Nukes and the UK's Role on the Global Stage

There was much to snicker at in US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s recent comments regarding the UK, Trident, and the Special Relationship™, but most perplexing was the claim that Trident helps the UK “play [an] outsized role on the global stage”.

It is difficult to defend this claim either theoretically or with reference to empirical (i.e. historical) evidence. Theoretically Trident functions as a deterrent against attack, with particular but not exclusive emphasis on deterring a nuclear attack that threatens the survival of the nation. By providing a guaranteed “second strike” capability, Trident ensures that no hostile power would undertake to annihilate or otherwise subjugate fair Albion, lest they be consumed by the fires of retribution. This survival function is a strictly negative one, with almost* no positive or enabling role. Akin to the distinction between negative and positive liberty, Trident protects against but provides little power to — and it is the latter that is relevant when it comes to “play[ing] an outsized role on the global stage”.

Nor does history look kindly upon the view that nuclear weapons help the UK play an outsized role on the global stage. Did Britain’s nuclear weapons deter the Soviet Union? Did they prevent the humiliation of the Suez Canal crisis? Did they deter Argentina from invading the Falklands or were they useful in recovering them? Did they deter Saddam Hussein from invading Kuwait or play a role in his 1991 or 2003 defeats? Did they allow the UK to retain Hong Kong? Have they been useful in Afghanistan, Libya, or the broader War on Terror? Indeed, is there any conceivable scenario in which Trident would play an active role either in allowing Britain to exercise power in the world, or serve itself as the positive manifestation of that power?

Against both the theoretical and historical failure of Britain’s nuclear weapons in helping it to play an outsized role on the global stage are the very real opportunity costs of those weapons and their supporting platforms. The many billions of pounds invested in nuclear weapons could have been (and could be) used to support more robust conventional forces that are useful forms of power to project abroad, from the Falkands to Iraq to Afghanistan. Far from allowing the UK to play an outsized role on the global stage, the expensive nuclear weapons complex actively inhibits the power that the UK is capable of exercising around the globe. The foregoing is not to render a verdict on the question of whether the UK should or should not retain nuclear weapons, but responds to a specific rationale claimed for them — that they allow Britain to play an outsized role on the global stage. They do not.

* There are significant caveats here with reference to the claimed or potential direct and indirect coercive powers of nuclear weapons, however these make for lengthy digressions that ultimately do not affect the conclusion. The UK’s nuclear deterrent has played no coercive role historically, and it is difficult to envision circumstances under which it would.