If Cold War turned hot in the 1980s

I have read a rather interesting thread on ACIG written by many intelligent people, as it seems according to most people the NATO would definitely go on the defensive against Warsaw Pact.

Usually, the NATO explained about its superiority in the air. Michael’s posts in the discussion about the Su-22 showed, however, that there was no such distinct edge like often tought.

By now, even if I could agree that on the ground the NATO would almost certainly be able to stop the War Pact forces (and these would not only include Soviets, but also Czechs marching through Bavaria, and Poles attacking Denmark), I’m not completely sure if the general consensus about the NATO being able to win over the War Pact is a point into the right direction. I mean, there are some aspects which should have been a cause for grave concern.

“On the paper” (espeically on the basis of what was known at the time about Soviet tactical aircraft), no Su-17 or MiG-27 stands a serious chance of surviving a 1:1 encounter even with Phantoms, not to talk about lighter fighters like Mirage, or subsequent “teens”. But, such assesments were based on what was found on export variants of Soviet aircraft sold to Peru, Libya etc. In reality, as Michael reminded us, the Su-17 and MiG-27 were equipped with solid guided weapons – including guided ASMs and LGBs – long before Tornado IDS/GR.Mk.1s, just for example, and certainly much earlier than any Harriers, or Alpha Jets, or A-10s. The use of AGM-65s was still limited in the NATO even in late-1980s, when the 16th Soviet Air Force already had the Kh-25 and Kh-29 in widespread use in all its attack units (remember that even RAF Tornado GR.Mk.1s haven’t got LGBs until 1991).

Furthermore, the NATO had one or two deicated SEAD-assets (F-4Gs at Spangdahlem, with eventual another wing arriving from the CONUS), with all the other units being completely unable to use any kind of ARMs. The Soviets, to contrary, had also the Kh-28/28M, Kh-25MP (which wasn’t even detected by the NATO), and later also Kh-58 (from 1986 or os) in widespread use in all of their units as well. All of these were also supported by a range of efficient ECM-pods, for which I know were able to effectively jam both, the MIM-23A and the MIM-23B Hawks.

Consequently, one must conclude that Soviet aircraft were equipped with a wider range of guided weapons, than NATO air forces, and were tactically far more flexible. Actually, it was so, that while the NATO boasted with the “technological superiority” of its air assets, the Soviets indeed possesed the technological superiority, as the NATO would have to fight an eventual air-to-ground war in the 1980s with dumb bombs, CBUs, and some support by more sophisticated assets, while the War Pact would do that with full use of stand-off guided missiles and ECM-pods.

The situation in the air-to-air arena, gentlemen, was even poorer – for the NATO. While the War Pact fielded over 1.500 MiG-23M/MFs by early 1980s, all of which were equipped with R-23 MRAAM, the NATO depended for such capability to one wing + one group of Sparrow-equipped F-15A/Cs, three squadrons of RAF Phantoms, and three of CAF Hornets. Poor odds, to say at least, and the situation has not improved subsequently, as the Soviets then introduced over 600 MiG-29s – equipped with the R-27 – into the theatre, while the first AMRAAMs reached IOC only in 1991. Thus, even if the R-23s and R-27s are of doubious quality, to say at least, in the BVR antenna the War Pact had such an advantage, that I must highly doubt if the NATO could seriously challenge this even with “much better training”.

Besides, who said that the training and readiness were really “better”? And, were they really so much more realistic? Or based on wrong assesments?

The NATO pilots trained to fight against pairs, fours, six or eight “enemy” aircraft. But, the War Pact would come in full-regiment-sized formations, and their regiments consisted of 35+ aircraft, not 20+ as usually described. Every Western pilot will always confirm, that two or four Floggers are no problem; but – especially those which confronted MiG-23s in air combat – will always confirm that in large numbers, they were VERY dangerous.

So I’m not only unsure if this “technological superiority” was really existant, but I’d say that the edge in training was also not very real either. As Michael pointed in the discussion about the Su-22: perhaps the East German AF (LSK) haven’t flown each day, but if everybody thinks this is so because they couldn’t better, then that’s wrong: the Soviets wouldn’t let them fly more often. Despite this, from what one hears from former LSK, they were at least as good, if not better, than the Soviets. And, gentlemen, while NATO pilots went home at Friday afternoon, Soviets, Germans, Poles, and Czechs sat in their ready rooms, and had very specific orders to be able to put all their aircraft into the air within 30 minutes, even on the weekend. The training of War Pact air forces was realistic, and intensive (something I haven’t believed until recently) and – contrary to IrAF – they would not be limited by a lunatic leader, and sit on their airfields, but deployed and used to full extension.

Exactly the last aspect is one which really makes me feeling cold when thinking about it. Namely, the Soviets (and the others) would indeed come over in very massive formations. For them, the air battlefield over Germany was organized in three fronts, each of which had very clear order for the first day of the war: create a main “safe corridor”, some 40-150km wide, over 160km into the depth of the enemy air space. If some of you now start to smile, mind this: the Soviets studied extensively the air war over Germany in WWII, and the US tactics from North Vietnam, and comined some elements of these for their purposes. For the creation of each such corridors, formations of following composition would be created:
– EW-support An-12 (3-4 examples);
– SEAD-strike Su-24Ms and MiG-25BMs, supported by Su-24MPs and Tu-16RMs, while Tu-16PPs would create chaff corridors (up to 20 aircraft in total);
– 50 Tu-22M and Tu-16 bombers, equipped with AS-4 and AS-6 ASMs, respectivelly (no, these would not be hunting NATO convoys in Atlantic);
– 50 Su-24Ms;
– 100 MiG-29s;
– 100 MiG-23s;
– up to 50 Su-27s and MiG-31s.

That’s 350 aircraft in one main strike, and each front was to create three sub-corridors at once, combining – depending on which front are we talking about – up to 1.200 aircraft (that’s if we asses the situation even with only 75% readiness) per single operation, or up to 3.400 aircraft at once.

Three such operations were to be flown each day on each front, and I still haven’t started to count true tactical assets, like MiG-27s, Su-17s, and Su-25s, which would attack single targets (foremost NATO airfields and depots) in wake of such strike packages.

I really don’t know how one could stop such onslaughts: the Germany haven’t managed (even if – periodically – inflicting heavy losses), and the Vietnamese either. Who would? The NATO? At which price and with which success? To me it appears that the NATO would either be so successfull, that after one week of the war it would spend all its reserves of AAMs, or it would be overrun in the air….

BTW, this all is still a talk about purely conventional operation; I haven’t considered the tactical nukes, the use of which was a viable solution. But if anybody likes…

Cheers,
Tom

PS A characteristic joke was going around at the time, explaining about two Soviet officers trinking coffee somewhere in Antwerp, or Paris, or similar, after the end of WWIII. One asks the other: “And, who won the air war?” The other: “Well, the NATO, of course.”

I too don’t think there was much Air Superiority from NATO in the 1980s at all, there were too few F-15s equipped with AIM-7 only and all the F-16s and I mean ALL were equipped with Sidewinders during the 1980s, they had no BVR weapons until AIM-120 I believe till 1991. Not only the F-16 would have to fight a 1:3 ratio in numbers against WarPact fighters such as Su-17 and Mig-23 and Mig-25, it was even more outclassed by early Mig-29s with R77 ad R27.