Mother ships for LCS?

How did the task forces transit the large expanses of the Pacific? Was there a major sub threat enroute? Have you looked at a map lately? the island locations where the battles took place have not changed? Was Midway fought in littoral? Coral Sea? How did the USN transit the Pacific from the west coast and Hawaii to the Solomon Sea? ???????…..etc.

So you are repeating what I said in different language?. The Pacific was a series of set piece battles initally that led to protracted littoral warfare. Can I assume that your unwillingness to answer a direct and very simple question is deliberate?.

They successfully conducted ASW with far less sophisticated weapons and sensors when needed just as a much larger ship (LCS) with better sensors, weapons, and helos would be able to conduct ASW as necessary now.

You are still seriously trying to make this connection?. Please, as you have been asked by others, look at the capabilities of the ASW vehicles deployed on LCS. Its chokepoint and shallows stuff. The most ASW support that an LCS will give a deployig group is to sanitise chokepoints in preparation for the group transit. Still vital work and not to be undervalued…..but not blue water ASW by any stretch.

Your ignorance is showing again. the SH-60/LCS combination steaming in the van of the main body is a superb system for providing AAW screening and early warning. Why, here is a hint….. radar can be detected at far greater ranges than the radar itself can detect and track a target. Maybe you don’t want to give away the location of something more valuable?

So now LCS is a valid FFG replacement, and an AAW one at that, because it carries an ESM fit???.

Naval architect you aren’t. Top weight is proportional to weight below the water line. Sure they had a lot of weight topside but they had even more at or below the water line so in effect that counters any weight topside.

You put weight up high on a ship, armoured directors or heavy radar fits and the suchlike, you will decrease its stability. That stability is restored, in some measure, by increasing the beam/displacement but you always have the tradeoff that beam/displacement brings extra overheads impacting propulsion/range. So its not always possible that the topweight is fully offset. Indeed designers will have a criteria set for ‘operational seastates’ where roll and pitch values will remain within parameters set for retaining capability to fight the ship. The top weight, whilst designed in, isn’t often completely balanced out as many designs ‘accept’ the relaxed stability in the more unpleasant sea states to trade off against the performance advantages of narrower beam and lesser displacement.

….and no I’m not a Naval Architect.

The point I am making here is that while they are designed to excel in the littoral, they also have considerable capability and bring considerable value to the CSG or ESG in blue water. They are in fact probably more capable than a Perry in most sea conditions for ASW. they are certainly more flexible and they have a better AAW self defense than the how the Perrys are currently equipped. they are in fact the new small general purpose escort that the Perry’s and Knoxs once where.

Which is a view thats unsupportable in any logical sense. Certainly the GD Trimaran has the potential to be equipped in the manner you describe and, doubtless, be a valuable, if pricey, asset.

As planned currently though neither LCS is equipped for the task. It cant be a successful blue water ASW asset without an organic ASW sensor or weapon. You might as well say that an auxilliary is a blue water ASW platform because it can operate an ASW chopper or two and can mount a SeaRAM!

The Pacific Campaign was a series of set piece surface engagements that became primarily a littoral island hop amphibious campaign.

How did the task forces transit the large expanses of the Pacific? Was there a major sub threat enroute? Have you looked at a map lately? the island locations where the battles took place have not changed? Was Midway fought in littoral? Coral Sea? How did the USN transit the Pacific from the west coast and Hawaii to the Solomon Sea? ???????…..etc.

What about them?. They were all horrific sea boats, significant percentages of the crew would be debilitated through seasickness routinely. They were never dry internally and in a seaway were generally terrible gun platforms. Do you think, for a single second, that their successes in the battle of the Atlantic translate to anything meaningful in today’s operations?.

They successfully conducted ASW with far less sophisticated weapons and sensors when needed just as a much larger ship (LCS) with better sensors, weapons, and helos would be able to conduct ASW as necessary now.

Not sensors though. There is still no utilisation offered by LCS-2 to a battlegroup, on transit, beyond its flight deck. It is still not an FFG replacement.

Your ignorance is showing again. the SH-60/LCS combination steaming in the van of the main body is a superb system for providing AAW screening and early warning. Why, here is a hint….. radar can be detected at far greater ranges than the radar itself can detect and track a target. Maybe you don’t want to give away the location of something more valuable?

As for the Iowa comment I didnt say anything about where most of the Iowa’s weight was?. I said it had a lot of topweight and therefore suffered for it – the Iowa’s like most BB’s had a lot of weight above the waterline. Simple statement.

Naval architect you aren’t. Top weight is proportional to weight below the water line. Sure they had a lot of weight topside but they had even more at or below the water line so in effect that counters any weight topside.

At any point have I or anyone else said that a semi-planing hull cant transit blue water?. I started on this stating that the LCS could self-deploy. What point do you think you are making here?. There is something of a difference between transit and operations.

The point I am making here is that while they are designed to excel in the littoral, they also have considerable capability and bring considerable value to the CSG or ESG in blue water. They are in fact probably more capable than a Perry in most sea conditions for ASW. they are certainly more flexible and they have a better AAW self defense than the how the Perrys are currently equipped. they are in fact the new small general purpose escort that the Perry’s and Knoxs once where.

Btw, it’s not below SS4, the 95% are below SS5. I’m sure these maps are somewhere on the net.

Not maps but almost as good. Probably more than 95% below SS5.
http://topex.ucsd.edu/sandwell/publications/9.pdf

…

What were the mainstream operational theatres discussed do you recall?. Gulf? Med? Baltic?. Places where a Seabase might use as OpAreas?. A 95% ratio of conditions below SS4 in the Atlantic is just not correct. That goes doubly so in the Southern Oceans. In littoral regions I wouldnt dispute it though. Which was probably the justification for the LCS-1 semi-planing hull!

Gulf of Oman (almost never above SS2), South China Sea (which also supprised me), Formosa Strait (though it can be quite windy). The other 5% is probable when typhoons are in the area. Didn’t see any maps of the North Atlantic.

Btw, it’s not below SS4, the 95% are below SS5. I’m sure these maps are somewhere on the net.

You really don’t know what you are talking about do you? The calmer waters of the Pacific? Are you serious? Oh I get it, they named it pacific because it was so calm.

The Atlantic Campaign primarily constituted repeated oceanic crossings in th face of a developed sub and air threat. The Pacific Campaign was a series of set piece surface engagements that became primarily a littoral island hop amphibious campaign. You tell me which was easier on a poor seakeeping hull.

But, just to satisfy your stupidity what about ships like HMS Capel or USS O’Flaherty (DE 340). both drew 11 feet of water? They and literally hundred of other similar DEs successfully conducted ASW in the North Atlantic. None of them had particularly deep hulls in fact they all had, ready for this …… flat bottomed (what we call) semi planning hulls.

What about them?. They were all horrific sea boats, significant percentages of the crew would be debilitated through seasickness routinely. They were never dry internally and in a seaway were generally terrible gun platforms. Do you think, for a single second, that their successes in the battle of the Atlantic translate to anything meaningful in today’s operations?.

Want to talk about the trimaran? As for the rest of your post, I can’t be bothered but the your comment on where most of the Iowa’s weight was shall we say a real knee slapper.

The trimaran is a different story and one I haven’t discussed at all. The trimaran hasnt been selected as LCS though has it?. If it does get selected, as I strenuously hope, the situation changes in hull terms. Not sensors though. There is still no utilisation offered by LCS-2 to a battlegroup, on transit, beyond its flight deck. It is still not an FFG replacement. As for the Iowa comment I didnt say anything about where most of the Iowa’s weight was?. I said it had a lot of topweight and therefore suffered for it – the Iowa’s like most BB’s had a lot of weight above the waterline. Simple statement.

You mean it broke the speed record going across the ferocious Atlantic Ocean? How on earth did it do that? The water must have been like glass those few days.

At any point have I or anyone else said that a semi-planing hull cant transit blue water?. I started on this stating that the LCS could self-deploy. What point do you think you are making here?. There is something of a difference between transit and operations.

Convoy escort duty may have gone away but there are still carriers and gators that need ASW. The need remains, LCS does perform it in a different way.

Yes on transit, in blue water, this is provided by SSN’s and DDG’s. In the littorals this is provided by LCS. Not a complicated force structure really.

Distiller,

Seastates above 4 are not so common. I remember a presentation on the Seabase and connector and SS4 covers more than 95% of the year in the mainstream potential theatres.

What were the mainstream operational theatres discussed do you recall?. Gulf? Med? Baltic?. Places where a Seabase might use as OpAreas?. A 95% ratio of conditions below SS4 in the Atlantic is just not correct. That goes doubly so in the Southern Oceans. In littoral regions I wouldnt dispute it though. Which was probably the justification for the LCS-1 semi-planing hull!

To get into a fight with, and overmatch, the Syrian and Egyptian fast missile boat flotilla’s. Essentially refight Latakia better.

Most definitely not the same brief as the US has set for LCS. LCS is pure asymmetric threat and more optimised for battlespace monitoring/preparation in an entirely different threat scenario. If, through offboard assets, it detects a small flotilla of FAC(M)’s inbound it will be running from them at the rush screaming rape whilst trying to get an MQ-8/MH-60 to pot a couple with APKWS/Hellfire or at least guide in a Harpoon strike from the attendant fleet unit over the horizon.

We were talking AAW capabilities. They put un 2×32 cells for Barak, with a 10km range, to fight missile boats? Apparently, they saw no need for something more long range. Of course, the prospective Israeli version of LCS-1 would carry the long range Barak that is under development.

….and the Fletchers were known as poor seaboats that stayed mainly in the calmer waters of the Pacific!. They, the Fletchers, did NOT do 35knts in SS4 and above any more than the LCS will!.

You really don’t know what you are talking about do you? The calmer waters of the Pacific? Are you serious? Oh I get it, they named it pacific because it was so calm. They certainly did do 35 knots in SS4. How do you think they screened the carriers? But, just to satisfy your stupidity what about ships like HMS Capel or USS O’Flaherty (DE 340). both drew 11 feet of water? They and literally hundred of other similar DEs successfully conducted ASW in the North Atlantic. None of them had particularly deep hulls in fact they all had, ready for this …… flat bottomed (what we call) semi planning hulls. Want to talk about the trimaran? As for the rest of your post, I can’t be bothered but the your comment on where most of the Iowa’s weight was shall we say a real knee slapper.

Seastates above 4 are not so common. I remember a presentation on the Seabase and connector and SS4 covers more than 95% of the year in the mainstream potential theatres.

Any idea what the LCS-1/-2 top speed on diesels alone actually is?

Shhhh, you stole my trump card. No kidding, really. Even in the big bad North Atlantic most of the time conditions don’t get worse than SS4.

I thought I read somewhere that the diesels on the LM design make about 17,000hp so I am guessing a speed of around 18-22 knots on diesels would not be out of the question.

ooh look.

The ships can carry out aircraft launch and recovery in conditions up to sea state 5, i.e. in winds up to 27kt and average wave heights between 6.4ft and 9.6ft. The ships will be capable of launching and recovering watercraft, for example 40ft high-speed boats, within 15 minutes in conditions of sea state 4, i.e. waves up to 5ft and winds up to 21kt.

http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/littoral/

So it can employ its offboard water borne sensors in SS4 and it can operate it ASW helos in SS5. Lets see, can Perry employ its offboard autonomous sensors in SS4? Wait, what, OHP doesn’t have any! Can OHP operate its ASW helos above SS5? No.

But wait, there’s more! (as they say on TV).

Lockheed Martin’s advanced semi-planing seaframe is based on technologies introduced by Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri on the 1,000t Destrier commercial vessel, which holds the transatlantic speed record, and the 3,000t Jupiter class.

http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/littoral/

You mean it broke the speed record going across the ferocious Atlantic Ocean? How on earth did it do that? The water must have been like glass those few days.

Has it not occurred to you that a class may be retired with no direct replacement? Its role may go away, or be performed in a different way, e.g. divided between other platforms.

Convoy escort duty may have gone away but there are still carriers and gators that need ASW. The need remains, LCS does perform it in a different way.

Has it not occurred to you that a class may be retired with no direct replacement? Its role may go away, or be performed in a different way, e.g. divided between other platforms.

Why does there have to be a replacement for the Perry class?

The escort mission for all kind of CS/CSS platforms doesn’t go away.
Burkes can’t be everywhere and aerial stand-off escort might not be enough.

Didnt forget it YF I thought the concept of shipborne deployment had been discretely pushed to one side. Last I read about it was an article, in Armada I think it was, couple of years back stating that there was an issue with getting it to hit a moving target?.

To be honest I thought that was the reason for the pressure on MQ-8 to fit APKWS and Viper Strike?.

Happy to stand corrected if you know better?

Doesn’t seem like an issue anymore, going by the latest releases. It’s definitely still on the table. Can’t see how the USN will regard the NLOS as worth the trouble if it’s confined to hitting stationary targets.

http://raytheon.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=1261&pagetemplate=release

Captive Flight Test Moves Raytheon and Lockheed’s NLOS-LS Closer to U.S. Navy Live Fire Testing
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, Fla., May 4, 2009 /PRNewswire/ — NetFires LLC, a joint venture between Raytheon Company and Lockheed Martin , conducted the second captive flight test of the Non Line-of-Sight-Launch System Precision Attack Missile (PAM).

NLOS-LS provides the warfighter with immediate, precise and responsive fires on high-payoff targets with real-time target acquisition and battle effects. It is also one of the key Littoral Combat Ship mission modules.

“As a key part of the LCS ‘layered’ surface warfare capability, NLOS-LS counters the small-boat threat,” said Capt. Mike Good, U.S. Navy program manager for the Littoral Combat Ship Mission Modules. “The success of this captive flight test increases our confidence in the over-water capability of these missiles. Combined with the recent successful U.S. Army guided tests, these are important steps toward the Navy-guided flight tests scheduled for later this year.”

The LCS Mission Module can fire as many as 45 NLOS-LS PAM missiles from three container launch units. With a range greater than 25 miles, the PAM missile gives the LCS an increased surface warfare weapon capability.

“These tests prove the plug-and-play missile seeker ability to detect and track targets while filling the warfighter’s capability gap for precision engagement of moving and stationary targets in open and complex terrain,” said Scott Speet, executive vice president of NetFires LLC and Raytheon’s NLOS-LS program director.

Would you class a modern FAC like Qatari Barzan class as a ‘small boat’ when it packs 8 SSMs, a full air defence hardkill/softkill suite and a medium calibre gun forward?. Christ alone knows what kind of gun platform it is if there is the slightest bit of chop, but, there is no denying the vessel has a comprehensive fitout. Yet its only 400tons in displacement and, with OTH targetting support from shore based air, in its littoral it would be dangerous.

Likewise if you step down the scale to something like the Thondor class boats the Iranians operate. 200 tons deep loaded yet a pair of them have the SSM loadout of a frigate!. In close, with offboard targetting, they will be dangerous and, in both cases, the LCS will be hard pushed to do much about an old Super Frelon or similar standing off 60nm and doing all the targetting necessary to draw a bead.

Thats why I say that LCS isnt really there to take on the FAC(M)’s as a threat system all by themselves. Small boats yes – speedboats and light gunboats yes definitely, and NLOS will be useful there as a layer outside the Mk110 gun, but anything with a missile armament with sufficient potential to saturate the RAM mount will be something best avoided.

Personally, I think it has less to worry about the FAC boat threat than the Heli threat you highlighted. The heli threat’s whats worrisome. FACs with AShMs rely too heavily on external cueing for missile launch (and most don’t have that targeting network), and here the LCS with its external sensor assets has an advantage. Should the enemy have a viable external cueing network however, then the LCS has a problem, which brings me back to my main beef with the LCS – a lack of comprehensive self-defense hard kill capability and the necessary sensor fit to support that.

Didnt forget it YF I thought the concept of shipborne deployment had been discretely pushed to one side. Last I read about it was an article, in Armada I think it was, couple of years back stating that there was an issue with getting it to hit a moving target?.

To be honest I thought that was the reason for the pressure on MQ-8 to fit APKWS and Viper Strike?.

Happy to stand corrected if you know better?

Countering small boats/FACs, MCM and littoral ASW are the 3 main jobs of the LCS at the moment. If the LCS has to run away from the FACs, they really should just end the LCS!

Would you class a modern FAC like Qatari Barzan class as a ‘small boat’ when it packs 8 SSMs, a full air defence hardkill/softkill suite and a medium calibre gun forward?. Christ alone knows what kind of gun platform it is if there is the slightest bit of chop, but, there is no denying the vessel has a comprehensive fitout. Yet its only 400tons in displacement and, with OTH targetting support from shore based air, in its littoral it would be dangerous.

Likewise if you step down the scale to something like the Thondor class boats the Iranians operate. 200 tons deep loaded yet a pair of them have the SSM loadout of a frigate!. In close, with offboard targetting, they will be dangerous and, in both cases, the LCS will be hard pushed to do much about an old Super Frelon or similar standing off 30nm and doing all the targetting necessary to draw a bead.

Thats why I say that LCS isnt really there to take on the FAC(M)’s as a threat system all by themselves. Small boats yes – speedboats and light gunboats yes definitely, and NLOS will be useful there as a layer outside the Mk110 gun, but anything with a missile armament with sufficient potential to saturate the RAM mount will be something best avoided.

Same difference: CAP is part of group AAW

Which then proves my point. That it requires CAP cover for basic self defense (without which the only hard kill defenses which are left would be short range systems) is indicative that its hard kill component of its defenses is lacking. It cannot be assumed that a CSG is available all the time to provide protective cover (say, if the LCS was escorting a ARG instead, or the CSG was too far away to provide effective coverage), or that it can provide protective cover even if available. (eg. for reasons of operational deception etc)

If, through offboard assets, it detects a small flotilla of FAC(M)’s inbound it will be running from them at the rush screaming rape whilst trying to get an MQ-8/MH-60 to pot a couple with APKWS/Hellfire or at least guide in a Harpoon strike from the attendant fleet unit over the horizon.

You forgot the Netfires, Jonesy. Countering small boats/FACs, MCM and littoral ASW are the 3 main jobs of the LCS at the moment. If the LCS has to run away from the FACs, they really should just end the LCS!

I kn ow what they are. The comparison is the threat, and the defence against it, not the hull. Why do you think the Israeli’s came up with the SAAR 5 in the first place?

To get into a fight with, and overmatch, the Syrian and Egyptian fast missile boat flotilla’s. Essentially refight Latakia better.

Most definitely not the same brief as the US has set for LCS. LCS is pure asymmetric threat and more optimised for battlespace monitoring/preparation in an entirely different threat scenario. If, through offboard assets, it detects a small flotilla of FAC(M)’s inbound it will be running from them at the rush screaming rape whilst trying to get an MQ-8/MH-60 to pot a couple with APKWS/Hellfire or at least guide in a Harpoon strike from the attendant fleet unit over the horizon.

Its probably this kind of scenario thats driving the renewed interest in a multimode-seeker ‘TASM-NG’ thats being touted off the back of TACTOM.

Well, I didn’t have much time to look. Yet, I was unable to find anything on a “serious” OHP Replacement. So, I stand corrected………..The LCS is the only replacement for the Perry Class FFG’s.

Has it not occurred to you that a class may be retired with no direct replacement? Its role may go away, or be performed in a different way, e.g. divided between other platforms.

Why does there have to be a replacement for the Perry class?

As I see it, the only way to mitigate this deficiency is to dedicate more CAPs over the area the LCS is operating while the CSG is held back.

Same difference: CAP is part of group AAW

The Flyvefisk is a 320 ton patrol boat, not 3000 tons like LCS. Hardly similar. Saar 5 is bigger, but still only 40% of the tonnage of LCS – and you say it “isn’t much better armed than LCS in terms of self-defence against air threats”.

The problem with comparing LCS with other vessels is that there’s nothing similar. It’s the size of a 1960s frigate, but with a very different role, & the speed of a FAC.

I kn ow what they are. The comparison is the threat, and the defence against it, not the hull. Why do you think the Israeli’s came up with the SAAR 5 in the first place?

I’d go for softkill all the way. For one no running out of rounds at an annoying moment for another no high energy fragments carrying on into my ship.

BUT I’ve still seen nowt to make me think that LCS is a true bluewater combatant nor a FFG replacement.

I may be being simplistic but things like the NAME OF THE SHIP and its Fncking HULLFORM seem to point away from either role.

Al

That would suprise me. The way it looks to me is that the USN has never really been all that interested in frigates. They get the destroyers to do the Fleet ASW and would rather not bother with the piddling little ships!.

With the loss of the Atlantic ‘Reforger’ mission it appears that the whole raison d’etre for the USN to have to entertain FFG’s has gone. With the LCS filling the littoral gaps that the Fleet units aren’t so good at, plus improvements in stand-off sensors (like the new active LF tail discussed in the Burke thread) on the bigger ships, it looked like the USN were finally going to forget about the whole concept.

FFG-7 replacement…..what replacement?!.

Well, I didn’t have much time to look. Yet, I was unable to find anything on a “serious” OHP Replacement. So, I stand corrected………..The LCS is the only replacement for the Perry Class FFG’s.

Of course that could change if the LCS didn’t prove to be successful………

What makes you think combat ops with e.g. MILGEM in the Med would be any less demanding than US would typically face with LCS?

What makes you think it’d be just as difficult?

a) stealthy design is harder to detect/lock
b) layered defense including both soft kill systems (e.g. 3x SRBOC or Terma SKWS soft-kill weapon system) and hard kill weapons (Bofors 57mm Mk3, RAM)
c) backed up by group AAW

As said before, I agree that the LCS hinges its survivability on denying the enemy the ability to localise it by its speed and stealth. And it does have a soft kill and a limited hard kill suite. My point is that its hard kill suite isn’t sufficient. That, along with its sensor suite. Sensor wise, that’d be remedied to some extent with the change in subsequent vessels SeaRAM which gives it a dedicated horizon search radar, though at a further cost to its hard kill loadout. Still, for a 3,000 ton vessel expected to operate in the littorals to clear the way ahead for the battlegroup (implying that enemy capability isn’t very much degraded, if at all), that little hard kill defenses simply isn’t reasonable.

Currently, the group AAW isn’t sufficient since they are limited to horizon engagement range. Going according to the scenario in the LCS video, the CBG and its escorts would be further back beyond the horizon. Only when the SM-6-CEC-E-2D combo comes online will there be some protection against sea skimmers. And that is also iffy, since with the LCS operating so far forward the geometry might not be favourable for an interception before the ASM reaches the LCS. As I see it, the only way to mitigate this deficiency is to dedicate more CAPs over the area the LCS is operating while the CSG is held back.

The Flyvefisk is a 320 ton patrol boat, not 3000 tons like LCS. Hardly similar. Saar 5 is bigger, but still only 40% of the tonnage of LCS – and you say it “isn’t much better armed than LCS in terms of self-defence against air threats”.

The problem with comparing LCS with other vessels is that there’s nothing similar. It’s the size of a 1960s frigate, but with a very different role, & the speed of a FAC.

Is everybody trying to look daft all of a sudden? Where did I say the LCS had no hard kill defenses? I said it didn’t have sufficient hard kill defenses.

The LCS program was announced on November 1, 2001, when the Navy stated that it was launching a Future Surface Combatant Program aimed at acquiring a family of next-generation surface combatants. This new family of surface combatants, the Navy stated, would include three new classes of ships:
1. a destroyer called the DD(X) — later redesignated the DDG-1000
— for the precision long-range strike and naval gunfire mission,
2. a cruiser called the CG(X) for the air defense and ballistic missile
mission, and
3. a smaller combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to
counter submarines, small surface attack craft, and mines in heavily
contested littoral (near-shore) areas.
…
The LCS’s primary intended missions are shallow-water antisubmarine warfare,
mine countermeasures, countering small boats, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Secondary intended missions include homeland defense, maritime intercept operations, and support of special operations forces.

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33741.pdf

What makes you think combat ops with e.g. MILGEM in the Med would be any less demanding than US would typically face with LCS? Some would argue:
a) stealthy design is harder to detect/lock
b) layered defense including both soft kill systems (e.g. 3x SRBOC or Terma SKWS soft-kill weapon system) and hard kill weapons (Bofors 57mm Mk3, RAM)
c) backed up by group AAW

Initially the Aegis had a Standard Missile that potentially could provide air defense for an area that was on the order of 25-plus miles. The Aegis, with the newer generation Standard Missile, can provide air defense for an area that has a radius of on the order of 75-plus miles. And the Aegis of the future and DD(X) with ERAM, the new missile, is going to defend an area that has a radius well over a hundred miles.

Which ships with simular roles are better armed? Note that while it has more missiles (32 usually, as the rear VLU is no longer used due to topweight problems), the Israel’s SAAR V for example isn’t much better armed than LCS in terms of self-defence against air threats. Stanflex 300 (Flyvefisken) has ESSM but in limited number and with just a single illuminator, which under some conditions has to be shared with the 76mm gun.

Interesting factoid on seastates: Waves are generally smoother and more uniform towards the equator, and higher and rougher and erratic towards the poles.

Seastates above 4 are not so common. I remember a presentation on the Seabase and connector and SS4 covers more than 95% of the year in the mainstream potential theatres.

Any idea what the LCS-1/-2 top speed on diesels alone actually is?