Next leap in airliner safety?

A few quick facts:
– Icing is worse between 0°C and -35°C, theoretically supercooled water droplets does not form under -35°C. Although, here we have a MCC (Mesoscale Convective Complex) which is a whole bunch of thunderstorm clusters so intense and vast, which such strong convective currents (and relatively warm air on that 1st of june 2009) that such supercooled droplets were there at FL350.
– If anyone didn’t remember those pitot probes were faulty

You do realise the pitots are heated right?

If pitot heat is turned on, yes.

So yes – while the ice remains the readouts will be faulty. (I dunno where your running with the expansion idea – the various pitots will all be reading different, i.e. wrong results – the computer will still be in alternate mode)

Because it’s happened before -> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birgenair_Flight_301 – if you read the report into that accident you’ll see that that Captains pitot tube was blocked, as the aircraft climbed the air trapped in the tube expanded due to the outside airpressure dropping. The captain believed this to be a true IAS reading and stalled the plane. The co-pilot had a perfectly working pitot tube and correct IAS readings. They still crashed.

However, instead of dealing with supercooled liquid at 35 kft, by dropping down to 10 kft you will clear the ice and you will have working pitots.

You will also have avoided stall and kept control of the aircraft – which is (or should be) rule no. 1.

I’m sorry but there is no basis for fact in that. Super cooled liquid water is a theory and not a fact. Also, by dropping 10kft you may well make the problem worse with less room to deal with the issue. Personally I always like sky below me – it can be useful if something goes wrong.

Rule number 1 is ‘fly the airplane’ which I’ll agree that AF447 pilots did not do but it was a confusing, strange situation that few pilots are trained for. It was dark and there was no horizon. Probably one of the worst situations to have problems in.

I’m not sure why they bothered taking so long with the investigation. You clearly have it all worked out. Have you thought of applying to the AAIB?

OK I give in. You obviously have much more insight into what happened that night than anyone else.

Running behind the lame excuse of “you weren’t there” is pathetic.

Fact is – the pilots f**ked up. Their procedures were f**ked up (not their fault) and the aircraft warnings were not clear enough, or prioritised enough (not their fault), to deal with bad pilots (their fault).

Other pilots closing ranks to protect their profession is not doing aircraft safety any favours.

Why would it? in fact, it could make the problem worse as air trapped behind the ice expands in the tube and provides even more confusing information to the aircrew.

You do realise the pitots are heated right?

So yes – while the ice remains the readouts will be faulty. (I dunno where your running with the expansion idea – the various pitots will all be reading different, i.e. wrong results – the computer will still be in alternate mode)

However, instead of dealing with supercooled liquid at 35 kft, by dropping down to 10 kft you will clear the ice and you will have working pitots.

You will also have avoided stall and kept control of the aircraft – which is (or should be) rule no. 1.

You can, it has been done, in ALT law as you say.

You took my comment out of context. you CANNOT stall an airbus in Normal law. 447 wasn’t in normal law but I suspect the crew didn’t fully register that fact.

Have you read the preliminary report and the CVR transcript?

Yes and the ACARS warnings as well as watched some of the expert opinion on the accident.

There certainly was a lot of confusion, I’ll give them that.
But who in their right mind pulls back on the stick/yoke and keeps it there and then does not tell his colleagues he is doing so? Especially when speed readouts are unreliable!

with 20/20 hindsight we know that the airspeed was unreliable. At the time of the incident did the aircrew truly know that the airspeed was unreliable? Did the aircrew truly know that 447 was in Alt law? If so then yes, they’d probably not have pulled back on the stick.

you are right that the pilot should have communicated, the fact he didn’t shows poor CRM. However, shouldn’t the other pilots have ASKED him what he was doing? Why were they passive? CRM allows and expects pilots to challenge each other and that never happened.

Pull the other one if you think sustained descent isn’t going to de-ice the probes.

Why would it? in fact, it could make the problem worse as air trapped behind the ice expands in the tube and provides even more confusing information to the aircrew.

As you know it is -56.5 degC on an ISA day at 37kft.

At 10 kft it is approx -5.

Pull the other one if you think sustained descent isn’t going to de-ice the probes.

So. Planes can handle thunder and turbulence. They can’t handle 35 degree AoA.

I can sum up what happened that night in 7 words. The aircrew lost control of the aeroplane.

OK I give in. You obviously have much more insight into what happened that night than anyone else.

You can’t stall an airbus.

You can, it has been done, in ALT law as you say.

Have you read the preliminary report and the CVR transcript?

There certainly was a lot of confusion, I’ll give them that.
But who in their right mind pulls back on the stick/yoke and keeps it there and then does not tell his colleagues he is doing so? Especially when speed readouts are unreliable!

It wouldn’t have helped with the icing and indeed may have made things worse.

As you know it is -56.5 degC on an ISA day at 37kft.

At 10 kft it is approx -5.

Pull the other one if you think sustained descent isn’t going to de-ice the probes.

Descending into thunderstorms and turbulence. As I’ve said before none of us were there on AF447 so we cannot know for sure what went on that night.

So. Planes can handle thunder and turbulence. They can’t handle 35 degree AoA.

I can sum up what happened that night in 7 words. The aircrew lost control of the aeroplane.

The problem with AF447 was it’s pilots.

Which is why pilots shouldn’t be allowed to crash planes.

The problem with AF447 was it’s pilots. That poor man in the right seat panicked, failed to communicate his actions (that he was pulling back on the stick) and kill everyone on board.

If only it was as simple as that…….

Do you know what happens if you pull back on the stick on most airbus aircraft? The nose goes up and thats it. You can’t stall an airbus. As I understand it this is something that Air France pilots were trained to understand.

And it’s true until the aircraft goes from normal law to alternate law. A simple yellow line of text on a crowded ECAM effectively told them that if they pull back on the stick they have the risk of stalling the aircraft.

One line of yellow text amoungst a lot of other lines of yellow text along with alarms, bells, whilstes the aircraft being thrown around and other distractions.

We can for a certain degree understand what went on, thanks to recorder transcripts.
The CVR Transcript basically paints a picture of confusion. Two relatively junior pilots, with the most junior as pilot flying. As soon as the alarms sound, the pilot flying pulls back on the stick and continues to do so, stalling the aircraft. He then continues to pull back on the stick almost all the way down to the water.

Had they stuck to procedure or done what Amiga is suggesting, the plane would NOT have stalled and crashed. The icing itself was not the problem and more ice would not have had any effect.

The problem with AF447 was it’s pilots. That poor man in the right seat panicked, failed to communicate his actions (that he was pulling back on the stick) and kill everyone on board.

Yes it would.

They wouldn’t have stalled. 😐

So what if you have to descend a long way to improve outer thermals. At least your alive to climb back up again.

It wouldn’t have helped with the icing and indeed may have made things worse. Descending into thunderstorms and turbulence. As I’ve said before none of us were there on AF447 so we cannot know for sure what went on that night.

There are procedures already. I think most of them basically boil down to: Advance throttles to position known to provide sufficient thrust to maintain airspeed above stall for known altitude.

Unfortunately (IMO) those are the wrong procedures. I believe EASA and the FAA are getting wise to it now and may issue revised guidelines sometime in future.

If there was poor weather around then descending into it wouldn’t have helped.

Yes it would.

They wouldn’t have stalled. 😐

So what if you have to descend a long way to improve outer thermals. At least your alive to climb back up again.

First priority – give yourself time to diagnose and sort the situation. If your at 35 kft – then enter a 2 degree dive.

That’ll give you a few minutes of controlled flight as well as bring your probes into warmer air.

I’m surprised it isn’t standard procedure

There are procedures already. I think most of them basically boil down to: Advance throttles to position known to provide sufficient thrust to maintain airspeed above stall for known altitude.

Had these pilots done that, then calmly troubleshoot the alarms (like those on the QF A380 did) I doubt we’d even be talking about AF447.

If there was poor weather around then descending into it wouldn’t have helped. They may have thought climbing above the weather was the right action. At 35000ft you have to descend a long way to be clear of icing. Icing at 35000ft is pretty rare anyway.

RE: AF447. I’m still completely dumbfounded that the co-pilot’s first action when the airspeed indication was lost was to pull back on the side stick and keep it firmly there for just about the entire 4 minutes of the crisis. I believe that action alone doomed the aircraft.

+1

First priority – give yourself time to diagnose and sort the situation. If your at 35 kft – then enter a 2 degree dive.

That’ll give you a few minutes of controlled flight as well as bring your probes into warmer air.

I’m surprised it isn’t standard procedure – it is blindingly obvious. Station keeping is irrelevant when control of the aircraft is at stake. One is a far higher priority than the other.

RE: AF447. I’m still completely dumbfounded that the co-pilot’s first action when the airspeed indication was lost was to pull back on the side stick and keep it firmly there for just about the entire 4 minutes of the crisis. I believe that action alone doomed the aircraft.