 1989. Nearly five years later, the first planes have begun to equip ROCAF squadrons.

From the drawing board in the mid eighties, to flying prototypes in the late eighties, and service deployment by 1994—this must set a record time for the deployment of a modern jet fighter of this sophistication and technology. Problems will inevitably rise, but when viewed against the context of being able to field such a complex fighter in record time, it is astounding that’s about all the problems they had, much less a remarkable safety record on both the plane and the engine—the Taiwanese should indeed be thankful at the lucky gods they worship. Many of the contemporary fighter projects in the eighties, have either stopped or has yet to even see deployment.

Indeed it is easy to underestimate the IDF. It does not appear much in airshows around the world, or in glorious sales brochures in trade shows, or in the front cover of aviation magazines. It is perhaps the most underestimated plane in the world. And part of this is because of its image of being “underpowered”. A more powerful engine would not have been allowed due to US embargo and sensitivity with Beijing relations.

Combined the two TFE1042-70 engines produce an afterburning thrust of 18,900lbs. This seemed meager compared to an F16A’s 23,000lbs of thrust. But then, when compared to an F16, many planes do appear meager and underpowered.

For one thing, the IDF is quite light—only over 6,400kg empty. An F16C weighs about 8,400kg empty in comparison. The IDF is claimed to actually accelerate faster than an F104 Starfighter, and its turning radius is smaller than even an F5.

To put this in context, let’s take the Saab Grippen. Acclaimed for its light weight, the Grippen actually weighs over 6,600kg, just slightly heavier than an IDF. Its Volvo made engine, derived from the GE 404, has an afterburning thrust of about 18,100lbs, slightly less than an IDF’s combined thrust.

On the avionics, the GD53 has a scan range of 80 nautical miles, or over 120 kilometers, with the ability to track 10 targets and offer firing solutions for four of them. The TC-1 missile it carries appears like a late model AIM9 derivative; the TC-2 is a medium range missile with true active guidance. While some people may hesitate to call it “AMRAAM” class, this is the term the DOD classed the missile. (It probably has a performance between the AIM7M and the AIM120, and whatever it actually means, the bottomline is that this missile is no slouch.) Regardless of any comparison with the AIM7M, active guidance means that the plane could fire these missiles at four different targets, and then forget about them, with no need to continually illuminate the target as the missiles autonomously pursues their targets. The TC2 puts Taiwan in a very select club of countries to design and make active guided AAMs. The IDF will also fire the AIM7M and AIM9 for those who wish to know.

For guided ground weapons, the IDF can carry the TC-2A anti radiation missile with passive and active radar guidance, and the HF2 antiship sea skimming missile.

Political winds changed a lot to Taiwan’s favor after Tianammen. Knowing that Taiwan would deploy the IDF anyway, the US allowed for one of the biggest F16 deals of the decade. Hungry for export sales, France also approved the largest Mirage 2000-5 purchase in history. The Mirage 2000-5 deal was considered a backup to both the F16 procurement plan and the IDF project if it failed. The fact that all three succeeded placed the ROCAF in a unique but logistically dubious position of having to own and maintain three different fighter types. The projected 250 planes was cut to 130, after Taiwan procured 150 F16s and 60 Mirage 2000-5s.

With the IDF, Taiwan would not have any need of the Mirage 2000-5 and the F16 other than to gain experience and study their respective technologies. However, because of the greater power of the US and French planes, these planes could carry heavier payloads the IDF can only dream of. And besides, the F16 had always been tops in the Taiwan want list.

But there are reasons why the F16A could not fulfill Taiwan’s requirements. While the F16A Block 20 has plenty of niceties (color MFD, AIFF, updated avionics, computer, etc,.) it cannot fire the AGM84 Harpoon, which the F16C can (and is refused by the US government for reasons you know what.) This is where the Mirage 2000-5 comes in, with its dreaded Exocets. The Mirage 2000-5 has many capabilities the Taiwanese could benefit in learning, and likewise use the experience in their next fighter. Both the US and the French governments did not allow for any modification on both fighters before delivery to fire the HF2 antiship missiles or the TC2 AAM. (The US isn’t also selling Taiwan the AGM88 HARM missile, which is why Taiwan is producing its own antiradiation missile, the TC2A).

That alone—the ability to support Taiwan’s own indigenous missile projects—means that the role of the IDF is destined to stay, and the inevitable destiny that it will have a successor. One such project is the Hsiung Feng III, an extended long range antiship missile with supersonic capability, putting Taiwan in a very select club of countries fielding supersonic ASCMs—the other two being Russia, and Taiwan’s neighbor across the straits.

The Taiwanese perchant to paranoid secrecy and desire not to attract any offending attention means that the lack of news pertaining to a new fighter project, does not mean there isn’t any. A project to put a more powerful engine on the IDF was suspended for the lack of funds after the F16 and Mirage 2000-5 purchase. Nonetheless this is viewed as the next step in the evolution of the IDF, which is to make it a more versatile multirole strike fighter. Taiwan has the technology to produce a radar reduction paint, and this might be used on the next version of the IDF, called the FCK-1C/D, expected to be deployed before the 2010. (Current FCK-1 will now be -1A/B, the latter suffix for the two seaters.) The IDF already has a few upgrades in the few years it is on service, among them the AIFF used in late batch F16s and the F16 MLU.

Is China’s new J10A a threat to the IDF? By all accounts it seems reasonable to assume that the J10A achieved technical parity with the IDF, even though the IDF first flew nearly ten years before, with service deployment several years before the J10. By the time the J10 comes into service, the IDF can be looking at its next generation. Performance wise, the J10 may have a more powerful engine, but the IDF’s proven serviceability means that more planes are likely ready for combat. Depending on the quality of how Taiwan can improve its TC2 missiles, the IDF can still be a formidable foe in BVR combat against the R77 armed J10s and the Flankers in Chinese service.

The introduction of the Flanker into PROC service was something unevisioned when the IDF was first concieved. Dealing with F7s is one thing, the SU27 is another. While the need of a multirole strike fighter capable of using indigenous missiles will assure the feature for a new IDF, the Flankers have upped the bar on the air superiority requirements, which I think the IDF may be hard pressed to meet. That question will have to be answered by the ROCAF in the next ten years.