Operation Safed Sagar

FORCE Oct 06

My Story

The Chief of Air Staff on Operation Safed Sagar
By Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis (retd)

Operation Safed Sagar, whatever in the world would that be?,” is a possible reaction from some readers, including those that are regular followers of matters military. Operation Safed Sagar, was the code name that the Indian Air Force had given its role in Operation Vijay, the Kargil War of 1999. It is expected that most lay people will not be able to relate it to Kargil. That is how it ought to be. It was not meant for public usage but, as code words by their very nature are supposed to be, for reference within the service, and for maintaining confidentiality. Therefore, its purpose is better served by making it as incongruous as possible to the nature of the operation it represents. But later the name does serve to perpetuate the operation’s legacy. When the name was first suggested, there were mild protests from within the air force ‘operational planning circle’ that it would not catch people’s imagination! Not surprisingly, stronger voices from outside the air force, questioned the need of a separate code word, as Operation Vijay, by itself was considered adequate to cover all facets of the operation!!

It is more than seven years since Pakistan’s surreptitious designs on the icy heights of Kargil fell apart and the rabid hostility of those days, is giving way to saner peace-making processes of today. The Kargil Review Committee Report findings have been accepted by the government long ago and the report has made public, barring some deletions. Over the years there has also been fairly wide coverage by the media. Several books have been published. Air and Army Headquarters have undertaken studies/reviews, concluded their findings, drawn lessons and hopefully have taken actions to rectify shortcomings. Under these circumstances, would a re-look at IAF’s participation in the Kargil Operations generate public interest today?

Well, re-look is a common phenomenon and it is strange how re-looks get initiated. Whether a particular re-look generates public or professional interest is a moot point; its timing certainly has some influence in getting people to peruse more than its heading; possibly the author’s name draws some readership, particularly if his authenticity is assumed ab initio! The writer hopes in this instance it would be accepted, as he headed the IAF during Safed Sagar. Strictly speaking, it really is not a re-look, but a first ever public account by the man who held the ultimate responsibility for Safed Sagar.

When is the right time for the then Chief of the Air Force Staff to give his account of the air operations? Difficult to have a specific answer; opinions will vary from immediately after the cessation of operation to never. I have accepted an invitation to write an article now. I can offer reasons, which I think have some validity: earlier this year General Ved Malik, who was the Chief of the Army Staff during Operation Vijay, released his book, ‘Kargil: From Surprise to Victory’; this was followed by the publication of Shri Jaswant Singh’s (who played a crucial role as a member of the Cabinet Committee on Security during Kargil) book ‘A Call to Honour: In Service of Emergent India’; and now the book, ‘In the Line of Fire: A Memoir,’ by the ‘villain of Kargil’,General Pervez Musharraf. All the three authors held centre-stage to a varying degree of importance during ‘Kargil’ and cover in their books the events of the time from their individual perspectives. As the then chief of air staff, my perspective, I reckon, should also carry interest. However, my own story, ‘Up and Away into the Blue Yonder’, which will certainly cover ‘Safed Sagar’, is still in its nascent form to allow it to fall in quick enough succession to the litanies of these august persona. Yet,this is an opportune moment to get across the then air force chief’s point of view. By one of those amazing co-incidents, editor of FORCE, Pravin Sawhney, expressed his keeness to have an article on Safed Sagar for the release of his copy on the Air Force Day, 8th of October. I felt I should accept, and offer the treatise as a tribute to a valiant service on the dawn of its platinum year.

The Start: Army Needs Air Force’s Help

If memory serves me right, it was probably on 9th or 10th of May 1999 that the air force vice chief (VCAS), Air Marshal ‘Ben’ Brar, walked into my office for a cup of tea and a chat, just as we often did whenever we both happened to be in-station together, to talk-over issues informally. There was an uncharacteristic frown on his brow as he took a chair. “Sir,” he began without a preamble, “Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Intelligence) tells me the army may be in some sort of difficulties in the Kargil area.” On querying what sort of difficulties, he explained he was not sure but there was reportedly unusual artillery firing.

I enquired whether he had any inputs from AOC-in-C Western Air Command (WAC) and the vice chief of army staff (VCOAS), who was also holding the army ‘fort’ as his Chief was away on a foreign tour. I asked my vice to find out if either of them had anything to say on the subject. AOC-in-C WAC had later informed VCAS that Northern (Army) Command had not divulged anything to him and that his counter-part, GOC-in-C Northern Command was away in Pune; possibly to emphasise further that all seemed well. He had informed that both Northern (Army) Command and Western (Army) Command were greatly pre-occupied with preparation for the forthcoming tri-service, very complex, brain-storming exercise, ‘Brahma Astra’. If Northern Command was facing difficulties it was hardly expected that Army Headquarters and these two command headquarters would wish to conduct the exercise in May, and a request for postponement would have been made to Air and Naval Headquarters. VCOAS was non-committal to VCAS.

A day later, because disturbing inputs continued to be brought to his notice by his staff, VCAS again approached the VCOAS to enquire whether all was well; the Army Vice Chief indicated that the army could handle the situation. The VCAS, however, also informed me that the ACAS (Operations) had received an input from Air Officer Commanding HQ Jammu and Kashmir (AOC J&K is co-located with HQ Northern Command and functions as a forward element of HQ WAC for day-to-day interaction with HQ Northern Command. He releases air effort to meet Northern Command demands, from within AF units placed in J&K to the extent possible and within the authority he is delegated), that HQ Northern Command had requested fire-support from Mi-25/35 helicopter gunships and armed Mi-17 helicopters to evict a few ‘intruders’ who had stepped across the Line of Control in the Kargil sector. AOC J&K had responded that the terrain over which the support was required was beyond the operating envelop of the gunships; for getting fire-support in the existing operating conditions HQ Northern Command needed to approach HQ WAC.

In light of ACAS (Op)’s input, this time I called up AOC-in-C WAC personally and enquired why he had not briefed Air HQ on what was happening. His response was that GOC-in-C Northern Command had still not approached him for any help and WAC had nothing to brief; I was also informed that the GOC-in-C was in fact not available at HQ Northern Command. I directed Air Marshal Vinod Patney (the AOC-in-C) to get ‘hold’ of his counter-part and get to the bottom of what was afoot.

Meanwhile, Air Marshal Brar (VCAS) had again enquired from VCOAS whether they needed help; VCOAS had expressed army’s ability to manage, but was upset that AOC J&K had not acceded to HQ Northern Command’s fire-support demand. VCAS explained that AOC J&K did not have the authority to do so and suggested that both of them discuss the issue with me. VCOAS did not consider it necessary at that juncture, but divulged that Northern Command was putting into action Army Aviation’s Cheetahs mounted with a 7.66mm (?) gun. ‘Ben’ Brar was a ‘hands-on’ VCAS who liked to take action fastest. He suggested that we offer armed Mi-17 helicopters to Northern Command immediately.

Now there was no doubt in my mind that the situation was desperate; using an egg-shell-strong Cheetah in offensive action against certain hostile fire was like presenting a chicken for ‘sacrificial appeasement’! And my vice recommending use of Mi-17 in an environment where it would be under hostile observation and fire for several minutes before and after its attempt (I say attempt because I knew it would have been impossible to put in a successful helicopter attack without creating the necessary conditions for such an attack) at engagement. I directed VCAS to request VCOAS for a meeting with me and advised VCAS that to enable air force to provide fire-support we needed political clearance. Also, the manner and type of fire-support will be determined by the air force. I think at this stage Lt General Chandrashekhar (VCOAS) gave me a telephonic call. I communicated to him that I appreciated his predicament and was anxious that the air force does its bit soonest. But I was not successful in persuading him to accept the essentiality of government clearance. Lt Gen Chandrashekhar informed the army will continue on its own.

I may be permitted a diversion at this stage, to give inputs that formed a relevant back-drop to my professional thinking and decision-making ways as chief of air staff and the ultimate professional authority of that time, on how air power should be used. Note the accent is on ‘how’, quite separately and differently from ‘whether or not’; that indisputably, in India ‘s civil supremacy tradition, I am proud to say, lies with the head of the government, duly assisted by the cabinet committee on security.

No head of an organisation is a ‘know-all’ fountain-head of that institution. He can not possibly have deep enough knowledge of everything within the outfit. The number of disciplines to which he has been exposed to and the extent of that exposure have a profound impact on how well he is able to evaluate experts’ knowledge and advice, and over-ride it with conviction, when necessary. The most difficult challenge to a top man is to hold his ground when there is intense pressure from the top man, who is liked and respected, of a sister service, who is under even greater stress to get the former to do the opposite of what he thinks is right. A philosophical adage, I have tried to emulate through 60 years of ‘greying’ is, ‘treat yourself with your head; treat others with your heart.’ But at various strata of command, I have also realised that one’s head must not allow the heart to let one get carried away emotionally.

I am a product of the National Defence Academy , with a poor academic record and a passable field performance. But I consider that I have imbibed well the central theme of NDA training: developing a strong espirit de corps and a fierce sense of loyalty. I hate friends to think I have let them down. NDA also taught me to respect capability, irrespective of rank. Most importantly, NDA exposure allowed me many opportunities to realise that if one gets over the initial bone-chilling dread of danger, the wrath of over-powering wrongful authority or the fear of being wrong-footed, one can stand his ground in the severest of challenges. It is satisfying to claim that my 41 years of air force service did not require me to modify the Academy’s teachings.

After the humiliating fiasco of the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, a practice had been initiated to send fighter pilots as Forward Air Controllers to Ladakh, to be attached to HQs of the two brigades, 70 and 114 under 3 Division for a period of four weeks. In mid-1963, as a flying officer, I was attached to 70 Brigade, where the stated four weeks got extended to 12. Instead of working in the Brigade HQ and staying in its mess, a tradition of sorts had been set, by the young, ‘unhappy-to-be-away-from-the-cockpit’ pilots attached to 70 Brigade, of allowing themselves to be hijacked by 9 Dogras for both occupation and sustenance/shelter. Within days, the initial unhappiness gave way to the joy of camaraderie that develops in a field area. It was wonderful to be a part of the army routine and experience its challenges, even if to a limited degree. I knew I was ‘accepted’ as a part of the battalion, when CO 9 Dogras made me his assistant adjutant! Required to be a part of the brigade HQ, even as a ‘blue’ subaltern I realised, that I could not ignore the other battalion. I went on a seven day reconnaissance patrol with 3/4 Gurkhas to assess the negotiability of passes ranging in altitude from a base-line of 13,000ft to over 15,000ft. It was a point of honour to lead the sturdy Gurkhas, even though my flying boots failed to withstand the rigour of marching. When I visited the bunker defences, I was shocked to see their smallness. Later, when I got the odd opportunity to direct practice fighter attacks on them, it was frustrating that the pilots were spotting the ‘target’ just around their firing range. Yet, the crystal-clear azure-blue skies ensured that I never lost sight of the aircraft during its circular attack pattern. Throughout my fighter squadron service of more than 15 years, I loved participating in army-air force exercises, searching, spotting and attacking targets, whether it was in the plains of Punjab , the desert of Rajasthan or the high mountains of the North. And so it was with most other pilots. The tougher the assignment, the stronger the professional intent to succeed.

I was most fortunate to be assigned the post of AOC HQ J&K. Immediately after taking over I got myself qualified as a pilot on both the Mi-17 and the Chetak/Cheetah. I flew extensively and familiarised myself with the terrain in the areas of responsibility of both 15 and 16 Corps. Besides both the Corps HQ, I visited the HQ of every division. I visited many brigade and group HQs, landed at tens of helipads, did heli-drops at several locations. I was lucky to be able to visit many forward posts. As the 102 Siachen Brigade offered the toughest tasks to the air force, I may have been partial to it with my time and concern. But I did have a couple of opportunities to visit 121 Kargil Brigade. I had covered the length of the brigade area several times by air and once by road. In short, I can claim I had developed a personal ‘feel’ of the area. This was reinforced later during my tenure of 26 months at HQ WAC, first as Senior Air Staff Officer and then as AOC-in-C.

I am deeply conscious that all this sounds too much like brazen blowing of one’s own trumpet. But I consider it necessary to convince, that my credentials for giving definitive judgement in the use of air power in the Kargil area, may not be doubted.

To come back to the narrative of the emerging situation in Kargil, on the 14th of May, Lt Gen. Chandrashekhar called on me at Vayu Bhavan. He came to the point immediately, army wanted fire-support by Mi-17 helicopters. Lt Gen. Chandrashekhar observed that the army was capable of throwing back the intruders on its own but it would take time; air support will hasten the process. He felt that political go-ahead was necessary only in case fire-support was being provided by fighters; use of helicopters, even in a fire-support role, was an in-house services’ headquarters’ decision. I was anxious to put him at ease; I attempted to extend my empathy and expressed my keenness to give support; for the moment he was my counter-part of the army (albeit acting) and an NDA course-mate. To be honest, I did not think I had succeeded in generating any confidence in him. Yet, I managed to convey to him my firm decision that government authorisation was mandatory; we needed to approach the Raksha Mantri together; I will support his demand for aerial fire-support. But it needed to be understood that the air force reserved the prerogative to give the fire support in the manner it considered most suitable. I explained that with the conditions obtaining in the problem area, helicopters will be sitting ducks. The VCOAS left soon after, without I having a clear indication whether he intended to approach the government.

On the next day, 15th of May, I called the VCAS and his two senior assistants, ACAS(Ops) and ACAS(INT) for a situation-appraisal meeting. AOC-in-C also participated. The two ACsAS gave a resume of developments over the previous five days. Reportedly, around 150 intruders had occupied some high points along the LOC ridge-line in general area of Kargil sector. Director General Military Operations and ACAS(Ops)had conferred and reconnaissance missions by Jaguars and Canberras launched. Air defence fighters were kept on ground-alert at Srinagar and Avantipur. Radars in Srinagar Valley were on 24 hours-vigil. Mobile observation posts were deployed. An additional direction and control centre was established at Leh. Mi-17 helicopters based at Srinagar were tasked to carry out air-to-ground firing practices with guns and rockets at the high-altitude firing range. I was satisfied with the initiatives taken. I gave my assessment of the situation, followed by directions of what was required to be done immediately:

(a) I observed that the ground situation was grave. Army required air force help to evict the intruders. Army Headquarters was reluctant, possibly because it was embarrassed to have allowed the present situation to develop, to reveal the full gravity of the situation to MOD. Thus it was not amenable to Air Headquarters’ position to seek government approval for use of air power offensively.

(b) Consideration of the use helicopters in offensive role was denied as they would be vulnerable to the extreme. This was to be projected at all levels of army-air force confabulations. The helicopters would, however, continue to carry out high altitude firing practices.

(c) Fighters deployed in the Valley were to intensify their high altitude air-to-ground firing practices. Fighter pilots manning the squadrons located/deployed in the Valley are to be given terrain-familiarisation sorties in helicopters, preferably accompanied by army officers familiar with the area.

(d) AOC-in-C Western Air Command was to activate HQ AOC J&K and all units in the Valley as per plans stipulated in HQ WAC Operational Instructions.

(e) AOC-in-C WAC to formulate contingency plans.

16th of May was a Sunday. Soon after my game of golf, my Air Assistant informed that the VCOAS desired a meeting with me. I directed the AA to organise the meeting in my office and request the VCAS and AOC-in-C WAC to be in attendance. After we had assembled in my office, had given VCOAS a brief resume of the situation obtaining in Kargil, Lt Gen Chandrashekhar reiterated his request for offensive air support by Mi 17 helicopters. Air Marshal Patney recommended I call a Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting immediately; Chandrashekhar was amenable to the suggestion. Without further ado, I telephoned Admiral Sushil Kumar, the Chief of Naval Staff, requesting an immediate COSC meeting; in the absence of Chairman COSC, Gen Malik, Adm Kumar would have to chair the meeting. Adm Kumar, understandably, was mildly irritated that an impromptu meeting was being called on a Sunday. When I explained the situation, a time was set to meet in the Army Operations Room (AOR).

At the AOR, after a situation report, VCOAS expounded on the need for fire-support by helicopters. I tabled my reasons for considering authorisation by government a pre-requisite for releasing offensive air support: Unlike the practice of the army routinely resorting to firing when a situation demanded it, air force fire power was not being used operationally in peace conditions; aerial action had far greater ‘visibility’; response of the adversary to own air attacks was indeterminate, undoubtedly at this stage; there was a high possibility of the adversary raising the ante and we had to be prepared for it.(The reader might be interested to know that the rocket fire-power of the Mi-17 can be three times more than can be brought to bear by the MiG-21). The gathering generally expressed that it did not realise/consider the consequences of air action as outlined by me. Acting Chairman COSC enquired whether the army could continue on its own. As the given answer was in the affirmative, he ruled we maintain status quo for the present.

On 17th of May, without a fore-intimation of what was in offing by Army Headquarters or Chiefs of Staff Committee secretariat, a meeting was called at AOR,which, along with CNS, CAS and acting COAS, was attended by the raksha mantri, Shri George Fernandes and the principal secretary to the Prime Minister, Shri Brajesh Mishra; secretaries defence, home and external affairs were also present. The army briefed, in greater detail than before, on the situation obtaining across the Kargil sector. In a briefing which I gave personally, I covered the following aspects:

(a) If air power were used offensively, the escalation could be very rapid to any level and anywhere. IAF needed to be prepared for every contingency.
(b) In the area under consideration and the air operating conditions obtaining there, the accuracy of air attacks would be comparable to that of the artillery.
(c) There was possibility of own aircraft crossing the Line of Control during their attacks.
(d) There was possibility of fratricide if own troops were in close vicinity of targets.
(e) Helicopter survivability in an offence role would be very low.
(f) IAF pilots have commenced air-to-ground firing practices at high altitude.

Shri Mishra said status quo be maintained. On 18th of May, the VCOAS and the DGMO briefed the Prime Minister, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee and members of the Cabinet Committee on Security. Present were the home minister, Shri L.K. Advani, the raksha mantri, Shri George Fernandes, the external affairs minister, Shri Jaswant Singh and principal secretary to the Prime Minister, Shri Brajesh Mishra. In attendance were CNS, CAS, directors of Research & Analysis Wing and Intelligence Bureau. It was an exhaustive briefing. The VCOAS summed-up that the army was capable of bringing the situation under control, but required time. He assessed that offensive air support by helicopters will hasten the process of eliminating/pushing back the intruders.

I (CAS) covered all the implications, as stated hitherto, and added the following:

(a) The IAF must have the freedom to use fighters.
(b) Escalation, inclusive of pre-emptive hostile strikes, could take place suddenly anywhere across the Indo-Pak border/Line of Control.
(c) The IAF needed to take precautionary measures to enable appropriate response to any contingency.
(d) The IAF sought 24 hours to implement (c); if inescapable the time factor could be cut down by half.

The EAM desired to know what the army’s assessment in respect of the enemy’s intentions was. A satisfactory answer did not emerge. It was apparent the army had not applied its mind to this aspect; they were engaged in getting out the intruders without having quite established the nature of the intrusions or the identity of intruders. I felt strong sympathy for the Army Headquarters staff. Having been caught off guard in the field, they were unable to make up for their initial lapse, due to inadequate intelligence and possibly indifferent involvement from the command headquarters.

The EAM went on to observe that bringing in the air force would internationalise the issue; it would be preferable not to let that happen. He was scheduled to leave for international visits, these he felt should not be disturbed. While he was away, Army Headquarters could get on with the job of establishing enemy’s intent. His recommendation: do not involve the Air Force, yet. PS to PM made the final recommendations:

(a) For the present, air power not to be used.
(b) Hot pursuit by ground forces to be permitted in the area of present operation, no-where else in J&K.

[b]The Prime Minister nodded his approval.[/b]

Earlier to the CCS meeting, on the same day, a contingency planning meeting had been held in my office with operations and maintenance staff of Air HQ and WAC. The state of IAF’s armament holdings, self-protection devices was reviewed. Directions had been given for actions required to be taken to improve the modification states of aircraft for carriage of armament, EW and specialised equipment. Operational staff was required to tailor operating procedures specifically for the conditions under which we would have to support the army; training had to be intensified and suitably modified to enable pilots to operate at high altitudes, in restricted areas and engage ground targets much smaller than they were normally assigned. Maintenance staff was directed to accelerate maintenance activity to substantially improve availability of aircraft, radars, equipment and spares.

The most debated issue was in respect of strategy and tactics. The air force has long contended that use of air power in direct support of ground battle is its most inefficient utilisation; it should be used sparingly in this fashion, unless the ground troops are under intense pressure and the integral artillery fire power is limited, ineffective or not in position. Spot targets obtaining within the ground battle-field are small, not easily sighted and vulnerability of aircraft is high. Air power has a more devastating effect when applied against logistics dumps and their lines of supply to forward posts/areas. In this case, it was pointed out that if there were restrictions on not being allowed to cross the LoC, toss/stand-off bombing was possible. My directions were: be ready to operate under the worst conditions, our attempt would be to get freedom of action to the extent possible. The final word was to prepare for a bigger conflagration.

Over the next few days, the air force, besides continuing with logistical support to the army in the form of air/heli-lifting troops and supplies, carried out photo-reconnaissance over operational-area, undertook electronic reconnaissance missions to establish the deployment of Pakistan ‘s ground radars in the POK and else-where. The air force was also on the look-out for unusual air activity. By now we had realised that, if and when the air force was given the go-ahead, our bombing techniques, the bombs, fuses and the aiming computers/sights would all require to be adapted for the ultra-high altitude air-to-ground work. Both operations and maintenance staff had put on their ‘thinking-caps’ and rolled up their sleeves for finding ingenious solutions, and fast, very fast! Air Forces’ think tanks at ‘Tactics and Combat Development and Training Establishment’ and ‘Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment’ were tasked for over-coming specific problems.

On May 21, a Canberra on a photo-mission was hit by an air-to-ground infra-red homing missile, later identified as a ‘Stinger’. The pilot did a commendable job by recovering a crippled aircraft. Realising that Canberra reconnaissance missions were vulnerable to ‘shoulder-fired’ AGMs, due to their heights of operation being well within the kill-envelop of these missiles, we discontinued them. Later, we brought in the MiG 25 strategic photo- reconnaissance aircraft to do the job of the Canberra. It was not a question of just bringing in a different aircraft. Its operating parameters and photo equipment had to be modified to enable it to do what was considered not possible, in fact dangerous, by the experts on the aircraft. The credit goes to Air Marshal ‘Jimmy’ Bhatia, then AOC-in-C Central Air Command, for encouraging the unit and ‘leading the way’ by flying in the aircraft during trials.

I had to proceed to the Naval Academy to attend the valedictory function and review the passing-out-parade on May 21-22. As the COAS, Gen Ved Malik, had returned from his foreign tour just the day before, I could not meet him before the 23rd.

The manner in which developments had taken place, from the time ‘Ben’ Brar gave me information of the army being in difficulty, troubled me. There had been total lack of army-air force joint staff work. When the army found itself in difficulties, information/intelligence had not been communicated by Army HQ, in any systematic manner to Air HQ. There had been no call for a joint briefing, leave alone joint planning, both at the service and command headquarters; just repeated requests for armed helicopter support. Air HQ seemed to have more information than WAC. How were the helicopters expected to be used? What was the threat? What were the objectives? There are a number of issues that have to be considered by the army and air force, so that both sides appreciate the strengths/limitations of each other. Proper joint staff-work brings them out, allowing the decision-makers to give well-considered directions. There had been no joint deliberations at any level. As Ved Malik was not in Delhi , I put down my concerns in a letter to him on probably May 19. After explaining what caused me to write the letter, I made the following observations:

(a) Use of combat air power, inclusive that by helicopters is an escalation in the existing operations.

(b) Before/after political clearance, concerned army/air force command HQs to be directed to present joint plan. The same to be done by Joint Planning Committee at service HQs level. Both plans to be presented to COSC.

(c) The air force to have freedom in application of air power.

(d) To avoid ‘being surprised’, COSC to be briefed on J&K situation regularly.

On May 23 afternoon Ved Malik requested Sushil Kumar and myself to join him in his office. Ved was very cordial and warm through the meeting. I was happy that he did not look perturbed, particularly as he had reason enough to be, given the developments in his absence. His main thrust was that we needed to put up a united front to the CCS. Sushil and I had no difficulty in endorsing that. Ved said air force had to join in as the army was in a difficult position. I told him that there was no doubt of that and the air force was very keen to join in, my only reservation was in respect of the use of helicopters, they would be too vulnerable. Ved appeared to get agitated on my reluctance to use helicopters. I did not press the issue at that moment, it could wait till later.

35. On 24 May,before proceeding for a ccs meeting,the three chiefs got together in the office of the CNS. I picked up the discussion about the use of helicopters with Ved Malik once again. I explained to him that in the Ladakh region,because of the pollution-free atomosphere the visibility is enormously better than what it is west of Zozi La. As the helicopters would have to approach enemy locations on the LOC ridge-line from the Kargil Valley,they would not be able to mask their approach and will be visibly picked-up by the enemy well before the heptrs come into firing range. The
effective range of the STINGER missiles is much greater than that of the rockets being fired by the helicopter. Ved was in no mood for any explainations. He shot back a question : did I think that in his 40 years of service he had not learnt about helicopter operations? Hoping to pacify him I said even I do not think that I know all about heptr flying. The effect was just the opposite of what I was hoping. Saying,”If thats the way you want it,I will go it alone”,and he stormed out of CNS’ office. I caught up with him in the corridor and told him to cool off,he would get his helicopters. Wanting to save Army-Air Force relations,I had given in against my better judgement!

36. At the CCS meeting,Ved Malik explained at length the difficulty of the
situation and how essential it was for the Air Force to step in without
delay. I stated as matter-of-fact as possible,the Air Force was ready. We
needed 24 hours to get going;we could cut down to 12 hours the time for
first attack. The Prime Minister said we could meet again the next morning.

37. Back at AirHQ,VCAS,ACsAS(Ops&Int) were briefed that the Army was on
shaky grounds and needed Air Force support without further delay. We needed
to ensure we will be ready to move in within twelve hours.

38. Early on 25 May,the CCS convened again. The preliminaries were much
shorter this time. The COAS was emphatic on getting Air Force support. I
told the Prime Minister the Army had to have Air Force support. We could
commence operations within 12 hours,6 if inescapable. All eyes were on the
Prime Minister. In his characteristically laconic manner,he said,”Theek
hai,kal subah se shuru karo.” I asked for permission to cross the LOC while
attacking targets on our side of the LOC. Suddenly the PM straightened in
his chair and said firmly,”Please don’t cross the LOC.No.No crossing the
LOC.” “Sir!”was all that was required of me. The PM and others stepped out
of the conference room silently,in a pensive mood.

“OPERATION SAFED SAGAR” IS LAUNCHED!

39. On return to my office I shot out the following directions:-

(a) IAF will commence offensive air action after first light the next
morning.

(b) Air Defence in the area of WAC to activated as per HQ WAC
Operational Instructions.

(c) HQ WAC to be given freedom of action,with the following proviso:-

(i) Aircraft not to cross LOC during attack patterns.
(ii) Air Defence aircraft escorting strike ac or ‘free-patroling’ parallel to LOC,if engaged in aerial combat with en ac, may cross LOC in ‘hot’ pursuit.(At the CCS meeting I had not specifically got this contingency authorised,it was not the right moment to do so. But I considered the’liberty’an essential element for the success of the aerial air defence measures. In view of the PM’s earlier ‘nod’ to the ground forces’ hot pursuit’,my conscience was not unduly burdened.
(iii) No sudden or mass movement of ac.
(iv)To the extent possible all fighters and helicopters employed in combat role to be fitted with infra-red self-protection chaff-dispensers.
(v) Chaff-dispensing operating procedures to be re-briefed to all aircrew.
(vi) It is to be assumed that all enemy positions have infra-red air-to-ground shoulder-fired missiles.
(d) Air HQ Operational Order for “Operational Safed Sagar be issued under my signature.

40. It would be close to thirty years since the IAF had fired a shot in anger. ” Real Combat”!(too limited a skirmish to call it a war), as I said the words to myself, caused goose pimples to rise on my fore-arms. Hey,if this can happen to a grand-father,what would be the effect on young pilots,who still wondered whether the ‘wings’that they wore on their uniform with an outward swagger,really belonged to them? Majority experience an adrenalin-pumping euphoria,some brace themselves with a professional ‘lets get-on-with-the-job’ attitude,some get sombre,a few might feel numbing fear. Both the extreme reactions need watching and counseling. There was a sudden,powerful urge to be the guys,no,’my boys’.But would it be wise? Confidentiality was essential for what was to happen on the morrow. Go,I had to,it would be good for the field to know their chief was with them. I summoned my Air Assistant,Air Commodore Ajit Bhavnani. He was to get an An 32 to carry a ‘special’load to Srinagar immediately. The nature of ‘load’ would be disclosed later;he could come to the ‘Air House’ when the aircraft was positioned at Palam.

41. Later,when Ajit Bhavnani came to the ‘Air House’,his jaw dropped to see me beaming broadly in my blue flying overalls,with wing commanders’ tapes on my shoulders. “Lets go”,I said to him. My wife,Molina,who had long taken in her stride my sudden ‘comings and goings’,was probably disappointed that I had not told her to pack a carry-on bag and come along,had not noticed anything unusual. The driver did not blink an eye-lid,he was looking straight ahead. He was possibly used to my some-time weird ways. His face was dead-pan when I told him I would be taking the stand-by ‘Ambassador’,and not the trade-mark ‘Tata Estate’ of the CAS. No flag,no plates. None of my cars were embelished with a red roof-top light. Ajit was told at the last second not to come with me. Staff officer was absent.

42. Normally the CAS boards his aircraft at the ‘VIP’ Squadron dispersal and is received by AOC Air Force Station,Palam. The captain of an An 32 would be waiting at the ramp. My instructions were to have engines’ start-up commence as I approached the aircraft. As I strapped in to the captain’s seat,the pilot would brief me,while the co-pilot and engineer continued with the start-up.The navigator managed the radio. I would be taxying out within five minutes. As a prior take-off block was normaly obtained,five minutes later we would be airborne. When a take-off time had not been ‘blocked’,the navigator would try to get priority for CAS,reffered euphemisicaly as ‘IAF VIP’.

43. Well, this time an An 32 for the ‘special load’ would be waiting some-where on Palam’s large transit-aircraft parking apron. Fortunately,there was only one An 32 aircraft;no need for a try-to-hit-the-right-aircraft-first-time anxiety. The driver was told to stop at the regulation point. I walked alone the distance to the aircraft. The captain was slouchingly resting against the aircraft. He eyed me casually as I walked up. As I caught his eye,recognition suddenly dawned upon him and he sprang to attention,fumbling with his cap. I sign-indicated to him to relax,but it was not easy for him. As I came within normal talking distance,with a broad and easy smile I told him to relax. Putting my arm casually around his shoulders,as friends do,I told him to act normal and continue at the normal pace,following normal procedures meticulously. He was not one of the several pilots who had flown with me often. But I expected that he was aware his Chief,as a rule,liked to have his hands on the controls. I asked him if he would mind if I flew,I was a qualified An 32 first pilot. He was hugely relieved,he must have been wondering in which bucket-seat was he going to place the chief. I requested the pilot to brief me on the flight profile,procedures and emergencies. I wanted the captain of the aircraft to be at ease with the full confidence that he was in command of the aircraft. My only direction to him at this stage was to ensure that nobody got an inkling that I was on board.

44. As we approached Srinagar ,I told the captain to inform the air traffic Controller.

It was two years ago, some time in June 2004 that the ‘blame-game’ was being attempted to be raked up by the media. General Ved Malik (he and I respectively headed the IA and the IAF during Kargil), possibly in the wake of some unsavoury quotes ostensibly directed towards him, felt constrained to clarify his position. While doing so, General Malik made remarks that made it appear to me that, on his return from a foreign tour in May 1999, he had not been briefed fully and correctly by his staff (inadvertently or otherwise I am unable to say) in respect of occurrence of events and position taken by the air force in his absence; also, his recall of what transpired when the three chiefs met on 20 May 1999 did not match my own perception of the meeting. The present RM was credited with putting to rest (at least temporarily) a media-sought political controversy on the NDA government’s alleged feet-dragging on clearance for use of air power at the army’s behest. Apparently, the RM anticipated a possible rejoinder from me to General Malik’s remarks, for I received calls from the then air force and army chiefs, Air Chief Marshal S. Krishnaswamy and General Nirmal Vij that the RM and they would appreciate it if I with-held any response that I may be contemplating, as the MOD and Army and Air Headquarters were fully aware of the realities and there was no need to offer clarifications. I accepted the requests in good faith. I might add that prior to these requests I had not decided upon making any comments.

Around the same time, at a chance-meeting with General Malik (at a wedding reception), I had tried to get across to him that some of his public observations were giving an erroneous slant to my stance, and by implication to the air force’s position, prior to the government go-ahead for use of air power in Kargil and I suggested that we talk it over some time. While he did show surprise at what I had to say, he was enthusiastic to the idea of a get-together. Neither did a chance occasion fall upon us again, nor did either of us do anything to catalyse a ‘bon homie’. Both of us have settled in different cities, travel and do our own things, so despite being good friends and the wives sharing unusual rapport, the ‘indiscipline’ (for me at least) of retirement gets one to oft-times let things happen, rather than make them happen. I am going to some length to emphasise the point that, as a rule, chiefs of services cultivate friendship and an amicable working relationship to promote jointmanship and set the tone for their subordinates to emulate. And they want to continue in the same refrain even after retirement. I strongly believe that General Malik, Admiral Sushil Kumar (heading the navy at that time) and I shared that sentiment and strived to achieve it in spirit and action, and would like to continue to maintain that image. That is not say that professionally we did not have different perceptions and priorities and that we did not put them across as strongly as they needed to be; but we tried to do so without rancour, granted here we did not always succeed! Perhaps there was some failure too in keeping few issues out of the public domain. Once that happens it is difficult to avoid counter and counter-counter reactions. So where should it end? A service chief’s responsibility to his service has to be absolute, even after retirement, unless, and there is only one unless, it trespasses on national interests. So if service interest is seen as being jeopordised, a chief/former chief has to speak to rectify it. In all cases truth must prevail.

In light of the aforesaid, there is little doubt that the air force’s ‘top-view’ on what transpired before, during and after ‘Operation Vijay’ and by corollary, ‘Operation Safed Sagar’ has to be put on paper. To an extent one can claim it has already been done through ‘The Kargil Review Committee Report’. But two niggling issues are giving cause to belief that the report’s findings are not articulated strongly enough to dispel doubts lurking in people’s minds:

(a) First, the Committee’s report merely acknowledges that there was no ‘refusal’ from the air force to participate in the operation, and that it sought political go-ahead before doing so; the report had to be more forthright. The air force’s correctness ought to have been highlighted, particularly in the back-drop of the pressure brought on it. Also, the report’s findings should have commented on whether there was any mala fide intent on anyone’s part in not wanting to seek government clearance for use of air power. Further, the full report is not yet public; parts of it have been deleted by government security without declaration of when they would be released for public information.

(b) Second, even after the report went public, comments improperly adversorial to the air force have continued. These need to be addressed.