Indian Navy News and Discussions

Report: India to help Vietnam train peacekeeping forces
By The Associated Press (CP) – 4 days ago

SNIP__

The South Asian powerhouse will help Vietnam train forces for international peacekeeping while the communist country offered to provide repair, maintenance and fuel for Indian naval ships, the Tien Phong (Pioneer) newspaper reported Thursday. The agreement was reached during talks Wednesday between Vietnamese Defence Minister Phung Quang Thanh and his Indian counterpart A.K. Antony, it said.

Snip__

http://www.google.com/hostednews/canadianpress/article/ALeqM5iwymASPhFSCxa2iS8Z5iHhoSWdAw?docId=4836297

Wonder if IN ships will be based in Vietnam

Inter-services feuds apart, I would say the rationale behind India’s development of amphibious warfare is not to get an organic capability within the Navy, instead to develop a token (related to India’s Armed Forces size) capability forcing potential opponents (mainly Pakistan) to spend huge resources to take care of the menace.

As a side effect, India will gain a political tool exploitable in many scenarious, from peace keeping missions to joint security agreements in the Indian Ocean area (mainly a maritime and archipelagos environment), but I won’t say it is worth of losing a whole Army’s brigade or to divert resources from other priorities to raise amphibious troops within the Navy.

91 Infantry Brigade – for amphibious warfare

First off, hello to all my distinguished contributors. It’s been a long time since I have been away.

I do not know if this has been discussed before but the 91st Infantry Brigade was trained in Amphibious warfare and are slated to be on INS Jalashwa.

While I do not know much about their actual location of posting (either sea based or land based), my main question is this :-

Instead of raising a 5000 strong infantry for amphib. warfare, why does not the Ind.Govt think of going ahead with raising MARINES as another force which would have an air / sea lift capability?

(I know we have the Marine Commando Force – but it is more of a mission-specific commando force than an expeditionary force) Would it not be a good idea to slowly raise an Indian version of the US Marines / Royal Marines / Phillipine Marines?

Any enlightening points would be highly appreciable in discussing this topic.

Cheers
Dandpatta

India in the market for LPD’s…finally focusing on amphibious abilities.

“Finally”?

In the last 4 years the IN has commissioned 3 LST(L) ships… which are improved versions of the earlier 2 commissioned in 1987 & 1997.

The earlier two were themselves improved versions of the RN’s “Sir” class LSLs (and the RAN’s Tobruk).

3 years ago, the IN purchased ex-USS Trenton to gain both design and operating knowledge of the larger, more capable amphibious dock type ship… and are now ready to build 4 of that type themselves.

It appears to me that the IN has been focused on amphibious abilities for some time now… it simply takes time to evaluate, develop, build, and put into service large warships of any type.

After all, the 3 Shardul class LST(L) were ordered in 2001, and construction of the first began in 2003.

India in the market for LPD’s…finally focusing on amphibious abilities.

http://www.bharatrakshak.com/NEWS/newsrf.php?newsid=13540

The four LPDs, on the lines of INS Jalashwa that India bought from the US for USD 50 million in 2007, would come at a cost of Rs 16,000 crore and a global tender would be issued for its under the Defence Ministry’s ‘Buy and Make’ production policy. Under this, India would make the warships through license from a foreign firm

That’s an easy way out from what you said earlier. See your own post with map.

I don’t think IN can see any hostile nation in the IOR which require more than the projected capability(the ships work with the two fleets).
MAP

The projected capability P-15 and P-15B (none has been commissioned), working with the two fleets that will include the current ships and the planned ships, hence the projected capability projected as i have read till now, out to 2020/22.

Easy way out, from a discussion?

Of course they are. You posted a map with countries ringing the Indian Ocean. I’m just discussing the capabilities of the relevant countries.

A military should (and will) consider all possible contingencies, even if they cannot be acknowledge publicly because they deal with ‘friendlies’. IMHO, China is a very real possible FOE, which operates Su-27, Su-30, J-11 and H6. Next consider China’s allies in the more immediate area.

Your view of relevant=every country in IOR, without considering any realities of this part of the world.

There is no cold war going on that could turn hot at any time, IN has coordination plans with many nations you state, and the governments political objectives that define what is or what is not a threat to the INs objectives are to work with many of these states.

PRC has no J-11s,H-6, Su-27s or Su-30s operating in the IOR. PRC military basing allies in the area include Pakistan at most (though not really), rest of the allies PRC is developing for commercial reasons including shipping (in a naval context), the string of pearls is not a scheme for military basing, as that opens up these ‘allies’ to military retaliation.

And if you take every nation with a maritime force in IOR as a threat to IN, then a that is paranoid behavior and b there is no way you could not consider USN, which can not be met at sea with the current or projected economic and military resources, so that forces a political decision to ally with or against, see 1971, USN carrier battle group and how it was dealt with through political choices.

That’s how Nato flotilla’s in the North Atlantic evaded USSR long range assets, in the face of significant threat posed by WP forces during the cold war. IIRC, they only ‘lit up’ once sure that they had been detected.

“EMCON is used to prevent an enemy from detecting, identifying, and locating friendly forces. It is also used to minimize electromagnetic interference among friendly systems. EMCON is normally imposed by a commander to control all electromagnetic radiations. Once EMCON is imposed, general or specific restrictions may be added to the EMCON order, depending on the operational, intelligence, or technical factors for the area affected. “
http://www.tpub.com/ans/69.htm

“The objectives of EMCON are to deny the enemy any way that it may locate your position, to support the efforts to disrupt the enemy’s electiveness, and to allow your actions to go unnoticed. To accomplish these objectives, EMCON conditions are designed with the following guidelines:
– Minimize detection by enemy sensors
– Allow effective friendly command and control (C2)
– Support operations security (OPSEC)
– Support operational deception (OPDEC)
– Minimize interference among friendly systems
– Degrade effectiveness of enemy C2″
http://www.tpub.com/content/istts/14226/css/14226_61.htm

Info from EW/ESM, long range MPA surveillance, submarines mainly
Not sure how you mean the bit between brackets: I’ve indicated the threat that certain aircraft in the possession of certain countries can/may pose to IN fleet though not that such an operation would be EASY. Definitely possibilities for the IN to consider.

Planes, Bombers, and submarines are not going to carry out an attack on ships they have not detected, once the ships have been detected there is no point staying passive. No planes, bombers and submarines fire off randomly on naval targets until their are hostilities and a hot war going on.

Passive sensors and other resources (AEW, patrol and recon) will inform them about any MPA/submarine/early warning/recon planes that are out looking for naval vessels, if a attack occurs that is missed to be read by all the patrol/aew vessels/planes, and attains absolute surprise, and if a country well equipped and trained enough to attack a naval target well out at sea from multiple vectors and platforms does carry out such an attack then their is little the navy can do except hope all the defensive systems work, and yes ships will drown in such a well coordinated attack, such things happen in war.

Just that their is no such massive and well trained threat that exists till now, which might be countered with adding additional vessels to the naval vessel building plans that exist.

Not necessarily. ESM, for example, will detect e.g. radar emissions at far greater ranges than radars themselves can detect a target.

So what else is new?

The SHAR and the MiG-29K/any naval fighter will fire their missiles well within the ranges out to which the ship based and the air based sensors will give them this advantage. A planes radar is limited in the area it can view.

nothing new, just stating that the MiG-29K is primarily an air defence fighter on the carriers, optimized for that role.

And how long/often will you be running a continuous CAP, under what circumstances? The longer you have to run this, the more crew fatigue will come into play and the more the aircraft available will begin to exhibit wear and tear and defects. Over time, it may become more difficult to maintain a CAP, especially if the number of pilots and aircraft is limited (e.g. in the case of the SHAR).

Lets hope the assumed state of war does not last forever, if there are no planes of CAP or recon, then whatever planes can be launched off the deck.

No, it sounds like you missed the point.

Yes that its the quality of the systems and not the range of the missiles.
Your statement

Originally Posted by insomnia.delhi View Post
Got that covered with the planned capability to accomplish GoIs objectives in the region.

The biggest threat sails under the water, and that is where the IN lacks in offensive and defensive capability.

With 45km russian missiles and -eventually – 70km israeli missiles, you mean you don’t think AShM equipped aircraft out to 1500km from nearest shores are a problem?

Are we switching the discussion now from AAW to ASW?

I’m aware of that and that’s why I mentioned heli AEW. They are nowhere equal to fixed wing assets like E-2C in terms of capability though.

They do provide a capability to overcome the low altitude under the horizon run by planes and missiles.

To be operated from?

Land based with refueling, some news sources state changes to IAC-2 or 3 design to accommodate heavier planes through catapult launching systems, however some other news sources state that for the E2-D platform IN inquired about non-folding fixed wings with more fuel carrying capability to increase time on station, which leads me to believe that at least these planes will be land based, which should give an idea about their use.

From one or more of the countries listed previously?

What People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, Russia, Malaysia.

No PRC planes in the IOR, they don’t even have that big a naval presence.

Russia is not a threat, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia we are working together with to keep the oceans safe, besides any hostilities will occur in the Andaman and Nicobar joint commands area of influence.

By avoiding detection e.g. fly low and fast, by good planning e.g. coming in simultaneously along different vectors (forcing the CAP to split), by launching outside of opponent’s missile range etc.

They will be detected well outside of their missiles launch envelop even if they are flying low and fast.

The planes on CAP should concentrate on the targets they can deny the opportunity to launch, rest of the missiles fired will have to be absorbed by the groups defensive systems.

The biggest threat from these hypothetical Sukhoi’s will be that to other airborne platforms, ASW/AEW helicopters and planes, any MPA working with the naval vessels etc. It is here that a larger area protected by a longer ranged missile will be of more use.

The MiGs missile range?

It means that it is more dangerous to use shorter ranged AShMs. Thus the options for the attacker are limited:
a) use the limited range missiles but risk to launch platform of

b) use a longer ranged AShM and let the launch platform stand-off. Longer ranged missile may well be bigger and heavier, limiting the number that can be carried by the launch platform, which limits the size of the wave that be launched from a given set of aircraft.

Compare e.g. the 4 ton Moskit and 2,5 ton Brahmos with lengths of around 7-8 meters to smaller 4-5m missiles typically weighing well under 1 ton. The former are supersonic but only few can be carried, the latter tend to be subsonic but more can be carried.

Only the latest of the latter have sufficient range though due to air breathing motors.

Yeah they do, but you’d be better off killing launch platforms than incoming missiles as the former can return, rearm and attack you again, while the latter can’t.

The Launch Platform can fire from outside the range of most AAW missiles, in case of latest versions they can fire from outside the effective range at altitude (which i think they have to do to utilise the full range of a weapon)and as you said, or fire after coming in from under the horizon.

Trying to flip the argument? You yourself suggest current and planned capability was sufficient. My point was that I don’t think it may be sufficient.

Yes the current and planned capability of Naval vessles till 2020 for e.g the P-15A/B. Specifically in regards to IN and the Type-45.

The discussion is about the current and planned capability (which is planned to respond to the changing environment).

That’s an easy way out from what you said earlier. See your own post with map.

Your view of the threats that IN can face in completing its objectives that far out at sea are very all-inclusive, there are geo-political realities to consider.

Of course they are. You posted a map with countries ringing the Indian Ocean. I’m just discussing the capabilities of the relevant countries.

For e.g: IN is not planning on taking on the oil blocks AF and Navy, if it has to then the objective has already failed and no amount of naval power can resolve it.

A military should (and will) consider all possible contingencies, even if they cannot be acknowledge publicly because they deal with ‘friendlies’. IMHO, China is a very real possible FOE, which operates Su-27, Su-30, J-11 and H6. Next consider China’s allies in the more immediate area.

when planes, bombers, naval vessels are trying to find you out and sink you with missiles and torpedoes, that does not sound like a time that requires strict emission control (rather a time to use all sensors that can operate without interfering with each other), unless they believe they have the element of surprise on their side and can move into an area undetected by relying on passive measures alone.

That’s how Nato flotilla’s in the North Atlantic evaded USSR long range assets, in the face of significant threat posed by WP forces during the cold war. IIRC, they only ‘lit up’ once sure that they had been detected.

“EMCON is used to prevent an enemy from detecting, identifying, and locating friendly forces. It is also used to minimize electromagnetic interference among friendly systems. EMCON is normally imposed by a commander to control all electromagnetic radiations. Once EMCON is imposed, general or specific restrictions may be added to the EMCON order, depending on the operational, intelligence, or technical factors for the area affected. “
http://www.tpub.com/ans/69.htm

“The objectives of EMCON are to deny the enemy any way that it may locate your position, to support the efforts to disrupt the enemy’s electiveness, and to allow your actions to go unnoticed. To accomplish these objectives, EMCON conditions are designed with the following guidelines:
– Minimize detection by enemy sensors
– Allow effective friendly command and control (C2)
– Support operations security (OPSEC)
– Support operational deception (OPDEC)
– Minimize interference among friendly systems
– Degrade effectiveness of enemy C2″
http://www.tpub.com/content/istts/14226/css/14226_61.htm

How does one fire a long ranged missile on to a target without knowing where the target is? (as i see you said “With 45km russian missiles and -eventually – 70km israeli missiles, you mean you don’t think AShM equipped aircraft out to 1500km from nearest shores are a problem?”)

Info from EW/ESM, long range MPA surveillance, submarines mainly
Not sure how you mean the bit between brackets: I’ve indicated the threat that certain aircraft in the possession of certain countries can/may pose to IN fleet though not that such an operation would be EASY. Definitely possibilities for the IN to consider.

I do see the advantage of a larger area covered by such a missile, my question was, is that enough at sea when the threat could be a long ranged antiship missile?

Trying to flip the argument? You yourself suggest current and planned capability was sufficient. My point was that I don’t think it may be sufficient.

A SHAR and a MiG-29K will have the advantage of being guided to the location of the threat, and a greater situational awareness through the ship based sensors.

Not necessarily. ESM, for example, will detect e.g. radar emissions at far greater ranges than radars themselves can detect a target.

Primary role of the plane is fleet air defense, with anti surface and recon/attack roles.

So what else is new?

What do you mean by ‘how many’, maintenance wise? If four planes are on a CAP and with fuel, then i suppose four are available, along with what ever planes can take off from the deck of the carrier.

And how long/often will you be running a continuous CAP, under what circumstances? The longer you have to run this, the more crew fatigue will come into play and the more the aircraft available will begin to exhibit wear and tear and defects. Over time, it may become more difficult to maintain a CAP, especially if the number of pilots and aircraft is limited (e.g. in the case of the SHAR)

That sounds like the choice a navy will make depending on its requirements.

No, it sounds like you missed the point.

Ka-31s service in Indian Navy is from aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates and shore based facilities.

I’m aware of that and that’s why I mentioned heli AEW. They are nowhere equal to fixed wing assets like E-2C in terms of capability though.

And the Navy is looking for fixed wing AEW options
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/awst/2010/06/14/AW_06_14_2010_p48-233219.xml

To be operated from?

Where are these Su-30s coming in from?

From one or more of the countries listed previously?

How do they attain the surprise to attack unchallenged?

By avioding detection e.g. fly low and fast, by good planning e.g. coming in simultaneously along different vectors (forcing the CAP to split), by launching outside of opponent’s missile range etc.

What advantage does a 150km anti air missile have over a 70km anti air missile when the attacking aircraft launches its missile at 200-300kms?

It means that it is more dangerous to use shorter ranged AShMs. Thus the options for the attacker are limited: a) use the limited range missiles but risk to launch platform of b) use a longer ranged AShM and let the launchplatform stand-off. Longer ranged missile may well be bigger and heavier, limiting the number that can be carried by the launch platform, which limits the size of the wave that be launched from a given set of aircraft. Compare e.g. the 4 ton Moskit and 2,5 ton Brahmos with lengths of around 7-8 meters to smaller 4-5m missiles typically weighing well under 1 ton. The former are supersonic but only few can be carried, the latter tend to be subsonic but more can be carried. Only the latest of the latter have sufficient range though due to airbreathing motors.

The MR and SR missiles and CIWS in the service have a role of shooting down anti ship missiles.

Yeah they do, but you’ld be better off killing launch platforms than incoming missiles as the former can return, rearm and attack you again, while the latter can’t.

The second is cost. Indian Navy sources in the past, have constantly stated that one of the biggest reasons they are focused on local shipbuilding is cost, foreign built platforms are simply too expensive. An example pointed out were Australia’s new proposed Aegis equipped platforms. So I really dont know whether they’d buy into a pretty expensive, though definitely capable Type45.

The hulls and engineering plants are cheap, built in England, the US, Aus, Spain or India that is the cheap bit in a modern ship. It is the Combat System, the radars, the launchers and integrating all that is expensive no matter where you build it.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/US-clears-Hawkeye-E-2D-aircraft-for-India/articleshow/5007550.cms

Will these platforms be able to provide a sustainable AEW coverage operating from land?

Is the IAC design flexible enough to accommodate for a single steam catapult and the systems to run it, and still have room left for all the aircrafts? (for the purpose of launching some AEW planes)

Or with the investment going into the redesign or new design and construction(more delays to the carriers), the navy might decide to do away with the STOBAR configuration altogether.?

It is probably too late to change IAC1..

Well, there are even reconnaissance satellites able to track naval forces, but they are not in so widespread use.

The same is for OTH radar networks, until now the only operators being Australia and Russia, plus France developing its own.

And by the way they are still highly vulnerable assets, requiring both a good defensive network and strategic depth to preserve them from enemy actions.

The main problem for any Air Force attacking a naval formation is actually how to find it.

Even a large naval group cruising, let’s say, 200 nm from the shore will be over the horizon for any land based surveillance network and still capable to menace both a country’s shipping lanes and to strike targets on land, at least targets located very close to the sea, even using only short range cruise missiles like Brahmos. It would take only an handful of hours to close in with the shore and launch the missiles, meaning the other side need to lock several air and naval assets just to prevent it, let alone to retaliate against the enemy’s naval group.

Over the Horizon (OTH) Backscatter and OTH Surface Wave radars may have ranges of over 3000km
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Over-the-horizon_radar

Elint/Sigint/Comint > detection ranges may be a multiple of the ranges of the radars being detects > several hundres of km
E.g. The Kolchuga passive sensor is an ESM system developed in Ukraine. This ESM system, comprises three or four receivers, deployed tens of kilometres apart, which detect and track aircraft by triangulation and multilateration of their RF emissions. Its detection range is limited by line-of-sight but may be up to 800 km (500 miles) for very high altitude, very powerful emitters.

Not to mention passive sonar.

On the other hand, AAW warfare is an higly specialized task, it is not a matter of how many frigates armed with medium range AAW missiles are deployable, nor it is a mere matter of missile’s range.

It’ mostly about sensors, FCS and CMS, enabling at least one single ship to trace a comprehensive tactical environment, tracking all of the own ships and air assetts, neutral air assetts, enemy assets.

It should be able to identify and prioritize both enemy air assets and enemy missiles, and to identify or guess potential targets within own naval group, and deploy a defensive sequence.

The first and foremost requirement for an AAW ship is the ability (better to say its CMS’s ability) to identify as hostile and engage menaces not aiming at herself, and a general purpose or ASW frigate’s CMS is usually lacking this feature, forcing the ship to act just as bastion placed between a potential target and the incoming missile to engage it.

Tend to agree with this.

An excellent description Verbatim

To reinforce your point you say:

Even a large naval group cruising, let’s say, 200 nm from the shore will be over the horizon for any land based surveillance network and still capable to menace both a country’s shipping lanes and to strike targets on land, at least targets located very close to the sea,

At 250nm range a 50ft masthead is below the radar horizon from an AEW aircraft orbiting at 30,000ft. So if the AEW platform is not being risked overwater its easily conceivable (and has been done) that a naval group less than 300nm offshore can operate, emission controlled, completely undetected.

The main problem for any Air Force attacking a naval formation is actually how to find it.

Even a large naval group cruising, let’s say, 200 nm from the shore will be over the horizon for any land based surveillance network and still capable to menace both a country’s shipping lanes and to strike targets on land, at least targets located very close to the sea, even using only short range cruise missiles like Brahmos.

It would take only an handful of hours to close in with the shore and launch the missiles, meaning the other side need to lock several air and naval assets just to prevent it, let alone to retaliate against the enemy’s naval group.

On the other hand, AAW warfare is an higly specialized task, it is not a matter of how many frigates armed with medium range AAW missiles are deployable, nor it is a mere matter of missile’s range.

It’ mostly about sensors, FCS and CMS, enabling at least one single ship to trace a comprehensive tactical environment, tracking all of the own ships and air assetts, neutral air assetts, enemy assets.

It should be able to identify and prioritize both enemy air assets and enemy missiles, and to identify or guess potential targets within own naval group, and deploy a defensive sequence.

The first and foremost requirement for an AAW ship is the ability (better to say its CMS’s ability) to identify as hostile and engage menaces not aiming at herself, and a general purpose or ASW frigate’s CMS is usually lacking this feature, forcing the ship to act just as bastion placed between a potential target and the incoming missile to engage it.

Don’t know if this is authentic or not, but it claims that the US Govt. has cleared NG to offer the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye to the IN..

full article link
October 1, 2010

US clears Hawkeye E-2D aircraft for India
IANS, Sep 14, 2009, 09.18am IST
The US government cleared yet another high technology system for India, the ”futuristic” shipboard Hawkeye E-2D aircraft for Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and battle management.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/US-clears-Hawkeye-E-2D-aircraft-for-India/articleshow/5007550.cms

Will these platforms be able to provide a sustainable AEW coverage operating from land?

Is the IAC design flexible enough to accommodate for a single steam catapult and the systems to run it, and still have room left for all the aircrafts? (for the purpose of launching some AEW planes)

Or with the investment going into the redesign or new design and construction(more delays to the carriers), the navy might decide to do away with the STOBAR configuration altogether.?

Don’t know if this is authentic or not, but it claims that the US Govt. has cleared NG to offer the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye to the IN..

full article link

The US government cleared yet another high technology system for sale to India, the E-2D aircraft for Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and battle management.

The US Navy has programmed for 75 E-2D aircraft, which is an all-weather, twin-engine, carrier-based aircraft designed to extend early warning surveillance capabilities. Acquisition cost per aircraft is estimated to be $235 million…

The US government cleared yet another high technology system for India, the shipboard capable Hawkeye E-2D aircraft for Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and battle management. The clearance has been described by diplomatic sources as a fall-out of the ”successful” visit of secretary of state Hillary Clinton, and the signing of the End User Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) of military equipment being supplied or sold by the US to India.

India is the second country, after the UAE, to be cleared by the US state and defence departments for sale of this sophisticated system. The US navy has sanctioned $432 million for trials of the aircraft, currently underway at the naval air station Patuxent River in Maryland. The naval systems command based there provides engineering and testing support for new naval systems and weapons.

The Hawkeye E-2D has been under the US government’s consideration for India for some time. In fact, in 2007, Pentagon sources in Washington indicated the aircraft was being cleared, but apparently the previous version, Hawkeye E-2C, was eventually offered to which the Indian navy said ”no” in informal discussions.
Indian navy officers had witnessed the capabilities of the Hawkeye E-2C but told the US officials that as the equipment India buys would be used for years, it must be the best and the latest with future capability insertion potential. Future aircraft carriers of the Indian navy would also have to be equipped with catapult launching systems.

[/quote]

The point was about which threats there may be against IN. You suggested there weren’t any that the current capability can’t deal with. I beg to differ.

The discussion is about the current and planned capability (which is planned to respond to the changing environment).

Originally Posted by insomnia.delhi

I don’t think IN can see any hostile nation in the IOR which require more than the projected capability(the ships work with the two fleets).

Your view of the threats that IN can face in completing its objectives that far out at sea are very all-inclusive, there are geo-political realities to consider.

For e.g: IN is not planning on taking on the oil blocks AF and Navy, if it has to then the objective has already failed and no amount of naval power can resolve it.

A ship not in EMCON will give its position away irrespective of whether or not it is stealthy. (how do ships at sea detect air threats several hundreds of km away without going active?) Besides, the aggressor by have an SSK shadowing a group of opposing vessels, again making the radar related stealthiness of ships less relevant.

Without going active and revealing the position of the stealthy ship?

when planes, bombers, naval vessels are trying to find you out and sink you with missiles and torpedoes, that does not sound like a time that requires strict emission control (rather a time to use all sensors that can operate without interfering with each other), unless they believe they have the element of surprise on their side and can move into an area undetected by relying on passive measures alone.

How does one fire a long ranged missile on to a target without knowing where the target is? (as i see you said “With 45km russian missiles and -eventually – 70km israeli missiles, you mean you don’t think AShM equipped aircraft out to 1500km from nearest shores are a problem?”)

I do see the advantage of a larger area covered by such a missile, my question was, is that enough at sea when the threat could be a long ranged antiship missile?

Yes they could, if they detected them. How well will a SHAR handle a Su-30MK#? Or a Mig-29 an F15E? How many will be available to defend the task group?

A SHAR and a MiG-29K will have the advantage of being guided to the location of the threat, and a greater situational awareness through the ship based sensors.

Primary role of the plane is fleet air defense, with anti surface and recon/attack roles.

What do you mean by ‘how many’, maintenance wise? If four planes are on a CAP and with fuel, then i suppose four are available, along with what ever planes can take off from the deck of the carrier.

Then the issue about an AAW vessel becomes a moot point because all escorting vessels are considered AAW vessels (but none of these is particularly specialized and hence all are less capable than a specialised vessel would be, unless all are top of the line AAW ships, which they aren’t)

That sounds like the choice a navy will make depending on its requirements.

With what will the IN see the incoming aircraft/missiles? AEW-H?

Another helicopter is the Russian-built Kamov Ka-31, deployed by Indian Navy on Krivak-III frigates.

Ka-31s service in Indian Navy is from aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates and shore based facilities.

It will have better performance finding anti ship missiles flying low, and surface vessels than it will have detecting aircrafts.

The helicopters will be deployed from the INS Viraat aircraft carrier

http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/ka31/

The navy already has a fleet of nine Ka-31 helicopters, which are deployed on India’s only aircraft carrier INS Virat and the Talwar Class guided missile stealth frigates of the navy.

They also operate from the navy’s shore-based air stations.

http://www.domain-b.com/defence/general/20090807_indian_navy.html

And the Navy is looking for fixed wing AEW options

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/awst/2010/06/14/AW_06_14_2010_p48-233219.xml

Su-30
Kh-31A mod 1 50 km.
Kh-31A mod 2 69 km.
Kh-31P mod 1 150 km.
Kh-31P mod 2 200 km.
Kh-59ME : 200 km (110 nmi)
Kh-59MK : 285 km (150 nmi)

A few pairs of aircraft on different vectors and there you have it.

Where are these Su-30s coming in from?

How do they attain the surprise to attack unchallenged?

What advantage does a 150km anti air missile have over a 70km anti air missile when the attacking aircraft launches its missile at 200-300kms?

The MR and SR missiles and CIWS in the service have a role of shooting down anti ship missiles.

The distance of the SAM does not matter, the quality of the system does, increase the distance of the missile to 150kms, what good will that do, if the aggressor can see your ship a huge, massive chunk of metal at 300 kms distance, they can fire their missiles and stay away from the effective area of your SAM systems, then its the same game of shooting down the missiles.

The point was about which threats there may be against IN. You suggested there weren’t any that the current capability can’t deal with. I beg to differ. A ship not in EMCON will give its position away irrespective of whether or not it is stealthy. (how do ships at sea detect air threats severla hundreds of km away without going active?) Besides, the agressor by have an SSK shadowing a group of opposing vessels, again making the radar related stealthiness of ships less relevant.

If a navy has an aircraft carrier with a squadron or two of naval fixed wing fighter aircrafts, they could send these aircrafts to deny the hostile aircraft an opportunity to fire their weapons.

Yes they could, if they detected them. How well will a SHAR handle a Su-30MK#? Or a Mig-29 an F15E? How many will be available to defend the task group?

The total area out to which a ship can provide cover can be off-set by distributing the capability amongst your vessels, for e.g the frigates carry very near the same sensors, systems and weapons as the destroyers, and thus they can provide a screen for a major vessel like a Aircraft carrier.

Then the issue about an AAW vessel becomes a moot point because all escorting vessels are considered AAW vessels (but none of these is particularly specialized and hence all are less capable than a specialised vessel would be, unless all are top of the line AAW ships, which they aren’t)

No i was responding to the very elaborate list of planes you had quoted and making my point that the real threat is the one you can not detect in time, a plane and a missile in open sea can be found through sensors at long ranges and appropriate countermeasures can be taken to respond.

Without going active and revaeling the position of the stealthy ship?

With what will the IN see the incoming aircraft/missiles? AEWH?

“There are only four helicopter-based AEW platforms in existence. One is the Royal Navy Sea King ASaC7 naval helicopter. It is operated from the Royal Navy’s Invincible-class aircraft carriers. The creation of Sea King ASaC7, and earlier AEW.2 and AEW.5 is the consequence of the harsh lessons learnt by the Royal Navy task force sent to the South Atlantic in the 1982 Falklands War. The lack of AEW coverage for the task force was a major tactical shortcoming at the time. Also, the Spanish Navy fields the SH-3 Sea King in the very same role, operated from the carriers Principe de Asturias and Juan Carlos I
Another helicopter is the Russian-built Kamov Ka-31, deployed by Indian Navy on Krivak-III frigates and reportedly used by the Russian Navy on its sole Kuznetsov aircraft carrier. It is fitted with E-801M Oko (Eye) airborne electronic warfare radar which can track up to 20 targets simultaneously with aerial detection range 90 mi (150 km) and surface warships up to 160 mi (250 km).
The most modern helicopter-based AEW is the AgustaWestland EH101 AEW of the Italian Navy.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airborne_early_warning_and_control

Su-30
Kh-31A mod 1 50 km.
Kh-31A mod 2 69 km.
Kh-31P mod 1 150 km.
Kh-31P mod 2 200 km.
Kh-59ME : 200 km (110 nmi)
Kh-59MK : 285 km (150 nmi)

A few pairs of aircraft on different vectors and there you have it.

Teer,

Politeness is the only reason I will refrain from using accurate language to describe your position here. I will reiterate the journalist has been invited to see a T45 launch. There is no CVF to see in Glasgow or anywhere else. Yet he makes the fantastic leap in logic that he is going to be party to the great CVF sell off. Something which s utterly baseless save for further hysterical meanderings from equally agenda-led journalists.

You then go on to support Kramer’s interpretation of this journalists house of cards telling your tale of nods and winks. No substance anywhere just a tapestry of self-supporting delusion. You then go on to say:

” Yeah, I see where this is going, namely that your argument so far is as dodgy or as reliable as the one saying that the CVF is meant for India.”

OF course it isn’t. The only people saying that India might WANT a CVF are idiot journalists be they whatever nationality and former commanders of whichever outfit. If they publish rubbish then they are idiots simple as that. The Indians have a long-standing requirement for AAW, they have opted for a development solution with the Israeli’s to induct an MR SAM. The Israeli’s have no experience with naval area defence SAMs or that operational environment. The IN have selected a no-risk evolution of an existing hull to mount this developmental AAW weapon system to.

There is ample room for the AAW system not to match requirements and the hull to be unspectacular when compared to current state of the art. If that were the case a journalistic article comparing what was SEEN on the BAE T45 against what is seen on a P15x may be advantageous to BAE’s cause. Certainly worth the risk of a few journalists on the expense account to BAE.

Simple easy straight-line logic. Yet you completely miss it and reinforce an idiots ramblings?. Hmm curious that one?

With 45km russian missiles and -eventually – 70km israeli missiles, you mean you don’t think AShM equipped aircraft out to 1500km from nearest shores are a problem?

Are we switching the discussion now from AAW to ASW?

The distance of the SAM does not matter, the quality of the system does, increase the distance of the missile to 150kms, what good will that do, if the aggressor can see your ship a huge, massive chunk of metal at 300 kms distance, they can fire their missiles and stay away from the effective area of your SAM systems, then its the same game of shooting down the missiles. If a navy has an aircraft carrier with a squadron or two of naval fixed wing fighter aircrafts, they could send these aircrafts to deny the hostile aircraft an opportunity to fire their weapons.

The total area out to which a ship can provide cover can be off-set by distributing the capability amongst your vessels, for e.g the frigates carry very near the same sensors, systems and weapons as the destroyers, and thus they can provide a screen for a major vessel like a Aircraft carrier.

No i was responding to the very elaborate list of planes you had quoted and making my point that the real threat is the one you can not detect in time, a plane and a missile in open sea can be found through sensors at long ranges and appropriate countermeasures can be taken to respond.