Pressure on France for second Carrier???

I know it’s a bit more complicated than this, but that’s roughly what the average Frenchman thinks.

Then I shall have to reevaluate my ingrained generations of prejudice against our gallic chums (sadly that’s said only partially in jest!)

Of course having an efficient intelligence and counter-terrorist apparatus also removes the perceived need for politicians to attack civil liberties in the guise of protecting us from the Bad Men.

Waging a war on a people under the guise (maybe even BELIEVED) of helping them does not seem to remove the sense animosity and hostility that some of that people have towards one.

As an influence and power-projection issue I am constantly amazed at how ham-fisted the western powers are with spending. The old cliche that the US defence spending for one year could pay for clean drinking water for the whole world’s population may be a false friend (don’t pay the defence budget for a year and you suddenly have a bigger drain on welfar payments and system, macinery which breaks down and so on) but if one wants to project power and influence then there MUST be better ways than waging a war.

A firefight ALWAYS has the potential to harm your own combatants and uninvolveds. Hit uninvolveds and there is a chance that you recruit them, their friends, their families and onlookers to your opponent’s side. It may be that in one given firefight onlookers are so anti one’s opponents that none are recruited. But more firefights = more opportunities.

The attacks on 911 were (self-evidently I should hope a Bad Thing) but a sustained intelligence-led police action could (in my view should) have allowed bringing to justice the perpetrators and prevention of future attacks. A ham fisted show of who has the biggest penis made the victims of the attack feel better briefly and then brought more loss, pain and suffering and has created more enemies and more conflicts.

That Said. Flat Tops are the current status symbol of power projection. So having two operational makes it look you mean business. That MIGHT be sufficient to make Nation States treat you seriously. Whether it changes the attitude of more loosely-aligned federations of smaller groups (a la Al Quaida) is maybe more open to debate.

Al

I for one think that the CdG is a child of the Cold War – as someone here so correctly pointed out. That’s why the need for a 2nd aircraft carrier isn’t seen as obvious here.

In our days there are two threats a country’s military force could encounter: wars of 3rd generation (less and less likely) and wars of 4th generation (more and more likely).

For W3G, nuclear dissuasion is a key and for me the SSBNs + MIRVed SLBMs combo (or simply MIRVed ICBMs) is more efficient than any other combo, including nuclear carriers + Rafales + ASMP-A. That could explain why the French military credits are more concentrated on SSBNs than aircraft carriers, and how they succeeded in ensuring that 2 SSBNs are at sea at any time. Needless to say that they’re far from achieving such a milestone with their carrier force (one ship only, and it’s in dry dock 50% of the time – just like any French SSBN, but we have 4 of them just in case).

When it comes to W4G, however, it’s becoming more and more obvious that conventional weapons are of no use, as disappointed as the MIC may be. Terrorism and terrorism-driven wars have to be countered with top-notch intelligence (i.e. DST and DGSE for France) and special forces, not troop movement nor mass bombing.

That’s what the taxpayers agree to pay for: nuclear SLBMs and efficient intelligence agencies. Anything in-between is of marginal use: France (like any Western country) could live with a Taleban regime in Afghanistan as long as secret services make their job: infiltration, surveillance and prevention for pre-emptive action. I know it’s a bit more complicated than this, but that’s roughly what the average Frenchman thinks.

SeaLord, I think you don’t know how french think. US has it, so they MUST have it. It’s straight-forwardly simply.

And, let me say, this rivality is something good for France and for her role in the world.

You think do you?:eek:

The question is not ‘Does the French navy need PA2 to have an effective carrier force?’ but ‘Does France need a an effective carrier force?’. The fact that they do not currently have one answers that question.

SeaLord, I think you don’t know how french think. US has it, so they MUST have it. It’s straight-forwardly simply.

And, let me say, this rivality is something good for France and for her role in the world.

Lawrence,

Utter nonsense. They have built a carrier force and have yet to complete it!. The requirement was always for the second vessel – a porte avions 2 – to be built to provide guaranteed deployed naval aviation. That they have put it back continually is as a result of the protracted development of DCN’s Romeo/Juliette work, the study as to optimal propulsion choices and the obvious financial issues.

Project Julliete was, IIRC, the conventional successor to the follow on CVN ‘Romeo’ and was shown as the preferred option as recently as the end of 04!. By 05 they had come onboard with UK CVF and thats dragged on through the usual mire that tends to happen when you try to make one design do two jobs for two different customers. Now their design is as mature as ours just their priorities are different as their naval aviation component is not ageing as ours is.

In direct contention with your claim that the French Navy is quite capable of performing its mission they need to recapitalise their escort fleet and generate an enhanced SSN capability. Wisely they are addressing that requirement before commiting to the carrier spend.

Again nonsense. That kind of argument is nebulous and suggests that PA2 may not happen if the public will in France turns against it. The CdeG exists. France has committed herself to a carrier capability and for the maintainance of that capability PA2 has to happen else the spend already made is wasted. The French Defence Minister said exactly this publically a couple of weeks back.

Not really. We have seen multiple issues with overflight and theatre base-in since 1980. The French closing of airspace in El Dorado Canyon, the similar act of the Turks in Iraqi Freedom. The utilisation of naval air in Allied Force. Our experience in 1982. The utilisation of naval air in the opening moves of Enduring Freedom before Kandahar was secured. All these have illustrated and underscored the value of naval air in the pursuit of foreign policy goals.

No nosense at at all Jonesey. If the public does not support sufficient defence spending to support PA2 then it will not exist, as is already shown by the postponement. The needs of the French navy are irrelevant and the cost effectiveness of a sing unit will be of little interest when it comes to deciding whether to cough up for another. My point is already proven by the lack of a second unit. Until France actually builds a second carrierit has not committed to anything.

Do tell, what is the great role that the French navy is currently unable to fulfill that is endangering French national security that will be solved by a second carrier?

Lawrence,

Utter nonsense. They have built a carrier force and have yet to complete it!. The requirement was always for the second vessel – a porte avions 2 – to be built to provide guaranteed deployed naval aviation. That they have put it back continually is as a result of the protracted development of DCN’s Romeo/Juliette work, the study as to optimal propulsion choices and the obvious financial issues.

Project Julliete was, IIRC, the conventional successor to the follow on CVN ‘Romeo’ and was shown as the preferred option as recently as the end of 04!. By 05 they had come onboard with UK CVF and thats dragged on through the usual mire that tends to happen when you try to make one design do two jobs for two different customers. Now their design is as mature as ours just their priorities are different as their naval aviation component is not ageing as ours is.

In direct contention with your claim that the French Navy is quite capable of performing its mission they need to recapitalise their escort fleet and generate an enhanced SSN capability. Wisely they are addressing that requirement before commiting to the carrier spend.

Again nonsense. That kind of argument is nebulous and suggests that PA2 may not happen if the public will in France turns against it. The CdeG exists. France has committed herself to a carrier capability and for the maintainance of that capability PA2 has to happen else the spend already made is wasted. The French Defence Minister said exactly this publically a couple of weeks back.

Not really. We have seen multiple issues with overflight and theatre base-in since 1980. The French closing of airspace in El Dorado Canyon, the similar act of the Turks in Iraqi Freedom. The utilisation of naval air in Allied Force. Our experience in 1982. The utilisation of naval air in the opening moves of Enduring Freedom before Kandahar was secured. All these have illustrated and underscored the value of naval air in the pursuit of foreign policy goals.

I would add the FNS Charles de Gaulle has been very active since its completion. Further, even during its most recent refit. The French Goverment sent Naval Rafale to the US to keep Carrier Qualified. Personally, it appears to me that France takes its Carrier Force very seriously………IMHO

Lawrence,

The question is not ‘Does the French navy need PA2 to have an effective carrier force?’ but ‘Does France need a an effective carrier force?’. The fact that they do not currently have one answers that question.

Utter nonsense. They have built a carrier force and have yet to complete it!. The requirement was always for the second vessel – a porte avions 2 – to be built to provide guaranteed deployed naval aviation. That they have put it back continually is as a result of the protracted development of DCN’s Romeo/Juliette work, the study as to optimal propulsion choices and the obvious financial issues.

Project Julliete was, IIRC, the conventional successor to the follow on CVN ‘Romeo’ and was shown as the preferred option as recently as the end of 04!. By 05 they had come onboard with UK CVF and thats dragged on through the usual mire that tends to happen when you try to make one design do two jobs for two different customers. Now their design is as mature as ours just their priorities are different as their naval aviation component is not ageing as ours is.

In direct contention with your claim that the French Navy is quite capable of performing its mission they need to recapitalise their escort fleet and generate an enhanced SSN capability. Wisely they are addressing that requirement before commiting to the carrier spend.

In the absence of threat there has to be a desire or need for power to act as a driver for such procurements, without it they do not occur. Defence policy is not made by Military’s or even Defence Departments but by public and political class perceptions of need and want, consequently whether France gets PA2 is not a question of whether the French navy needs it for an effective carrier force but whether the French people decide they need or want to spend the money on it.

Again nonsense. That kind of argument is nebulous and suggests that PA2 may not happen if the public will in France turns against it. The CdeG exists. France has committed herself to a carrier capability and for the maintainance of that capability PA2 has to happen else the spend already made is wasted. The French Defence Minister said exactly this publically a couple of weeks back.

This raises a much wider doctrinal issue, the usage of fleet carriers for power projection in the post Cold War era is largely defined by their usage in the 1990/91 Gulf War, in that instance there use was remarkably important, the platform for strike aircraft was vital. Unfortunately GW1 has turned out not be the model for intervention in the 2000’s, for continental European countries at least. Consequently vessels such as the Mistral class are more cost effective and why France is procuring three of them.

Not really. We have seen multiple issues with overflight and theatre base-in since 1980. The French closing of airspace in El Dorado Canyon, the similar act of the Turks in Iraqi Freedom. The utilisation of naval air in Allied Force. Our experience in 1982. The utilisation of naval air in the opening moves of Enduring Freedom before Kandahar was secured. All these have illustrated and underscored the value of naval air in the pursuit of foreign policy goals.

True, but one still has to justify them and I would not be surprised to see France go either way, the fact remains however that she is currently not committed enough to PA2 to have taken what would probably have been the easiest opportunity to get one.

The French navies problems go deeper than not having PA2, the Horizon order was halved to 2 and the FREMM order has fallen from 17 to 11 giving her a force of (when all is procured) of just 18 frigates and destroyers. There is somthing much deeper at work than just money for one carrier.

Well, the French do have several years to decide in any case……

France very much wants to be a major power in the world. Also, Carriers are the new Battleships with a great deal of prestage that comes along with it. Personally, I would be surprised if she doesn’t work out something to “Keep up with the Jones”. 😉

True, but one still has to justify them and I would not be surprised to see France go either way, the fact remains however that she is currently not committed enough to PA2 to have taken what would probably have been the easiest opportunity to get one.

The French navies problems go deeper than not having PA2, the Horizon order was halved to 2 and the FREMM order has fallen from 17 to 11 giving her a force of (when all is procured) of just 18 frigates and destroyers. There is somthing much deeper at work than just money for one carrier.

France very much wants to be a major power in the world. Also, Carriers are the new Battleships with a great deal of prestage that comes along with it. Personally, I would be surprised if she doesn’t work out something to “Keep up with the Jones”. 😉

That logic hinges on the fact that a carrier is only a response to a direct threat though. Its not. It is an instrument of French foreign policy. An instrument that France has already determined has value for them as they have built and deployed their CVN. What they are doing with PA2 is completing that capability package as, at the moment, they have the most untenable situation of all. This being a national requirement, however nebulous it may appear to some, that has had a large expenditure against but provided a part time solution at best.

PA2 is not a new capability under the heading of ‘shiny new toy’ and should not be considered as such. PA2 is the completion of the requirement that saw the creation of CdeG and is about the only thing that would justify the spend for a navy to have a carrier capability that is not guaranteed-available 24/7/365.

I never said PA2 was a new capability. The fact is that French defence spending is limited by Frances lack of threat and magnified national power that comes from being part of the grand western alliance. Thus the fundamentals required to propel such a procurement do not exist. The capability offered by PA2 would be impressive but that reality is that French fleet is more than able to perform the basic functions required of it without CdG. And let us not forget that CdG herself is a product of the cold war, a look at her design tells you that without even considering the time lines involved.

The question is not ‘Does the French navy need PA2 to have an effective carrier force?’ but ‘Does France need a an effective carrier force?’. The fact that they do not currently have one answers that question. In the absence of threat there has to be a desire or need for power to act as a driver for such procurements, without it they do not occur. Defence policy is not made by Military’s or even Defence Departments but by public and political class perceptions of need and want, consequently whether France gets PA2 is not a question of whether the French navy needs it for an effective carrier force but whether the French people decide they need or want to spend the money on it.

This raises a much wider doctrinal issue, the usage of fleet carriers for power projection in the post Cold War era is largely defined by their usage in the 1990/91 Gulf War, in that instance there use was remarkably important, the platform for strike aircraft was vital. Unfortunately GW1 has turned out not be the model for intervention in the 2000’s, for continental European countries at least. Consequently vessels such as the Mistral class are more cost effective and why France is procuring three of them.

Whilst this thread has correctly identified money as the key reason for France having abandoned PA2 is has failed to recognise why that money has not been made available.

The fact is that France, like every other western European nation, has no real threat scenario, thus there is no driver to spend money on shiny toys.

And why would France care if India develops a powerful carrier force?

That logic hinges on the fact that a carrier is only a response to a direct threat though. Its not. It is an instrument of French foreign policy. An instrument that France has already determined has value for them as they have built and deployed their CVN. What they are doing with PA2 is completing that capability package as, at the moment, they have the most untenable situation of all. This being a national requirement, however nebulous it may appear to some, that has had a large expenditure against but provided a part time solution at best.

PA2 is not a new capability under the heading of ‘shiny new toy’ and should not be considered as such. PA2 is the completion of the requirement that saw the creation of CdeG and is about the only thing that would justify the spend for a navy to have a carrier capability that is not guaranteed-available 24/7/365.

France will be the odd one out

just the way France wanted it to be! 🙂

At the last Franco-Italian summit in Rome, which was entered into an agreement for the transfer of nuclear technology to Italy, the President Sarkosy has thrown flat on the proposal of a common carrier between the 2 countries.

The problem is that the requirements are too different, CATOBAR vs STOVL, and if also Italy found the money to fund half units would be more logical to build a second Cavour.

If the requirements were similar, having an aircraft carrier each, have a common carrier would be interesting and with an appropriate managing of the work on the 3 unit in order to have always 1 operative carrier for nation.

Once CVF/F-35B are in service, France will be the odd one out in terms of aircraft operated by European nations, as Britain, Spain and Italy will all be Lightning B operators and will be able to cross deck easily, making joint ops more straightforward.

At the last Franco-Italian summit in Rome, which was entered into an agreement for the transfer of nuclear technology to Italy, the President Sarkosy has thrown flat on the proposal of a common carrier between the 2 countries.

The problem is that the requirements are too different, CATOBAR vs STOVL, and if also Italy found the money to fund half units would be more logical to build a second Cavour.

If the requirements were similar, having an aircraft carrier each, have a common carrier would be interesting and with an appropriate managing of the work on the 3 unit in order to have always 1 operative carrier for nation.

I agree with Sealord, there’s no direct threat to warrant building another one. Europe has more important matters to deal with.

Whilst this thread has correctly identified money as the key reason for France having abandoned PA2 is has failed to recognise why that money has not been made available.

The fact is that France, like every other western European nation, has no real threat scenario, thus there is no driver to spend money on shiny toys.

And why would France care if India develops a powerful carrier force?

Assuming PA2 goes ahead on schedule, she will be the third CVF class ship built and could well benefit from any teething problems with the first of class (HMS Queen Elizabeth) being ironed out, although this would require a continued good relationship between France and the UK for the necessary information to be passed along as PA2 will be built in France and not by the same builders as CVF-01 and 02. Thus she will still be the ‘first of class’ built in France, so her builders will face the same difficulties BVT will face in the UK.

In the European context PA2 will make a significant contribution to the overall strength of European naval strike power, as it will bring to four the number of large deck strike carriers (HMS Queen Elizabeth, HMS Prince of Wales, FS Charles de Gaulle and PA2) that European nations can contribute to operations, backed by smaller carriers such as the Italian Cavour and Garibaldi, the spanish Principe de Asturias and Juan Carlos I (when not on amphibious duties), the French Mistral and Tonnere )which in theory could operate British Harriers or F-35Bs for short periods) and not forgetting HMS Ocean. In theory quite a resectable carrier force, second only to the USN.

That is if the European Carrier Force is taken together as a whole and the PA-2 is constructed………..”if”

Assuming PA2 goes ahead on schedule, she will be the third CVF class ship built and could well benefit from any teething problems with the first of class (HMS Queen Elizabeth) being ironed out, although this would require a continued good relationship between France and the UK for the necessary information to be passed along as PA2 will be built in France and not by the same builders as CVF-01 and 02. Thus she will still be the ‘first of class’ built in France, so her builders will face the same difficulties BVT will face in the UK.

In the European context PA2 will make a significant contribution to the overall strength of European naval strike power, as it will bring to four the number of large deck strike carriers (HMS Queen Elizabeth, HMS Prince of Wales, FS Charles de Gaulle and PA2) that European nations can contribute to operations, backed by smaller carriers such as the Italian Cavour and Garibaldi, the spanish Principe de Asturias and Juan Carlos I (when not on amphibious duties), the French Mistral and Tonnere )which in theory could operate British Harriers or F-35Bs for short periods) and not forgetting HMS Ocean. In theory quite a resectable carrier force, second only to the USN.

They have history, tradition, technology , Aircraft and most importantly the usefulness of a additional carriers. What they do not have is Euros.