Production Engineering in WW2

[ATTACH]200290[/ATTACH] Got this Print from Shoreham a few years back (Phil Jarret?) There were about 10 photos of this fuselage on route( spent up by then,so could only afford this one DOH!!).Don`t know where it is ,but there were others of it crossing a narrow bridge.

How an Auto Giant got ready for war

From the Military.com site I send you the following-
http://www.military.com/veteran-jobs/content.career-advice/military-transition/how-a…
A view from across the ocean at starting war production.

Back to Merlins! I have a Rolls Royce in house magazine with the story of the Crewe Shadow factory somewhere, I shall dig it out and have a read but I seem to remember that it took less than a year from turning the 1st sod to having a running Merlin on the test bed! they were building parts and training local men as the factory was being built around them. they took a core of skilled men from Derby and used them to train and run the new factory. as an apprentice it was for me hallowed ground to walk around that place and still find evidence of the past at Crewe, the engine test cells still had engines running but of the V8 car variety instead of V12 Merlins but I could still dream……………..

The wings did go from Rochester to Windermere.

When I visited Rochester to give a talk to some former Short Bros workers there we had an interesting chat about the route – they were particularly trying to work out where the most likely crossing of the Thames was in the 1940s.

My trip Cumbria to Rochester was 7 hours – M6, A14 M11. But pre M6 the northern section would have gone through the centres of Preston, Lancaster, Kendal and many others. I wonder how long it would have taken. There is a photo of a wing on a Commer Q2 lorry with more wing overhanging the rear of the trailer than on it. There some evidence that some wings arrived damaged and had to be repaired before they could be used.

You’re quite right – those journeys shifting big lumps of aircraft around took more planning than the motorway trips of today.

AllanK

Sunderland Wings

Excuse the sidetrack but, nacelles were built in Windermere and put on lorries for Rochester where wings were made. Wings, with nacelles, arrived in Windermere to be fitted to Sunderlands. That’s not efficient but duplication was necessary if there was a risk of bombing interrupting production.

If you will excuse a further sidetrack. Were wings arriving in Windermere returned from Rochester ? That’s a trip halfway across the country. Being a local chap I am trying to envisage how they got them out of Shorts works then across the narrow/low Rochester Bridge at a 90 degree junction, let alone across the rest of the route.

This must have been possible as I have read elsewhere that Stirling fuselages went from the other Rochester factory, over the same bridge on their way to South Marsten for final assembly.

Hard to imagine these trips across Britain nowadays, let alone on wartime roads. Sub-contractors and production dispersal on various projects seems to have sent parts of aircraft on incredible journeys across the nation.

[I]If, with me, you recognise the decisive role of the Red Army, inc. August, 1945 scything into Manchukuo, then…Ike was wrong with his list of War-winning utensils: bulldozer, jeep, howitzer, landing craft, C-47. Yet the greatest must have been the pre-fab Liberty ship, which brought 4 to/sustained all 5 in Theatre…and some millions of personnel.

Don’t underestimate the importance of the wooden cargo pallet…..

& now imagine how important the CONEX shipping container is these days…

[I]If, with me, you recognise the decisive role of the Red Army, inc. August, 1945 scything into Manchukuo, then…Ike was wrong with his list of War-winning utensils: bulldozer, jeep, howitzer, landing craft, C-47. Yet the greatest must have been the pre-fab Liberty ship, which brought 4 to/sustained all 5 in Theatre…and some millions of personnel.

Don’t underestimate the importance of the wooden cargo pallet…..

& now imagine how important the CONEX shipping container is these days…

What interests me is what quantity of aircraft were ‘remanufactured’ where a new aircraft mark was built but utilised a previous airframe, there is a good picture which shows Mark 14 spits being built at a supermarine works but the fuselages all have old paint on with various different squadron codes and it doesn’t look like a repair facility, so it looks like a lot of previous marks were consumed into new aircraft.

Graham

What interests me is what quantity of aircraft were ‘remanufactured’ where a new aircraft mark was built but utilised a previous airframe, there is a good picture which shows Mark 14 spits being built at a supermarine works but the fuselages all have old paint on with various different squadron codes and it doesn’t look like a repair facility, so it looks like a lot of previous marks were consumed into new aircraft.

Graham

It is interesting – an area I’m learning a lot about. Context is everything and discussions like this greatly help my understanding. Thanks

I try not to wear rosy glasses but also I don’t knock the huge task achieved – ramping up production was remarkable, not least when much industry had to disperse from the SE target zone. Moving skilled staff is never straightforward. Another positive was conscription of women which added greatly to the unskilled base in factories allowing expansion.

OT – Old B&Ws? – glib answer is start with quality. Like all collectors, i seek quality as well as interesting. For Windermere I was given a unique original set of prints made from glass negs later destroyed – on condition that they should be published. They are 10″x8″ and fine grain – the ones above are mostly cropped out of those originals – lots and lots of detail to zoom in on.

A good home scanner (Epson Perfection series does negs too), an eye to keeping them all looking similar in tone and a publisher with similar care made a nice looking product – the donor of the photos (Peter Greetham) was very happy with his copy in return.

Short Bros original prints are usually good quality – I have a set of 20 of Empires being built just arrived, mostly very nice. The Sunderland out of the jigs above, is poor, high contrast – I have a better copy but not clearance to use it.

AllanK

It is interesting – an area I’m learning a lot about. Context is everything and discussions like this greatly help my understanding. Thanks

I try not to wear rosy glasses but also I don’t knock the huge task achieved – ramping up production was remarkable, not least when much industry had to disperse from the SE target zone. Moving skilled staff is never straightforward. Another positive was conscription of women which added greatly to the unskilled base in factories allowing expansion.

OT – Old B&Ws? – glib answer is start with quality. Like all collectors, i seek quality as well as interesting. For Windermere I was given a unique original set of prints made from glass negs later destroyed – on condition that they should be published. They are 10″x8″ and fine grain – the ones above are mostly cropped out of those originals – lots and lots of detail to zoom in on.

A good home scanner (Epson Perfection series does negs too), an eye to keeping them all looking similar in tone and a publisher with similar care made a nice looking product – the donor of the photos (Peter Greetham) was very happy with his copy in return.

Short Bros original prints are usually good quality – I have a set of 20 of Empires being built just arrived, mostly very nice. The Sunderland out of the jigs above, is poor, high contrast – I have a better copy but not clearance to use it.

AllanK

They are fantastic images, and thanks for the insightful information both, it is a very interesting subject.

Just to be clear I’m not saying that I think that UK industry outshone or achieved anymore than any other of the allies, but I do believe that it reacted and dealt with the times superbly, especially given the fact that it had the very real threat of receiving heavy bombing of defensive measures (inc fighter airfields), industry, and populated areas, aswel as having vital supplies by sea being cut off.
I’m not sure that any of the other allies had to ramp up production and disperse it with against the background of that threat, or certainly not to the same extent. I don’t know enough about the French situation, but their industry didn’t seem to react or adapt at all to the growing threat.
The point about Coastal Command is a good one, it seems to have been a hugely overlooked command just pre-war (unlike Luftwaffe Condor, flying boats), which seems quite strange when you think of our island state and reliance on the sea. Apart form the Sunderland it had to use adapted bombers for long-range work, luckily the Liberator was picked up by the AM/RAF quite early on.
Strangely it is situation that the UK now finds itself in, no RAF maritime patrollers, or RN carriers and strike aircraft.

They are fantastic images, and thanks for the insightful information both, it is a very interesting subject.

Just to be clear I’m not saying that I think that UK industry outshone or achieved anymore than any other of the allies, but I do believe that it reacted and dealt with the times superbly, especially given the fact that it had the very real threat of receiving heavy bombing of defensive measures (inc fighter airfields), industry, and populated areas, aswel as having vital supplies by sea being cut off.
I’m not sure that any of the other allies had to ramp up production and disperse it with against the background of that threat, or certainly not to the same extent. I don’t know enough about the French situation, but their industry didn’t seem to react or adapt at all to the growing threat.
The point about Coastal Command is a good one, it seems to have been a hugely overlooked command just pre-war (unlike Luftwaffe Condor, flying boats), which seems quite strange when you think of our island state and reliance on the sea. Apart form the Sunderland it had to use adapted bombers for long-range work, luckily the Liberator was picked up by the AM/RAF quite early on.
Strangely it is situation that the UK now finds itself in, no RAF maritime patrollers, or RN carriers and strike aircraft.

Thank you. How do you reproduce ancient B&W to come up so well?

Thank you. How do you reproduce ancient B&W to come up so well?

Interesting stuff, especially overseas insight

More Sunderlands? – Ok lets look in detail at the “lego-kit” example and Sunderland production, it was a joint failure of the Ministry to recognise production system early and to force complience with design rules and Short Bros who failed in imagination to see what was needed in design (despite Ministry recognising need to move aircraft production away from SE of England, hence Shorts in Belfast)

The Sunderland was never designed to be built in small bits

While Sunderland was in design in mid 30s, a Ministry directive – Aircraft Design Memorandum 340 – called for parts to fit in standard Ministry categories:
A 21 ft x 6’6” x 6’
B 22’ x 9’ x 7’6”
C 35’ x 9’6”x 8’
D – no limits but deck cargo supposed to be limited to 50’ x 9‘ x 10’ and 9 tons.

Short Bros were used to shipping large – Empire Boat to Bermuda by sea and Kent main plane by sea measuring 55’ x 13’9”

A Sunderland in packing cases would need:
hull 88’ x 19’9” x 13’4”
Wing 55’ x 8’ x 23’6” (narrowing to 10’6″ at other end)
Tail and elevator: 16’9” x 11’ x 5’6”
Even beaching gear only just fitted the B category.

The Sunderland wing needed splitting into smaller parts – a 1937 an AM memo stated:
“If you compel me to accept this thing I shall have to hire an aircraft carrier every time I move a spare wing.”

Short Bros (in July 35) arguments for non complience were:
Increased weight (so less fuel, so less range), loss of strength, loss of performance (Sunderland spars were very close tolerance) and road or rail transport did not arise when firms had a sea or river frontage at seaplane bases (!)

All along the focus of ADM340 was on being able to ship parts to repair. The ministry wasn’t (at that time) considering production and shipping components from small firms to assembly works.

Would the ministry accept a heavier, more expensive and three month delayed aircraft so the wings can be split into bits? Turned out, no, they accepted ADM340 wasn’t retrospective.

So by the time Sunderland production needed dispersing, it had the wrong design and could not be be built in small components to be shipped for assembly at the coast – even Rochester Airport works was limited to making bits as small as floats.

The dispersal which became Windermere could not be tasked with making just components but whole aircraft – in fact Col Llewellin at the MAP wrote of Windermere: “The product is a flying boat, a site on the edge of deep water is essential. We have therefore had to decide on Windermere.”

The lesson was learnt for the Shetland, planned in 1940, to be built in large sections and assembled later. But would not be ready until 1945 and the Sunderland V was good enough by then.

Only one example but older designs wouldn’t easily adapt to latest production thinking – and in some cases perhaps older design staff wouldn’t adapt

This is a Sunderland hull, fresh out the jig, as small as it could be made:

And it becomes clear why this type of thing wasn’t seen very often (in Belfast, taking damaged aircraft back to Short and Harland)

AllanK

Interesting stuff, especially overseas insight

More Sunderlands? – Ok lets look in detail at the “lego-kit” example and Sunderland production, it was a joint failure of the Ministry to recognise production system early and to force complience with design rules and Short Bros who failed in imagination to see what was needed in design (despite Ministry recognising need to move aircraft production away from SE of England, hence Shorts in Belfast)

The Sunderland was never designed to be built in small bits

While Sunderland was in design in mid 30s, a Ministry directive – Aircraft Design Memorandum 340 – called for parts to fit in standard Ministry categories:
A 21 ft x 6’6” x 6’
B 22’ x 9’ x 7’6”
C 35’ x 9’6”x 8’
D – no limits but deck cargo supposed to be limited to 50’ x 9‘ x 10’ and 9 tons.

Short Bros were used to shipping large – Empire Boat to Bermuda by sea and Kent main plane by sea measuring 55’ x 13’9”

A Sunderland in packing cases would need:
hull 88’ x 19’9” x 13’4”
Wing 55’ x 8’ x 23’6” (narrowing to 10’6″ at other end)
Tail and elevator: 16’9” x 11’ x 5’6”
Even beaching gear only just fitted the B category.

The Sunderland wing needed splitting into smaller parts – a 1937 an AM memo stated:
“If you compel me to accept this thing I shall have to hire an aircraft carrier every time I move a spare wing.”

Short Bros (in July 35) arguments for non complience were:
Increased weight (so less fuel, so less range), loss of strength, loss of performance (Sunderland spars were very close tolerance) and road or rail transport did not arise when firms had a sea or river frontage at seaplane bases (!)

All along the focus of ADM340 was on being able to ship parts to repair. The ministry wasn’t (at that time) considering production and shipping components from small firms to assembly works.

Would the ministry accept a heavier, more expensive and three month delayed aircraft so the wings can be split into bits? Turned out, no, they accepted ADM340 wasn’t retrospective.

So by the time Sunderland production needed dispersing, it had the wrong design and could not be be built in small components to be shipped for assembly at the coast – even Rochester Airport works was limited to making bits as small as floats.

The dispersal which became Windermere could not be tasked with making just components but whole aircraft – in fact Col Llewellin at the MAP wrote of Windermere: “The product is a flying boat, a site on the edge of deep water is essential. We have therefore had to decide on Windermere.”

The lesson was learnt for the Shetland, planned in 1940, to be built in large sections and assembled later. But would not be ready until 1945 and the Sunderland V was good enough by then.

Only one example but older designs wouldn’t easily adapt to latest production thinking – and in some cases perhaps older design staff wouldn’t adapt

This is a Sunderland hull, fresh out the jig, as small as it could be made:

And it becomes clear why this type of thing wasn’t seen very often (in Belfast, taking damaged aircraft back to Short and Harland)

AllanK

What Were Diggers For?

JDK #40,42 has UK/SBAC, a cartel, resorting to restriction, protection, on putting Aero work into Canada, Oz.

The 1955 volume N.American Supply by H.Duncan Hall in HMSO Civil Series, Official History of WW2 has much on ramping Canada into Aero. Harald Penrose (Westland Chief Test Pilot), Ominous Skies, HMSO,1980 touches on Canada/Oz, inc much on Beaufort, and on W/C Wackett/CAC as father of Harvard, which UK then bought for money.

Go up to my Logistics point in #51. UK early on formed Ministries of War Transport, Shipping, and Economic Warfare: all were seen as quite as relevant to the Effort as any Fighting Service – strangulation, again. Even while US was neutral, much co-ordination. So, to minimise demand on transport, what to do with the wealth/resources of Canada? ALCAN on their own could turn bauxite into the raw base for aircraft: a mere short step then to assemble extrusions/sheet and flyaway. What, now to do with distant Oz (and Kiwis and Saffies)?

My take: PMs Lyons, Menzies and Curtin endorsed the logic that it was better to ship ANZACs to meet up with US/UK/Canada-built kit, than to ship bulk to Oz, to be turned by fit young men into kit then to be shipped to Theatre to be utilised by…well, lesser folk. Ditto FM Smuts: both he and Curtin were members of Churchill’s War Cabinet (the Inner powerhouse of maybe 6 Ministers), attending when in London. I do not see these men (MacArthur, of Curtin: “one of the greatest of the wartime statesmen”) as Pom Patsies.

SBAC was not a cartel, but a lobby. It was UK’s Air Ministry that chose to confine R&D tenders to a Ring of design-proven teams. The logic was, in the locust years, to spread thin gruel sensibly. So pre-War, no design balm for Airspeed, Martin-Baker, Cunliffe-Owen, Wolseley, Fairey-in-engines. Sure they moaned in April,1938 when G/C Harris recommended and PM Chamberlain bought Harvard, Hudson. Sure HP, Vickers, Rolls et al tried very hard to keep the sudden manna of Rearmament in-house. But they did what Ministers funded them to do.

JDK: may I gently suggest that UK’s view of 1938 Oz-as-Business-Threat was rather similar to SecDef McNamara’s view of maybe 50 TSR.2s as Threat to his plan for >3,000 TFX, or of US industry’s response to Avro Arrow: frankly, my dear, I don’t give a d–n.

What Were Diggers For?

JDK #40,42 has UK/SBAC, a cartel, resorting to restriction, protection, on putting Aero work into Canada, Oz.

The 1955 volume N.American Supply by H.Duncan Hall in HMSO Civil Series, Official History of WW2 has much on ramping Canada into Aero. Harald Penrose (Westland Chief Test Pilot), Ominous Skies, HMSO,1980 touches on Canada/Oz, inc much on Beaufort, and on W/C Wackett/CAC as father of Harvard, which UK then bought for money.

Go up to my Logistics point in #51. UK early on formed Ministries of War Transport, Shipping, and Economic Warfare: all were seen as quite as relevant to the Effort as any Fighting Service – strangulation, again. Even while US was neutral, much co-ordination. So, to minimise demand on transport, what to do with the wealth/resources of Canada? ALCAN on their own could turn bauxite into the raw base for aircraft: a mere short step then to assemble extrusions/sheet and flyaway. What, now to do with distant Oz (and Kiwis and Saffies)?

My take: PMs Lyons, Menzies and Curtin endorsed the logic that it was better to ship ANZACs to meet up with US/UK/Canada-built kit, than to ship bulk to Oz, to be turned by fit young men into kit then to be shipped to Theatre to be utilised by…well, lesser folk. Ditto FM Smuts: both he and Curtin were members of Churchill’s War Cabinet (the Inner powerhouse of maybe 6 Ministers), attending when in London. I do not see these men (MacArthur, of Curtin: “one of the greatest of the wartime statesmen”) as Pom Patsies.

SBAC was not a cartel, but a lobby. It was UK’s Air Ministry that chose to confine R&D tenders to a Ring of design-proven teams. The logic was, in the locust years, to spread thin gruel sensibly. So pre-War, no design balm for Airspeed, Martin-Baker, Cunliffe-Owen, Wolseley, Fairey-in-engines. Sure they moaned in April,1938 when G/C Harris recommended and PM Chamberlain bought Harvard, Hudson. Sure HP, Vickers, Rolls et al tried very hard to keep the sudden manna of Rearmament in-house. But they did what Ministers funded them to do.

JDK: may I gently suggest that UK’s view of 1938 Oz-as-Business-Threat was rather similar to SecDef McNamara’s view of maybe 50 TSR.2s as Threat to his plan for >3,000 TFX, or of US industry’s response to Avro Arrow: frankly, my dear, I don’t give a d–n.

Your Mess or Mine?

JDK/#36, p01/#38 are exploring: WW2: who did best at ramping up military Aero production?

Prof.Overy in Why the Allies Won takes the Logistics Rule, OK! stance on warfare. Sheer mass of good-enough kit lifted the Allies beyond Axis reach. Merchant shipping, delivering POL, munitions, and grub, supported the British Way of Warfare, which is to visit WMD on the Bad Guys’ backyard. In WW2 starvation inflicted by the Royal Navy was matched from the Air: together, blockade and bombardment immobilised the Axis, with empty galleys and bowsers.

If, with me, you recognise the decisive role of the Red Army, inc. August, 1945 scything into Manchukuo, then…Ike was wrong with his list of War-winning utensils: bulldozer, jeep, howitzer, landing craft, C-47. Yet the greatest must have been the pre-fab Liberty ship, which brought 4 to/sustained all 5 in Theatre…and some millions of personnel.

The contribution to Victory made by 55,000 drowned Brit Forces Merchant Mariners was quite as profound as that of 55,000 dead Bomber Command personnel. So, let’s follow Ike’s logic. Lego-kit. Ships built as chunks deep inland, rail/truck to the wet and launched in days, do I mean hours? Rosie, in from the farm to rivet apace, to Quality that has not since been dissected and disdained by revisionists. Kit that may not have been engineering-couth, but was good enough…delivered NOW! In WW1 doughboys and USAAS were (largely) kitted by France/UK; in late 1938 FDR started the process of turning a primary, extractive economy into the arsenal of democracy…and did so in, what, 20 months?

So: the best job in civil:military industrial conversion was by US; USSR’s shift, tools and toilets, across the Volga and up the Urals, overshadows UK’s dispersal from SE to NW GB. No Axis Power drew in the distaff half of its Human Capital, to the extent the Allies did.

Churchill, July,1942: “Highly inefficient (Coastal Command must) not trench so heavily (on) reserves. In spite of (losses to) U-boat(s) the Bomber offensive should have first place in our effort” C. Ponting, Churchill,1994,S-Stevenson, P581. If we, on this Board, were not Aero-centric, we would absorb this on the Mid Atlantic Gap, Spring 1943: R.Overy,Why the Allies Won,Cape,95,P60: “Why (RAF resisted) releasing bombers for work over the ocean defies explanation (A) mere 37 (B-24 with ASV III(UK)/IV(US), May,43 closed) the Atlantic Gap (which) had almost brought plans to stalemate.”

More Sunderlands, fewer Stirlings, please. UK built the wrong things.