PLA (All Forces) Missiles

Hey, flattery will get you everywhere 😀

And with that, since we’ve hit 20 pages, this thread will be closed down. Which of course does not in any way imply that a new iteration should not be started, preferably one loaded with photos!

Aha, you’ve got to give me points for sidestepping the pitfall that loomed at my feet. :diablo:

Had you persisted, I was going to post the link to that file :diablo:

it appeared like you were discounting them entirely from any discussion of air warfare over the strait.

That certainly wasn’t what I had in mind. I know the extent of SAM positions along China’s coast opposite Taiwan, in no small part due to your .kmz file. Thanks for that effort, by the way. (Just using this an an opportunity to show some appreciation)

Land based SAM coverage won’t necessarily cover an amphibious assault, I do agree there. My main point initially was that there are numerous long-range SAM systems and it appeared like you were discounting them entirely from any discussion of air warfare over the strait. However, the naval SAM complement is increasing rapidly. There are already DDGs fitted with HHQ-9s, and others fitted with S-300FMs (can’t recall the ship classes off the top of my head). What that land-based SAM coverage does provide is cover for massing forces and protection to a degree from aerial attack while crossing the strait. Couple that with PLAAF and PLANAF fighter coverage and air cover for any assault on Formosa should be pretty robust. There is also the KJ-2000 AWACS fleet to provide battle management in concert with the land-based 64N6 radar systems. None of this, however, is relevant, until China possesses an amphibious landing capability of sufficient size to actually take this on.

Based on the type of target, a long-range system like the S-300PMU-1 should be effective around 80% of the maximum engagement range. Get to the 80% line and you won’t have enough time to turn around and exit the engagement zone before you get whacked.

First, coverage isn’t cylindrical – remember the general shape of missile engagement zones being in the general shape of a diamond. Second, even venturing into the NEZ (assuming 80% of range is the NEZ) doesn’t necessarily mean the aircraft is definitely ‘whacked’. EW does help.

Anyway, as a result of the above my point holds – land based SAM coverage doesn’t help in providing air cover in an amphibious assault. Which in turn allows fighters and attack helis to operate. Especially attack helis, which can stay concealed behind land terrain while picking off landing forces and directing rocket arty fires.

Based on the type of target, a long-range system like the S-300PMU-1 should be effective around 80% of the maximum engagement range. Get to the 80% line and you won’t have enough time to turn around and exit the engagement zone before you get whacked.

Are you kidding me? There are numerous S-300PMU-1/2 sites along the strait!

Yes, but notice I said ‘practical SAM coverage’. Simply taking the max range of the missiles and drawing a circle around that point only shows theoretical max coverage, but surely you know that SAM engagement zones don’t look anywhere like that.

It’s called the 64N6 battle management radar used to control S-300P batteries.

I was referring to sea based SAM coverage, which would usually be more effective due to closer proximity to the landing zone. However, as I pointed out, even that is degraded by clutter from land and blind engagement zones, something that only a JLENS or E-2D like system can fully resolve.

Sorry, practical SAM coverage from mainland doesn’t extend to Taiwan’s shores. And shipborne SAM coverage is still pathetic with only 2 052Cs capable of providing area air defense.

Are you kidding me? There are numerous S-300PMU-1/2 sites along the strait!

Their capability to provide SAM coverage over land will also be degraded unless they have a system like the E-2D & SM-6 combination.

It’s called the 64N6 battle management radar used to control S-300P batteries.

Poor ignorant fool. Never heard of “Operations Research” eh?

There ain’t nothing like paper wars eh? Operations research is a poor mans attempt to consider some of the factors of engagement and ruling out all others. This is not even the case here.

LOL. You self-contradictory fool. First you insist that BMs can be used against airfields, then you insist that PLAAF has no jurisdication over them and is used as long range artillery.

And using them as long range artillery only reinforces the conclusion that ballistic missiles cannot realistically be used against airfields.

If you can’t understand English then just say so. There’s no need for you to be a prune.
Read my reply again.

Again, brilliant display of your ignorance. Why do you think PAC-3s were purchased if not for use against ballistic missiles?

For the kick back and the brilliant explanation to the people that PAC-3 are needed to protect them against missiles. LOL

Considering that theres willfully inadequate amount of pac-3 to make a difference.

No, but the PLA isn’t as stupid as you. They understand the need for air and sea superiority, even if only for the duration of the assault. Air superiority is a basic requirement for amphibious operations because the enemy must be suppressed during the transit and landing phase.

PLAAF and PLAN is well up for the job. BTW only local air superiority(duration of the assault) is needed for PLA to attempt an attack. Missiles are just extra.

Sorry, practical SAM coverage from mainland doesn’t extend to Taiwan’s shores. And shipborne SAM coverage is still pathetic with only 2 052Cs capable of providing area air defense. Their capability to provide SAM coverage over land will also be degraded unless they have a system like the E-2D & SM-6 combination.

S-300 coverage piratically covers the whole straight. You can forget about attacking during the transit stage and with the advent of AAAV amphib PLA can launch an assault well beyond visual range of the shore battery.

LOL. Where did I say anything about ‘unlimited amount of fighters scrambled’? Please don’t assume others are as ignorant as you. I remember some poor idiot (hmm, who might that be?) ticked off by a canadian LCol. for thinking exactly that. Now that same idiot is trying to use the same lines as the LCol. LOL. Let’s have a quick look shall we?

http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/political-discussions/5041-us-encircling-china-8.html

Too bad you don’t go back anymore. Too hot to handle eh?

I wasn’t considering the losses or C&C but rather just suggesting the concept of saturating the airspace as an obscuration before the main assult.
I was being polite and not wanting to argue with a mod.
An act to which you have no clue.

The whole assertion that you can use an equation to determine an out come of an engagement is absurd simply because there is so many factors you can not account for.

Poor ignorant fool. Never heard of “Operations Research” eh?

ALL assumptions.

Look If it is a coordinated attack of BM and a follow up with fighter bombers then ROCA has little time to prepare for emergency scramble. BTW this is not how the missiles are envisioned to be used. You don’t even understand the basic principle that PLAAF don’t own the missiles and have no jurisdiction to call on them. The missiles are long range artillery to PLA and it will be used to soften landing zones or be used as coordinated attacks pre PLA push inland.

LOL. You self-contradictory fool. First you insist that BMs can be used against airfields, then you insist that PLAAF has no jurisdication over them and is used as long range artillery.

And using them as long range artillery only reinforces the conclusion that ballistic missiles cannot realistically be used against airfields.

And no every military specialist agree with me that no missile will be wasted by ROCA to engage BM with dubious outcome. Missiles would be saved for engaging PLAAF fighters.

Again, brilliant display of your ignorance. Why do you think PAC-3s were purchased if not for use against ballistic missiles?

And you are a military planner in the PLA?

No, but the PLA isn’t as stupid as you. They understand the need for air and sea superiority, even if only for the duration of the assault. Air superiority is a basic requirement for amphibious operations because the enemy must be suppressed during the transit and landing phase.

PLA has its own air cover in the forms of SAM.

Sorry, practical SAM coverage from mainland doesn’t extend to Taiwan’s shores. And shipborne SAM coverage is still pathetic with only 2 052Cs capable of providing area air defense. Their capability to provide SAM coverage over land will also be degraded unless they have a system like the E-2D & SM-6 combination.

BTW in any aerial engagement in Taiwan will be dictated by the available airspace for air combat. Newbies like you always assume there can be unlimited amount of fighters scrambled but rather in reality only 40 fighters can safely engage each other in an area of 100km2

LOL. Where did I say anything about ‘unlimited amount of fighters scrambled’? Please don’t assume others are as ignorant as you. I remember some poor idiot (hmm, who might that be?) ticked off by a canadian LCol. for thinking exactly that. Now that same idiot is trying to use the same lines as the LCol. LOL. Let’s have a quick look shall we?

http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/political-discussions/5041-us-encircling-china-8.html

Too bad you don’t go back anymore. Too hot to handle eh?

Oh, by the way. Number of fighters which can be fielded in the air by each side is determined by sortie regeneration rate, battle management capability (which includes IFF and airspace deconfliction capability) etc. Not strictly by available airspace. On this count the Taiwanese are better off in terms of training and equipment.

That was a response to claims by CIBs that Air Superiority could be achieved through SRBM attacks on airbases.

Very good idiots arguing with idiots. What a waste of time.

And we’re to take your word for it?

The whole assertion that you can use an equation to determine an out come of an engagement is absurd simply because there is so many factors you can not account for.

How can air operations be suppressed if what must be taken out to deny operations on the Taiwan side isn’t taken out? If suppression is to be used in a manner similar to that of artillery fire, which implies small quantities of missiles fired with each time over a long period of time, then that is equally pointless since Taiwan’s anti-ballistic missiles can intercept the incoming missiles and give a window of opportunity for aircraft to scramble.

ALL assumptions.

Look If it is a coordinated attack of BM and a follow up with fighter bombers then ROCA has little time to prepare for emergency scramble. BTW this is not how the missiles are envisioned to be used. You don’t even understand the basic principle that PLAAF don’t own the missiles and have no jurisdiction to call on them. The missiles are long range artillery to PLA and it will be used to soften landing zones or be used as coordinated attacks pre PLA push inland.

And no every military specialist agree with me that no missile will be wasted by ROCA to engage BM with dubious outcome. Missiles would be saved for engaging PLAAF fighters.

So you think China can conduct a successful amphibious invasion without aerial superiority? LOL. I applaud your stupidity. Too bad the PLA doesn’t agree with you.

And you are a military planner in the PLA?

No where have I ever read in any source which states PLA require full air superiority in order to strike. No only does this counter historic examples but also goes against quintessential PLA doctrine of achieving the political objective first whatever the cost.

Yes PLA will need to advance without air superiority but it does not mean PLA will be a push over to take out. PLA has its own air cover in the forms of SAM.

BTW in any aerial engagement in Taiwan will be dictated by the available airspace for air combat. Newbies like you always assume there can be unlimited amount of fighters scrambled but rather in reality only 40 fighters can safely engage each other in an area of 100km2

Which really means all 20 ROCAF fighters will need to engage the 20 PLAAF. Virtually none will be spared for bombing runs.

What makes you think there would even be a “second wave” of PRC troops left considering any amphibious lift is probably going to be part of that 70%? Of course, that’s assuming what he says can be relied on. You people only cherry pick what you want to believe from the Taiwan side.

Not cherry pick but a direct quote from the defense minister.
Yeah ignoring him is gonna help your argument… LOL

So what does any calculation prove when you can just change the numbers at will to try and produce the outcome you want?

Except that the figure of 0.8 came from an assessment of similar missiles to the Prithvi, so that figure wasn’t pulled out of nowhere. Even if a 95 % reliability is used, as can be seen the required number of missiles are way beyond what China has. You can try to calculate for 100% reliability. The ultimate conclusion still holds.

Firstly, of all those airfields, only a few are major ones and the majority of Taiwan’s fighters are concerntrated in a few fields, largely in the mountain shelter.

Uh, which part of ‘Those are the fighter bases’ do you not comprehend? And this study doesn’t even include emergency airstrips and taxiways which can be used for takeoffs/landings.

Secondly, since when was this been an all or nothing issue? Taking out one field could easily deprive the ROCAF of nearly 10% of its fighting force, assuming the fighters are distributed evenly, which they are not. Taking out a major field can significantly change the dynamics and outcome of any air battle.

The point being disproven is that SRBMs can by themselves achieve aerial superiority on their own. Which is what many like to believe since they know that the PLA cannot conduct an amphibious landing without aerial superiority, and the PLAAF cannot as yet do that.

So China can only take out one runway at a time? Are you even thinking your responses through before posting them?

Do you have anything to prove that China can take out more than 1 runway at a time using SRBMs? With only around 250 missiles (max) able to be launched per wave, that is pretty much the max of what the PLA can do.

So do you know what kind of submunitions are likely to be used and their distribution radius, yeild and number? The key in such analysis is the actual P values, not the simplistic equation you seem to love so much. And the P values from the Prithvi study are useless when used to try and estimate DF15 and 11s.

Well, the P values reach a maximum of 1, since you don’t seem to know that. And as proven above, even giving a value of 1 still results in a value far larger than what China has at the moment.

And the Pritvi has a 1000kg payload, or twice the payload of the DF-15 and DF-11. Which means that 1000+ figure for DF-15s is already an understatement. Submunitions cannot be much smaller than that used by the Prithvi in an anti-runway role. In fact, the submunitions would have to be specialised for anti-runway operations, otherwise they’d only do superficial damage which would only require at most a clearance of debris and steel matting place over the runway for flight ops to resume.

Other glaring inconsistencies include omissions of important weapons such as the DF21.

Trying to add in DF-21s with an inventory of around 80 max and a CEP of 300 to 400m? ROFLOL. You’re getting desperate aren’t you? Put a nuclear warhead in that then it’ll be worth something. As a conventional attack weapon it’s useless with such (in)accuracy.

Have you actually seen what a proper mathematical or statistical equations looks like? Defending those equations like they are some inspired piece of maths only proves to demonstrate your own lack of knowledge and common sense.

Yes. Have you? Apparently you didn’t look at the Prithvi study and the Polya-Williams Approximation. Too scared to look at them because they’d confirm your fears? :rolleyes: You have only been trying to cast doubt but rather evidently your words are those of a desperate man trying to deny what reality has presented to him.

And using the Indian study’s P values to approcimate Chinese missiles is going to be grossly unreliable, just like using the accuracy of AK47s to guess the scatter pattern of M16s are inaccurate to the degree of pointlessness.

Clear evidence you were too afraid to see the document. The Prithvi study calculated for a range of CEP values. The 1000+ figure was taken using the same CEP value as that of the DF-15.

Only those with an agenda would let themselves be blinded so easly by such flimsy attempts of disinformation. Or the truely stupid I guess.

The truly stupid is the one who can only argue without substance. You cant even give a good reason why those figures are wrong. Poor you. Try harder next time.

How about this. If you think the PLA can deny Taiwan aerial superiority by using SRBMs to take out runways, how about you show some figures to support your assertion? You probably won’t, since you know too well the answer isn’t what you’d like.

Does it matter when you can vary the figure to what you believe it to be and calculate for yourself the final result? Even at 0.95 reliability of Chinese missiles, 2227 DF-15 missiles are required. Doesn’t change the end result one bit – China still has far less missiles than it needs.

So what does any calculation prove when you can just change the numbers at will to try and produce the outcome you want? :rolleyes:

You obviously also missed the point about the need for reliable P values to make the calculations have any meaning whatsoever.

Lol, Taiwan has at least 23 Airports. Those 12 are precisely those used by fighters. Meaning that they all have to be suppressed to expect loss of ROC fighter coverage.

Firstly, of all those airfields, only a few are major ones and the majority of Taiwan’s fighters are concerntrated in a few fields, largely in the mountain shelter.

Secondly, since when was this been an all or nothing issue? Taking out one field could easily deprive the ROCAF of nearly 10% of its fighting force, assuming the fighters are distributed evenly, which they are not. Taking out a major field can significantly change the dynamics and outcome of any air battle.

4-6 hours repair time means that that one runway (or less) that China can take out in 1 wave of missiles will be out of commission for 4 to 6 hours.

So China can only take out one runway at a time? Are you even thinking your responses through before posting them?

Employment of submunitions can be approximated using the calculations done in the study provided. “Even if we assume that all of the DF-15s and DF-11s utilize sub-munitions, then using the Prithvi study, approximately 12 DF-15s/strip or 32 DF-11As/strip will be required. Which in turn requires (when using 400m x 50m strip size, meaning 92 strips) at least 1104 DF-15s or 2944 DF-11As.” That’s assuming all of them are sub-munition equipped.

So do you know what kind of submunitions are likely to be used and their distribution radius, yeild and number? The key in such analysis is the actual P values, not the simplistic equation you seem to love so much. And the P values from the Prithvi study are useless when used to try and estimate DF15 and 11s.

Other glaring inconsistencies include omissions of important weapons such as the DF21.

Accuse the equations of being simplistic without pointing out where they are flawed makes you look like you are in denial.

Have you actually seen what a proper mathematical or statistical equations looks like? Defending those equations like they are some inspired piece of maths only proves to demonstrate your own lack of knowledge and common sense.

The maths behind those equations are primary school level. It just states that the probability of a missile hitting is the success rates of all the various stages multiplied. Thats just stating the obvious and the equation in itself tells you absolutely nothing you shouldn’t know already. What makes such equations have any meaning are the actual P values used to make the calculations, which can only be obtained with first hand field testing of said missile, and thats data that is never going to be available publicly as long as those missiles are still operational. Thus the entire methodology is hopelessly flawed.

And using the Indian study’s P values to approcimate Chinese missiles is going to be grossly unreliable, just like using the accuracy of AK47s to guess the scatter pattern of M16s are inaccurate to the degree of pointlessness.

The truth must be suppressed indeed. How else can the myth perpetuate? 😀

Only those with an agenda would let themselves be blinded so easly by such flimsy attempts of disinformation. Or the truely stupid I guess.

Even if the role of the missiles are as he described,

That was a response to claims by CIBs that Air Superiority could be achieved through SRBM attacks on airbases.

his equation is flawed

And we’re to take your word for it?

The point is not complete annihilation of all Taiwan air bases but rather how long can air operations be disrupted and most importantly by what percentage of sortie rate will be suppressed. The missiles are used to open up a window of opportunity. Even a 50% suppression upon the first wave of missile is a good investment.

How can air operations be suppressed if what must be taken out to deny operations on the Taiwan side isn’t taken out? If suppression is to be used in a manner similar to that of artillery fire, which implies small quantities of missiles fired with each time over a long period of time, then that is equally pointless since Taiwan’s anti-ballistic missiles can intercept the incoming missiles and give a window of opportunity for aircraft to scramble.

BTW these SRBM are under direct army control. Most likely It will be used as long range fire support in a cluster wave of 5 missiles. PLA historically never depended upon air superiority and intrinsically no PLA doctrine calls for complete air superiority not even the new joint high tech limited war.

So you think China can conduct a successful amphibious invasion without aerial superiority? LOL. I applaud your stupidity. Too bad the PLA doesn’t agree with you.

The likelihood of Taiwan withstanding a all out PLA attack? Not good…according to Taiwan defense minister, ROCA can annihilate 70% of the first wave of PLA before succumbing. Which really means when it comes to a war of attrition Taiwan will lose. Coming from your own defense minister doesn’t give much confidence.

What makes you think there would even be a “second wave” of PRC troops left considering any amphibious lift is probably going to be part of that 70%? Of course, that’s assuming what he says can be relied on. You people only cherry pick what you want to believe from the Taiwan side.

– What is the basis for assuming ‘lower Chinese production quality’ for ballistic missiles compared to India?

– What is the basis for using 0.85 successful launch and flight other then it being slightly higher then the 0.8 used in the Indian study?

Does it matter when you can vary the figure to what you believe it to be and calculate for yourself the final result? Even at 0.95 reliability of Chinese missiles, 2227 DF-15 missiles are required. Doesn’t change the end result one bit – China still has far less missiles than it needs.

– So what if Taiwan has 12 airports? Are all fighters distributed equally between all those airports? Of course not. Thus the main fighter bases will get the main focus of attention, and other back up strips and civilian airports can be taken out by cruise missiles and/or fighters in the second wave.

Lol, Taiwan has at least 23 Airports. Those 12 are precisely those used by fighters. Meaning that they all have to be suppressed to expect loss of ROC fighter coverage.

– A 4-6 hour repair time might sound impressive to those who have no idea what they are talking about, but the ROCAF would be hard pressed to keep the PLAAF at bay for long at full strength. How long will they last and what kind of kill-loss ratio can they expect fighting with only 50, 40, 30% of their numbers? In 4-6 hours, the air war could easily be over and those runways and planes trapped on the ground would be ready to be used just in time for the next wave of bombs and missiles to fall on them.

4-6 hours repair time means that that one runway (or less) that China can take out in 1 wave of missiles will be out of commission for 4 to 6 hours.

– The blind obsession with CEP pays absolutely no heed to how the employment of submunitions would effect the outcome, other then some superfical lip service that did not affect the results except when twisted to try and make it more favourable for the ROC.

Employment of submunitions can be approximated using the calculations done in the study provided. “Even if we assume that all of the DF-15s and DF-11s utilize sub-munitions, then using the Prithvi study, approximately 12 DF-15s/strip or 32 DF-11As/strip will be required. Which in turn requires (when using 400m x 50m strip size, meaning 92 strips) at least 1104 DF-15s or 2944 DF-11As.” That’s assuming all of them are sub-munition equipped.

The equations are stupidly simplistic and the author completely fails to realise that the real meat of the analysis he based his work on depended entirely on having accurate and realiable figures for all the P values that can only be obtained with first hand operational evaluation and testing. The equations upon which he based his entire case is just basically stating the obvious! To treat them like some gem of true knowledge speaks volumes about the total lack of basic analytical skill of the author and gives a good indication of his level of intellegence.

Accuse the equations of being simplistic without pointing out where they are flawed makes you look like you are in denial.

Its the kind of dime a dozen internet garbage that will only be a waste of time to read. I wish I hadn’t, but since I already did, I might as well try and save others from making the same mistake.

The truth must be suppressed indeed. How else can the myth perpetuate? 😀

That so-called analysis has so many holes, baseless assumptions and logical falacies I’m amazed anyone would take it seriously for a second.

– What is the basis for assuming ‘lower Chinese production quality’ for ballistic missiles compared to India?

– What is the basis for using 0.85 successful launch and flight other then it being slightly higher then the 0.8 used in the Indian study?

– So what if Taiwan has 12 airports? Are all fighters distributed equally between all those airports? Of course not. Thus the main fighter bases will get the main focus of attention, and other back up strips and civilian airports can be taken out by cruise missiles and/or fighters in the second wave.

– A 4-6 hour repair time might sound impressive to those who have no idea what they are talking about, but the ROCAF would be hard pressed to keep the PLAAF at bay for long at full strength. How long will they last and what kind of kill-loss ratio can they expect fighting with only 50, 40, 30% of their numbers? In 4-6 hours, the air war could easily be over and those runways and planes trapped on the ground would be ready to be used just in time for the next wave of bombs and missiles to fall on them.

– The blind obsession with CEP pays absolutely no heed to how the employment of submunitions would effect the outcome, other then some superfical lip service that did not affect the results except when twisted to try and make it more favourable for the ROC.

– The equations are stupidly simplistic and the author completely fails to realise that the real meat of the analysis he based his work on depended entirely on having accurate and realiable figures for all the P values that can only be obtained with first hand operational evaluation and testing. The equations upon which he based his entire case is just basically stating the obvious! To treat them like some gem of true knowledge speaks volumes about the total lack of basic analytical skill of the author and gives a good indication of his level of intellegence.

The author had no realiable p values whatsoever and all he did was copy and paste the figures for the Indian missiles (which in itself my be inaccurate) and applied it to the Chinese case. Well the Chinese are using different missiles, and considering the longer length of time China has been designing and making ballisitic missiles as well as the complexity and capability of Chinese missiles compared to Indian ones, it can be safely stated that the figures from the Indian missile would be inferior compared to Chinese missiles.

I can go on if I could be asked. But its quite clear that that the author of that blog had an axe to grind and went about it in a very clumsy and inaccurate manner. His entire methodology is wrong, he ommitted factors from the analysis that are likely to yield unfavourable outcomes, and he made some extremely questionable and unsustaintial assumptions to to produce the result he wanted and that renders every conclusion he comes up with null and void.

Its the kind of dime a dozen internet garbage that will only be a waste of time to read. I wish I hadn’t, but since I already did, I might as well try and save others from making the same mistake.

How many SRBMs does the PLA require to take out the important runways in Taiwan? If you ever wanted to know the numbers required based on OR analysis, look here.

http://peacethoughstrength.blogspot.com/

The analysis is done by an amateur. Even if the role of the missiles are as he described, his equation is flawed and his reasoning even more ludicrous.
The point is not complete annihilation of all Taiwan air bases but rather how long can air operations be disrupted and most importantly by what percentage of sortie rate will be suppressed. The missiles are used to open up a window of opportunity. Even a 50% suppression upon the first wave of missile is a good investment. Then there is also the psychological effect of BM raining down on your position.

BTW these SRBM are under direct army control. Most likely It will be used as long range fire support in a cluster wave of 5 missiles. PLA historically never depended upon air superiority and intrinsically no PLA doctrine calls for complete air superiority not even the new joint high tech limited war.

The likelihood of Taiwan withstanding a all out PLA attack? Not good…according to Taiwan defense minister, ROCA can annihilate 70% of the first wave of PLA before succumbing. Which really means when it comes to a war of attrition Taiwan will lose. Coming from your own defense minister doesn’t give much confidence.

So yeah there is a difference between fan fiction and operational reality.

How many SRBMs does the PLA require to take out the important runways in Taiwan? If you ever wanted to know the numbers required based on OR analysis, look here.

http://peacethoughstrength.blogspot.com/

It’s probably talking about LD-2000, a land base CIWS developed by Norinco. That’s probably why Norinco said that the “57mm AAA” was theirs.

but NORINCO said that CNPMIEC ‘took’ their old 57mm design and combine it with QW-3 MANPADS into new designation called TD-2000, not LD-2000…
i think LD-2000 is 30mm gatling type CIWS, and could be incorporate TY-90 missile…
but this is chinese 57mm+QW-3….

or is it only for indonesia? :confused:
if indonesian army didn’t talk about 57mm AAA, i’ll be sure they talked about LD-2000

It’s probably talking about LD-2000, a land base CIWS developed by Norinco. That’s probably why Norinco said that the “57mm AAA” was theirs.