Ministry of Supply departments

Then, suits rule, was because industry was stretched quite enough in making the platform. The kit to go in it was: a) beyond industry ken, and b) likely to go in a 2nd. platform. So suits made sense.

The Weapon System, say from 1955-ish, caused Integration to rule, and UK comprehensively stuffed that for a decade or so. See demise of Supermarine and Gloster. By, say, 1965 Govt.’s options were: take charge as own Prime Contractor (which is what we did on Bombs: although we appointed Hunting Engineering as nominal Prime on WE.177, in fact all those Factories doing the clever stuff were AWRE-managed/MoS-paid); or: assign the job to one industry team and pay.

Starting, as I noted, with Panavia, then HSAL on Hawk, that is what we have since done…

until last week. Yet another Green Paper/change of direction: buy simples.

There is no “best” way of buying complex kit…unless you accept what actually exists. See, IT systems: always buy a proprietary product that does 80% of your optimum Spec, never embark on bespoke aiming for 100%. The UOR wheeze (where under fire, all normal buying process is ignored and the User gets, NOW, what he needs) is the way to go. Pols must ignore all the vested interest moaners. But the User’s Requiror must rein in his nerdish yen for newest/bestest, which is the enemy of the good enough. It is better to give our fighters the adequate, now, rather than the ideal later, maybe.

And ignore the jobs issue. If the local product is quickest/cheapest/best, it will be bought. If it’s not, it does not deserve to be bought.

Don’t forget that a camel is a horse as designed by a committee

But do I read it right that you think that the procurement process was worse back then than now?

I would see it as a few accountable suits (some genuinely talented, some a waste of a suit) in wood panelled offices on civil service pay coming up with the requirements and specifications of aircraft, componants, and support kit, while these days it gets passed to the contractors with all sorts of chances for odd deals and making managers a quick buck, while still costing the taxpayer large sums of money.

It looks more like hundreds of suits, each of which has to define one specific component, then other suits put a dozen components together and define the package, then still other suits put the packages together into sub-assemblies… etc.

Apparently it sometimes took years to define what they wanted built.

Contrast this to what happened with the P-51… RAF reps asked North American Aviation to build P-40s, NAA said “we can build something better”, the reps said “OK, do your thing”… and 117 days later the first prototype left the factory, and flew 61 days after that (178 days after the “go-ahead” had been given)!

Great to see your input into this Ken as you obviously understand this subject more than most.
The structure of the MoS and AM etc has always fascinated me, but also have never fathomed it out.

But do I read it right that you think that the procurement process was worse back then than now?

I would see it as a few accountable suits (some genuinely talented, some a waste of a suit) in wood panelled offices on civil service pay coming up with the requirements and specifications of aircraft, componants, and support kit, while these days it gets passed to the contractors with all sorts of chances for odd deals and making managers a quick buck, while still costing the taxpayer large sums of money.
It seemed that pre the Healey changes the customer got what the bods and research establishments thought best, whereas now we have projects that cost us a fortune and have very little to show in practical value (Nimrod 3 & 4 being good examples).
The Panavia story seems like the one true success of the modern era of procurement.
Or am I seeing things with my rose tinted shades on?

BTW, you ever considered writting a book using your knowledge and insight?

You have to find jobs for the boys somehow.

Just to confuse you, DDOR (Deputy Director of Operational Requirements) was the customer, in Air Ministry (1/4/64: MoD(Air)). Healey became fed up with it all, like you, and started the process that has swept it all away. Onto the (6, reducing to) 3 National Armaments Directors (oh, that’s a different bunch to MoD or MoS/MoA) that stayed with MRCA, he imposed MacNamara’s Notion: the Prime Contractor carrying project financial risk. That was partial: Panavia bought everything except the egg and gun, or ground support equipment (GSE: oh: that was yet another fief, run by an in-house RAF team at Bircham Newton), or inventory-common kit-we-already-have, like electronic warfare (oh, that was another fief…).

Healey also set up (to be HSAL Hawk), ordered by his successor. One package price for R&D + supply of 175, complete, airframe+egg+everything else that flew. Still not turnkey, inc. GSE and life-cycle cost-of-ownership. That is why we now have these mega-billion contract awards embracing 25 years of spares, displacing the Ministry teams that had been responsible for Post Design Services (oh, that was another fief centred on an Air Ministry outfit in Harrogate.) Now you have it.

Now we have none of the above. Industry discharges Prime Contractor duties, interfacing with a Customer outfit today called Defence Equipment & Supply, which is structured around Integrated Project Teams. See: BAe on Nimrod AEW.3; see BAE Systems on Nimrod MRA4. See European Helicopter Industries on EH.101; see IBM/then Loral/then Lockheed on Merlin HMA1/HC2 (wait! hang on).

We have swung from micro-management by narrow nerds whose horizon was, say, boots (MoA had an abbreviation-team responsible for aircrew boots), to devolved non-management by macro-buyers of Capability.

Trust me: if you found the telephone books of these MoS/MoA constructs, you would be seriously depleted.

Thanks Ken,

I didn’t realise the MoS was quite that big. I’m sure there must have been a guide to the departments – so that the recipient of a memo from, say, RDQ.4(Inst), (copied to RDQ.B, DDOR.4, RDL.2(b) and RDT.5) could determine who was who and what their responsibilities were.

abadonna

It changed frequently. Lectronics, Quipment, Telecomms. Upto 20,000 MoS, then MoA civil servants, Scientific and general Home, were involved in Air Procurement Administration; parallel set-ups in War Office and Admiralty.

The logic, dating back to the Royal Aircraft Factory, to State-owned Arsenals and Naval Dockyards, was that industry was scarcely capable of wiping the bottom of the platform, and was way out of any competence with the gizmos and gadgets that turn tin into weapon. So anything more complex than fasteners was governed by direct MoS R&D contracts, then directly procured on MoS production contracts and free-issued (Embodiment Loan) to the place of platform assembly.

You will find reference to piston engine “power eggs”: the engine firm normally knew nothing of the accessories leeching onto their pride, so no one man was responsible for power-as-delivered. “Egg” was the forerunner of todays’ ECU (military; civil: QEC), where RR/GE/PW deliver a dressed, ah, egg: one price, one warranty, one man to kick.