JF-17 vs J-10 vs LCA

Good joke. Keep thinking that if it makes you feel better while everyone ignore you.

Clearly not everyone.

you certainly otherwise you wouldn’t stop . I write less but always correct

Good joke. Keep thinking that if it makes you feel better while everyone ignore you.

I will be honest with you, with the amount of BS you spill here over years, no one care about your opinions anymore. Certainly not me.

you certainly otherwise you wouldn’t stop . I write less but always correct .

Guys … is there a reason to be so fat off-topic already ? None of Your latest replies has anything to do with either the JF-17, the J-10 or LCA??

My bad, will stop now.

The previous statement above was directed for you but you still continue.

I will be honest with you, with the amount of BS you spill here over years, no one care about your opinions anymore. Certainly not me.

Moreover, iam not saying that Harpoon isn’t enough for USN, considering that their fleet is bigger than anyone else .

The previous statement above was directed for you but you still continue.
how exactly is USN bigger than anyone else?. Look at deployable ships in Pacific against Chinese. deployable does not mean sustainable in high tempo operations. Those missiles need to be reloaded. The primary function of Chinese Navy is Pacific and there improvement in less than 5 years will make them vastly superior to every one else.
Primary function of RuaN is against Eastern EU and Middleast/Arctic and they are well designed for that task. This Chinese one belt one road will put every thing on road to make seas irrelevant.
The only function left for USN is to deal with Western EU/Africa and Latin America and that they will deal effectively with harpoons.

Guys … is there a reason to be so fat off-topic already ? None of Your latest replies has anything to do with either the JF-17, the J-10 or LCA??

Deino 😡

There aren’t many navies with long range air defense, but there aren’t many navies with aircraft carrier either. Most of them are US allies. In short, you can be attack majority of ships with nap of the earth tactic using weapons with 50-70 km range.

Correct, hence the Block II+ focused primarily on network enhancements to bring the WS into the Navy’s IFC network, much like the JSOW-C1 is now. Against a very large number of threats in the near term the weapon can be launched by the SH or P-8 at optimal altitudes and fly optimal flight profiles. You are essentially looking at a 100-120 km ranged weapon which can now be launched from the higher end of its kinematic envelope on account of it being networked.

The argument against the extra range of JSOW-ER can be used against Harpoon-ER as well.

Right, but keep in mind that the ER-JSOW, is not exclusively an anti-surface weapon, it is far more likely to be used against a land based target than a ship, and Raytheon’s argument is that they can provide a motor to the JSOW with overall program, and fly-away cost that is lower than the JASSM/ER which is not in the Navy’s inventory (as I tried to explain in the JSM case, there are costs every time you introduce a new weapon to the fleet over and above integration, and procurement costs). Plus I bet their business pitch involves modification to the existing JSOW inventory to incorporate the motor.

For surface-warfare duties both ER options are a hedge in case the Increment-2 weapon moves to the right. There is a good reason why the USN is not rushing to field these capabilities despite the benefits from a pure range perspective being quite enormous.

Iam aware that RF seeker can be used in all weather, but iam talk about the advantage of JSOW-ER over Harpoon-ER aka more capable of penetrating air defense, longer range. Harpoon-ER doesn’t offer much in term of AD penetration capability compared to new antiship missiles

No one in the Navy or here (at least me) is pretending that it is so. It is merely something that brings up the baseline capability affordably as a new weapon concept is defined, developed and fielded.

However that doesn’t mean there isn’t an inferior weapon between the two complimentary weapons.

All it means that the US Navy, the service that creates acquisition strategy and finds money to pay for systems views them as complementary capabilities and has brought both up to its fleet, by introducing the JSOW-C1, and by bringing to the service the Block II+ Harpoon, capability that it was only introduced to the fleet this summer. For all practical purposes, the subject matter experts and powers at be in the USN don’t want or feel a need to compete these systems – they value the capability of both them for the given mission set.

However that doesn’t mean there isn’t an inferior weapon between the two complimentary weapons.

Depends on what you are seeking. If the USN wants a networked active RF weapon the JSOW can’t even compete. Same with a powered weapon, until testing is compete on the ER (and a subsequent decision made to acquire it), it cannot compete in that space. If the Navy wants a networked, glide munition with a passive seeker then at least a “New Built” Harpoon cannot compete at the price point of the JSOW-C. Same if the USN wants to field a networked anti-surface/strike weapon on the F-35C (internal). The Harpoon can’t compete there, while the JSOW (both powered and unpowered) can and is planned for integration.

You see my point?.

Not really since these are systems designed around different requirements and are included in the inventory to serve different needs. A pure, powered anti-ship weapon in the JSOW family does not exist yet while the Block II+ Harpoon is with the fleet. Similarly, for the type of seeker, there are no plans of adding that capability to the JSOW nor are there plans to buy new built Harpoons or optimize their OML to reduce RCS etc. With the Harpoon you are basically buying modifications so it is affordable.

How many navies around the world can kill a Super Hornet, 250 km from ship? This before we get into a cluttered environment, jamming support and penetrated attack with F-35Cs against the highest threats? Again, as I said with a slow weapon and particularly in the short to medium term threats you do not need a 300+ km weapon against a large number of potential threats. In fact, I would say a vast majority of them

There aren’t many navies with long range air defense, but there aren’t many navies with aircraft carrier either. Most of them are US allies. In short, you can be attack majority of ships with nap of the earth tactic using weapons with 50-70 km range. The argument against the extra range of JSOW-ER can be used against Harpoon-ER as well. Then if we talk about jamming, not only JSOW-ER can benefit more from jamming because of its lower RCS, there are also many more ways to jam a radar seeker than an IIR seeker.

Yes but then they both come with different advantages. As mentioned, the PMO wants an active RF weapon and there are no plans currently in place to bring that into the JSOW requirements. Each and every breifing that I have seen by the PMO, has stressed the complementary nature of these weapons and emphasized the active seeker of the Harpoon. Moreover, a lot many S&T efforts in preparation for a future OSuW have focused on RF seekers and particularly combined RF/IIR seekers stressing the Navy’s intentions to maintain that enterprise and competency

Iam aware that RF seeker can be used in all weather, but iam talk about the advantage of JSOW-ER over Harpoon-ER aka more capable of penetrating air defense, longer range. Harpoon-ER doesn’t offer much in term of AD penetration capability compared to new antiship missiles

What defense? What are some of the defensive capabilities a short to medium term thread across non PACOM scenarios field? All but the highest threat aside, the Harpoon Block II+ is good enough when employed within a networked attack framework when one looks at the holistic capability of the USN to engage surface targets. For the highest end threat they are developing the Increment-2, and fielding the gap filler increment-1 to meet the urgent needs requirements. Whether or not the JSOW-ER is pursued as far as an acquisition program is concerned, the Navy has made it quite clear (by putting dollars into programs, and by agreeing to work with OEMs) that it will continue to enhance the capability of the Harpoon right through to the mid 2020s when it expects a new weapon to emerge. There is no reason to doubt that if the new weapon moves to the right by 3-5 years, they won’t continue down this path which upgrades existing missiles, fields new variants of existing weapons while buying small amounts of gap fillers against specific urgent needs requirements. I see this as a good strategy given budgetary constraints

Missiles can get closer will have better chance of penetrate it assuming same speed regardless the kind of defense.
Moreover, iam not saying that Harpoon isn’t enough for USN, considering that their fleet is bigger than anyone else, they have complementary SM-2/SM-6. Most of their adversaries are countries that barely have a functional navy. USN should be alright even with vanilla Harpoon. Operating both IIR and RF weapons at the same time can help mitigate disadvantages of each. However that doesn’t mean there isn’t an inferior weapon between the two complimentary weapons. For example: a bayonet is a complimentary part of the rifle, it has it’s own advantages but doesn’t mean it isn’t inferior to the gun. Or F-15 and F-16 are complimentary aircraft, but F-15 is generally considered better due to range/load out.. etc. You see my point?.

It’s great you are using words like long range, stealthy, reduced RCS and saturated attack with AAM, SAM, Ashm etc.

But longer range give more options, especially nowadays when both SAM and AAM have very long range.

How many navies around the world can kill a Super Hornet, 250 km from ship? This before we get into a cluttered environment, jamming support and penetrated attack with F-35Cs against the highest threats? Again, as I said with a slow weapon and particularly in the short to medium term threats you do not need a 300+ km weapon against a large number of potential threats. In fact, I would say a vast majority of them. But that is all besides the point, the Navy is pursuing JSOW-C1 and Harpoon Block II+ together and has a MOU with Boeing as far as demonstrations for the ER Harpoon is concerned. They are complementary capabilities that both are a value add compared to the status quo.

AAM have very long range.

How many potential target sets (in the anti-ship role) in the short-medium term will field naval fighters, or air-cover from land that can hold the carrier strike fleet at 300 km stand off ranges against potential ship targets?

As far as i know, LRASM re use JASSM airframe rather than a completely new airframe. JSOW-ER re use JSOW airframe. I don’t see why JASSM would have significantly lower RCS than JSOW

The JASSM and JASSM-ER are amongst the stealthiest cruise missiles currently with the USAF/DOD. RCS optimization was a strong enough design driver on the JASSM that it warranted the Skunk Works from being roped in to design the overall form factor. It was at the time (and may still be) the only cruise missile that design house has worked on. Ben Rich details some of the work in his book. The JSOW with an engine is unlikely to have those requirements given the different mission set (you are taking a glide bomb and adding a motor to it). Stealth is also beyond simple RCS. The LRASM is smart and has the ability to analyze RF threats both form the target, and along the way. It is far less “network dependent” than the JSOW, or the Harpoon for that matter.

Even if JSOW-ER has higher RCS than LRASM, it still more stealthy than Harpoon-er by order of magnitude.

Yes but then they both come with different advantages. As mentioned, the PMO wants an active RF weapon and there are no plans currently in place to bring that into the JSOW requirements. Each and every breifing that I have seen by the PMO, has stressed the complementary nature of these weapons and emphasized the active seeker of the Harpoon. Moreover, a lot many S&T efforts in preparation for a future OSuW have focused on RF seekers and particularly combined RF/IIR seekers stressing the Navy’s intentions to maintain that enterprise and competency.

As a result, it has higher chance of penetrating the defense, and also need fewer missiles for a saturated attack

What defense? What are some of the defensive capabilities a short to medium term thread across non PACOM scenarios field? All but the highest threat aside, the Harpoon Block II+ is good enough when employed within a networked attack framework when one looks at the holistic capability of the USN to engage surface targets. For the highest end threat they are developing the Increment-2, and fielding the gap filler increment-1 to meet the urgent needs requirements. Whether or not the JSOW-ER is pursued as far as an acquisition program is concerned, the Navy has made it quite clear (by putting dollars into programs, and by agreeing to work with OEMs) that it will continue to enhance the capability of the Harpoon right through to the mid 2020s when it expects a new weapon to emerge. There is no reason to doubt that if the new weapon moves to the right by 3-5 years, they won’t continue down this path which upgrades existing missiles, fields new variants of existing weapons while buying small amounts of gap fillers against specific urgent needs requirements. I see this as a good strategy given budgetary constraints.

Range is mission specific. While the Extended Range for the JSOW-ER may be very useful in striking non time critical ground targets it may, during many scenarios be totally an overkill given the CONEMP as an anti-ship weapon. The purpose being to place the stand-off platform outside of the threat given a particular air-defense set up and the Harpoon-ER given its expected range of in excess of 230 km would provide the SH with that against a number of the sort of targets it may be deployed against in the near to medium term.

But longer range give more options, especially nowadays when both SAM and AAM have very long range.

Neither is particularly stealthy compared to the LRASM so the tactics employed would still be that of a saturated multi-directional attack with force overmatch from the carrier strike fighters. I don’t see these tactics being particularly different given the JSOW’s likely signature.

. As far as i know, LRASM re use JASSM airframe rather than a completely new airframe. JSOW-ER re use JSOW airframe. I don’t see why JASSM would have significantly lower RCS than JSOW thus, I wouldn’t be so sure that LRASM is much more stealthy than JSOW-ER. On the otherhand, Harpoon-er re use the airframe of basic harpoon without any modification. Even if JSOW-ER has higher RCS than LRASM, it still more stealthy than Harpoon-er by order of magnitude. Along with IIR seeker, JSOW-ER can get significantly closer to target without being noiticed. As a result, it has higher chance of penetrating the defense, and also need fewer missiles for a saturated attack

Range is mission specific. While the Extended Range for the JSOW-ER may be very useful in striking non time critical ground targets it may, during many scenarios be totally an overkill given the CONEMP as an anti-ship weapon. The purpose being to place the stand-off platform outside of the threat given a particular air-defense set up and the Harpoon-ER given its expected range of in excess of 230 km would provide the SH with that against a number of the sort of targets it may be deployed against in the near to medium term. Neither is particularly stealthy compared to the LRASM so the tactics employed would still be that of a saturated multi-directional attack with force overmatch from the carrier strike fighters. I don’t see these tactics being particularly different given the JSOW’s likely signature. Secondly, the Harpoon and the JSOW-C1 are seen by the Navy as complementary systems because of two different seekers. Many in the PMO or those connected to it make it a point to identify the former’s active RF seeker as an important tool that the service values as far as its strike fighter capability is concerned.

Looking at the near-mid term threats, I fail to see many opponents that can deny a Super Hornet access, 200+ km from a ship. In the medium to Long term, yes both are inadequate but that is why you have the Increment-2 program.

what are the differences between APKWS RW and FW

Mostly as they pertain to different environmental conditions encountered when deploying on fixed wing, medium-high altitude aircraft compared to rotary winged setup (Image attached).

I don’t see how the Harpoon block II ER is any less capable to the JSOW-ER

Harpoon-er has shorter range than JSOW-ER. While others anti ship missiles have either speed (Brahmos, ASM-3.. etc) or stealth (JSM, JSOW-ER, LRASM.. etc) to help them penetrate air defense better, Harpoon-er has neither.

what are the differences between APKWS RW and FW

Harpoon-er seem less capable compared to LRASM, JSM or even JSOW-ER. Practically a longer range Harpoon without improvement in ability to penetrate air defense

Navy likes Block II Harpoon because it has an active RF seeker. On its S&T roadmap, the Navy has continued to fund advances in RF and multi-spectral seekers (Combined mmW/IIR) and has had multiple programs to this end, specific to such missions. It clearly wants to retain that as part of a broader capability going forward. As described, the block II, block II+, and Block II+ER weapons are networked modifications to existing inventory and as such quite affordable way of enhancing capability for the Navy’s fleet. Based on Navy’s plan with OASuW, the Harpoon is/was to sunset in 2025 and transition (as in the Navy would stop buying mods and either procure OASuW weapons or wait for its development to be completed to start building inventory) to the “definitive” OASuW weapon which would be the increment-2. Of course if they decide to keep the weapon past 2025, they can consider other enhancements such as a seeker bump or a motor upgrade for the extended range.

I don’t see how the Harpoon block II ER is any less capable to the JSOW-ER. It has the same jam resistant capability in its GPS, has the same network connected to the IFC, and on top of that has an active seeker which the navy values for all weather performance. It can like most missiles also fly different profiles. LRASM is a totally different weapon with a different employment concept to the Harpoon or the JSOW-ER and JSM. As the Navy describes it, the upgrade modifications procured for the Harpoon and the JSOW are to provide enhanced capability to the fleet until a new weapon is fielded. They don’t meet the requirements for the new weapon which will obviously be focused at current and future threats. The problem with OASuW is that the cost increases on the LRASM side have for the last 2 years eaten budget requests for increment-2 to pay for them. This could change here but I expect increment-2 to be a 2030 weapon and not the 2025 weapon the Navy hoped it would be. We may even see similarities and commonalities being explored with it and NGLAW as the concepts are further refined.

Harpoon-er seem less capable compared to LRASM, JSM or even JSOW-ER. Practically a longer range Harpoon without improvement in ability to penetrate air defense

The costs involved with integrating the the JSM on the F-35C are minuscule (even after factoring in the paperwork & red-tape)

Again, If you read carefully, I had mentioned the cost of introducing a new missile/weapon to the Navy’s inventory and all the costs that that comes with, not the cost of physically integrating the weapon on the F-35C @ Block 4.X.

elative to the Harpoon.

Never did I once mention integrating the Harpoon on the F-35C. I don’t see what advantage it would have, or why it would even be required. With the F-35C only coming to the fleet operationally (deploying on an aircraft carrier) in the 2021-2022 time-frame, and the larger 20 squadron set up likely taking a decade+ beyond that, it makes a lot of sense to deploy the F-35C with the JSOW-C1 and its iterations while acting as quarterbacks commanding stand off strike from Super Hornets at a distance. This is the CONEMP that the Navy has developed as part of its NIFC-CA, and why it has invested heavily to network its current and future weapons. The ER-Block II+ Harpoon will fit nicely into this concept especially since it has been intelligently designed as a MOD which can be procured for the existing inventory of classic Harpoon’s or the upgraded Block II and II+s. Moreover, one could always look to ordering a couple of more years worth of LRASMs to further build on this capability, as the Increment-2 weapon is developed.

That takes care of internal carriage – for 340 F-35Cs, to be delivered over next two decades.

That would be an advantage ONLY if the said missile actually met Navy’s needs for a long term solution to a problem they have been developing solution sets for in the their S&T and R&D for the last decade. It DOESN’T. Of course it goes without saying that there is a very strong possibility that Increment-2’s baseline requirements would warrant internal bay compliance given F-35C inventory circa 2025-2030, but also the strong likelihood that whatever replaces the F-18E/F would also have an internal weapons bay.

For more demanding roles there’s the LRASM & its future variants – because even though it was selected as a gap filler, an upgraded Harpoon will still be the inferior weapon system

Again, If you read carefully what I wrote, I clearly stated that the default incase Increment-2 is moved to the right by 3-4 years would be to “buy more of the same”. Currently the Navy is having a three pronged approach to the immediate Anti Surface needs for NAVAIR’s fleet. One is the gap filler LRASM, 85 of which are part of their long term program-of-record, others are the Harpoon Block II+ MODS currently being purchased (and only put out to the fleet this summer), and the JSOW-C1 which is an internal bay compliant weapon. Looking ahead, say into the next 2-4 years, there are additional MODS they can buy in case increment-2 moves to the right. Paths to make the Block II+ Harpoon better by addressing its range (nearly doubling it), and by going for the powered JSOW-C1 route are low cost options that will be low risk path to bring capability into the fleet relatively quickly in case increment-2 moves to the right. Of course there will be a capability gap that will remain since neither of those weapons would meet increment-2 requirements but that is not what is under debate here. If the Navy does not have a program for another 3-5 years they will likely continue to buy what they are already buying rather than look to acquire something that is in development, is not part of their fleet, would not be operational until next decade and most importantly DOES NOT meet its requirements.

at least until a new ASM enters the picture and that’s not happening in the near future.

The Navy has a set need for new Anti Surface Warfare weapons. First gap filler need is met as an urgent requirement with the LRASM. In the interim, the Navy continues to buy mods for its Harpoons while funding better capability demonstration on the JSOW. On the surface navy side they are funding mods to the TLAMs including introducing a new seeker to the system early to mid next decade. Long term, the Navy has identified 2 programs that will fund a new missile for both the surface navy and NAVAIRs assets. Those will be NGLAW for the surface navy side, and Increment-2 for the air launched mission. In the interim, they have both the gap filler LRASM, and modifications and upgrades they are pursuing to weapons already in their possession. The timelines for the new weapons are 2025-2030 for Increment-2, and 2030 for NGLAW.

However, needless to say that if the LRASM doesn’t and couldn’t incorporate all Increment-2 capabilities due to its “schedule driven” nature, then the JSM, a less capable system will not be able to meet the long term increment-2 needs of the Navy given its own investment tracks and some of the S&T programs it has funded across the components (propulsion, seekers, networks etc etc).

That takes care of internal carriage – for 340 F-35Cs, to be delivered over next two decades.

It doesn’t take care of anything as long as it is unable to meet the basic requirements of the increment-2 weapons system. You aren’t going to go out and start buying an inferior weapon to “take care of internal carriage”, especially when far cheaper “interim” options are available and in testing. There isn’t unlimited money out there to invest in a massive gap filler capability when your program has been structured to support a new weapon by 2030 and that too will face funding challenges.

On the NSM-LCS situation this made sense since there was no POR to address that particular need, as the Navy at the time was not interested. For both the VLS, and air launched side they have a program of record, have been investing in technology development over the last many years and have a structure in place to develop new systems for the future threat. As they do so, they are addressing the “current” needs of the fleet by introducing the LRASM in limited quantities based on PACOM demands, while improving the capability of their existing inventory by bringing those weapons into its IFC. This as I said is deliberate i.e. improve current weapons —> Field gap fillers —-> Develop new weapons.

There are costs involved when you decide to introduce a new weapon into your inventory. Logistical costs, costs of maintaining that weapon and the costs of actually making sure that it covers all your threats. This beyond first creating the requirements for such a weapon and conducting testing to see that it actually meets those requirements in the first place. You just don’t put out an RFI and buy a few missiles for a long term program, you have to create all those things for a new weapon, for it to be effectively used by your combat forces. As explained already, the objective of the increment-2 program is to field a capability that you couldn’t at a short time-line (hence LRASM). You won’t go out and buy an inferior weapon for that program to the one you fielded as a GAP FILLER.

The costs involved with integrating the the JSM on the F-35C are minuscule (even after factoring in the paperwork & red-tape) relative to the Harpoon. That takes care of internal carriage – for 340 F-35Cs, to be delivered over next two decades.

For more demanding roles there’s the LRASM & its future variants – because even though it was selected as a gap filler, an upgraded Harpoon will still be the inferior weapon system – at least until a new ASM enters the picture and that’s not happening in the near future.

The JSM will be operational with the F-35A, and the integration costs for operationalizing it use on the F-35C are negligible.

There are costs involved when you decide to introduce a new weapon into your inventory. Logistical costs, costs of maintaining that weapon and the costs of actually making sure that it covers all your threats. This beyond first creating the requirements for such a weapon and conducting testing to see that it actually meets those requirements in the first place. You just don’t put out an RFI and buy a few missiles for a long term program, you have to create all those things for a new weapon, for it to be effectively used by your combat forces. As explained already, the objective of the increment-2 program is to field a capability that you couldn’t at a short time-line (hence LRASM). You won’t go out and buy an inferior weapon for that program to the one you fielded as a GAP FILLER. That is not how these things work and that is not how the USN has been playing with its IB for the last decade through various S&T programs aimed at a future threat.

LRASM doesn’t need to be internal carry on the F-35 – it’ll be operational on the SH and that’s good enough for the ranges involved.Although, as the LRASM inventories expand (and other customers come onboard esp. F-35 & JASSM operators) its very likely to be cleared for the F-35 as well.

Let me lay out a few things –

The USN identified a need for a new weapon many years ago and embarked on a path of technology maturation and development while at the same time studying how the evolving threat will likely require capabilities out into the future. At the same time, PACOM introduced an UONS for a weapon based on certain threats and needs identified in that particular AOR. The Navy and the DOD could not develop the weapon that it knew it needed for the future threat on PACOM’s time-lines hence they took something that was in research and packaged that as an interim “Gap Filler” for both the USAF and USN’s identified, theater specific urgent need. This forced them to split their Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare program into two, with increment-1 being the “Gap Filler” weapon that met the urgent need as the increment-2 weapon, capable of handling the broader OASuW threat was developed.

Hence the entire program of record for the LRASM is expected to close down in 2021 after delivering around 135-150 weapons split between the PACOM needs of the USN and USAF as that concludes the urgent needs requirement for a rushed weapon system. The Navy is currently working on the increment-2, which as the recent slide from the PO from the Navy’s office that handles Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare portfolio explains is designed around a broader mission set and requirements.

There is no long term “Expanded” LRASM inventory planned at this moment as the program was and is aimed at meeting an urgent requirement and then moving on to delivering something that the Navy has been supporting from an S&T perspective for many years. The Navy has already run and completed multiple seeker and networking programs for a future anti-surface weapon, and contractors are at this time flight testing their own seeker solutions for future applications across the mission set.

As explained more than once now, on the surface navy side the ONLY programs of record are to equip the VLS with newer TLAM variants both in the short term via software upgrades to the weapons and through introducing a new multi-mode seeker before finally transitioning to the NGLAW sometime towards the end of the next decade. There is no other program of record in the Navy’s acquisition plan to introduce a new weapon to the VLS for this mission between now and the late 2020s based on publicly released information.

Although, as the LRASM inventories expand (and other customers come onboard esp. F-35 & JASSM operators) its very likely to be cleared for the F-35 as well.

LRASM inventories will expand, from around 10 operational missiles with the Navy around the the end of 2018/early 2019, as it awaits for EOC with the F-18E/F, to around 85 Missiles around late 2021, early 2022 timeframe. This is how the program is structured and once similar deliveries to the AF conclude (AF EOC with B-1 is in 2018) around the same time, the urgent needs COCOM requirement would have been met under the appropriate 5000.02 AC (AAP).

As far as Increment – 2 WS is concerned, as explained the Navy will need something that is more capable, against a wider threat type than the LRASM. They will look to package capabilities that they have been supporting that could not find their way into the LRASM as the program prioritized schedule as opposed to all out requirements. The JSM is obviously not that weapon. How that program shapes up, and how much money is with the Navy to actually support it remains to be seen. If it is moved to the right, perhaps 2-3 more batches of LRASM can be ordered under the existing AAP so you can add 3 years more of orders and around 75 more missiles, taking the Navy’s inventory to 160. The Navy has also just this year introduced the Block II+ Networked Harpoon Mod into its inventory, expect more of them as well as the ER version of the same if they push their plans to the right on increment-2.

What will be extremely surprising is that after years of leading their IB towards a certain solution set, the Navy abandons that line of reasoning and investment altogether, and buys a weapon system that fields capability they could have introduced to the fleet in even earlier than LRASM time-lines. If a subsonic, IIR+Radio was what the needed they could have fielded it years ago. But one look at some of the capability they have been funding over the last decade as far as seeker-concepts, propulsion, and networking is concerned tells us that they want something that is more capable – Hence we ended up with a GAP FILLER LRASM.

From a capability, and acquisition stand point it makes sense to buy capability that you are already heavily invested in from a development+testing+logistical perspective especially if there is iterative development happening to that capability at no additional cost. Other anti-surface investments will under such a scenario will also be leveraged as more interim capability is brought up as increment-2 moves to the right.

JSOW-C1 is obviously the logical choice here since it is already in the Navy’s portfolio as a surface strike weapon and is compliant with their F-35 which will begin rotating with the carriers in an operational context in the early 2020s. Moreover, capability enhancements to the weapon are already funded by the USN and it is an important weapon in its portfolio, is networked and has a seeker. These things should take care of a 3-5 year “pause” to the increment-2 efforts on account of budget priorities (under a hypothetical scenario where Increment-2 is put on the back burner). As I had mentioned earlier, the PB18 request deferred Increment-2 funding by a year but that is obviously not the last we have heard of it since Congress has a say.

U.S. Navy To Flight Test Quadruple-Range JSOW-ER

The U.S. Navy has moved forward with plans to evaluate Raytheon’s jet-powered AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapon-Extended Range (JSOW-ER) concept.
The service has awarded Raytheon almost $9 million to complete a flight-test demonstration of the latest network-enabled JSOW C-1 configuration, to be powered by the Pratt & Whitney/Hamilton-Sundstrand TJ-150 turbojet engine.

The contract announced on May 30 has been expected since late last year. It will be the first government-sponsored test.
The goal is to more than quadruple the glide bomb’s range to 300 nm when powered, from 70 nm unpowered, without changing the outer mold line or mass properties. That kind of striking distance would allow Navy strike fighters to destroy targets over a 282,743-sq.-nm area with JSOW, compared to 15,393 sq. nm now.

Raytheon has been developing the weapon concept internally since 2007. In October 2009, JSOW-ER flew 264 nm, launching from a BoeingF/A-18E Super Hornet.

Raytheon already has completed production of new JSOW C-1 weapons for the U.S. military services at its plant in Tuscon, Arizona, and will soon close out the assembly line. But if the JSOW-ER demonstration is successful, the Navy could choose to launch a program of record for new JSOW-ERs.

The latest datalink-equipped, GPS/INS-guided JSOW C-1 variant is designed to strike land and moving maritime targets from up to 70 nm away from 40,000 ft. By comparison, Boeing’s air-launched Harpoon has an advertised range of 67 nm, or more than 134 nm in the proposed extended-range configuration.

U.S. Naval Air Systems Command (Navair) is now supporting demonstrations of longer-range variants of both the JSOW C-1 and Harpoon Block II+, the maritime service’s only two network-enabled air-to-surface weapons.

Navair Program Manager Capt. John Dougherty says Raytheon has continued to mature the design performance of the JSOW-ER since the 2009 demonstration using its own funds. There have been no other free flight tests since 2009.

Both the ER-Block II+, and the JSOW-C1 incorporate US Navy standard jam resistant GPS, and are networked into the Navy’s IFC. Moreover, unlike a new weapon that comes with integration, procurement, support and logistical cost, the ER-Harpoon is designed as a MOD to existing 1C baseline rounds or upgraded 1C-Block II+ missiles, mods for which are currently being delivered to the USN. The inventory of baseline missile is extremely large and since you are just buying mods and not new AURs, it is an extremely cost effective solution which a gap filler should be in a scenario where increment-2 is moved to the right for budgetary or TMRR reasons.

Regardless of what happens with budgets, it is EXTREMELY unlikely, given the nature of the Harpoon replacement program (a WS that has produced >5000 AURs) that the service will look to, or indeed be allowed to (by the OSD and Congress) back-door either a weapon that it itself classified as an interim Stepping_stone capability to Increment-2, or a weapon that is inferior in capability to the weapon that it classified as a gap filler for the ultimate OASuW mission set.

Of course it will over time acquire a weapon. Not disputing that.

Again, the JSM is being integrated by Norway for its needs. The LRASM with OASuW Inc. 1 under an immediate PACOM need and only on 2 platforms. Anyhow, the F-35C won’t be able to support the LRASM in its bays and as a SO, the much larger SH fleet will be more than adequate for the few hundred missile inventory that is being split with the USAF.

The JSM will be operational with the F-35A, and the integration costs for operationalizing it use on the F-35C are negligible. LRASM doesn’t need to be internal carry on the F-35 – it’ll be operational on the SH and that’s good enough for the ranges involved. Although, as the LRASM inventories expand (and other customers come onboard esp. F-35 & JASSM operators) its very likely to be cleared for the F-35 as well.

LRASM inventory is too small for its integration to make sense even more so since it won’t fit the weapons bay. Unless the Navy inventory is increased they are unlikely to consider this. Current Navy program of record (as per the FY18 SAR) is 85 missiles, while that of the Air-Force is 50 missiles. Tough to justify a third platform’s integration costs.