Interview with Vice Admiral Madanjit Singh PVSM, AVSM
FORCE Volume 2 NO3 November-2004
Commissioned into the Indian Navy in January 1966, Vice Admiral Madanjit Singh PVSM, AVSM, specialises in gunnery and missiles. Before taking charge as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Western Naval Command, he was FOC-in-C, Southern Command. Among his various afloat and ashore appointments have been the command of five ships including the frigate INS Ganga and the aircraft carrier INS Viraat. He served two terms as director of Staff Requirements at Naval
Headquarters. He was the Director General Defence Planning Staff till March 2001 and in October 2001, he became the Chief of Personnel. His overseas responsibilities included setting up the Officers Training Academy at Port Harcourt in Nigeria in 1980-83, when he headed the Indian naval team to that country. An alumnus of the National Defence Academy in Pune, he passed out as the best cadet. Hailing from Kapurthala in Punjab , the admiral has a passion for golf and marksmanship. Sitting in his plush office which overlooked the Bombay harbour with naval ships (both static and moving) forming an interesting backdrop, he spoke to FORCE on a range of subjects including the growing role of the navy in modern warfare.
I am personally not in favour of P3C-Orion’ (Contd…)
How has the induction of new weapon systems and technologies affected the operational level of war?
The warfare has changed for us because of the equipment profile that we now have. There are more capable ships, aircraft, submarines with longer range missiles and force-multipliers. For example, the INS Talwar that we now have probably has two to three times more offensive capability than the earlier ships. So things have changed a lot.
Does it mean that now our area of responsibility has increased and we are more offensive in our operational art?
Areas of interest were always there, it was just that we were focused in other areas. Last few years, we have been showing our presence in most parts of the Indian Ocean and beyond. We are also doing bilateral exercises with many other navies. In fact, now we have declared that certain periods in a year we will not participate in any bilateral exercises because we need that time for our own operational changing patterns. Naval diplomacy has always been there. For the last so many years, among the three services, the navy has had a larger role in diplomacy and will continue to have so.
The recently released Indian Maritime Doctrine talks about littoral warfare, which also appears to be the trend worldwide. How are you moving in this direction?
We always had a focus on littoral warfare. It is the extra regional navies which have realised that littoral warfare is the order of the day and hence they have to pay attention in this area.
If you are saying that the navy has always been conscious of littoral warfare then what exactly has changed?
There have been a lot of changes. Most Asian nations, in fact none of them, have offensive capabilities beyond their own immediate areas, not even the Chinese. And no country in the West will sell anything to an Asian country which has an offensive capability. Most Asian navies are getting missiles (Surface to Air Missiles) which are defensive in nature. What has changed for us is that we have gone in for offensive weapons. We have an offensive capability. So our deterrence is effective over a wider range. For so many years we have been operating within 200 miles of our east and west coasts. We now do much more. For instance, Persian Gulf has always been very important to us and we have been sending our ships there, but now we are showing our presence in the Persian Gulf region much more. How many countries are sending their ships to Iran , UAE and Kuwait and so on?
Is it not true that a weapon system is offensive or defensive depending upon how it is used? Then what do you mean by offensive weapon systems?
In the past we had guns. We introduced missiles in the navy 30 years ago. Now we have developed Brahmos and also have offensive missiles with three or four times more range than our earlier missiles. If you have the power which is visible nobody wants to come close to you. That is deterrence. Our surface ships and submarines have these missiles. For example, the US which has nuclear-powered submarines is in a different kind of warfare. They are concerned about our conventional submarines.
Why is the US concerned about our conventional submarines?
Because they are difficult to detect as they are silent at slow speed. The Indian Ocean has eight choke points. A conventional submarine could be lurking anywhere here and could cause havoc.
Then why are we looking for the nuclear-powered Akula submarines?
I am not saying that we are looking for Akula submarines. But we firmly believe that the least vulnerable platform for strategic weapons is a nuclear-powered submarine which can be at sea for several months.
You have mentioned that the navy has acquired certain offensive weapon systems like the Brahmos missile. Yet, what are the operational equipment gaps which are preventing the optimal use of these offensive weapon systems?
We have quite a few of them. For example, Electronic Warfare comprises important equipment and sensors that every ship and submarine must have. Some we have imported, some we have made indigenously. In naval warfare, there is no eyeball contact. Now we are talking of BVR ( Beyond Visual Range ), but we acquired BVR weapons many years ago, as we do not get into visual range or even radar detection range. Then we have our navy-wide data link. We have a link between aircraft, helicopters, ships and submarines. We are totally networked and we have considerable amount of what the Americans call Cooperative Engagement Capability. This is an area which we are slowly developing. We have certainly not reached the US level.
In specific terms, what would be your equipment priorities?
Specific to offensive capabilities, we have been trying to develop a long range cruise missile capability, particularly for land-attack purposes. This will help the navy with the capability to contribute to the battle on land area. I don’t have to cross any borders. My ship or submarine can launch such a missile.
What about the Brahmos missile?
Brahmos is not a cruise missile; it is a supersonic anti-ship missile. It is a top missile in the world and renders obsolete any defensive weapon systems.
What are the ranges that you would ideally be looking at?
May be 1,500km.
Will the DRDO be able to do this?
They have been working on this for sometime. There is a technology gap, which we still have not been able to overcome.
What about the long range Maritime Patrol Aircraft?
This is an operational gap and we are conscious about it. We are working at it. We are upgrading our IL-38s. We are buying some more of those. We are looking at upgrades of TU-142 aircraft which have a much longer range. We have not yet found a satisfactory aircraft which meets our requirements. As you are aware the American are phasing out their P3C Orions and are keen that we buy them. I am personally not in favour of them.
Why is it?
First of all, they are vintage aircraft. Nothing wrong with them, as we can upgrade their Electronic Warfare system and use them for five to 10 years. But we will be introducing into our service a vastly different type of aircraft with attendant logistics and operational spares requirement. In any case, we have a major problem as we maintain a diverse range of equipment. I would say that we should go for an Airbus or Boeing configuration. This would give us much more electronic capability.
Are we happy with the present Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Searcher and Heron) in the navy or are we looking for something more?
They are the interim. Our eventual requirement is to have a UAV with a rotary capability that can be launched from a ship. The Russians have developed such a system.
Considering that the Asian nations are paying a lot of attention to submarines, how do you assess our submarine capabilities, and how do we make up for our dwindling numbers?
Our submarines have got the desired capabilities that we are looking at. The government has accepted the 30 years submarine plan. The CNS has also made a statement that the Scorpene programme will start sooner rather than later. These submarines have much more capabilities than the ones which will be phased out.
Although the navy chief is backing the Scorpene programme, there appears to be a divided opinion within the navy about whether we should have gone for the French Scorpene submarines or the Russian Amur submarines. What do you say to this?
There is no divided opinion. There are some pluses for the Scorpene and some for the Amur. In fact, there are three versions of the Amur submarine. We feel that in our area of operations, we need submarines with two different types of capabilities. We have decided that we cannot start two submarine lines at the same time. Once we are finished with one type of submarine, we can consider the other one. In fact, we have already done some sort of evaluation for the Amur submarine.
The Russians have made an offer of the Talwar class follow-on ships. Is this worth considering?
We have an option clause. We went for the Talwar class because we did not get government sanction in time to build replacement ships of this type. We could not have built this type of ship in India in four years. We have used a lot of sensors of Russian origin and we have put a lot of equipment of our own origin also. All the three ships of this class, including Tabar, which has just come, have gone through combat worthiness and form a good team.
What are your Key Result Areas, or things that you would want to accomplish during your tenure?
We have analysed a few areas of weaknesses, both in combat and man-management. In a single sentence, I want the combat capability of the navy to be fully networked. Regarding man-management, we have very capable officers and men. Earlier, we had an officer profile which was seven to eight years younger than the army. However, after the pay commission recommendations we find that the age profile of our officers in command has gone up to the army and the air force level. We used to have, what is called the standard service. If an officer did not go beyond a certain rank he retired after 21 years of service. Now the same officer, even if he does not go beyond that rank can serve up to 54 years of age or more. For this reason, the overall age profile of the navy has gone up. For example, I recently met the Singapore Navy Chief who retired at the ripe age of 44 years. Now, I am not saying that we can match that age profile, but the service has to remain young, which will ensure that it remains
By: Blackcat - 13th November 2004 at 21:46
What about the long range Maritime Patrol Aircraft?
This is an operational gap and we are conscious about it. We are working at it. We are upgrading our IL-38s. We are buying some more of those. We are looking at upgrades of TU-142 aircraft which have a much longer range. We have not yet found a satisfactory aircraft which meets our requirements. As you are aware the American are phasing out their P3C Orions and are keen that we buy them. I am personally not in favour of them.
I hope the Russians sent a proposal for a patrol a/c based on the Tu-204 which they initially had intended. I’d personally like to see that happen rather than goinin for something based on Boeing or Airbus.
thread for IL-38 & P-3 successors
http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showthread.php?t=33393
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here is the Yakolev’s Tiltrotor one, but the tilt-rotors mean more maint …
By: Blackcat - 12th November 2004 at 14:56
Nice pictures there Jay ….. Tks
the pctures that u posted actually gives an idea abt its size and the ‘parts’ which can’t be judged from the small pic that i posted….. Grrr8 job man.
But there is also another yakolev Tiltrotor design …… hope some one can post something abt that.
By: star49 - 12th November 2004 at 01:43
Does the GOI need to give you in writing when the deal will be signed , Its before the CCSA and it will be given the go ahead when it comes before it , The DM , Navy Chief had said repeatdly that its being examined by the highest authority in the country and it will signed soon , After all there are billions of Dollar involved in such a deal and I am sure lots of government body , media and public at large will be scrutnising the deal after it is signed and the GOI needs to take a carefull and calibirated decision before going the goahead , the GOI is very well aware of the Navy critical need for subs .
Who said all three deal will be signed together the Scorpene deal will be the one to get the goahead first , the navy just started examining the Amur as said by a Senior navy officer to a newspaper , I am sure we are all hearing of modified amur with brahmos etc etc has a lot to do with India . The financial aspect of any deal will be only know after the deal is signed and what kind of TOT is involved and the numbers being built at the Shipyard etc , lots of thing needs to be taken in to account , Initally per reports from media and navy and MDL officials 6 Scorpene will be built at the Mazagoan Docks .
Defence deal is signed by any government BJP/Congress as per the critical defence needs of the country , No government will say no to defence purchase if it affects the country security , Its just that the media highlights the fact that one particular party government will be signing more deal than the others or things like that , Ofcourse changes in the government affects the pace and timings of the deal since the new government has to take charge of the situation . And all defence deal are passed through the Finance Ministry which looks into the financial aspect of every deal and ofcourse affordibility and long term finincial commitment involved , whith a growing GDP rate of 6 + percent India can well afford with minimum rise in defence budget to take care of defence purchases without affecting the economy.
My initial statement was based on $4.5B for scorpenes which you people seem to challenge. 6 diesel submarine price cannot be that much. So the price is lower. And 7 to 8 % inflation kills small increase in defence budget. just look at the 50% rise of euros versus dollar since May 2002 when negotiation was finalized.
By: Jai - 11th November 2004 at 12:03
A few photos of the Ka-137.
By: Austin - 11th November 2004 at 10:58
when it is going to be signed is the whole question. Next year, next decade or next century. I can predict with reasonable certainity that among the three programs one at a time will signed. either scorpene, Amur or Nuclear but not 3 at time. and scorpene deal wont be $4.5B(that 200000 crore). So where is the fault line in my statement. Regarding BJP government if it is so found of defence agreements than why it left all the financial burden to current government.
Does the GOI need to give you in writing when the deal will be signed , Its before the CCSA and it will be given the go ahead when it comes before it , The DM , Navy Chief had said repeatdly that its being examined by the highest authority in the country and it will signed soon , After all there are billions of Dollar involved in such a deal and I am sure lots of government body , media and public at large will be scrutnising the deal after it is signed and the GOI needs to take a carefull and calibirated decision before going the goahead , the GOI is very well aware of the Navy critical need for subs .
Who said all three deal will be signed together the Scorpene deal will be the one to get the goahead first , the navy just started examining the Amur as said by a Senior navy officer to a newspaper , I am sure we are all hearing of modified amur with brahmos etc etc has a lot to do with India . The financial aspect of any deal will be only know after the deal is signed and what kind of TOT is involved and the numbers being built at the Shipyard etc , lots of thing needs to be taken in to account , Initally per reports from media and navy and MDL officials 6 Scorpene will be built at the Mazagoan Docks .
Defence deal is signed by any government BJP/Congress as per the critical defence needs of the country , No government will say no to defence purchase if it affects the country security , Its just that the media highlights the fact that one particular party government will be signing more deal than the others or things like that , Ofcourse changes in the government affects the pace and timings of the deal since the new government has to take charge of the situation . And all defence deal are passed through the Finance Ministry which looks into the financial aspect of every deal and ofcourse affordibility and long term finincial commitment involved , whith a growing GDP rate of 6 + percent India can well afford with minimum rise in defence budget to take care of defence purchases without affecting the economy.
By: star49 - 9th November 2004 at 23:35
I dont want to sound Nostradamus here , but If the files are placed before CCSA , thats the last stage after a lengthy process , technical evaluation , financial evaluation etc , Its not the question if the deal will be signed but when it is going to be signed , Had it not been the general election the BJP led government had almost given the go ahead for this deal , So may be the new government will give us a nice suprise before the Navy day .
If you look at the alternative , besides the Scorpene there are just two of them , the Type 214 HDW , which is not likely coz its been blacklisted coz of corruption charges , and the other is Amur-1650 or the newer one which will come when it comes , so the scorpene deal is a go go for the navy.
when it is going to be signed is the whole question. Next year, next decade or next century. I can predict with reasonable certainity that among the three programs one at a time will signed. either scorpene, Amur or Nuclear but not 3 at time. and scorpene deal wont be $4.5B(that 200000 crore). So where is the fault line in my statement. Regarding BJP government if it is so found of defence agreements than why it left all the financial burden to current government.
By: Blackcat - 8th November 2004 at 21:55
and the Russian one that the Chief had talked abt.
Ka-137 (Russian)
The Russian Kamov helicopter OKB (design bureau) has also built a tactical UAV, the Kamov “Ka-137”. Kamov has produced a number of different manned helicopter designs since the 1940s, focusing on the “coaxial” rotor configuration, with twin rotors spinning in opposite directions on the same shaft.
Kamov flew Russia’s first unmanned helicopter, the Ka-37, in 1993, after developing the UAV with their own funds. The “Ka-37” looked like a scaled-down version of a Kamov manned helicopter, with the coaxial rotor configuration and a tailboom with fins. The Ka-37 was apparently sold in some numbers for agricultural applications, and led to an improved “Ka-37S” prototype in 1996 that featured a new engine.
The Ka-137 is a next-generation follow-on to the Ka-37, and has been substantially redesigned. The Ka-137 is an endearingly toylike machine, somewhat in a class with the Canadair CL-227, with a ball-shaped body, four landing legs, and a coaxial rotor system powered by a 49 kW (65 horsepower) piston engine. It can carry a TV imaging system, and can be operated using a truck-based support and control system. The Ka-137 is currently in use with Russian border guards and possibly Russian coast guard patrol boats.
spec —- metric —- english
rotor width —- 5.3 meters —- 17 feet 5 inches
body diameter —- 1.22 meters —- 3 feet 11 inches
max loaded weight —- 280 kilograms —- 617 pounds
maximum speed —- 175 KPH —- 110 MPH / 95 KT
service ceiling —- 3,500 meters —- 11,500 feet
endurance —- 4 hours
payload —- Day / night imager.
guidance system —- Programmable with radio control backup.
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and as u guys can see and if searched more ….. this wud be the most compact, simple and ofcourse the cheapest one and I guess aeach ship wud be able to carry 2-3-6 or more for its round the clock operation.
By: Blackcat - 8th November 2004 at 21:39
and some more
CAC Systemes Heliot (French)
The CAC Systemes Heliot is a small two-seat helicopter that can be piloted or operated as a UAV for reconnaissance or decoy missions. It is also used as a target drone. The Heliot is of conventional main-tail rotor configuration and is powered by a Hirth piston engine with 79 kW (105 horsepower). It has a large payload capacity, and CAC Systemes advertises it for use with a wide range of standard or customer-supplied payloads for reconnaissance, electronic warfare, or training.
spec —– metric —- english
rotor diameter —- 6.7 meters —- 22 feet
length —- 6 meters —- 19 feet 8 inches
payload weight —- 120 kilograms —- 265 pounds
empty weight —- 230 kilograms —- 507 pounds
launch weight —- 450 kilograms —- 992 pounds
maximum speed —- 126 KPH —- 78 MPH / 68 KT
service ceiling —- 3,000 meters —- 9,850 feet
endurance —- 2 hours 30 minutes
payload —- Imagers, EW, countermeasures, etc.
guidance system —- Programmable with GPS, radio control backup.
&
Techno-Sud Vigilant (French)
The Techno-Sud Vigilant is another French mini-UAV. It is a small unpiloted helicopter of conventional main-tail rotor configuration, and powered by a 9 kW (12 horsepower) two-stroke engine. The Vigilant is marketed by Thomson-CSF, and is being sold to both military and civilian users. Civilian users have accounted for the bulk of sales, using it for applications such as security or environmental monitoring.
spec —- metric —- english
rotor diameter —- 1.83 meters —- 6 feet
length —- 2.3 meters —- 7 feet 6 inches
launch weight —- 40 kilograms —- 88 pounds
maximum speed —- 97 KPH —- 60 MPH / 52 KT
service ceiling —- 1,830 meters —- 6,000 feet
endurance —- 1 hour
payload —- Imagers and custom payloads.
guidance system —- Programmable with radio control backup.
&
Schiebel Camcopter (Australian)
Schiebel of Austria has developed a helicopter mini-UAV named the “Camcopter”, which was evaluated the US Air Force as part of studies in developing improved defenses from terrorist attacks on military installations. It was purchased by the Iranians, officially to help clear minefields, but has apparently also been used for patrolling Iran’s border with Afghanistan.
The Camcopter has a conventional main-tail rotor helicopter configuration, with twin-blade main rotor. It used an 11 kW (15 horsepower) two-stroke piston engine.
spec —- metric —- english
rotor diameter —- 3.09 meters —- 9 feet 11 inches
length —- 2.68 meters —- 8 feet 10 inches
empty weight —- 43 kilograms —- 95 pounds
launch weight —- 68 kilograms —- 150 pounds
maximum speed —- 90 KPH —- 56 MPH / 49 KT
service ceiling —- 3,000 meters —- 9,840 feet
endurance —- 6 hours
payload —- Day / night imager.
guidance system —- Programmable with GPS, radio control backup.
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By: Blackcat - 8th November 2004 at 21:26
I think it should read “Americans”, referring to the Bell Eagle Eye and the NG Firescout.
I wud differ on that coz its highly unlikely that any word mentioning American be mis quoted by Indian media and those reporting defence matters, coz of their obsession with western world.
anyway here are some info for all abt the two system …. from vectorsite
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Bell Eagle Eye tiltrotor
The Bell Eagle Eye tiltrotor, another one of the competitors in the Navy VT-UAV competition, performed its initial flight in 1993. The Eagle Eye is powered by a single Allison 250-C20 turboshaft engine mounted in the center fuselage, with a transmission system driving a tilting rotor at the end of each wing.
Bell promoted the Eagle Eye for a decade without finding a buyer, but in the summer of 2002, the US Coast Guard ordered the UAV as part of the service’s broad “DeepWater” re-equipment effort. It must have been a great relief to company officials.
spec —- metric —- english
wingspan —- 4.63 meters —- 15 feet 2 inches
length —- 5.46 meters —- 17 feet 11 inches
rotor diameter —- 2.9 meters —- 9 feet 6 inches
max loaded weight —- 910 kilograms —- 2,000 pounds
maximum speed —- 322 KPH —- 200 MPH / 174 KT
service ceiling —- 6,100 meters —- 20,000 feet
endurance —- 8 hours
&
US NAVY RQ-8A FIRESCOUT
* While the Army was working on Outrider, the Navy was moving on to its second generation UAV, as old Pioneers were being withdrawn from service.
The Navy requirement specified a vertical takeoff & landing (VTOL) aircraft, with a payload capacity of 90 kilograms (200 pounds), a range of 200 kilometers (125 miles), an endurance on station of three hours at an altitude of 6 kilometers (20,000 feet), and the ability land on a ship in a 46 KPH (29 MPH) breeze. The UAV was to fly 190 hours between maintenance.
There were three finalists in the competition, which was designated “VTOL-UAV” or “VT-UAV”. Bell, Sikorsky, and a collaboration of Ryan and Schweizer Helicopters submitted designs.
The Ryan-Schweizer UAV was selected as the winner in the spring of 2000. The “RQ-8A Firescout”, as it was named, was a derivative of the Schweizer three-passenger, turbine powered 330SP helicopter, itself a derivative of the Hughes 300 series helicopters, with a new fuselage, new fuel system, and added UAV electronics and sensors.
The initial prototype of the Firescout was piloted in initial tests, flying autonomously for the first time in January 2000. The Rolls-Royce Allison 250 turbine engine ran on JP-5 and JP-8 jet fuel, which is nonvolatile and safe for shipboard storage.
The Firescout was to be fitted with a sensor ball turret that carries electro-optic and infrared cameras, and a laser range finder. It was to be controlled over a data link derived from the Northrop Grumman Global Hawk UAV, operating over a line of sight to a distance of 280 kilometers (172 miles). The control system was to be fitted onto a ship, or could be carried on a Hummer light vehicle for US Marine service.
The Firescout program suffered a setback in November 2000, when the initial prototype crashed and was destroyed, leading to a schedule slip. Despite the accident, the Navy was expected to move quickly to begin production and introduction of the type, but then in late 2001 the program went into a stall.
Although progress on the project had been regarded as satisfactory, the Navy decided the Firescout didn’t meet their needs after all, and cut funding for the program in December 2001. The Navy hopes to leverage technology development for the Firescout program into their next UAV effort. Northrop Grumman continues to promote the Firescout to other potential customers.
* Despite the difficulties in procuring operational UAV systems, the US military is entering a new era in which UAVs will be critical to warfighting tactics. UAVs fitted with optical, infrared, and SAR sensors, SIGINT payloads, or ECM systems should be in widespread use in about a decade, with the UAVs controlled and relaying data back over high-bandwidth data links in real time, linked to ground, air, sea, and space platforms.
The trend had been emerging before the American war in Afghanistan in 2001:2002, but was greatly accelerated by the use of UAVs in that conflict, and in fact combat experience was one of the inputs that convinced the Navy to give up on the Firescout. The war in Afghanistan emphasized “long endurance” UAVs, which are the subject of later chapters.
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and below pictures of Eagle Eye & Firescout
By: Arabella-Cox - 7th November 2004 at 19:08
Our eventual requirement is to have a UAV with a rotary capability that can be launched from a ship. The Russians have developed such a system.
I think it should read “Americans”, referring to the Bell Eagle Eye and the NG Firescout.
By: Nitin_V - 7th November 2004 at 03:51
Ah but Austin, you have to realise that logic is Star49’s forte. Y’see the Scorpene would enhance Indian defence preparedness. Hence, its bad and Star49 wishes it never happens. Ergo, it wont.
How dare you say anything different. :rolleyes: 😉
By: Austin - 6th November 2004 at 13:04
this deal is not going to be signed.
I dont want to sound Nostradamus here , but If the files are placed before CCSA , thats the last stage after a lengthy process , technical evaluation , financial evaluation etc , Its not the question if the deal will be signed but when it is going to be signed , Had it not been the general election the BJP led government had almost given the go ahead for this deal , So may be the new government will give us a nice suprise before the Navy day .
If you look at the alternative , besides the Scorpene there are just two of them , the Type 214 HDW , which is not likely coz its been blacklisted coz of corruption charges , and the other is Amur-1650 or the newer one which will come when it comes , so the scorpene deal is a go go for the navy.
By: nirav - 6th November 2004 at 07:33
this deal is not going to be signed.
et tu Nostradamus ?? 😀
By: star49 - 6th November 2004 at 00:44
In May 2002, the Price Negotiations Committee (PNC) had clinched the deal for six submarines at Rs 14,000 crore excluding the cost of infrastructure to be set up at Mazagon Dockyards Ltd
(MDL) in Mumbai. At present, the cost has risen to about Rs 20,000 crore.
this deal is not going to be signed.
By: Nitin_V - 4th November 2004 at 10:13
Yes. Thats FORCE’s critical weakness- its editorial board is quite sloppy and hence quite a few articles end up on a whimsical note and sometimes sheer flights of fancy. Hence its a bit of a tabloid in some ways.
And they have plagiarized my work as well, so I guess I should be either flattered or ticked off!
Anyhow, both articles are much better than their norm and kudos to Austin for typing them out.
By: Severodvinsk - 4th November 2004 at 10:06
yeah, I agree, the last paragraph is over the top… These three stupid Agosta’s aren’t going to turn the tide. About the maritime patrol aircraft, yes indeed, yet India is getting and having a carrier, and an Exocet or Harpoon is well within the range of the carrier’s aircraft.
The Sublaunched Exocet is just rubbish. Much-too short ranged. I’m sure you can even SEE the point from where it’s launched from the carrier. The horizon is large enough for that. If you are very attentive, you can find that sub quite easily. Also, the defenses of IN are quite good, with Kashtan, Barak, Shtil…
Another note is that Pakistan has a quite weak surface fleet, not able to cover the submarines on top. When IN gets a good maritime patrol craft (which they have in form of the IL-38, yet they have too few of these aircraft), those Agosta’s will be quite busy.
By: Nitin_V - 4th November 2004 at 09:40
Nice articles but slightly alarmist. The IN subs are seeing considerable update. The KIlos got state of the art new sonars and fire control systems as well and DRDO developed ESM gear is also being inducted on the sub fleet. Per IN officers latter is highly capable and equivalent to any imported kit.
Also BDL is making decoys with Italian tech.
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2003/11/06/stories/2003110604691200.htm
The company is closely involved with the Navy and the Air Force, apart from the traditional customers, the Army, and is developing munitions for all the three services. Submarine-fired decoys are being produced while user trials have been held for lightweight torpedoes and production may start soon.
By: Victor - 4th November 2004 at 03:03
First of all, they are vintage aircraft. Nothing wrong with them, as we can upgrade their Electronic Warfare system and use them for five to 10 years. But we will be introducing into our service a vastly different type of aircraft with attendant logistics and operational spares requirement. In any case, we have a major problem as we maintain a diverse range of equipment. I would say that we should go for an Airbus or Boeing configuration. This would give us much more electronic capability.
A man after my own heart 🙂
By: Austin - 4th November 2004 at 02:58
Killers at Bay
Force Volume 2 NO 3 November 2004
Submarines are the offensive weapons of choice
The Indian Navy’s biggest operational gap is its dwindling number of submarines. Moreover, all existing submarines lack the technology know-how to adjust their roles and missions to changing times: from operating alone to contributing to the land battle. Considering that the lifespan of a conventional
submarine is 25 years, by 2010, most of the kilo class submarines should be de-commissioned, bringing the strength, unless reinforced well in time, to a total of five submarines. It is another matter that the Indian armed forces have a habit of flogging their weapon platforms much beyond the stipulated longevity, which of course, is done at great risk to own men, with little operational outcome. The first kilo class submarine, Sindhughosh was commissioned in April 1986 and the last one, Sindhushastra in Jul 2000. In addition to the 10 kilos, the navy has four conventional (SSK), HDW-T1500 class submarines. Two Foxtrot class submarines of the Sixties vintage, which are counted in the inventory, need to be junked soonest. Therefore, the operational need is both to induct new submarines, and to introduce technologies, which would enlarge the existing option of employing submarines as ‘lone wolves’ to their full integration with the overall tactical picture. Observers believe that the singular ability of submarines to remain stealthy makes them the true capital ships of the 21st century. For this reason alone, over 700 submarines are deployed around the world with navies of more than 40 countries. Closer home, all Asian nations, especially China and Pakistan , have invested heavily in their submarines.
India, which lacks nuclear-powered submarines, must make use of the growing relevance of conventional submarines, which is leading to breathtaking technologies to fulfil its new tasks. Even as nuclear-powered submarines will continue to play a vital role in ‘power projection’ operations by delivering ballistic/cruise missiles against coastal and in-depth targets, the diesel-electric submarines are sought to be employed on a variety of missions to meet the evolving operational requirements. During the Cold War, the conventional submarine operations were limited to Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), with little co-operation between the conventional submarines and other naval assets. With littoral warfare assuming importance over deep sea warfare, as evident from the post 9/11 Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the mission profile of conventional submarines the world over has changed drastically with primacy of operations shifting to Intelligence gathering, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), mine-laying, support to Special Operations, and importantly to eventually become part of the emerging operational concept called Network Centric Warfare (NCW). (Littoral warfare refers to coastal and shallow areas, and its precise NATO definition is ‘a coastal region consisting of the seaward area from the open sea to the shore that must be controlled to support operations ashore, and the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from sea’). This has resulted in the worldwide-renewed focus on conventional submarines, which started in the Nineties, a development of great importance for the Indian Navy.
The recently released Indian Maritime Doctrine has listed various types of operations including Strike-Warfare, ASW, ASuW, Anti-Air Warfare, Amphibious Warfare, Special Operations, Mine Warfare and Operations to influence decisions on land or simply the land-attack capability. The submarines can play the central or an important role in all the listed operations. After all, the peculiarity of submarines lies in the fact that while invisible, its presence in the Order of Battle is in itself a powerful deterrence. Regarding the Indian Navy, the moot question is whether it has requisite numbers and quality of submarines to fulfil its above-mentioned operational tasks. To understand this, it is necessary to appreciate the need for submarines, the peculiarities of oceans especially the Indian Ocean , the worldwide technologies now available for conventional submarines, and the capabilities of our immediate adversary, Pakistan.
The effectiveness of a submarine depends upon its ability to remain undetected for long periods when it searches, tracks or lies in wait for its stated assignment. The medium of concealment, the ocean, is advantageous for a submarine only so long as it is not detected and or deprived of its ability to detect. The choice of energy used for detection of submarines in an ocean is based on the range of penetration of the energy source in the medium, its ability to differentiate between objects and its speed of propagation. Light has an excellent differentiation ability and high speed but its range in water is limited to tens of metres. Similarly seawater is impervious to RF transmissions with VLF transmissions penetrating to just about 10m and VHF/UHF go down to just a few millimetres. Thus it can be seen that even Radar will be of use only against a surfaced submarine or one at periscope depth. Sound while lacking the propagation speed of light or magnetic waves is capable of being transmitted through the sea to distances that are operationally significant and relevant . Sound is not a panacea to the problems of underwater detection and its optimum use requires a thorough understanding of the medium. Sound propagates through the water as series of compressions and rarefactions. Actual sound propagation in water is subject to geometric spreading and attenuation both of which affect the acoustic intensity at the receiver. The factors that affect the path of a sound wave in water are temperature, pressure that is linked to depth, salinity and density of the medium. Temperature is the most important of these environmental factors and therefore the thermal structure of the ocean is of significant tactical importance. The tracing of sound ray paths in the ocean is the key to exploitation of the medium.
The water in the ocean is not a single homogenous unit and is actually a sandwich made up of several layers of water, each of which has the same thermal characteristics. In our waters, the surface area of the water is much warmer than the water mass just 40 to 50m below. The differences in temperatures cause layers to form, which provide the ability for sound waves to travel through them. More often than not the sound wave would reflect from this region. The submarine exploits these layers effectively by hiding below or above them, depending where the threat is from, below against a surface ship and above against a submarine operating deep. When employed on reconnaissance task, the submarines position themselves at 40 to 80 metres depth, where temperatures are about 25 degrees centigrade. At depth of 200 to 250 metres, all oceans have temperatures around 15–18 degrees, below which it dips sharply to about 4 degrees. Sound waves do not travel in straight lines in the ocean but follow curved paths. The curvature of these paths varies with the type of ocean, the season of the year, the time of the day, and the depths of water available in the area. Submariners seek out shadow zones that are essentially areas where sound waves from the transmitting ship do not reach the submarine. These zones are determined using special software programmes. The seawater environment favours the submarine over its surface counterparts. Submarines rely heavily on passive detection means and have a distinct range advantage over enemy surface ships whose cavitation noise (noise caused by ships propeller movement) can be detected at great ranges. As cavitation decreases with depth (because of increased external pressure due to depth) a submarine can dive deep and reduce its speed to minimise its own cavitation noise. A submarine routinely records the temperature at various depths that is this then utilised to select the correct depth for the designated operational task. The ocean, especially shallow water area, is a noisy medium; it contains innumerable sources of sounds besides submarines. These other noises tend to mask the feeble sounds generated by submarines. Therefore, unlike the atmosphere, the ocean is a noisy, non-uniform medium whose properties change with time, and from point to point on the surface of earth. This difficult environment helps submarines and makes ASW a challenging task.
Before a submarine is attacked, it must be first detected and then localised as per the requirements of the available weapon systems. An ASW operation thus consists of three steps: to detect a submarine, to localise it, and then to ‘kill’ it. Detection, which is the single most important step in ASW operations, consists of ascertaining whether a submarine is or is not in a given area of an ocean. Localisation, on the other hand, is the task of pinpointing the position of the submarine within that region, usually a mile or so on a side. The last task of ASW is to ‘kill’ that is, sink, the enemy submarine; under certain circumstances, such as most peacetime operations, it is necessary to follow an enemy submarine continuously, rather than attempt to sink it as soon as it is localised. To detect a submarine some radiation or reflection of energy must take place from the submarine and or else the submarine must disturb one of the natural static fields of the earth such as the magnetic field. Unlike nuclear-powered submarines, radar or infrared detection devices can detect conventional submarines, when they surface up to periscope depths to re-charge their batteries by running their diesel engines (which they must do every 24 hours or so). Radar can detect a submarine even if only its periscope or snorkel is above the surface of water and so can infra–red cameras mounted on airplanes and helicopters. A high resolution satellite is unlikely to detect a submarine unless it is passing over at that time. A geo–stationary satellite which would provide permanent coverage of an area would not have the resolution to detect a submarine snorkel or mast.
Another method would be to intercept the submarine’s radio communication with its command bases on land. When a submarine merely receives messages and maintains radio silence, it is not possible to find where it is with this technique. But when the submarine sends out radio signals, these signals can be intercepted, and by determining from which direction they are coming using a process called triangulation, one can not only detect the presence of a submarine, but also localise it to within a few miles. Radio emissions from a submarine can be detected by receiving equipment on satellites overhead, ships, aircraft, and land-based receivers. All countries with extended coastlines maintain Direction Finding stations along their coasts to intercept radio messages and locate/identify a transmission source.
As a submarine travels underwater, it emits characteristic sounds generated by the motion of the submarine through the water, which is the hydrodynamic noise and noise generated by the vibrations of its engines or by human activities onboard, and by the vibrations of its hull called machinery noise. This acoustical energy generated by the submarine propagates over considerable distances in the ocean, especially in the low frequency bands and can be detected by passive listening devices. However, if the submarine is motionless and silent, it can be detected by an active sonar system, that generates a powerful sound wave underwater and then listens for the return echo of the portion of that wave that bounced off the hard hull of the submarine. The passive approach has two advantages: The submarine does not know that it is being detected and the position of passive detector in the ocean remains unknown to the submarine. The advantage of the active approach is that a submarine can be detected even if it is emitting very low noise by lying dead still in the water. The disadvantage is that a submarine can easily hear the sound emitted by the sonar, on its own passive sonar at about twice the range at which the ship can detect, and thereby know that it has been detected.
Once a submarine is detected, there are several methods used to pinpoint a submerged submarine. One is for an aircraft or helicopter to fly over the area within which the submarine has been detected, carrying a Magnetic Anomaly Device (MAD), a sensitive instrument that measures the local strength of the geo-magnetic field. Since most submarine hulls are made out of ferromagnetic material, like iron or steel, they tend to gather together and concentrate the local magnetic field. So a sudden intensification of the earth’s magnetic field detected by the MAD means that there is a submarine somewhere within a kilometre. Another approach is to use a series of sonobuoys with a detection range of about 10km that are able to indicate from what direction the sound of a submarine is coming. Sonobuoys however need a relatively quiet environment to operate in and thus are virtually useless in shallow waters. Also sonobuoys need to be monitored by aircraft/helicopters and the tactical situation should permit this. Sonobuoy barriers are thus used in a defensive role and closer to home. Still another way is to have at least two helicopters search an area where a submarine is suspected to be with dunking sonars that can tell the direction from which the reflected echo is coming. Other techniques, using hunter-killer submarines with sonar arrays or surface ships with towed arrays, can determine both the direction from which the sound is coming and the distance of its source from the detector. A commonly used method is to employ Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), which flies over a submarine positioned at periscope depth and takes its picture on its radar or on an infra-red device. Once the presence of a submarine is confirmed, depth charges/torpedoes are thrown to ‘kill’ it. Of all ASW platforms, submarines are most vulnerable to aircraft equipped with infra-red visibility and radars. The problem, however, is that none of the above methods for localising a submarine are overly successful individually and a combination of these is required to confirm a submarine contact. More often than not, experienced submariners with information of the local ocean conditions exploit this situation and can slip away and disappear.
Given this, it is clear that conventional submarines are most vulnerable at periscope depth, which in a 24 hours cycle, during peacetime they usually come to for about three to four hours to charge batteries alone, besides the time otherwise spent at periscope depth for communications, intelligence gathering etc. During times of crisis, this is the biggest problem faced by submarines, which are then forced to regulate their speeds, at the cost of tactical vulnerability, to reduce the frequency and duration of charging of batteries. For example, moving at a speed of about 25 knots, conventional submarines would need to charge batteries after half-an-hour, while at a speed of two knots, it could stay submerged for more than 24 hours. Probably, the single biggest innovation which has revolutionised the employment of conventional submarines across the entire spectrum of peace-time operations, crisis management and conflict scenarios is the Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) which could be based on Stirling engine technology, fuel cell, and the French Mesma systems. This permits conventional submarines to stay submerged for long periods (up to 14 days at a stretch), achieve high speeds under battery power, dive deeper which helps in reducing heat radiation and reducing noise emission level to a minimum. Considering that conventional submarines are smaller with minimal signature as compared with nuclear-powered submarines, they can operate in shallow waters for long durations as well as Deep Ocean without limitations, irrespective of sea-state and weather conditions.
The discovery of AIP has in turn lead to other technological innovations in conventional submarines to impart them with more stealth and agility, modularity to be employed on a range of missions, and connectivity to make them a part of dynamics littoral scenarios. The age old tested communication system where a submarine maintains complete radio silence and depends completely on a pre-determined broadcast schedule disconnects it with the larger tactical picture. The key to the future of conventional submarines lies in its ability to deliver in real time, which implies both technological changes as well as doctrinal reviews. All countries, however, will view the submarines technology changes in their respective doctrinal context. For example, the threat posed by Russia ‘s stealthy Akula-class SSNs imposes new demand on US weapons and sensors. Thus, despite a surplus of nuclear-powered submarines, the US has two compelling reasons to build new and more advanced SSNs. First, there is a need to preserve the stealth of US submarines, and second, the US must overcome the stealth of the most advanced foreign built submarines. Therefore, the US submarine programme is aimed at developing submarine platforms, sensor and weapons needed to track and destroy submarines, which in future will be faster, more lethal, and increasingly stealthy. The second key role of US attack submarines will be the need to deliver precision firepower against land targets ashore.
The European nation’s submarine development, on the other hand, is tilted towards better conventional submarines rather than SSNs for the new roles that they can undertake. A four-yearly submarine conference organised by the German and Swedish submarine companies, has in its 2003 proceedings (SubCon 2003) provided a fascinating glimpse into the future roles and technologies regarding conventional submarines. According to SubCon 2003, a typical mix of submarine operations in the future might be like this: Intelligence operations will be 50 per cent; Special Operations, AsuW, ASW and mine laying operations would constitute 10 per cent each; and mine clearance and land strike operations would be five per cent each. It is evident that the European approach towards submarines is at variance with the American.
Small conventional submarines are best suited for ISR missions in littoral waters. This is leading to improvements in above water sensors like periscopes, electronic intercept systems and radar. Modern periscopes equipped with infrared, low light visibility, laser and digital imaging capabilities can extract maximum information from an enemy’s visible and thermal energies for successful ISR operations. Moreover, radars are being improved to become a high value sensor for high density contact management. The ISR from submarines is sought to be expanded to both control and launch Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to obtain information beyond the enemy coastline to provide commanders with real time intelligence picture. It is obvious that such information would help Special Operations immensely. All the above is possible if the submarine overcomes its indiscretion rate — the need to come to periscope depth regularly to re-charge batteries, which is now possible with AIP.
According to SubCon 2003, as the requirement develops for a multi-mission capability of submarines, it is accompanied by the need to fit the platform with an increased array of payload. Though this will be limited by the size and displacement of the submarine, modularity would be the way out of the dilemma. For example, for sea denial and sea control operations, the submarine will be fitted with towed array sonar; while for operations in the littorals the submarine will attach high-frequency side-scan sonar for bottom-mapping or mine reconnaissance operations. Yet another demand on the submarines to fulfil their multi-tasks will be the need for real-time connectivity. By its very nature, littoral warfare demands a multimedia approach, since joint and combined operations would be the rule rather than the exception. This requires NCW, which will allow a coherent employment of the entire naval force. The pre-requisite for the integration of submarines in NCW is gaining access to real-time communication systems without compromising the submarine’s stealth. Satellite Communications (SATCOM) and active data links are the answers for this. Moreover, Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) will add a new dimension to submarine warfare. These will be fired from torpedo tubes and will expand the submarine’s surveillance capability beneath the seas. After the tragic KURSK accident in 2000, the question of how to protect and rescue submarine crews in distress has also assumed importance. In summation, according to SubCon 2003, a modern non-nuclear powered submarine can be regarded as a reliable, extremely economical and highly efficient weapon system for any medium-sized navy, especially when its favourable life-cycle costs of a third to a fifth of those of a frigate. (See chart).
The kilo is divided into six compartments called Fore-ends which houses six torpedo tubes, Control Room, Third or Battery compartment, Engine Room, Motor Room, and the Aft-ends. Although the submarine has a double hull and is provided with anechoic rubber coating, there is a need for advanced shock mountings and internal noise measuring equipment to ensure minimum noise level. On the other hand, the HDW or Shishumar class submarines have a single hull with three compartments: the torpedo room with eight torpedo tubes, Combat Information Centre, and machinery space.
The Kilos have a bow mounted sonar with a range of over 40 miles, and are equipped with TEST-71 ME wire guided torpedo and CET 53-65 KE wake homing torpedo with ranges of about 20km. Moreover, five kilo submarines are also armed with Klub 3M-54E anti-ship supersonic missiles with a range of 200km plus. In addition, one of the kilo submarines is in Russia and is likely to be fitted with Klub 3M-14E land attack missiles, which has a range in excess of 300nm. The HDW-built submarines, on the other hand, are armed with the Italian 20km range SUT (Surface Underwater Torpedo). In the absence of SATCOM, the submarine relies on the regular broadcast schedule, which is slow and tedious. Moreover, the VLF and HF radio frequencies can be easily monitored by the enemy, even if he is unable to decipher codes. Given this limitation, the navy has been negotiating with France and Russia to procure TWA (Towed Wire Antenna), which allows the submarine to monitor radio communications even when dived deep. Regarding sonar, the Shankul submarine, whose retrofit is underway at the Mazagon Docks, is being provided with flank array sonar in addition to the bow sonar. The remaining two submarines, Shalki and Shankul will also be fitted with flank array sonar, in addition to slightly better periscope. The need is for better-towed array and flank array sonar, which cover the low frequency spectrum, and has ranges up to 150nm. It is obvious that to detect incoming threats, there is an urgent requirement for better Electronic Surveillance Measures (ESM), better periscope, and better endurance, all of which are lacking. In addition, the submarines need smart torpedo and decoy systems to deal with modern decoys. The present periscopes on kilo are simply archaic, while the ones on the HDWs are just a step better. Besides, it is difficult to install piecemeal add-ons on the existing submarines as this could imbalance the boat besides cause it to spend extended times in refit. Moreover, installing USD100m AIP on a hull which is already 15 years old may not be a cost effective option. The present equipment and weapon systems also have imposed limitation on employment of submarines.
The IN submarines are lone operators whose usual Time on Task (ToT) is not more than six weeks. The ToT refers to the time spent in the patrol area excluding the transit time. Once a submarine leaves for task, its time and event plan is known to not more than a handful of officers including at the highest level at Naval Headquarters. This is done to maintain secrecy for safety of the crew. While on task, the submarine relies totally on the regular communication broadcasts for any additional instructions, and lacks knowledge of the larger tactical picture. When on task, the submarine can be passed instructions from an aircraft in two ways: direct and indirect. In the direct method, the submarine intercepts the intelligence broadcast being passed from the surveillance aircraft to the land-command centre. The disadvantage of this approach is that lacking the overall picture, the submarine may start pursuing the wrong target in close proximity to the enemy. In the indirect approach, the command centre analyses the aircraft intelligence and passes only the relevant instructions to the submarine through the regular broadcasts. Usually, the indirect approach is followed when the enemy is far away, while the direct approach may be resorted to when time is at premium. The involved risks need no elaboration.
Against Pakistan , even as submarines can be assigned a number of missions, in reality the tasks are just two: reconnaissance in peacetime, and reconnaissance and sinking of any ship at or near the approaches of Pakistani harbours or even on its Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs). In broader terms, however, missions are listed as: interdiction of PN surface ships at or leaving harbour, interdiction of merchant ships on SLOCs (Pakistan does not have its own merchant ships and relies completely on foreign vessels for maritime trade), mining off Karachi and other harbour, missile attacks on Vulnerable Areas and Vulnerable Points, and insertion and extraction of Special Forces (Marine Commandos, Marcos). In reality, mining off harbour is an unrealistic mission for Indian submarines. For example, Shishumar submarine can carry a maximum of about 30 mines, which is chicken feed considering hundreds of mines are needed to effectively mine 5 x 5 miles area, which would be a normal approach to a harbour. While the Special Forces mission is practiced, the truth is that it is hazardous to extricate these forces by own submarines. The commandoes go in the full knowledge that they would have to fend for themselves and remain under cover in enemy territory till hostilities are declared over. Similarly, while anti-ship role is a real one, given the limitation, anti-submarine role is near impossible for Indian submarines.
There are at least two operational limitations constantly faced by submarines. The first is called mutual interference and implies interference between own ships, submarines and aircraft since the work schedule of submarine is not known to anyone. The maximum likelihood of mutual interference is during offensive operations when a large number of naval forces may be operating in a small area and time is not available to inform a submarine of a friendly ship entering its patrol areas. The cumbersome procedure involves that surface ship enter own submarine patrol areas only after reasonable time of about 24 hours is given to ensure that the message has reached the submarine. The other limitation is in the air-submarine cooperation. The cooperation is essential for providing submarine with early information about enemy activity. As this is possible only under conditions of a favourable air situation, it leads to the submarine unknowingly being indiscreet for longer duration close to enemy territory. For instance, without long range MPA, it is dangerous for submarines to be too close too long along the Pakistani coastline. And given the fact that the submarine periscope is vintage pieces, there are minimal intelligence gains to be made by the boats.
In contrast, Pakistan has invested well and built its naval forces around force multipliers that will stretch the Indian Naval forces both in peace and in war. Pakistan scores over India in, at least, four areas. One, the Pakistani Navy has always maintained a modern and capable submarine force. There is a provision for MESMA AIP in the three Agosta 90B Pakistan submarines acquired from France . According to reports, Pakistan navy chief, Admiral Shahid Karimullah is considering the possibility of acquiring three more submarines each from France and China . The PN also operates midgets which are ideally suited for clandestine operations off the Gujarat and Maharashtra coast. Two, unlike the Indian Navy, Pakistan Navy has a capable Long Range Maritime Patrol aircraft fleet made up of the long range Atlantique and P3C-Orion aircraft armed with Harpoon and Exocet missiles. These aircraft are a threat to both the surface and submarine forces of the Indian Navy. Three, the Agosta 90B submarines have better ESM in the form of Thomson-CSF DR -3000U, and lastly, the Pakistan Navy has a good weapons package and has been using submarine launched missiles at least 10 years before the Indian Navy acquired them. Unless the Indian Navy focuses on refurbishing its depleted and old submarine fleet, it has real trouble at hand.
By: Austin - 4th November 2004 at 02:57
Waiting for Scorpene
Force Volume 2 NO 3 November-2004
The government needs to push Project 75 at the earliest
The long-pending Scorpene submarine deal is costing both the nation and the Indian Navy three to four crores every day. In May 2002, the Price Negotiations Committee (PNC) had clinched the deal for six submarines at Rs 14,000 crore excluding the cost of infrastructure to be set up at Mazagon Dockyards Ltd
(MDL) in Mumbai. At present, the cost has risen to about Rs 20,000 crore. This is not enough. Sensing that the Manmohan Singh government is unsure about the deal, which was finalised by the Vajpayee government, Russia has resorted to pressure tactics and allurements. For example, Russia has now offered to provide BrahMos on their Amur 1650 submarines. Going a step further, they have even suggested that the agreement about leasing of two nuclear-powered Akula submarines for a period of 10 years to India may be reviewed. Exasperated by the inordinate delay, there are voices within the navy now that appear to favour the Amur submarine over Scorpene. The logic they give is two-fold: One, considering that the Indian Navy has recently purchased many big platforms from Russia including the Talwar class ships and Gorshkov, it may be prudent to purchase the Amur for undisclosed benefits, which may include assistance in the indigenous Advanced Technology Vessel programme. And two, if the government is hesitant to sign on a deal finalised by the previous regime, the Russian offer should be considered. The Chief of Naval Staff, Adm. Arun Prakash, however, is hopeful that the contract for the Scorpene submarines would be signed soon. The question is how soon? Even as the matter has been pending with the Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) since June 2002, the navy’s project 75, which is the submarine programme, has had numerous setbacks.
Navy’s Project 75, the 30 years submarine building plan (2000 to 2030), which was cleared by the CCNS in July 1999 accepted the navy’s suggestion of two lines of submarine building in India in two steps for a total of 24 subs. Step one envisaged that six each western and eastern submarines be built in India; the first two submarines in each category were to be purchased off-the-shelf, while the remaining were to be built in India by involving the private and public sectors. The whole ethos was to inspire shipbuilding in India . The second step implied that after the experience gained from the above, 12 submarines would be indigenously designed and built. Two factors contributed to the navy’s thinking about two lines of submarine building: First, the sudden demise of the Soviet Union had an adverse impact on the maintenance of Indian ships and submarines as spares and important assemblies were not available. And two, the Western sanctions which followed India ‘s 1998 nuclear tests brought home the lesson that India should not be dependent on a single source for product support. It was against this backdrop that the navy started negotiations for the Scorpene and Amur submarines. It is another matter that discussions on the Scorpene had started much before the CC.S sanction.
Following the disclosures of kickbacks on the German HDW T1500 class submarines in 1987, the government had banned HDW and cancelled the contract for remaining two submarines; of the total six, two were purchased off the shelf, while two were built at Mazagon docks in Mumbai. The fourth and last HDW submarine named Shankul was commissioned in 1994. The navy then approached the CCNS for permission to float open tenders for construction of two remaining HDW design submarines in India . The French Thales was the lone company to bid and procure the contract. Once talks began, it was realised that Thales would have to approach HDW for the bow section (Torpedo tubes) and other assemblies, which was unacceptable to India . At this stage, the newly-formed DCN and Thales combine, Armaris, offered its Scorpene submarine. The Indian Navy which had just finalised its Project 75 decided to talk with Armaris for six Scorpenes instead of seeking two submarines to make up the HDW shortfall. Against this backdrop, two-track negotiations commenced for Scorpene and Amur submarines; MDL was nominated to build the Scorpene, while the private contractors Larsen and Tubro, which has facilities to build reactor hull in Hazira in Mumbai was short-listed for the Amur construction in India.
Even as talks were in progress, the navy’s budgetary allocations were hit hard by two purchases: the Gorshkov contract and the impending Akula lease deal. The latter costing between three to four billion dollars was to be paid by the government as an inter-government contract. Suddenly, the government decided to put the Akula financial burden on the navy leaving it to wonder if it had adequate funds for pursuing the two-lines of submarine building simultaneously. It appears that the Navy’s first priority is the Scorpene and the Russian option would follow later. It was during this period that the ground work for Scorpene was done at the Mazagon docks. According to Rear-Adm. R.M. Bhatia, CMD, MDL, “All negotiations for Scorpene are over. Once the government inks the contract, the dockyard can be made ready for Scorpene construction in 12 to 15 months. The first Scorpene could roll out in four to five years, and thereafter one submarine each year.” All that is needed is for the government to make up its mind.
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November 4, 2004 at 2:53 am