Korean safety audit

Korean was always suspect by trying to get so many fighter piolets to fly their aircraft. It is this reason that has caused so many incidents/accidents with their aircraft. I think now they have eventually got their act together.

scary yes…….

I have only read the items you mention rather than the entire audit but it makes very scary reading.

this is very interesting reading.

this is very disturbing to read.

39. Crew must be aware of take off performance. Crew are doing intersection takeoffs at maximum weights to “save time” while the figures are calculated for full length. The aircraft thus would not STOP in time in an RTO and would not clear the required obstacles in the event of a go decision with an engine out. There is NO intersection take off data in any of the performance manuals. This should be looked into as fuel savings can be made here but the data used must be correct.

3. After start with many crews Captain speaks to ground, FE does after start checks, FO reads after start checklist by himself. This is uncoordinated and produces inherent dangers. The procedure should be: After engine start engineer must complete his checks and advise the Captain that he is “ready for disconnect.” The Captain will then make a standard callout to ground, “remove nose gear steering pin and all ground equipment, clear to disconnect, hand signals on left/right.” Only when ground give clear will after start checklist be read. This will ensure no one gets run over.

this is the most disturbing!

8. While departing Anchorage recently, 4.00 am, OAT 16 9C, rain and wind, the Captain briefed that he required nacelle anti ice after start. The FE said it was not required and that using the nacelle anti ice with the TAT 17 at 12C, would damage the engines.

The FE informed the Captain that he was a professional of many years, and that he was right as this was his job, and the Captain was wrong to require it.

The Captain tried to explain that on the ground TAT and OAT are the same. TAT takes into account ram effect and as they were stationary, there is no difference. The TAT read 12C due to residual heat from the TAT probe heater after the last flight. With an OAT of 9C and visible moisture present, icing conditions indeed existed and nacelle anti ice was required. The Captain explained that use of anti ice above 10C does not damage engines as far as he was aware and it is always better to err on the side of safety in such matters.

The FE would not buy the reasoning and was insulted as a professional by this decision. The Captain had to demand the anti ice be turned on after start in the interests of safety. Sadly CRM was compromised as a result and there was the minimum of communication and input from the FE on the remainder of the flight. (8hrs.)The FO would never get involved in a situation such as this as the FE is senior and any input would be seen as disrespectful to the FE.

In addition, (this was not seen on this flight but has been observed on the line), anti ice is normally turned off by the FE immediately after landing in icing conditions. This is NOT the correct procedure and anti ice must be left on until just before shutdown to protect the engine. The Boeing manual clearly covers this.

It weatherman is already forecasting the coming winter may indeed be a severe one. The Boeing adverse weather procedures must be known, understood and applied by all crew before the winter season sets in.

This highlights the following problem areas among the crew. This lack of understanding is probably not localized only to the FE’s only but may be through out the airline.

There is little understanding of the meaning of TAT, SAT, and OAT and Boeing anti ice procedures.
The FE’s require an urgent audit by an INDEPENDENT, EXTERNAL professional flight engineer. There is a high level of complacency and lack of knowledge/misunderstanding evident in certain areas of the operation. ( It may be that the English text Boeing manuals are just not understood because of the language problem.) It appears that “experience” gives the FE the authority to make decisions takes precedence over the published procedure and his decisions are above discussion because of his age and the culture. As the auditors are not and have not been trained as a flight engineer, it is neither fair or professional to undertake an audit of a position that I am not qualified for. Gross deficiencies have been mentioned where observed, but there may be many that have been missed due to the auditors not being FE qualified.
CRM and standardization needs urgent attention on the KAL flight deck.