Missile defense and polish site

Doesn’t wash, being an SS-20 variant it is still part of a system that was not designed as a SAM or ABM.

All the more reason to drop the INF treaty then. :dev2:

The SS-20C, yes. :dev2:

Doesn’t wash, being an SS-20 variant it is still part of a system that was not designed as a SAM or ABM.

No it’s not, read that treaty excerpt again. Was the SS-20 designed from the outset as a SAM and nothing but a SAM?

The SS-20C, yes. :dev2:

It will not be a SS-20. It may be something like a nuclear tipped 9M82M. This thing weights 5 tons, 20% more than a Iskander. Launched in a sort of parabolic trajectory, it will have a very interesting range. It was stated that the “asymmetric answer” will come from the “fifth generation SAM”, now in early design stages.

It sounds crazy, but this is actually the solution.

No it’s not, read that treaty excerpt again. Was the SS-20 designed from the outset as a SAM and nothing but a SAM?

So the obvious solution would be to reinstate the SS-20 but alter the three MIRVs so that they all airburst and call it a SAM for destroying any airborne stealth aircraft over their base of operations. The targets are therefore aircraft, which are not ballistic so it isn’t an ABM system.

It sounds crazy, but this is actually the solution.

“3. If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply.”

The obvious implication back then would’ve been an ASAT system, but with the obliteration of the ABM treaty an ABM system is also covered here.

So the obvious solution would be to reinstate the SS-20 but alter the three MIRVs so that they all airburst and call it a SAM for destroying any airborne stealth aircraft over their base of operations. The targets are therefore aircraft, which are not ballistic so it isn’t an ABM system. :diablo:

Actually the INF treaty covers nuclear and nonnuclear armed ballistic or flying weapons (had to include the latter to include cruise missiles).

Not conquer… the US couldn’t even manage Somalia let alone a real super power.

Yeah, what would the worlds only country with an operational ABM site that has been operational for a couple of dozen years know about intercepting balistic targets… :rolleyes: Keep working on those PAC-3s… and they might get to be as good as the S-300V was in the mid 80s….

Well let’s see, it’s not because evil Bush wants to conquer Russia and it’s not because Russia might get some info. Let me guess it’s because the evil American stuff is so bad we’d be embarrassed to let the Russians look at it? :rolleyes:

Indeed, but the inaccuracies of reentry would mean that a MARV warhead would be required… the reentry footprint would be huge without the ability to manouver towards a target of choice.

I’d assume that MIRV-like accuracy might be able to be achieved even without a MARV…but you could always just use a megaton-class warhead and forgo substantial increases in accuracy.

So the Russians don’t need to withdraw from the INF treaty… they just reclassify their SS-20s and SS-23s as ABM systems designed to engage, not cities, but points of air, or clouds of smoke, 500m above cities.

What part of this section wasn’t clear:

“3. If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply.”

The obvious implication back then would’ve been an ASAT system, but with the obliteration of the ABM treaty an ABM system is also covered here.

The interceptor missiles being not nuclear tipped (ie they rely on hit to kill interceptions), they are not covered/prohibited by the INF Treaty.

Actually the INF treaty covers nuclear and nonnuclear armed ballistic or flying weapons (had to include the latter to include cruise missiles).

It must be because evil Bush wants to conquer Russia

Not conquer… the US couldn’t even manage Somalia let alone a real super power.

Couldn’t possibly be that the US doesn’t want to share technology could it? (Nor the more likely case that Russia would use it’s info for blackmail or pass it along to the other side.)

Yeah, what would the worlds only country with an operational ABM site that has been operational for a couple of dozen years know about intercepting balistic targets… :rolleyes: Keep working on those PAC-3s… and they might get to be as good as the S-300V was in the mid 80s…

That’d be a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS). Probably the ultimate iteration of a strategic weapon, even more dangerous than a comparitively benign MARV.

Indeed, but the inaccuracies of reentry would mean that a MARV warhead would be required… the reentry footprint would be huge without the ability to manouver towards a target of choice.

Who knows? That’d still make the system effective as a deterrent.

Spending billions or trillions on a system your enemy already has a defence for is pretty dumb and therefore rather unlikely… unless they had plans to directly attack the defences just before launch… backpack nuke near the ABM system…

That implies that the warhead bus wasn’t intercepted beforehand, or that the warhead itself wasn’t intercepted before detonation, but that is an interesting idea. EMP is an undervalued weapon.

Simple radar emitter that detects reflected returns called a proximity fuse to detonate the nuke just before impact with an interceptor should suffice… along with 30 decoy warheads…

And that’s only relevant if the ABM interceptor can be classified as a GLBM.

So the Russians don’t need to withdraw from the INF treaty… they just reclassify their SS-20s and SS-23s as ABM systems designed to engage, not cities, but points of air, or clouds of smoke, 500m above cities.

This I understand. But then, am I correct in assuming that this system could then in no way protect the country it is located in (Poland) and neighbouring countries from a missile attack as they would be way past their mid-course??

You could still pull of an endoatmospheric intercept with the risk of warhead material impacting somewhere in Europe. And you’ll still have the warning you require to get a good track to set up a shot, so Europe should be defended.

And if you used a globe then that wouldn’t be strictly accurate either because most globes are pure spheres, while the Earth is not a pure sphere… it bulges out in the equator. Equally the spin of the Earth would aid a trajectory with the earths spin and oppose a trajectory that opposes its spin.

Spot on, that’s the rotating earth drift. Missile ranges in the business are typically given with rotating-Earth and non-rotating-Earth ranges to compensate for that effect.

Yet again if you can get a nuclear warhead into orbit and can accurately deorbit that warhead then you don’t need a ballistic trajectory at all an could attack the US from any direction… including over the south pole.

That’d be a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS). Probably the ultimate iteration of a strategic weapon, even more dangerous than a comparitively benign MARV.

Second if the US spend billions building this system in Poland would the Iranians continue to build ICBMs and somehow ignore that it is there?

Who knows? That’d still make the system effective as a deterrent.

A MRV missile would be easy to build with a warhead carried in the warhead bus all the way to the US, while another smaller warhead is ejected after launch to follow a similar trajectory but lower, so that it is above the atmosphere over Poland when it detonates and ionises the atmosphere making all radar and radio transmissions pointless for about half an hour. Even hardened systems that survived would be largely blind for that period.

That implies that the warhead bus wasn’t intercepted beforehand, or that the warhead itself wasn’t intercepted before detonation, but that is an interesting idea. EMP is an undervalued weapon.

Another issue is the range of the interceptor missile… it would need to be greater 5,500km, or 3,437.5 miles otherwise it would violate the INF treaty.

Or it’d have to have a range of less than 500km. Regardless, that’s irrelevant, according to Article VII:

“3. If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply.”

And that’s only relevant if the ABM interceptor can be classified as a GLBM.

The Russians already offered joint development of missile defence forces in Europe and with the US, but were rejected without consideration. Only one reason why such an offer would be rejected without even considering the potential benefits and problems…

It must be because evil Bush wants to conquer Russia :rolleyes: Couldn’t possibly be that the US doesn’t want to share technology could it? (Nor the more likely case that Russia would use it’s info for blackmail or pass it along to the other side.)

Any way, I think “all ways go to Rome”. That means that USA will have 2500 strategic warheads plus a rapid redeployment force of 3000 warheads plus a NMD located were she wants, but Russia will have a 1500-2000 warheads distributed along ICBM, SLBM and a new IRBM plus a tiny rapid redeployment force plus a very big stock of (near)deployed tactical nuclear weapons. The pole site will kill the INF. That’s were the things go.
Just an opinion

Another issue is the range of the interceptor missile… it would need to be greater 5,500km, or 3,437.5 miles otherwise it would violate the INF treaty.
With such a range how can there be any protests when the Russians withdraw from the INF treaty and start building missiles with a similar range…

The interceptor missiles being not nuclear tipped (ie they rely on hit to kill interceptions), they are not covered/prohibited by the INF Treaty.

I did state in another thread that the best solution to the Russian issue is a joint network, incorporating Russia’s BMEW assets.

The Russians already offered joint development of missile defence forces in Europe and with the US, but were rejected without consideration. Only one reason why such an offer would be rejected without even considering the potential benefits and problems…

Merely looking at a 2D map of the world and drawing a straight line from Iran to Washington DC isn’t going to be an accurate representation of the missile’s ballistic flightpath as the curvature of the Earth is not taken into account. If you transposed a ballistic flightpath onto a flat, 2D map, it’d be a curved line.

And if you used a globe then that wouldn’t be strictly accurate either because most globes are pure spheres, while the Earth is not a pure sphere… it bulges out in the equator. Equally the spin of the Earth would aid a trajectory with the earths spin and oppose a trajectory that opposes its spin. Yet again if you can get a nuclear warhead into orbit and can accurately deorbit that warhead then you don’t need a ballistic trajectory at all an could attack the US from any direction… including over the south pole. Second if the US spend billions building this system in Poland would the Iranians continue to build ICBMs and somehow ignore that it is there? A MRV missile would be easy to build with a warhead carried in the warhead bus all the way to the US, while another smaller warhead is ejected after launch to follow a similar trajectory but lower, so that it is above the atmosphere over Poland when it detonates and ionises the atmosphere making all radar and radio transmissions pointless for about half an hour. Even hardened systems that survived would be largely blind for that period.

Another issue is the range of the interceptor missile… it would need to be greater 5,500km, or 3,437.5 miles otherwise it would violate the INF treaty.
With such a range how can there be any protests when the Russians withdraw from the INF treaty and start building missiles with a similar range…

Greece is too far to the west of a likely flight path. The idea of putting them in Poland is to intercept the missiles during their midcourse flightpath. Any closer (like Turkey, for example) and you risk not having enough warning to set up a shot. Any farther away (like in Maine, for example) and you risk an endoatmospheric intercept with the possibility of warhead material still impacting the US countryside..

This I understand. But then, am I correct in assuming that this system could then in no way protect the country it is located in (Poland) and neighbouring countries from a missile attack as they would be way past their mid-course??

I did state in another thread that the best solution to the Russian issue is a joint network, incorporating Russia’s BMEW assets.

May be! The problem is that most Russian LPAR look at the west and USA, except the one on Gabala (likely to be closed soon ) and the new Voronezh-DM in Armavir. I.e. how can work for USA the LPAR located in Pechora.

OK, SOC, I undestand this, but it still seems Greece to be the best place. In case of a “polar path”, the best place will be St. Petersburg. :diablo: 😮

Greece is too far to the west of a likely flight path. The idea of putting them in Poland is to intercept the missiles during their midcourse flightpath. Any closer (like Turkey, for example) and you risk not having enough warning to set up a shot. Any farther away (like in Maine, for example) and you risk an endoatmospheric intercept with the possibility of warhead material still impacting the US countryside.

Anyway, I frankly think USA should say “We want a global NMD with an all azymuth coverage”. In both cases Russian reaction will be exactly the same (Pionners) but a more open dialogue seems always better.

I did state in another thread that the best solution to the Russian issue is a joint network, incorporating Russia’s BMEW assets.

OK, SOC, I undestand this, but it still seems Greece to be the best place. In case of a “polar path”, the best place will be St. Petersburg. :diablo: 😮
Anyway, I frankly think USA should say “We want a global NMD with an all azymuth coverage”. In both cases Russian reaction will be exactly the same (Pionners) but a more open dialogue seems always better.

You can’t look at this in two dimensions, ballistic trajectories don’t work that way as they are partially exoatmospheric. Merely looking at a 2D map of the world and drawing a straight line from Iran to Washington DC isn’t going to be an accurate representation of the missile’s ballistic flightpath as the curvature of the Earth is not taken into account. If you transposed a ballistic flightpath onto a flat, 2D map, it’d be a curved line.