Indo-Russian Military Technical Cooperation.

As I have seen that this board has a great interest with on goings between India and Russia. Here is an article i found which can make your minds very clear of the scenario and give you a lot of info. on Indio-Russian present, past and future ties.

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Indo-Russian Military Technical Cooperation: Implications for Southern Asia.

The region of Southern Asia has inherited its own share of the flux and countercurrents generated with the end of the cold war.(1) International arms control initiatives have sought to deepen and widen adherence to the norms, outlooks, and interests enshrined in multilateral security regimes that seek to stem or reverse the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These initiatives have engendered greater international consensus but also have brought the core of intractable issues to the fore. Within the national contexts, Russia, as the successor to the Soviet Union, is struggling to come to terms with being a nation-state instead of an empire; to devise mutually acceptable relations with the former Soviet republics; and to establish its centrality within the post-Soviet space. India, whose economic restructuring roughly coincided with the end of the cold war, is searching for a way to facilitate closer integration into the global economic matrix without compromising its legitimate security concerns in the process. And China, consolidating nearly two decades of state-guided economic reforms, is modernizing its armed forces and appears to be on course to occupying a central position in the international community.

It is within this fluid context that I analyze Indo-Russian relations and examine their implications for the balance of forces and emerging strategic equation in Southern Asia. In the first section I examine the national issues within Russia and India that propel them to seek closer bilateral ties. In the following section I discuss the current relations between the two in the security sphere (arms acquisitions, technology transfers, future areas of cooperation, and so forth). In the final section I analyze the implications of expanding Indo-Russian relations for countries in the strategic neighborhood, with particular attention to Pakistan and China.

NATIONAL IMPERATIVES FOSTERING CLOSER BILATERAL COOPERATION

The Russian Case

To Russia devolved the nuclear mantle following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. However, this inheritance has produced a fair share of difficulties as the nation searches within for an acceptable status in the international community and for a way to forge its relations with countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU), the extended neighborhood (Western Europe and central and western Asia), and beyond (particularly the United States). The continued search for its national identity impinges sharply on the Russian strategic calculus in dealing with these other nations. As the national elite seek to situate these interactions within the ebb and flow of Russian history, an assortment of developmental issues emerge that explain the scope of its foreign policy decisions. An eclectic, albeit spare, survey of issue areas illustrates this dynamic.

Russia’s inability to impede the eastward expansion of NATO has led to a considerable shrinkage of its sphere of influence within the region. As Russia seeks to reestablish its centrality within the post-Soviet space, it has had to enter into protracted negotiations with countries of the former Soviet Union. For the latter, these negotiations afford the means to harness Russia’s (latent) hegemonic aspirations by binding its behavior to an institutionalized framework of relations. For Russia, on the other hand, they provide an avenue to reestablish its salience in the region. Further, Russia has sought to compensate for its shrinking sphere of influence by deepening its strategic relationship with China and India. A series of diplomatic initiatives has transformed its relationship with China from one of “containment” to “overt engagement.” With India, it has sought to elevate the traditional close relation with the Soviet Union into a “strategic” one.

In addition, Russia has sought, particularly since 1993-94, to substantially increase its global sale of advanced conventional weapons (ACWs). Restructuring of the defense sector, including privatization of defense industries, has been attempted to generate additional revenue that will both finance further research and development (R&D) and ease the burden on the state of implementing badly needed economic reforms. While this has enabled Russian gross arms sales to increase from $1.5 billion in 1994 to $4.3 billion in 1997-98, the performance of private firms, as compared to the state-run Rosvorouzhenie, has brought into question the wisdom of further decentralization and privatization in the defense sector. Notwithstanding this dilemma, it is clear that arms sales, particularly those embedded with technology transfers, are intended not only to generate revenue but also to serve as an influential policy tool in dealing with the recipient states. It is pertinent to note here that as Russia enters into defense agreements involving technology transfers and joint production of weapons systems (with production sites often located within the recipient country), it augments other countries’ capacity to emerge as commercial competitors to Russia in the global arms market. Thus, it is useful to speculate: Is Russian “compulsion” to enter into such agreements actually fostering competition in the process? Are the recipient countries in a position to take advantage of the supplier’s dependency syndrome faced by Russia?

In analyzing Russia’s evolving relationship with the West, several contentious issues come to the fore. Leaving aside the terms of assistance to Russia’s economy, which is on the verge of collapse, a primary impediment remains the inexorable eastward expansion of NATO. Another major hurdle relates to the U.S. emphasis on rejuvenating and expanding its national missile defense (NMD) concept, which seeks to erect an impregnable fortification against strategic missiles. Under the current formulation, often denoted as the “3 + 3” concept, the United States would make a decision in the year 2000 on whether or not to erect the NMD shield over the continental United States. If the decision is made to do so, the NMD is expected to be put into place by 2003.

Although a discussion of the NMD is beyond the scope of this study, several components of the NMD violate the terms of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, as well as the 1974 ABM Protocol.(2) Further, any U.S. attempt to extend this umbrella to its allies (say, in East Asia) under the aegis of the Theater Missile Defenses (TMD), would worsen the strategic force balance for Russia against those states.(3) These and other problems continue to dog Russian integration into the “core” of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This is especially significant because MTCR faces a more fundamental dilemma between whether it is an internal policy coordination regime or a global missile proliferation control regime.(4) The current mandate of MTCR not only limits its scope of action, but also complicates its interaction with member states such as Russia (and aspirants such as Ukraine and Israel).

The above discussion provides the substantive context within which to examine Russia’s decision to elevate its relationship with India into one of a “strategic partnership.” Given Russian vulnerability to deepening strategic relations with recipient states, the risk is significantly reduced when dealing with “friendly” states (including India, Iran, North Korea, and now, China). Russia’s new defense cooperation with India should be pursued under the aegis of military technical cooperation encompassing the political, economic, and security spheres. It seeks to provide the institutional framework for the two countries to significantly deepen and widen their bilateral cooperation, building on the congruence in their strategic outlooks and priorities.

The Indian Case

For India, its own brand of perestroika (massive economic restructuring) and glasnost (opening up to the global economy) roughly coincided with the break-up of the Soviet Union and emergence of Russia as the successor state. Although examination of the economic reforms in India is not within the purview of this study, it is important to note that the net sum of deregulation and reforms undertaken since July 1991 has been larger than those effected in the previous forty-four years since independence (in August 1947). Domestic public policy discourse on the economic front is imbued with a new sense of pragmatism. Measures that enhance profitability, productivity, capital formation, advanced technology-embedded factors of production, and identification of competitive niches for the domestic industry, all compete with the “sacred cow” of distributional egalitarianism as criteria for the measurement of success of a policy choice. The same pragmatism increasingly animates the domestic security debate in India.

Armed forces modernization. The last major overhaul of the defense inventory and “limited” force modernization was undertaken in India during the early to mid-1980s. Thus, another such exercise was long overdue. Since budgetary constraints were slightly eased in the early 1990s, the domestic security establishment has been engaged in such a task. According to the latest figures, India’s defense budget for the period 1997-2001 is approximately 2 trillion rupees (U.S.$51 billion), with the annual budget for fiscal 1998-99 at $10.1 billion.(5) In inflation-adjusted terms, the real growth in the annual budget represents a modest rise of about 10 percent. However, in the wake of the nuclear tests conducted by India in May 1998, Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha announced significantly higher allocations for the Department of Atomic Energy (62 percent) and the Defense Research and Development Organization (approximately 48 percent). He also assured that additional budgetary allocations will be made as and when necessary to ensure that the country’s defense preparedness and other security priorities are not compromised.(6)

India’s defense planners envisage the future face of its armed forces as leaner, more mechanized, and more modem. Of course, such an exercise would require not only significant resource commitment but also clarification of the country’s strategic doctrine. The first three wars (1947-48, 1962, and 1965) had been waged on domestic soil and contiguous enemy territory, and in each case the army had played the most significant role, with limited support from the air force and the navy. The 1971-72 war is the only instance where integrated missions were executed with some success. Thus, the air force provided air cover to the attacking ground troops in addition to other support missions, while the navy engaged in limited shelling of the Karachi harbor to divert Pakistani troops from the invading Indian ground forces. It was only later that strategic review of the experiences of the war highlighted the need to significantly upgrade the role and strike power of the navy and the air force so that the three can act in concert where the situation so warrants.

Armed force modernization, with an emphasis on greater mechanization, would imply reconstitution of the size of the three services but also entail reconfiguration of their respective roles. As can be readily imagined, this complex issue has generated a broad range of opinions. National debate remains inconclusive on what the optimum size of the forces should be and whether it would require forcible retirement, smaller recruitment, or both. Would conscription be a good idea? Would conscripts have the same level of training (and motivation) to execute all (especially hazardous) missions? Can they be mobilized rapidly? Would the higher costs of recruitment and training be offset by a leaner force?(7)

The financial aspects of the above issues have generated considerable policy debate with the adoption by the Indian Parliament of the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission. While the total emoluments package to each soldier has been increased, it is not clear how the defense budget would cope with the additional resources required to put it into effect. Further, the per capita investment to maintain a soldier in the infantry (cost of equipment plus training) is considerably lower than maintaining one in the mechanized divisions. Likewise, the cost of maintaining a soldier in the army is considerably lower for a member of the navy, and both are considerably lower than in the air force. Is such a reconstitution warranted, and if so, how is it to be financed?

Internal Peacekeeping Missions versus External Security Dimensions. The financial battle outlined above makes it even more imperative to clarify the strategic doctrine of the country. Critics concede that the pace of technological growth has revolutionized modern warfare. Security planners around the world are grappling with the phenomenon called “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA), or its derivative, “Revolution in Military Technology” (RMT). Indian security elite are engaged in a similar exercise to analyze the implications of RMA and RMT for the regional theater and force requirements to meet such threats in the first quarter of the next century.(8) The critics concede that for certain strategic missions, such as the ones that India undertook in the 1980s (Sri Lanka and Maldives), it is vital to bolster capacity for rapid deployment of forces in farflung theaters. But that is precisely why the country should clearly enunciate its strategic doctrine–its core missions versus other priorities, and so forth.

This has become especially important following the rise of ethno-national strife in the northeastern and northwestern parts of the country, which received generous insurrectionary support from across the border, making internal security an increasingly important mission for the armed forces.(9) These developments tax the resources of the armed forces and draw them away from their core mission, defense of the nation from external threats. It is imperative that a national consensus be forged on the devolution of responsibilities for the state police, internal security forces (such as the Border Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force, and Indo-Tibetan Border Police), and the armed forces.
Meeting internal security threats would require small arms and ammunition and mobile forces that can deploy and meet insurrectionary challenges in, among others, inhospitable mountainous terrain. The Indian defense industry can meet much of the demand for such weapons, but increasing sophistication of the “enemy’s” war-fighting capability means continuous upgrading and refinement of retaliatory capacity. Arms acquisition to meet external threats is of a different order of magnitude, and the domestic industry is hard-pressed to meet most of those demands.

Indian Nuclear Tests: Formulating a National Security Doctrine. India conducted five nuclear tests between 11 and 13 May 1998 to add to the lone test of May 1974. This has revived and intensified debate on the need for an explicitly enunciated strategic doctrine for the country. Policy analysts had distilled various components of what was called the “implicit” military doctrine of India.(10) In the post-test context, the domestic security establishment has been engaged in devising the new command, control, communications, and intelligence ([C.sup.3] I) network that will be required to operationalize the minimum nuclear deterrent (MND) that the leadership is seeking. The MND is part of the ongoing negotiations to determine the terms of India’s joining the larger Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NNPR), including signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and participating in the discussions at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva relating to the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.(11)

India’s leadership has assured the continuation of its policy of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states and reiterated its offer to Pakistan to conclude a bilateral “no-first-use” pact on nuclear weapons, which Pakistan has declined. The leadership has also indicated that its new deterrent will continue to be “defensive in posture.”(12) This implies that the size of the nuclear arsenal would be small, and deployment would be primarily in the defensive mode.(13)

Although the contours of the Indian MND are still evolving, it is safe to assume that missiles, as delivery vehicles, would be integral to this doctrine. I do not propose to discuss Indian space capabilities, which include the launch vehicles and the missile programs. But I do wish to underline that Russian assistance in this endeavor is crucial and highly valued. Although this collaboration is not strictly within the domain of their bilateral military technical cooperation, it is vital to augmenting the Indian pursuit of the classic nuclear triad, wherein nuclear weapons (tactical and strategic) can be delivered from land, air, and sea.

Within the context of India’s evolving force posture and demand for weapons outlined above, Russia’s importance becomes evident. Accordingly, in the next section I undertake a detailed examination of bilateral defense cooperation.

INDO-RUSSIAN DEFENSE COOPERATION IN THE 1990s

The element of trust occupies an important position among the factors that undergird India’s close relationship with Russia. Policymakers in India’s security establishment feel strongly about the bonds of trust that have been forged over the past four decades and have stood the test of time.(14) Despite India’s strong belief in, and leadership of, the nonaligned movement, its close relations with the Soviet Union/Russia have survived major systemic changes over time, explained by the congruence of their philosophical and pragmatic outlooks and priorities.(15)

The Soviet Union had easily been the most important country as far as India’s defense acquisitions were concerned. By a rough estimate, almost 60 percent of the Indian army’s military hardware, 70 percent of its naval hardware, and 80 percent of air force hardware is of Soviet/Russian origin. India’s current agenda of force modernization does not seek to deviate from this trajectory of close cooperation. Indeed, it seeks closer cooperation, albeit with the aims of progressively enhancing Indian self-reliance in the design and production of existing technologies/weapons systems and collaborating with Russia in joint design and production of major weapons systems and subsystems in the future.

The Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), the chief technology generator for the defense establishment, faces crucial choices in the weapons systems that it will produce and sources of technological collaboration. A problem that DRDO shares with military-industrial complexes worldwide is that unless its indigenous weapons systems can compete successfully with top-of-the-line systems produced elsewhere, the domestic armed forces would prefer off-the-shelf purchases from the global arms market. This creates a vicious cycle: the domestic armed forces would not place binding purchase orders for the domestic products unless they meet its quality and timeliness requirements. But the latter becomes feasible only when the production facility receives firm monetary commitments. The problem becomes even more acute given the increasing rate and scale of technological obsolescence worldwide, which raises the stakes for the DRDO as it seeks to avoid entering into a technological cul-de-sac, particularly since it intends to produce weapons for both the domestic and the international market.(16)

Indian Air Force (IAF)

The IAF is significantly upgradating its strike capability. In 1994 it purchased ten MiG29 aircraft from Russia to replace aging craft in the existing fleet.(17) The aircraft have already been delivered, and their assembly, plus overhaul of the existing fleet, are being undertaken at various Hindustan Aeronautic Laboratories (HAL) across the country.

The IAF ordered forty Sukhoi-30 MK aircraft from Russia in 1996. Eight of these have already been delivered, with the remainder to be delivered by 2005. The planes are being delivered to HAL as components and assembled by HAL personnel, giving them much-needed experience in handling future repairs or upgradating. Negotiations are on for future production of these aircraft in India under license. Indian scientists are working with their counterparts in Russian design and production facilities, most notably in the area of avionics (for example, the Mission Computer).(18) Although upgradating the Su aircraft will be an ongoing process, the last eight to be supplied will meet the specifications desired by the Indian side. These, to be classified as Su-30 MK-I, will then serve as the benchmark, with the previous thirty-two to be retrofitted to come up to their specifications.

In 1995, India ordered 150 MiG-21 BIS aircraft from Russia. This attack aircraft is completely designed by Russia, and Indian input has not yet been agreed on. Russia has recently delivered two of the prototypes to the HAL unit in Bangalore where work on its upgrading and flight testing will commence soon. Russia is to transfer the technology to the HAL unit where future assembly/production is to take place.(19) Russia is designing the weaponry onboard the MiG-21 BIS to Indian specifications, but the chaff dispensers that the craft carries have been supplied by Israel.(20)

The two sides agreed in summer 1998 that India would receive the Russian Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT), also called the MiG-AT. This deal includes transfer of technology, with production to commence in 1998. The negotiated price for this trainer is almost 50 percent of that quoted for the British Hawk. The deal is even more attractive because the IAF is badly in need of more AJTs. In the current decade, accidents have increased dramatically because the IAF lacks enough good training crafts. With pilots training to fly “fourth-generation” aircraft, good-quality AJTs are particularly valuable.(21) The inertial guidance system and the engine and ring laser gyros for the AJTs are being supplied by France.

Work on upgrading India’s fleet of MiG-27 aircraft has begun in earnest at HAL units around the country. This upgradation will receive beneficial spinoffs from the indigenous pool of research conducted for the light combat aircraft (LCA) that India is building. This is particularly relevant in the electronics segment (such as electronic warfare, signal jamming, communications, identification of friend or foe). It is noteworthy that keeping the MiG-27 fleet at its fighting best is a priority for the IAF, at least until all the Su-30s are delivered, assembled, flight tested, and inducted into the force. The timeline before the LCA can enter into service is even more extended.(22) Thus, the MiG-27s are expected to constitute the bulk of attack aircraft at the disposal of the IAF. Further, India is reported to be negotiating the purchase of a variation of the MiG-29 (called the MiG-29 SMT), which has yet to be inducted into the Russian air force.(23)

Indian Navy

The naval component of India’s armed forces, as mentioned earlier, had not played a significant part in the four armed conflicts of the past. The domestic strategic community has been seeking to correct this imbalance and be prepared to deliver a “three-way punch” in the event of another war. A review of Indian naval build-up since the 1970s demonstrates that the navy has been engaged in serious “perspective planning” since it has had the luxury of not being expected to play a critical role in any armed conflict in the short run.

Indeed, of the three services, it is the Indian navy that has been most successful in pursuing developmental targets, by enhancing its strike power, maritime surveillance, and sealift capabilities. It has been particularly successful in indigenous efforts at modifying and upgrading diverse imported hardware and technology to suit domestic needs. This is of crucial significance to the defense community because experts have increasingly concluded that the future of deterrence is likely to be sea-based. In other words, a country’s ability to conduct warfare, whether employing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) or advanced conventional weapons, would be greatly augmented if its navy is able to successfully execute these missions.

It is in this context that one should perceive Indian naval build-up and Russia’s collaboration in it. India has ordered two kilo-class submarines from Russia, and negotiations are under way to purchase Krivak III frigates as well. The navy will require $75 million for medium-term refits of the kilo-class submarines, with the work to be done in St. Petersburg, Russia. In addition, it needs another $50 million to upgrade four Foxtrot class submarines that it purchased from Russia.

The navy is finalizing negotiations with Russia for the purchase of six Ilyushin-78 planes, beginning with the delivery of two.(24) Two or three of these planes are expected to provide air-to-air refueling facilities for the front-line aircraft, including the LCA.(25) The remainder are expected to provide the platform for an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) by mounting a rotordome on the Ilyushins, and the on-board radar, with 360-degree coverage, to provide on-site intelligence. The radar has been indigenously produced, and the problem surrounding its miniaturization is expected to be resolved soon with active Israeli help. The rotordome has undergone successful experimental testing on the Avro aircraft and soon will be mounted atop the 11-78s. Providing refueling or serving as AWACS platform are mutually exclusive functions given the space constraints on board the craft. Acquisition of the Ilyushins and induction into their respective roles will tremendously enhance Indian capability to conduct both intrusive surveillance and deep strikes of strategic Pakistani territory. By almost any estimate, recent naval purchases are to be regarded as major force multipliers.

From the navy’s long “wish-list” from Russia, another item of special significance is the Admiral Gorshkov. Built in 1984 and decommissioned in 1995, this aircraft carder is being overhauled for the Indian navy, and there have been reports that a modification of the MiG-29, called the MiG-29 SMT, has been tested for operating off the Gorshkov.(26) India is also reported to be negotiating the purchase of the Russian KamovV (aka Black Shark). This is a highly sophisticated antisubmarine, or submarine-hunting device that sends out deep sonar to accurately determine the location of an enemy submarine and eliminate it. There are unconfirmed reports that Russia is assisting Indian scientists in improving the accuracy of the underwater stage of the launch of its submarine-launched ballistic missile Sagarika.(27) These two would significantly upgrade Indian naval capacity to safeguard its territorial waters and patrol the region beyond.

Indian Army

As part of their military technical cooperation, India and Russia in 1996 formalized the Joint Indo-Russian Working Group (JIRWOG). This group seeks to organize bilateral defense cooperation along three levels: (a) It meets every six months to one year and is mandated to take care of older or existing servicing contracts for all three services; (b) the Military Technical Group meets at the joint secretary level to chart future areas of cooperation; (c) service-to-service contacts formalized during the visit of Russia’s defense minister, General Rodionov, aim to clarify many operational aspects of service-to-service cooperation; it also involves exchange of officers, sharing information concerning military exercises, and so forth.

The Indian army is negotiating the purchase of 155 mm self-propelled guns (SPGs). Because Russia currently produces ammunition for the 152 guns, it wants India to pay for the R&D to develop ammunition for the 155 mm guns before commercial production becomes possible. India, in turn, insists that in a buyer’s market, it should not be expected to pay extra above the actual cost of the ammunition that it will purchase.

The Indian army intends to mount the 155 mm guns on the chassis of the T-72 tanks that are being produced at Avadi in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. However, the user trials of these tanks have not been very successful so far.(28) Negotiations are also on for the purchase of Russia’s newest T-90C tanks.(29) The advantage of the 155 mm SPGs are that they provide illumination (perhaps some of the shells will be used as tracers to light the sky and help pinpoint enemy locations) and augment night-fighting capability; they provide more effective ammunition (over the 152mm variety); and they are usable with the Bofors, the much-publicized Swedish guns in the inventory.

Because the army is not certain whether or when the 155 mm SPG deal will be finalized, it is negotiating outright (“off-the-shelf”) purchase of Russian-made Msta guns. This may assume added importance because of related developments. If the indigenous Arjun (main battle tank) does not enter into serial production and service soon, the army will need these guns to augment its fire power; and if Ukraine insists on supplying T-80 tanks to Pakistan, overruling Russian objections,(30) the Indian army might need to counteract the resultant power asymmetry.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTHERN ASIA

Impact on the Indo-Pakistan Balance

The last full-blown military conflict between India and Pakistan, in 1971-72, led to the creation of Bangladesh. The ensuing period has been described variously as one of “ugly stability”(31) or “recessed deterrence,”(32) among other characterizations, and has seen the rise in substate level, insurrectionary warfare with sustained materiel and diplomatic support from across the border to militant nationals. Since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1979, the insurgents include a vast number of Afghan refugees who have been easy targets for Pakistani mobilization and recruitment. Countering this threat presents a serious dilemma for India. Neglecting the issue would create dangerous instability in the troubled region of Kashmir. Overt response through armed means has the danger of escalating to the level of all-out conflict, with the threat of use of nuclear weapons.(33)

The Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 removed any ambiguity surrounding its nuclear weapons capability. Until the tests, the nuclear situation in South Asia could be described as one of “existential deterrence.”(34) In this situation, since neither side has overtly deployed its nuclear arsenal, neither side is able to incontrovertibly infer that it would be able to launch a preemptive first-strike that would effectively neutralize the nuclear weapons capability of the adversary. The residual capacity of the adversary could enable it to mount a retaliatory second strike. This uncertainty creates some restraint on permitting conflicts to escalate to a point where threat of use of nuclear weapons becomes a possibility.

However, until India and Pakistan enunciate their respective nuclear doctrines and institute robust C31 networks, the ambiguity surrounding the tactical-military aspects of their nuclear relationship will endure. The recent Indian force buildup should be perceived as an attempt to decisively alter the force balance with Pakistan on the conventional weapons axis. It is aimed at circumventing the strategic dilemma faced by the Indian security establishment and developing a strategic doctrine and the necessary force level to enable India to preempt a Pakistani attack and put a determined end to the insurrectionary threat to the territorial integrity of the nation.

The doctrinal and tactical lessons learned from India’s biggest-ever battle exercise, Operation Brass Tacks (1986), are of particular relevance in this context. General Krishnaswamy Sundarji, who was in command of Operation Brass Tacks, laid out the strategic prerequisites for executing such a mission (in his famous plan, Army 2000).(35) Sundarji’s plan envisaged building a Rapid Deployment Force, equipping the army with squadrons of attack helicopters and light transport helicopters to quickly navigate difficult terrain and paradrop forces and light fighting equipment into the enemy’s own territory. Since this plan has been only partially implemented (with one existing squadron being supplied with attack helicopters), such offensive capability remains highly limited.

It is in this context that India’s purchase of Ilyushin-78 aircraft, the Su-30MK, and the MiG-29 assumes particular significance. Further, India is either indigenously developing or acquiring a host of night-fighting equipment, as well as augmenting its electronic warfare and “fly-by-wire” capabilities. It is estimated that such buildup would provide India a decisive qualitative, as well as quantitative, edge over Pakistan in conventional warfare.

Given the experience of the three prior wars, and the (immutable) geostrategic “compulsions” of Pakistan, India can acquire a military capability and force posture (including deployment) that effectively neutralizes Pakistan’s ability to launch a first strike.(36) It is important to note, however, that in recent years we have witnessed a series of initiatives to seek a diplomatic solution to the protracted issues. These have included bilateral confidence-building measures, cooperation under the auspices of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, and various nongovernmental (“track 2”) initiatives, such as the annual series of discussions at Neemrana (Rajasthan, India). Regardless of the trajectory traversed by the cooperative initiatives, it is clear that defense cooperation with Russia greatly augments Indian capacity to contain the threat emanating from its western border.

Impact on the Sino-Indian balance

China’s economic reforms, begun in the early 1970s, have made the country a major player in the global economic arena. As a nuclear weapon state, it faces altogether different challenges than India in augmenting its weapons of mass destruction. In the current decade, however, as China pursues its great power aspirations, it has entered into a series of diplomatic/military agreements that seek to deemphasize conflict and promote peaceful coexistence in its strategic neighborhood.

However, experts remain ambivalent regarding Chinese behavior in the medium to long term. The benign projection of Chinese policy makes it likely that the country will increase its stake in the international system. On the other hand, it is also possible that as China improves its relative position in the international balance of power, the “realist” strand of its strategic culture might resurface, threatening the strategic stability of Asia and beyond.(37)

On the Sino-Indian front, mixed indicators abound. Eight rounds of meetings of the IndoChinese Joint Group have led to a significant reduction of troop levels and their deployment pattern along the line of actual control. On the other hand, Tibet remains an intractable problem. In recent years, China has deployed additional troops and surveillance units along the sensitive forward posts in Tibet. In the months leading up to the nuclear tests, India claimed that China was lengthening the runways at military airstrips in Tibet to permit tactical strikes by attack aircraft. Further, China was alleged to have beefed up surveillance along the Coco Islands, barely twenty-five miles off the strategic Indian Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

While some of this can be discounted as Indian posturing, it remains clear that an uneasy rapprochement best characterizes the Sino-Indian relationship. A major strain appeared during the recent visit of President Clinton to China, when a joint communique issued by the two sides espoused an active Chinese role in resolving the South Asian nuclear crisis. This was clearly unacceptable to India, which faces a nuclear and missile threat from China as well as from its clandestine assistance to Pakistan. A defining element of the Indian strategic dilemma is how to alert the West to its growing threat from China while also seeking a rapprochement with the latter.(38)

Following the end of the cold war, both Russia and the United States have significantly reduced their naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Concerned by the growing Chinese naval buildup, several states of Southeast Asia have urged India to increase its presence and counteract the naval power asymmetry, which could have serious implications for trade and other maritime operations. For India, this complements its recent Ostpolitik (“Look East” policy) wherein it pursues its economic and geopolitical aspirations through several avenues, including membership of the Association of South East Asian Nations, technology sharing with member states, and limited naval exercises with Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines.(39) These interactions, which have important implications for the Sino-Indian relationship in the next century, deepen Indian commitment on its southeastern flank.

Analysts concur that at least in the medium term, neither India nor China has tactical or strategic objectives that would make them adversaries. Rapid economic growth is an imperative for both sides, and the two are indeed deepening and widening their economic cooperation (including in space launch technology). Nevertheless, both sides augment their ability to make war against a possible downturn in their relationship.

In this context, it is significant that Russia has entered into military technical cooperation with both India and China. Given its security concerns and developmental imperatives, it makes sense for Russia to forge strong links with both India and China. For India, too, pursuing a policy of greater convergence with Russia and improved relations with China appears to be the most suitable course of action. A serious deterioration in Sino-Indian relationship would compel Russia to choose China over India as its strategic partner.(40) Further, China will be a central figure in any realistic configuration of the emerging Asian balance of power. Accordingly, India and China should initiate negotiations to clarify their mutual concerns and priorities relating to their strategic neighborhood. Clarification of doctrines and force structures would enhance transparency and accountability in their bilateral relations and diminish security concerns of other, smaller, states in the region. Such a move, particularly from the Indian side, would clarify whether its deepening defense cooperation with Russia is geared toward meeting contingent security threats or augmenting its power projection capability.

In the post-cold war era choices of policy instruments to pursue national goals and interests have been in flux. The preceding discussion has highlighted the national contingent reasons that propel Russia and India to seek closer bilateral ties. After the initial phase of adjustments with which both sides had to contend, within their borders and beyond, a deeper relationship of strategic significance is in the making. This makes it doubly imperative for India to clarify the doctrinal and operational aspects of its developmental goals and priorities. Doing so would enable the international community to better appreciate India’s legitimate security concerns and policies, and not perceive them as spasmodic acts of a state that still searches for its rightful place in the global community.