As per request, here is some numbers, timelines, data, equipment as used for such. Some data may not be accurate and subject to update as more info comes out:
First batch: 18 SU27SK + 6 SU27UBK in 1992. One report has it that two additional SU27s were provided as a goodwill gift.
Second batch: 20 SU27SK + 6 SU27UBK in 1996, cost around $32 million for the SK. 60% of the money in hard cash, 40% in barter probably.
In 1996, a 1.2$ billion agreement signed to manufacture 200 single seat SU27 in China. Breakdown approximately 450 million for license and technical material, 750 million for various components. About the first 50 of these planes will be assembled using Russian kits, the rest with increasing domestic content, except for engines. Jane’s report this license covers the SMK variant, but only the SK variant is made.
In 1999, China signs a contract to purchase 28 SU27UBK for $35 million each. Assembled in Irkutsk, These may have been delivered by 2001 but I need to get more info on this.
In 1999, China signs a $1.85 billion contract to purchase SU30MKK, of which 38 was delivered by the end of 2001 from kNaPPO.
July 2001, China signs a $1.5 billion contract to purchase 40 more SU30MKK, expected to be delivered by 2003.
In March 2002, Russian export burueau assigns new SU30MKK contract to Irkutsk factory, creating a controversy of sorts.
There are three SU30MKK prototypes, numbers 501, 502, and 503. 502 was said to have been turned over to China in one of the Zhuhai airshows. It is probable that 501 and 503 has also been turned over to China, and now used in a testing center.
Local production:
2 assembled at the end of 1998. Quality problems ensued, and the two planes were remanufactured.
Quality problems resolved by the end of 2000, with 14 J-11s made.
In 2001, 25 J-11s were supposedly made and delivered. This may establish a building rate of 25 to 40 planes a year.
No news yet on 2002. Looks like Shenyang is steaming ahead though.
Weaponry:
200 R73s and 200 R29s were supposedly ordered with the first batch. More could have been purchased since then. Info suggests R27T and R27R variants
100 R77s reportedly delivered with the first SU30MKK batch on a separate contract. This was reported by Jane’s. In December 2001, SU27UBKs were reported by Kanwa to have finished internal modifications to allow them to fire R77s.
Kh31a and -p. Reportedly being made under license in China now.
Kh29t.
Kh59MK.
KAB500kr, and KAB1500kr. Both TV guided, and reportedly being made under license in China also.
No laser designator pods or laser guided weapons. Possibly the Chinese want to use their own (recently seen with FLIR/IT pods on Q5E/F and LG500F (LGB bomb).
Reported attempts to use indigenous missiles such as air to ship C701K did not prove successful. Adapting IR guided close range PL8 and PL5 missiles should be easier though, as Phazotron has shown this is capable on a Zhuk equipped F8IIM test bed.
Russians do not appear to be cooperative in trying to adapt C801K and other indigenous missiles to the SU30MKK, insisting instead that the Chinese purchase Kh35 (which may have been done so as a result.)
Differences of SU27SK vs. SU27S (Flanker B)
SU27S reports a maximum search radar range of 240km and 185km engagement. However, this reporting is done more than two decade ago and reflects the RCS of Western aircraft which is much higher at that time (6m^2 and over). One target is engaged.
SU27SK radar has shown various changes since then. Engagement range is down to 100km, but this reflects a radar target of only 3m^2 (RCS of F16) and this is the new standard used by Russian radar quotes in th nineties. Western radar range quotes use an RCS target reference of about 5m^2 (RCS of MiG21). If engaging a 5m^2 target, range should be about 100km to 150km, and higher if RCS is larger.
Two targets are now engaged (Zhuk 27 extends to four, and Sokol to six). There is also improved provision to allow for accurate unguided munitions bombing (indeed the SK proved to be good in this), although it’s a waste for an SU27 to do what cheap and expendable Q5 Fantans should be doing.
There is provision in the SK’s N001 for a software enhancement that can enable it to fire R77. Such an enhancement has been performed on the SU27UBK, and it is likely since the trainers have been so equipped, that the SU27SKs/J11s have already been equipped so as such.
There is a new ECM suite.
Fuel capacity is said to have increased, and landing gear strengthened to handle the extra weight. Combat load increased from 4000kg to 6500kg.
-SMK would add refueling probe, Zhuk 27 radar and increase of hardpoints from 10 to 12. However, testing to use single seat SU27 in the multirole did not prove succesful due to high workload on the pilot, resulting in the purchase of the SU30MKK instead, and reverting the SU27 back to air superiority role.
Other events:
In 1999 and 2000 Zhuhai air shows, Russians exhibited TVC engine, but Chinese leadership failed to express any interest in purchasing such or the SU37 type. Rumors are however, rife that TVC engines may be used on the J10 instead.
Purchase of the more conservative SU30MKK type rather than a SU35 type or something similar to SU30MKI reflects Chinese leadership’s conservatism.
Chinese leadership not being happy with the maintenance issues of the SU’s and AL31F engines, have signed up contracts with Ukraine and Belarus to assist and participate in an organization intended to maintain the SU and the AL31F engines.
Chinese leadership is also not happy with insufficient Russian cooperation in adapting indigenous missiles, as Russians seem eager to prefer to sell their own missiles, and this may put a damper in future Russian fighter purchases.
Exercises:
SU27s are frequently seen in yearly exercises starting around March and extends to six months. This may be the second year SU30MKKs may be joining.
Ir is rumored that SUs along with J8s are used in a blue flag regiment (1st or 2nd Air Regiment) like an aggressor squadron that is intended to reflect a Western style airforce such as the ROCAF and practice using Western style doctrines.
Rumored:
1. Some SU27SKs may be fitted with Zhuk 27 for testing purposes. They are likely to have been used to evaluate multirole functions for the SU27. This probably did not prove satisfactory, due to high pilot workload, leading to the purchase of the two seat SU30MKK instead.
2. Second new order of SU30MKKs may switch radar supplier from NIIP, which made the SU30MKK’s N001VME radars, to Phazotron NIIR, for Zhuk 27 PH. Zhuk 27 gives better BVR performance than N001 variants, increasing target engagement from two to four, with a slight increase in range.
3. Possible midlife upgrade to SU27SKs is being negotiated. Rumors include new radar from Phazotron, maybe Sokol or Zhuk 27.
4. 20 Sokol sets were supposedly delivered for evaluation. This gave rumors that Sokol may be fitted on J10 too (as the Zhuk 10PD).
5. Shifting unfinished quota of locally built SU27SK to SU30MKK.
6. Wish list to use locally developed MFDs on J11 cockpit, and use locally developed firecontrol system such as JL10, WS10A engines, and digital three axis four way FBW on J11.
Accidents:
There may have been a few lost but PLAAF never releases any news of this at all. Thus we don’t know what is the attrition rate. If PLAAF is babying their SUs then attrition may be very low but quality of training may be sacrificed as a result. In view of this, it may actually be better to hear about a few accidents to show at least that PLAAF may be pushing their SUs to their limits.
Projected:
At least 200 SU30MKK requirement, with the interest of building them in China.
Russia is interested to sell as much as 150 to 200 SU30MK/SU35 type planes (with canards), but Chinese leadership is fickle, technologically conservative and careful, if not distrustful. Chinese leadership also wants to emphasize national self reliance.
As much as 3,000 obsolete airplanes in PLAAF inventory needs to be replaced in the next decade or so. Thus actual SU procurement may be higher, but it is up to Chinese leadership to determine how much of these goes to J10 or to SUs.
Long term:
We may see the J11 continue to go on like the J6 and the J7, way beyond the service life of their Russian counterparts. J11 may continue to evolve albeit with Chinese additions and improvements, such glass cockpits, digital fly by wire, WS10A engines and indigenous fire control radar such as the JL10A to enable firing Chinese missiles.
Midlife improvement for J11 is necessary, if SAC (Shenyang Aircraft Corporation) is to remain competitive against its new rival CAC (Chengdu Aircraft Corporation) which will make the J10. Currently, the J10 appears to a more sophisticated aircraft than the J11, which is mainly based on the two decades old SU27S design.
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May 24, 2002 at 1:43 am