Post War RAF:What could (should?)have been

I’m not sure any other strike ac fielded by the RAF would have been any less vunerable to AAA/SAMs than the Phantom.

If the RAF faced an enemy with the SAM assets of NV, there would have been significant losses.

I seen a couple of articles by ex US Phantom pilots from Vietnam that all highlighted the aircrafts particular vunerability to taking damage in its belly. I understand that if you hit it anywhere in the belly you take something vital out.

Compare this with the Buccaneers in the Gulf that came back despite taking direct hits in the engines and other important areas.

You are correct though about the vunerability of the RAF to AAA/SAM this was due to the lack of modern ECM. In the Falklands the most modern thing we had were second hand A6 Intruder pods that had been bought for the Bucs and grafted onto the Vulcans. This is why in my senario the TSR2 sharing the A6 systems could have evolved through the 70’s and 80’s as the A6 did. The TSR2 having the key advantage of having space in its airframe to accomodate new systems as they became available.

…choosing Phantom over Buccaneer in the strike role was equally flawed given the Phantoms vulnerability to ground fire. We must remember it was the later decision to do away with the carrier force that gave the RAF the Buccaneer.

I’m not sure any other strike ac fielded by the RAF would have been any less vunerable to AAA/SAMs than the Phantom.

If the RAF faced an enemy with the SAM assets of NV, there would have been significant losses.

TSR2 + Viggen

I think there was a significant opportunity lost in the early and mid 60’s, obviously the resulting 70’s was not a total disaster as we did not go to war. However the Falklands, Gulf War 1 and Balkans showed that the RAF would have lacked key capabilities in ECM, Range, Serviceability and All Weather capability had the Red Army rolled into Germany.

Obviously money was short in the late 60’s even without Harold Wilson and his Merry Men. Obviously the F111 proved a complete waste of UK Government money in cancellation fees and then choosing Phantom over Buccaneer in the strike role was equally flawed given the Phantoms vulnerability to ground fire. We must remember it was the later decision to do away with the carrier force that gave the RAF the Buccaneer.

My strategy would have been to reduce the risk and cost of the TSR2 project and also keep our American money lenders happy by adopting the A6 Intruder avionics for the Strike variant and also develop a long range Interceptor version for use over the North Sea and Iceland gap using the F4 Phantom avionics with a Sparrow (later Skyflash) and Sidewinder fit. Later on the airframes could have been enhanced with F14 Avionics and would have remained effective until the arrival of the SU27 in the late 80’s.

As for the strike role would have looked towards Sweden with the Viggen, given that the RB199 was originally intended as its power plant. The Viggen with its STOL capability, low angle approach, robust undercarriage and compact size would have been utilised in its Strike optimised (AJ37) to replace the Hunter, Anti Ship optimised (SH37 later upgraded to Multirole variant offered for Nato + Exocet missle) to replace the Buccaneer and Sea Vixen with the FAA focussing on smaller 30,000 ton Centaur Class carriers and the Air Superiority optimised (JA 37) to replace the Lightening.

The forerunner to the Swedish JA37 was a fully multirole version offered to Europe and generally considered superior to the F16 in the mid 70’s, with the FAA and RAF as customers and UK assembly and support, already developed rather than promissed range and inflight refueling it proably would have beaten the F16 for Norway, Holland and Belgium.

As well as STOL, the other key advantage the Viggen had over its contemporises such as the F16 was its serviceability, designed to be supported at the side of the road in artic conditions by conscripts operating out the back of a lorry. Its reliability and ease of maintenance would have been ideal with a realistic maximum of 25 available on a 30,000 ton Multirole Carrier.

The resulting RAF would have been

TSR2 All weather Strike, Recon and Tactical Nuclear
TSR2 All weather Interceptor
Buccaneer S2 All weather Anti Ship / Strike (All ex RN)
Viggen AJ (AF) All weather strike (Secondary fighter)
Viggen JA (FA) All weather fighter (Secondary attack)

FAA

Viggen SH All weather anti ship / strike (still superior interceptor radar to Sea Harrier FA1) later updated to Multi role with JA intercept capability. Operating from Six planned and four built; 30,000 ton multi role carriers (ASW, Attack and Commando).

The above force would allow for additional savings over the RAF actual Harrier, new build Buccaneer, Jaguar and Phantom purchase, as the Vulcan, Canberra recon and Lightning’s could be retired and you only have three aircraft to maintain with spares, with the Buccaneer force in a Sunset state and probably retired when the fatigue problem found.

Of course this was all far too intelligent for Mr Healey and Mr Jenkins to consider.

SLL, I have reread and reread your post, and to me that does imply you mean the RAF.

Surely the RAFs choice of going for single types to do different roles was a sounder idea than having one multi role type which might not have lived up to expectations (ala Tornado with the F.3).
The FAA probaly latched on to multi role idea when the carriers started shrinking, due to limitations of carrier borne operations, ie only having room and equipment on a ship for a handfull of types.
There has always been the threat of merging the FAA into the RAF, since WWII, so this must of led to rivalery to any available defence budget and competition between the two forces, now of course it is merged aircraft wise.

1) I didnt, I apologise if my post was not clear enough.

2) The Tornado problem was really the result of taking an aircraft that was largely orientated towards the strike role and then making it into a fighter, never a happy conversion. Rather than having an original airframe intended for both. If one takes the Phantom as an example, it managed to pull of both roles sufficiently well, as has the Mirage 3/5/50/F1/2000 series and the Mig-23/27. I would also not the weakness that the RAF’s fighter force has suffered really up to now as a result of the previously mentioned single role policy.

As for the FAA, well its all hypothetical anyway, they ended up with no choice but the Harrier and its dual role capability when they were given baby carriers. However I maintain that had the Vickers Type-581 been selected from the off as a strike and fighter airframe for both the FAA and the RAF, both sides could have had a much more capable fleets at a reasonable development cost and support for British Industry.

I have always felt that the only scenario in which the P.1154 would have made any real sense is if the RN had remained a super power navy and maintained a large force of smaller carriers, under this scenario only Ark Royal and Eagle (and their potential successors) were large enough for phantom size aircraft thus the P.1154 could have been use to equip the older smaller ships (rebuilt ‘armoured’ carriers and the centaurs). Obviously that is just pure fantasy though.

XN923, I think the F-35 is the new P.1154, now we have the technology to make it a viable fighting machine. However, look how long it’s taken to turn it into a production aircraft, and at one time problems were such that the project came close to cancellation. I think the F-35 has partially been saved due to the amount customers, aircraft ordered, and comparitively large congress funding.
I see what you are saying that the FAA was into multi role at one time but they seemed to have learned by the end of the war that it wasnt best to go that route. I was trying to keep in the time frame of the original question, in the 60s – 80s. Fighters, SeaVixen, Scimiter, Phantom, Sea Harrier; Bomber/Strike, Buccaneer; Anti Sub, Wessex & Seaking: AEW, Gannet & Seaking.

Nashio, I wouldnt be too despondant about how the airforce turned out, they had some truely great aircraft, and if we had gone the other route of just using a couple of types we could have been on this forum mourning the fact that we didnt have Lightnings, Buccaneers, Canberras, Vulcans, Victors, Jaguars and Harriers in service as late as we did. I believe with the Typhoon in service, it is a truely capable force again.

The FAA probaly latched on to multi role idea when the carriers started shrinking, due to limitations of carrier borne operations, ie only having room and equipment on a ship for a handfull of types.
There has always been the threat of merging the FAA into the RAF, since WWII, so this must of led to rivalery to any available defence budget and competition between the two forces, now of course it is merged aircraft wise.

See my earlier post – this was going on even when the RN was finally getting some of the most modern and capable carriers in the world, the Ark Royal and Illustrious class. They were intended to be equipped with Blackburn Skuas (dive bomber, patrol fighter, recon), Rocs (turret fighter, bomber) and Swordfish or Sharks (Torpedo bomber, bomber, artillery spotter and reconaissance). Lots of roles, but an inability to do most of them well. It was blind luck that the Swordfish was so successful as a torpedo bomber, partly due to its characteristics but also because in its most glorious moments (Taranto, Bismarck) it did not face any fighters.

The RN’s air arm was taken over in 1914, again in 1918, got control back in 1937 and the RAF took over most fixed-wing flying the 70s. Joint Force Harrier looks like history repeating, hopefully with some lessons learned.

Is F-35 the new P.1154?

i read this thread, and look at what could have been, and what the Raf could have been…:(

However the RAF’s complete and utter faliure to learn the lessons of 1957, and thus their decision to carry on buisness as usual, is probably largely the reason for the disaster of the mid 1960s.

SLL, I have reread and reread your post, and to me that does imply you mean the RAF.

Surely the RAFs choice of going for single types to do different roles was a sounder idea than having one multi role type which might not have lived up to expectations (ala Tornado with the F.3).
The FAA probaly latched on to multi role idea when the carriers started shrinking, due to limitations of carrier borne operations, ie only having room and equipment on a ship for a handfull of types.
There has always been the threat of merging the FAA into the RAF, since WWII, so this must of led to rivalery to any available defence budget and competition between the two forces, now of course it is merged aircraft wise.

I’m not ignoring all the posts following this one which I’ve read with great interest but something has occurred to me.

I wonder if the RAF insistence on multiple single-role types was influenced by the FAA, for many years, insisting on a multitude of roles for everything.

This resulted in them receiving a continual succession of, if not complete dogs, aircraft that weren’t particularly good at anything.

Amen. Since officers on Courageous in 1930 wrote a paper suggesting that the way to manage an insufficient budget was to combine roles within a small number of types. Trouble was it didn’t work then and it won’t work now. Blackburn Skua (The world’s first swing-role – discuss) was intended to be fleet fighter and dive bomber – by extension, fight to target, bomb target and fight way out (Dunkirk and Channel fight way past RAF as well) and protect the fleet at the same time. FAA ends up with a converted light bomber that lost an RAF requirement and a sack of converted BofB Hurricanes. Tries again – we want a sprightly single seater and a two seat long range patrol fighter, but we want them both to be substantially the same aircraft to save on manufacturing and ensure commonality. FAA ends up (eventually) with Firefly, single seat version is cancelled but Firebrand is also ordered (worst of all worlds – single seater based on a two seat design, and two types anyway, WTF?) – and misses the war.

Meantime the FAA is bolstered by crash-happy Seafires, and loads of Grummans and Voughts. Commonality? yeah, right.

Need I even mention the Barracuda? It not only had to carry the kitchen sink, but three different types of kitchen sink to ensure compatibility with all the different taps the RN and RAF were using.

Unfortunately, the theory doesn’t seem to go away. Cheap, simple single-role a/c? No, if it’s not all-singing, all-dancing we don’t want to know. The potential of Hawker’s P.1121 is only matched by the Government and RAF’s complete and utter lack of interest in it in favour of machines which could intercept whole squadrons of Russian bombers before they took off while singing ‘Some Enchanted Evening’ and making the tea. What’s that? Too expensive? We’d better cancel it then. And the whole sorry process starts again.

RAF ended up with some surprisingly capable aircraft – Buccaneer, Harrier and Jaguar. Each of which knew what it did well and stuck to it. With more development they could have gone a lot farther – Supersonic Buccaneer Mk2* was ignored in favour of pan-European projects.

I was reffering to the British aerospace industry not the RAF. If you had properly read my posts you would have realised that and that I was pointing out that one of the flaws was an RAF doctrine which required multiple single role types as opposed to one or two multi-role types.

I’m not ignoring all the posts following this one which I’ve read with great interest but something has occurred to me.

I wonder if the RAF insistence on multiple single-role types was influenced by the FAA, for many years, insisting on a multitude of roles for everything.

This resulted in them receiving a continual succession of, if not complete dogs, aircraft that weren’t particularly good at anything.

What the RAF COULD have been doesn’t matter.

Without a political base…and public support for a strong (or at least credible) defense…there wasn’t the money for it.

In the end it worked out okay…the UK survived the Cold War while spending the least amount of money it had to.

All the neat stuff cancelled over the years would have been good for the UK aerospace industry (and made things a bit easier in the Falklands..and perhaps the 1991 Gulf War), plane buffs and Airfix, but in the long run history proves they weren’t needed (thanks in part to a strong NATO/U.S.).

Again well put. And even with the political support there probably would not have been enough money.;)

What the RAF COULD have been doesn’t matter.

Without a political base…and public support for a strong (or at least credible) defense…there wasn’t the money for it.

In the end it worked out okay…the UK survived the Cold War while spending the least amount of money it had to.

All the neat stuff cancelled over the years would have been good for the UK aerospace industry (and made things a bit easier in the Falklands..and perhaps the 1991 Gulf War), plane buffs and Airfix, but in the long run history proves they weren’t needed (thanks in part to a strong NATO/U.S.).

Of what doctrine do you speak?

Sometimes the narrow question can help clarify the broad, I didn’t mean to imply the Q should be considered in isolation.

The RAF doctrine was three fold, first an most obviously was the air defence of Britain against Soviet Bombers, a threat which never really materialised to the extent that was expected and was partially neutralised by the existence of Norway.

The next, and arguably its favorite, was Nuclear detterence. This involved theartre bombers such as the Canberra and later the TSR-2 blasting holes in the Soviet AD network in central Europe then V-Bombers pouring through the gap and heading of to their targets. The problem here was the cancellation of the TSR-2 and the Avro-730 made the survivability of this force look very bleak. Note the sheer expense of both those types and their single role nature.

Then there was the tactical support role, this was largely performed by hunters and was the role the P.1154 was intended to fill. As you can see, we already have a three tier strike force, Tactical, Theatre, Strategic. Add to this that there was supposed to be a global capability as well and again that all three types were single role airframes as concieved.

The problem of V/STOL, it can take of vertically, well whoop-di-doo. Just imagine the support train that is going to be required to operate a Mach-2 strike aircraft away from a fixed base. For years I lived with the idea that the Harrier would be great for operating from damaged air bases until one day I mentioned it to a far more qualified friend than I who simply laughed, basically in a WW3 scenario (and this is what was being planned for) any airbase that was bombed would have been nuked, ie everyone outside atom proof bunkers incinerated. If by the grace of god your P.1154 had survived this and you managed to role it out of the hangar and get it off the ground for its single sortie it would likely not have much left to support on its bombing mission. Of course the other great problem in V-STOL land is that all V/STOL types make a performance sacrifice compared to their coventional siblings which thus requires the use of said siblings to makeup for the performance sacrifice. V/STOL has worked properly in only two scenarios, one is baby carriers for those who wont pay for real ones and in expeditionary warfare where aircraft can be operated from a site whilst it is turned into a fixed base, at the same time when said base is not at risk from attack.

To conclude, you cant have V/STOL without conventional aircraft if you want to win, and the actual benefits are very limited.

The problem is that the V/STOL concept only works as part of a much wider doctrine, and the RAF could not afford that doctrine.

Of what doctrine do you speak?

I should also say that the Question that you are asking is a very narrow one, as I have said sure it could work in technical terms, but there is a much wider picture, involving economy, politics and doctrine. It is a simplistic blinkered technical approach that leads many to regard the cancellation of TSR-2 as a crime against humanity.

Sometimes the narrow question can help clarify the broad, I didn’t mean to imply the Q should be considered in isolation.

Exactly, SLL.

No reason to suppose P.1154 would have failed technically. PCB (by-pass reheat – so, hot front nozzles) was on 1945’s W2/700. BS.100 was not only 1965’s biggest UK engine,but was to be our dearest in R&D: much BSEL flair (and c.10% RR-share) were to be poured in. If FAA had stayed in, power would have been deflected Twin Spey. With neither engine would it have found export customers: the price of verticality exceeded its benefit. Unit production price would have exceeded F-4D/E, so USMC and Harrier’s Naval Users would have put A-4S/F-8N on catapults. Dead-end P.1154 run: 60(RAF), Gutersloh Wing (not Harrier GR.1), plus 52 if (RN) stayed in (not F-4K). RAF would have got the 175 F-4D they wanted for 38 Gp and the rest of RAFG.

Instead of P.1154, HSAL probably sold more man-years as Sister Firm/making chunks for F-4K/M. “Best use” of metals industry and engineers was part of Wilson’s lot’s pitch to get (re-)elected. He used “white heat of the scientific revolution”: today it’s “knowledge”, but the issue is constant: how to feed 60Mn. Brits faced with diligent, efficient Asians whose end-prices are unattainable here.

So: what should RAF have had – implicitly, as well as what was actually deployed.

Some assert the Kaiser, Hitler, Tojo, USSR fell to “the 4th. Arm of Defence” -money, by trying to do guns and butter. UK twice very nearly did the same – Wilson resigned from Attlee’s Cabinet over an unaffordable Korean arms budget; Macmillan in 1957 – petrol rationing, deep pain – instructed Sandys to pare. He did so by dumping local Reds and Blues and Yellows to licence US nukes. If he had taken the logical step, after resiling from strategic “independence”, of letting Mk.1 V-Force gently expire, to give RAFG something fitter than Swift FR.5 and Canberra B(I)8 (P.1121 if you like), we could have been into all-arms 40 years ago. Wilson tried in 1965 to fund all RAF’s roles despite “stunned horror” at Treasury’s reception brief. Outgoing Chancellor Maudling “put his head round (Callaghan’s) door (and said cheerfully) good luck old ****. Sorry to leave it in such a mess.” P.83,D.Sandbrook,White Heat, Little,Brown,2006.

Very well said. I would just add that from the doctrinal perspective it took the RAF until Tornado to finally get the right balance in their strike aircraft, it has taken until now for them to get a truly dual role aircraft in the form of Typhoon (yes I know the Phantom could do both) and it has still yet to learn the lesson about V/STOL.

Exactly, SLL.

No reason to suppose P.1154 would have failed technically. PCB (by-pass reheat – so, hot front nozzles) was on 1945’s W2/700. BS.100 was not only 1965’s biggest UK engine,but was to be our dearest in R&D: much BSEL flair (and c.10% RR-share) were to be poured in. If FAA had stayed in, power would have been deflected Twin Spey. With neither engine would it have found export customers: the price of verticality exceeded its benefit. Unit production price would have exceeded F-4D/E, so USMC and Harrier’s Naval Users would have put A-4S/F-8N on catapults. Dead-end P.1154 run: 60(RAF), Gutersloh Wing (not Harrier GR.1), plus 52 if (RN) stayed in (not F-4K). RAF would have got the 175 F-4D they wanted for 38 Gp and the rest of RAFG.

Instead of P.1154, HSAL probably sold more man-years as Sister Firm/making chunks for F-4K/M. “Best use” of metals industry and engineers was part of Wilson’s lot’s pitch to get (re-)elected. He used “white heat of the scientific revolution”: today it’s “knowledge”, but the issue is constant: how to feed 60Mn. Brits faced with diligent, efficient Asians whose end-prices are unattainable here.

So: what should RAF have had – implicitly, as well as what was actually deployed.

Some assert the Kaiser, Hitler, Tojo, USSR fell to “the 4th. Arm of Defence” -money, by trying to do guns and butter. UK twice very nearly did the same – Wilson resigned from Attlee’s Cabinet over an unaffordable Korean arms budget; Macmillan in 1957 – petrol rationing, deep pain – instructed Sandys to pare. He did so by dumping local Reds and Blues and Yellows to licence US nukes. If he had taken the logical step, after resiling from strategic “independence”, of letting Mk.1 V-Force gently expire, to give RAFG something fitter than Swift FR.5 and Canberra B(I)8 (P.1121 if you like), we could have been into all-arms 40 years ago. Wilson tried in 1965 to fund all RAF’s roles despite “stunned horror” at Treasury’s reception brief. Outgoing Chancellor Maudling “put his head round (Callaghan’s) door (and said cheerfully) good luck old ****. Sorry to leave it in such a mess.” P.83,D.Sandbrook,White Heat, Little,Brown,2006.

Without re reading the thread, what is PCB?

Sealordlawrence, ‘the disaster in the mid ’60s’ is a matter of opinion. How can you say the procurement of the Harrier, Buccaneer, Jaguar, Phantom and Nimrod was a disaster?
Also I really dont think that putting faith in two types, the TSR 2 and the P.1154, the forces would have done anywhere aswel as the previously named types in the real conflicts of this country.

I was reffering to the British aerospace industry not the RAF. If you had properly read my posts you would have realised that and that I was pointing out that one of the flaws was an RAF doctrine which required multiple single role types as opposed to one or two multi-role types.

Without re reading the thread, what is PCB?

Sealordlawrence, ‘the disaster in the mid ’60s’ is a matter of opinion. How can you say the procurement of the Harrier, Buccaneer, Jaguar, Phantom and Nimrod was a disaster?
Also I really dont think that putting faith in two types, the TSR 2 and the P.1154, the forces would have done anywhere aswel as the previously named types in the real conflicts of this country.

So let me reconstrue my question,

What are people’s opinions of the likely outcome of the UK pursuing the P.1154 with PCB? A successful aircraft or a failure? Could both RAF and RN aircraft have been a success? Just one of them?

Forgive me if I sound like a cracked record but there are so many very knowledgable people here and I have no idea what the answer to this question is.

The RN version got canned, by the RN who got the aircraft they wanted, the phantom (I mean in terms of concept not neccesarily aircraft). Sure they both could have worked but not really of the same airframe due to the vastly different roles that they were intended to fill. Remember that the BS.100 engine was succesfully test run. Had the RAF version been pursued to fruition we would probably be in the same place as we are today only the Harriers would have been supersonic. The problem is that the V/STOL concept only works as part of a much wider doctrine, and the RAF could not afford that doctrine.

I should also say that the Question that you are asking is a very narrow one, as I have said sure it could work in technical terms, but there is a much wider picture, involving economy, politics and doctrine. It is a simplistic blinkered technical approach that leads many to regard the cancellation of TSR-2 as a crime against humanity.

So let me reconstrue my question,

What are people’s opinions of the likely outcome of the UK pursuing the P.1154 with PCB? A successful aircraft or a failure? Could both RAF and RN aircraft have been a success? Just one of them?

Forgive me if I sound like a cracked record but there are so many very knowledgable people here and I have no idea what the answer to this question is.