Lessons from Textron Scorpion…

A military aircraft that went from nothing to first flight in 23 months with just over half the design team of a typical business jet (which is significantly less than that for a conventional fighter).

Now, its not fully mission capable, nor is it a high performance fast jet.

But, what it is is proof that letting engineers manage the project timescales*, letting engineers manage what is needed and what is not and letting engineers decide what has to go to public domain and what does not gets the job done.

So, to that end, what else is there that can be applied to future programs? I would volunteer the following.

1. Have customers define their problem, let SQEP (chief engineers) define their solution(s).
2. Complete separation of flight software from mission software.
3. Where possible, have common installation interfaces between existing engines and any bespoke design. Allowing flight testing to proceed without reliance on (a)mission systems reaching DAL for flight test maturity and (b)new engine designs reaching maturity for flight test.
4. Don’t chase the last ~5% of performance. The cost in time, money and optimisation leaves the program late, expensive and with less scope to react to future requirements**.

*Dale Tutt is an engineer first, MBA second

**JSF contracts were awarded in 1996. The X-35 had its first flight in 2000. [4yrs] The F-35 first flight in 2006. [10 yrs] A *******ised form of IOC may occur in December of this year… That is 20 years from initial reward to IOC.

In comparison, AFT was awarded in 1986, YF-22 first flight happened in 1990 [4 yrs], F-22 first flight happened in 1997 [11 years] and IOC 2005 [19 years]… in a program that went through the end of the cold war, with the associated massive upheaval in budgets and requirements.

Going back to the F-15, contract awards were 1968/1969, first flight 1972 [4 yrs] and IOC 1976 [8 yrs total]. Or the F-16, initial award 1972, first flight 1974, IOC 1978… 6 years total.

By the time the JSF will enter service, much of the technology used to define the design will be 10-15 years old. Same with F-22, but that has to consider world events (cold war end).

Furthermore, its weight, volume and thermal margins are so fine that there is little to no room for future non-zero-impact enhancements. What happens if defensive DEWs become effective enough to deal with 2 or 3 AAMs “simultaneously” in the next 10 years and the Russians have left design scope to stick them on PAK-FA?