Navy may sue over Seasprite failures

Firstly I must state that I was always for the Lynx – I am ashamed to say, I do not know what makes the Australian Defense Force ADF tick at times!
They have had the uncanny ability to take a good idea (and already working weapons platform and through a spanner into it, to turn it into an over cost lemon – i.e. – Collins Class sub, Seasprite, Jindalee OHR

Secondly – I think we have made a big mistake in failing to go on with the Australian / Malaysian Joint OPV purchase, or an all Australian OPV. For although the new Armadale Class patrol boats are an improvement over the Fremantle Class PB`s, they are still lacking in endurance and combat capability.

Regards
Pioneer

You have to look at the requirements, thats what drives the projects.

The RAN needed a large and capable SSK that could transit 5,000 miles, maintain station for an extended period then transit back. No one was making a conventional sub that could do that, so the requirement needed some development work. Kockums stepped up and said we can do this. Turned out they were almost right. The almost part is what delayed the boats initial IOC. The software issues were another matter and common to navies the world over.

The Seasprite was a mistake, one which should have never have been ordered. The preferred model was additional Sea Hawks with an ASUW tasking, to match the surveillance and ASW tasked S70B2 already in service.

Jindalee is pretty much the world standard when it comes to OTHB radars, it can track aircraft landing in Hong Kong when conditions are good. The delay was not in the technical engineering side, it was in the software integration for what was an immensely difficult task. Once again not unique to Australia.

The Joint OPV was dead in the water, except for the fantasies of a few politicians and Tenix. The Malaysian’s simply did not have the money for the number of OPVs required, as can be seen by the long and painful gestation period of their chosen solution.

The Tenix design, of which I have a small image and for which I am seeking a decent plan to build a 1/72 scale R/C model, was interesting but was not marketed well by Tenix, despite the RAN’s reluctant endorsement.

The only area that the Armidale’s could be said to be lacking capability is in their inability to operate a UAV or helicopter. Apart from that they are perfect for what they are designed to do, intercept people smugglers, illegal fisherman and drug smugglers. The armament is sufficiant for the role and is apparently turning out to be extremely accurate, just what is required for well placed warning shots or for knocking out rudders and screws.

What else do they need to do their job? Harpoon? Barak? Brahmos?

Keep the requirement in mind, a vast array of coastline facing a low tech threat. That does not need a few large and capable vessels, it needs a large number of low level capability vessels, rather than a few major warfighting platforms that will spend their life burdoned with capability and systems that will not be required for their role.

Tenix is trying to interest the RAN or Fisheries in a small number of OPVs almost identical to the Project Protector OPVs for the RNZN, for operations in the Great Southern Ocean, that is a project that may happen, with Fisheries chosen as the relevant authority.

Of course, if there is a change of Government then an Australian Coast Guard is a Labour policy, in which the Armidales will probably be hived off from the Navy into the Coast Guard.

Unicorn

Firstly I must state that I was always for the Lynx – I am ashamed to say, I do not know what makes the Australian Defense Force ADF tick at times!
They have had the uncanny ability to take a good idea (and already working weapons platform and through a spanner into it, to turn it into an over cost lemon – i.e. – Collins Class sub, Seasprite, Jindalee OHR

Secondly – I think we have made a big mistake in failing to go on with the Australian / Malaysian Joint OPV purchase, or an all Australian OPV. For although the new Armadale Class patrol boats are an improvement over the Fremantle Class PB`s, they are still lacking in endurance and combat capability.

Regards
Pioneer

Thanks for the post danrh, good to know that after investing a billion dollars they aren’t going to throw the baby out with the bath water over 35 million.
There will be I told you so’s and why didn’t you do it this way or that way, bt at the end of the day what Australia needs is a helo that meets their needs and I think the Sea Sprite is up to the task.

My apologies if anyone objects to this thread being brought back

http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/NelsonMintpl.cfm?CurrentId=6705

SEASPRITE HELICOPTERS

In April 2006, I initiated a full examination of the Seasprite project following grounding of the aircraft due to concerns over the reliability of the Seasprite’s Automated Flight Control System.

The review paid particular attention to the reliability of the Flight Control System and its associated safety implications; the ramifications to Naval aviation of the project being 6 years late; and the performance of the integrated sensor system.

The review examined how to resolve these issues so that the best possible capability can be provided to the Royal Australian Navy.

After detailed consideration of the issues involved, the Government has decided to continue the Seasprite project, subject to satisfactory contract arrangements.

The return to flying will involve a series of controlled steps to assess the contractor’s performance, and to ensure the safety, performance and reliability of the Seasprite.

The Government will take steps to ensure that the contractor’s progress is measured against milestones during the course of the additional work.

In other words…the Howard government will have a hard time avoiding the blame for the Sea Sprite fiasco?

Not really, people just don’t care enough about this sort of stuff. The government continues to produce multi-billion dollar surpluses (thanks to the GST and the resources boom) and people know this stuff is expensive so it doesn’t sound that bad. There is no threat for folks to get excited about. Folks are more interested in the their mortage rates, climate change and how their team is doing this week. Lets see the Cricket World Cup is coming up and the footy season starts again shortly. I expect the election to be right around Grand Final time so between now and then only the few hundred thousand Australian’s who occasionally watch the ABC will even know about this stuff.

Daniel

In other words… it works just fine as per the original contract.

Once again, the problem lies with the customer changing specifications & requirements (in this case by changing the certification standards) after the contract was signed, and demanding that the new specifications be met without exceeding the contracted cost!

The comment “The company has failed to understand that they have lost the confidence of the customer,” is therefore BS… the customer has screwed over the company!

In other words…the Howard government will have a hard time avoiding the blame for the Sea Sprite fiasco?

RAN Seasprite: Hear Our Case, Kaman Execs Tell Defence Minister.

Kaman officials are waiting – and hoping – that the imminent decision on the future of the Royal Australian Navy’s Sesprite program won’t go against them.

The Australian Defence Minister – Brendan Nelson – has been scheduled to decide its fate for some time now, and he’s certainly beyond the originally scheduled October 2006 deadline.

The issue is complex, but reduced to two main essentials turns on (a) the aircraft’s technical mission suitability, and (b) it’s acceptability in Australia in the context of a certification process that has recently been re-defined, with consequent shifting timelines.

‘There isn’t a relationship between certification and flight safety, and that’s certainly what everyone is worrying about now in the broader political context,’ a top Kaman executive (requesting off-the-record status) says.

‘We have fixed the problem areas where safety was a perceived problem – in an area having to do with the flight control software – and more than fixed it. We now have an AFCS system that provides many more measures of automated fault tolerance than anybody originally required. In fact, it’s almost a cognitive decision aid added to the system – a software load that aids pilot decisions in ways that directly enhance safety.’

The SH-2G version the Australians are buying has been designed around a hard two man crew requirement – ‘where the genius of this whole thing lies, because you’ve got two guys doing things six or seven people are doing in a modern maritime helicopter.’

Development of the AFCS enhancements were completed about a month ago, and have been flown and tested by company crews around Long Island.

Kaman agrees the Australian requirements for a flight certification framework acceptable to the three services in the country has amounted to a statement of work that would take about 29 months to complete – with a $37.7-million pricetag.

‘But, look, they’re the ones who have been deciding on the process. They’re the ones who have decided to put their aircraft – from all the services – through something like this. Of course we’ll be compliant, but what’s been created is this perception that because we haven’t run that course – nobody down there has – that somehow we’re not compliant with the actual physical, original tactical needs. We are.’

Problem is that getting this through to an Australian political decision-making system – one that is influenced by negative media commentary, sheer gut politics and a public disaffection for defense program screw-ups in Australia generally – is difficult.

‘We’re caught in a mood thing, a pre-disposition not to see the thing based on its actual merits.’

To be sure, however, the programme has had a checkered past.

Years late, it has consistently failed, up to this point, to meet early hopes from within the RAN community. But now Kaman – which stands by its claim to have spent over $100-million of company money rather than pushing the delta off to the customer – says the end has justified the means.

‘The aircraft works. It’s the most sophisticated, capable platform of its type anywhere today. We have been doing a level of integration that nobody in industry is doing. The results are spectacular – but we’ve got to somehow get them to agree.’

That dilemma may not last much beyond the next few days.

Kaman is hoping, however, that RAN officials who support the project – based on its potential to provide littoral patrol and sea-control capability at new levels of operational efficiency – will be able to persuade a reportedly reluctant defence minister to think again.

‘We need to all stop here, step back, and do some demos in the simulator, and even some time back here in our test aircraft to show what in real, actual terms we have been able to achieve,’ an impassioned executive says.

‘There’s an inherent logic to the operating system in this thing you have to see for yourself.’

http://www.shephard.co.uk/Rotorhub/NewsAnalysis.aspx?Action=745115149&ID=7d1f94ec-0ae9-438a-855f-8980c220673c

A different view

Seasprite program headed for the scrap heap
Patrick Walters, National security editor
February 10, 2007

THE navy’s ill-fated Seasprite helicopter program is almost certain to be scrapped after a decade of problems, leaving taxpayers with losses of more than $1 billion.
The Defence Department has recommended that the contract with US manufacturer Kaman Aerospace Corporation be terminated.

And senior government sources say the axe could fall on the project to refurbish the Vietnam-era helicopters as soon as next Wednesday’s meeting of federal cabinet’s National Security Committee.

The Seasprite helicopters have been dogged by software engineering glitches and airworthiness issues, with the project running more than six years behind schedule.

The twin-engine SG-2G(A) Super Seasprites, equipped with Penguin anti-ship missiles, are designed to operate from the navy’s Anzac-class frigates, providing a maritime strike and surveillance capability for the surface fleet.

If the Seasprites are dumped, Defence will buy a new helicopter for the Anzacs, choosing between the US Seahawk, which is already in service with the navy, and the European NH-90, in an investment likely to cost at least $1.5 billion.

The failure of the project will be an embarrassment for the Howard Government, which is extolling its virtues as a superior economic manager against new Labor leader Kevin Rudd.

The Government is expected to counter that it was burdened with the project by the previous Labor government of Paul Keating.

Kaman executives have been in Canberra this week lobbying hard for the retention of the project, arguing that the Seasprites are safe to fly, with only Australian airworthiness certification procedures yet to be met.

But the latest estimate from Defence is that the navy will now not have a fully operational Seasprite squadron until 2010, at the earliest.

The original $667 million contract with Kaman, signed in 1997, called for the supply of 11 helicopters. The one-off project involved fitting a wholly new avionics package designed for the Royal Australian Navy into a 1960s airframe.

Ten of the Seasprites have been delivered to the navy but were grounded last year after concerns about their airworthiness and problems with their flight control systems.

If the project is scrapped, it is likely Defence will attempt to sell the remaining Seasprites.

More than a decade in development and now running six years late, the Seasprite has been one of Defence’s most troublesome “legacy projects” – those that originated before the election of the Howard Government in 1996 and before major reforms of the Defence Materiel Organisation, the organisation that manages new equipment purchases.

Defence Minister Brendan Nelson has made no secret of his unhappiness at the state of the Seasprite program and his readiness to consider an alternative solution for the navy.

Dr Nelson met senior Kaman executives in Washington in December to express his concerns at the continuing delays in achieving an operational capability for the navy’s Fleet Air Arm.

“The company has failed to understand that they have lost the confidence of the customer,” one senior government source told The Weekend Australian.

A decision to scrap the Seasprite would come as a bitter blow to the helicopter’s manufacturer, which maintains that all the major hurdles to achieve a fully operational capability have been met.

Kaman estimates that meeting Australia’s current airworthiness certification regulations, which fall outside the original contract specification for the Seasprites, will take a further 29 months and cost $US35 million ($45million).

Kaman is confident that it has solved all technical problems associated with the Seasprites’ flight control system. This includes the handling glitches in the Seasprite’s air data computer before last year’s grounding of the machines.

“We have really done all of the testing to this point to convince us that the aircraft meets all of its specified requirements,” Kaman Aviation’s vice-president of engineering Mike Bowes told The Weekend Australian.

This included bench and flight testing of it and its sensors and weapons systems, including the Penguin anti-ship missile.

“We have just completed an enhancement of the flight control system which the commonwealth asked us to do to allow us to get an interim airworthiness certificate,” he said.

Mr Bowes said Kaman had agreed a statement of work with the commonwealth to achieve full air certification by mid-2009.

The additional $US35 million cost will cover further software engineering and installation of additional redundancy in the Seasprites’ flight control system as well as new software to comply with regulations.

Kaman is confident it has satisfactorily resolved a list of outstanding concerns presented by Defence last year relating to the performance of the Seasprites. These included the helicopter’s performance when it was equipped with the Penguin missile and its stability when the missile was fired.

Dr Nelson has compared the ambition of the program, in which the latest avionics have been incorporated into an older airframe, to trying to put a “2010 motor vehicle into an EH Holden”. “If this were a domestic purchase and you had the project in your garage, you would be sitting around your kitchen table with your wife saying, ‘Look, do you think we should be continuing with it?”‘ he told The Weekend Australian last year.

“If it was my money, my project, and it involved my domestic arrangements, I know what I would be doing.”

Looking at this, something comes to mind…

“meeting Australia’s current airworthiness certification regulations, which fall outside the original contract specification for the Seasprites”

“”We have just completed an enhancement of the flight control system which the Commonwealth asked us to do to allow us to get an interim airworthiness certificate,” he said.

Mr Bowes said Kaman had agreed a statement of work with the Commonwealth to achieve full air certification by mid-2009. “

“The additional $US35 million cost will cover further software engineering and installation of additional redundancy in the Seasprites’ flight control system as well as new software to comply with regulations.”

In other words… it works just fine as per the original contract.

Once again, the problem lies with the customer changing specifications & requirements (in this case by changing the certification standards) after the contract was signed, and demanding that the new specifications be met without exceeding the contracted cost!

The comment “The company has failed to understand that they have lost the confidence of the customer,” is therefore BS… the customer has screwed over the company!

I don’t know that it was ever an option. Being built on the Comet 4 airframe there was probably an issue with availability. Did/does the capacity o manufacture complete new build exist?

Only the prototype Nimrods were built on Comet 4 airframes. The production aircraft were all new-built from scratch.

BAE offered Nimrod MRA.4 as a candidate for the US Navy’s P-3 replacement program (ultimately won by the Boeing 737/P-8), so clearly they believed that new airframes could be built, even as late as 2002.

New build

I don’t know that it was ever an option. Being built on the Comet 4 airframe there was probably an issue with availability. Did/does the capacity o manufacture complete new build exist?

Daniel

Didn’t realise they were all converted airframes – might explain it.

New ones should be possible, but it wouldn’t just be a case of phoning BAe/Airbus to knock a few out. There would be issues with material availability. For example, certain primers for adhesive bonding are now banned; alloy grades have changed, etc. These will all entail replacement and reproving at best, redesign at worse.

So should be possible, but….

Well, the “new” ones have new-build wings, so I imagine that new-build fuselages would not be too hard either.

Sadly could be applied to anything UK built..

Why did it never sell overseas?

I don’t know that it was ever an option. Being built on the Comet 4 airframe there was probably an issue with availability. Did/does the capacity o manufacture complete new build exist?

Daniel

Ja: I actually meant the RAF, not the RAAF regarding the Orions – I was specifically referring to the P-7, which was to replace RAF Nimrods, US P-3s and German and Italian Atlantiques. The Nimrod is a great aircraft, but to be honest, it is not in wide enough service to allow quantity to combat cost. I would be happy to see Nimrod MRA-4s in larger numbers, acting as both bombers and maritime patrol planes, but you need quantity as well as quality!

Sadly could be applied to anything UK built..

Why did it never sell overseas?

http://www.defense-aerospace.com

It’s more than $35 million, that’s only an additional amount, millions have been wasted! 😡

Indeed, but why not spend an additional $35 million to salvage a $1 billion program?

It is hard to imagine a cancellation before an election, especially when the opposition seems to favor continuing the program?

[size=5]Seasprite Debacle[/size]

(Source: Australian Labor Party; issued Feb. 10, 2007)

Defence Minister Brendan Nelson appears poised to announce that the Government has flushed a billion dollars of taxpayer’s money down the drain.

A decision to scrap the Seasprite helicopter project will be an admission of the Howard government’s failure to properly manage the project.

Labor understands that the problems with the Seasprite are largely solved, and that full air worthiness certification could be achieved within the next three years for a further A$35 million.

Minister Nelson needs to explain to the Australian people what alternatives he has in place for the Seasprite, how much they will cost and when they can be operational with our Defence Force. (ends)

Background:

Australia’s Seasprite procurement project dates from 1997, when the government ordered 11 helicopters from US company Kaman to operate from the navy’s Anzac frigates.

What was not widely known at the time was that Australia was buying used but fully refurbished choppers. Seven had been built between 1963 and 1965 and others in the mid-1980s.

For the Seasprites, Defence specified a very advanced radar and weapons capability including computer datalinks that would enable them to serve as the extended eyes of a warship 50 kilometres away.

There have been problems with aircraft flight control systems, but the major cause of delay was in integrating the software combat system. (source: Australian Associated Press, Feb. 10, 2007)

-ends-

http://www.defense-aerospace.com

It’s more than $35 million, that’s only an additional amount, millions have been wasted! 😡

The reason is that it is explicit ADF policy to reduce the number of disparate helo platforms being operated.

Current fleet

Army – Black Hawk, Chinook, Kiowa (don’t know if any UH1’s are still in service)
Navy – Squirrel, Sea King, Sea Hawk, Super Seasprite
Air Force – Squirrel (basic helo training)

Future fleet

Army – MRH-90, Chinook, Tiger
Navy – NH-90, Sea Hawk (until retired)
Air Force – none
Civil contractor – Leased A109s for continuance training and probably another type for intial training.

Unicorn

Watch for a complete replacement of the Super Seasprites, Sea Kings and eventually the Sea Hawks with a naval version of the MRH-90s.

It won’t be perfect for all roles, but it will reduce the fleet type numbers.

The Super Seasprites will probably be sold back to Kaman for a relative pittance as part of a settlement, the Sea Kings are very long in the fang and subject to maintenance issues on a regular basis and the Sea Hawks will probably last longest (about 5-7 years) before being retired.

That leaves the Squirrels in the training role, something for which they are not long for this earth, as outlined in the accompanying media release.

Just for the sake of argument, why couldn’t the Sea Sprites be replaced by the A109? The MH-68A has done well in Coast Guard service, and is fully SAR capable, despite the fact that the USCG has removed the rescue hoists because they weren’t essential to the HITRON mission. At very least, the RAN would have a servicable fleet of helicopters for the Anzac class, perhaps even with the ability to deliver a torpedo (or two?) to limits of sonar range.

In reality, with 6 FFGs being replaced by only 3 AAW destroyers, the RAN will only need 8 direct Seahawk replacements, not 16. Perhaps the number of Sea King replacements will be doubled because of the LHD program, or perhaps not? It is hard to imagine a MRH-90 purchase encompassing replacements for the little used Sea Sprites.

Is it plausable to expect that the RAN will be “rewarded’ for the failure of the Sea Sprite program? It would easier to justify smaller, far cheaper helicopters in the A109 class as 1:1 replacements for the Sea Sprites.

Kaman proposes upgrade resolution for RAN Super Seasprites

Kaman Aerospace has proposed a USD35 million upgrade to resolve the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN’s) troubled SH-2G(A) Super Seasprite helicopter programme.The AUD1.1 billion (USD27.1 million) Super Seasprite programme is already six years behind schedule due to software integration difficulties with the helicopter’s Integrated Tactical Avionics System (ITAS) and technical problems with its digital flight-control system.

[Jane’s Navy International – first posted to http://jni.janes.com – 06 February 2007]

Unicorn

So does the RAN’s Sea Sprite fiasco amount to only a $35 millon problem?

If that is indeed the case, it would be foolish to throw away the SH-2G(A) in favor of another potential billion dollar fiasco.

Kaman proposes upgrade resolution for RAN Super Seasprites

Kaman Aerospace has proposed a USD35 million upgrade to resolve the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN’s) troubled SH-2G(A) Super Seasprite helicopter programme.The AUD1.1 billion (USD27.1 million) Super Seasprite programme is already six years behind schedule due to software integration difficulties with the helicopter’s Integrated Tactical Avionics System (ITAS) and technical problems with its digital flight-control system.

[Jane’s Navy International – first posted to http://jni.janes.com – 06 February 2007]

Unicorn

That’s right mate, the whole reason we did buy them as become a lie. We bought them because it was feared that the Seahawks couldn’t operate off the ANZAC’s (lie, the ANZAC’s have been using them for a number of years now.

The other reason was the upcoming deal with Malaysia for new OPV’s (Malaysia canned the deal and bought the A-100’s from Blohm & Voss mainly because the Australian government said it had to build all the ships here in Australia but that final fit out could happen in Malaysia. When The Malaysians pulled out the whole thing was dead and the second reason for buying the helos went out the window, why do we need them now)?

I just love the huge irony… Australia had several reasons for going for the Seasprite and if things had gone to plan they would have been good reasons. As Ja mentions those reasons for one reason or another disappeared. The real Irony however is that New Zealand only bought the Seasprites for one reason… commonality with our allies… we wanted a replacement for an obsolete type but it didn’t really matter which new helo we bought as long as it could operate from an ANZAC ship. If Australia pulls out and gets rid of their seasprites then we (in NZ) end up with a helo that no longer met our primary criteria. Fortunately for us the helo does seem to do the jobs we want it to do so I doubt we will get rid of them, but that will mean less commonality with our mates across the ditch. I am sure we will get over it though, and I hope Australia can get a helo that better meet its needs.