October 18, 2011 at 8:31 pm
Which aircraft would you say had the most difficult transition from prototype form to an acceptable production machine? Or which production aircraft differed most from it’s original prototype? How about the Curtiss SB2C Helldiver? Think I read somewhere that the USN demanded a whopping 800+ major modifications and literally thousands of minor ones before accepting it.
By: Arabella-Cox - 1st November 2011 at 19:36
B-1 Bomber
The B-1 must get some mention as well, both in terms of “difficulties” and changes from prototype to production. The first 4 B-1A prototypes were nuclear armed penetrators, but production was cancelled. When the program was re-started as the B-1B significant changes in design and re-rolling took place. Changes included dramatically increased all up weight, RCS measures/inlet ramp changes, armament, avionics and changing the crew escape pod to 4 ejection seats.
As for difficulties, there were teething problems with the avionics fits, being derided as “the worlds first self jamming bomber”. A series of fixes took years (if ever) and maintainence hours remain very high.
By: Arabella-Cox - 1st November 2011 at 19:36
B-1 Bomber
The B-1 must get some mention as well, both in terms of “difficulties” and changes from prototype to production. The first 4 B-1A prototypes were nuclear armed penetrators, but production was cancelled. When the program was re-started as the B-1B significant changes in design and re-rolling took place. Changes included dramatically increased all up weight, RCS measures/inlet ramp changes, armament, avionics and changing the crew escape pod to 4 ejection seats.
As for difficulties, there were teething problems with the avionics fits, being derided as “the worlds first self jamming bomber”. A series of fixes took years (if ever) and maintainence hours remain very high.
By: Arabella-Cox - 1st November 2011 at 19:23
F-102
One of the best examples of prototype to production changes is the Convair F-102.
Unable to reach Mach 1 in its original form, its fuselage was redesigned with the benfit of the “area rule” principle. That concept (by NACA’s Richard Whitcomb) changed not only the F-102 but many (all?) future supersonic fighter designs.
Agree on the F-102 getting major changes. Not only the total redesign of the fuselage noted by Boyle (lengthening and coke bottle area ruled shape), but also a major redesign of the wing (to the case X shape), canopy and larger tail. Also the structure was lighter. The engine and fire control radar also went through evolutionary changes. Big changes from the XF-92 demonstrator (not realy a prototype for the 102) the prototype 102 and production versions. Essentiallly a new plane from prototype to production verision.
By: Arabella-Cox - 1st November 2011 at 19:23
F-102
One of the best examples of prototype to production changes is the Convair F-102.
Unable to reach Mach 1 in its original form, its fuselage was redesigned with the benfit of the “area rule” principle. That concept (by NACA’s Richard Whitcomb) changed not only the F-102 but many (all?) future supersonic fighter designs.
Agree on the F-102 getting major changes. Not only the total redesign of the fuselage noted by Boyle (lengthening and coke bottle area ruled shape), but also a major redesign of the wing (to the case X shape), canopy and larger tail. Also the structure was lighter. The engine and fire control radar also went through evolutionary changes. Big changes from the XF-92 demonstrator (not realy a prototype for the 102) the prototype 102 and production versions. Essentiallly a new plane from prototype to production verision.
By: mike bb - 1st November 2011 at 12:16
How about the Gloster Javelin? Having read the book ‘Empire Of The Clouds’ by James Hamilton-Patterson, it seems that the Javelin was a bit of a dog…
Although the Hamilton-Paterson book has been around for a couple of years now it might be worth mentioning that there’s a fairly recent review on
http://londongrip.co.uk/2011/09/book-review-lost-empire/ which might be an encouragement to anyone who hasn’t yet had a look at this sad but fascinating look at British aviation in the 1940s and 50s.
By: mike bb - 1st November 2011 at 12:16
How about the Gloster Javelin? Having read the book ‘Empire Of The Clouds’ by James Hamilton-Patterson, it seems that the Javelin was a bit of a dog…
Although the Hamilton-Paterson book has been around for a couple of years now it might be worth mentioning that there’s a fairly recent review on
http://londongrip.co.uk/2011/09/book-review-lost-empire/ which might be an encouragement to anyone who hasn’t yet had a look at this sad but fascinating look at British aviation in the 1940s and 50s.
By: alertken - 22nd October 2011 at 10:28
Prot to Prodn Pain. The WW2 Officlal History, M.Postan, Design&Devt of Weapons, 1964, HMSO, at P.129 has besieged Warwick, logical derivation of 1933 Wellington, as “the most spectacular failure of all” : ITP as the crucial Heavy: 7/10/35, never a useable bomber, despite, what, 3 tries for power.
It also has, at P.135: 1942’s hopes for FAA Types: “were soon belied… shortcomings (the) story of the fleet fighter (Roc) is even more melancholy”. Barracuda came very close to causing the loss of the British Asian Empire: for such a type-to-be-determined were the 1936/37 armoured carriers funded. Design ITP, 30/1/39, a massive Production Group put in place: in action 9/43 and generally disappointing cf. USN types. (But paling cf. the dual nomination here of Firebrand).
By: alertken - 22nd October 2011 at 09:58
at #36: TOM Sopwith’s £1Mn. A confusion, I suggest with retention of Hawker A/c Ltd. capitalised at £1Mn. as (what we today might call) a Strategic Business Unit within new Hawker Siddeley A/c Co. Ltd, 7/35, capitalised at £2Mn. The sequence presented in the Hawker Putnam is: 4/36: “the Hawker (not HSAL) Board…issued instructions for the production planning, jigging and tooling for 1,000 (Hurri) airframes…(A.M contract 3/6/36 for 600 at a reported unit price of £4,000.) by reason of the Co’s. anticipation, the issue of production drawings…was completed only one week later.” Risk investment by (TOMS+his fellow Directors) was in some man-weeks’ draughtsman-labour, recovered upon receipt of the A.M contract.
jdk #33: Spitfire was nearly too late. Much has been made of the production complexity of structure+design of the wing. On 3/6/36 A.M ordered the 600 Hurricanes and 310 Spitfires. On that day HSAL and A.M had extensive experience of (then not called dual-sourcing) sub-contracting Camm-structure: done, in hand or in plan: Boulton Paul: 106 Demon; Bristol: 141 Audax; General: 75 Fury II; V-A/Weybridge: 162 Hart, 114 Hart Trainer; Westland: 43 Audax, with Gloster metal wing, 178 Hector; HSAL: Avro: 330 Audax and 24 Avro 674; AWA: 456 Hart; Gloster: 47 Hardy, 25 Audax, 72 Hart. Easy-peasy to put a simple monoplane variant onto that Production Group.
HSAL made no fuss about “lost” business or creating “competitors” (General A/c) outside the established design-parent “Ring”. Sir Robert Maclean at Supermarine volubly did so. A.M was bothered, not about the wing, but about the volume. Muddy Woolston did arboreal sculpture. Imposed by A.M on Maclean were Cunliffe-Owen (who he?) for wing, Folland (who he?) for tail, General (who he?) for wing and tail, Pobjoy (you jest!) for (was it) cowlings. Much feet-dragging on drawings and general co-operation, culminating in Vickers Main Board, under A.M pressure, firing him in 1938.
Remember: no-one expected deterrence to fail; no-one expected Hurricane to be built in cascades to 1944, “Spitfires” to, what, 1949. Industry, 1937-38 lobbied intensely for some form of guaranteed recovery of unamortised investment, when A.M cancelled all this work-in-progress after Germany came to its senses. That’s why Vickers tried to assert that geodetics were beyond others’ wit, and that Spitfire was P.V-owned (and RR ditto on Merlin). Their wish was to deny all these autonauts and upstarts access to hard-won technology.
By: Vega ECM - 20th October 2011 at 20:11
Did a Nimrod AEW ever reach the RAF to count as ‘production’ ?
Uhm,- I think that will be another thread called “Tragic Waste of Time Aircraft Types” which made it in to production but were scraped before any saw service;- Miles Monitor, Nimrod AEW3, and NimrodMRA4…..any more?
On a similar theme we could have the “Biggest shortfall from original spec but still made it to service” thread;- Rockwell B1, and Myasishchev M 4 …..any more?
By: JagRigger - 20th October 2011 at 06:31
Did a Nimrod AEW ever reach the RAF to count as ‘production’ ?
By: Vega ECM - 19th October 2011 at 20:45
Back to original question, I was thinking Concorde, the 001/2 prototypes were radically different to the 01/02 pre-production prototypes which in themselves were notablity different to the 101 pre-production aircraft which was only similar to the production A/C.
But this leads the question as to what is a prototype?
Many first off’s are really technology demonstrators with little serious effort put into making them a serial production item………That comes latter when the basic concept is proven and all the lessons of how not to best do it have been learnt………and hence the embodiment of hundreds of major mods. Many of the A/C manf worked this way and in the US at least some still do i.e. JSF to F35.
By: AdlerTag - 19th October 2011 at 16:19
I don’t mean to drag the discussion off topic, but while we’re chatting about Hurri production and service introduction etc, can anyone confirm the story that Tom Sopwith put an enormous amount of his own personal fortune into tooling up for Hurri production? The story goes that he put around £1m of his own money into production preparation before the Air Ministry had made any orders for the type, thus giving Hawkers a head start when orders did come in.
By: JDK - 19th October 2011 at 16:11
I understand that, but I don’t see how that in anyway takes away from the Spitfires’ construction and progress to production success?
Still think your missing my point. I’m not critiquing Supermarines, just pointing out a getting the Hurri into service as Hawker’s and the RAF did was a better turnaround and a vital achievement.
The Spitfire’s production ramp-up was good – but thankfully the Hurricane was available earlier in quantities, or it wouldn’t have been enough.
It says something that the bombers were almost the other way around, Blenheim, Hampden, Whitley were all using stressed skin monocoques, with the Wellington being the odd one out.
That’s a good point.
I know that fabric covering had been praised for ease of repair etc, but I do wonder it was more to do with reluctance to embrace the new rather than looking out for the repair side of things.
The critical point was that the factories that had produced Hawker biplanes could – and did – produce numbers of Hurricanes quickly, without having to switch production to new technology, jigs, processes and so on – the challenge Vickers Supermarine faced and did well at, but not so quickly that Spitfires were available at the rate Hurricanes were as early as they were – when modern fighters were desperately needed.
Had Hawker’s ’embraced the new’, it would have been a disaster – the RAF wouldn’t have had enough fighters. (The field repair element of the Hurricane’s modular construction was a bonus, but not a decisive factor.)
The Spitfire was a great fighter – but there were only just enough early in the Battle, and the RAF depended on Hurricanes. The Hurricane’s interim design and production was the only answer that delivered a good enough fighter, in enough quantity, in time.
By: pagen01 - 19th October 2011 at 15:49
I understand that, but I don’t see how that in anyway takes away from the Spitfires’ construction and progress to production success?
Personally speaking, out of the two I have always preffered the Hurricane anyway, but the two and half years from getting a clean looking prototype, using a then very advanced construction technique, to an in service fighting machine is surely remarkable?
Any ‘lateness’ can really be layed at the Air Ministrys’ door for not taking up the idea sooner with production fighters.
It says something that the bombers were almost the other way around, Blenheim, Hampden, Whitley were all using stressed skin monocoques, with the Wellington being the odd one out.
I know that fabric covering had been praised for ease of repair etc, but I do wonder it was more to do with reluctance to embrace the new rather than looking out for the repair side of things.
By: JDK - 19th October 2011 at 15:20
I’m not sure what you mean about Hawker using better stressed skin construction than Supermarine point though James? Supermarine were the first out of the two to use it and both had a good enough quality of construction and understanding of aerodynamics, certainly from a usable service aircraft point of view.
Not ‘better’ more timely. The Spitfire was nearly too late – it was too few (on it’s own) in 1940. Hawker’s were able to produce enough ragwing Hurris(by making a ‘Fury Monoplane’) which they knew they could do using their Hawker system of construction, giving the RAF enough Hurricanes early enough to get up to speed with modern fighters, lose a lot in France and have enough for the Battle.
Had Hawker’s gone for a fully stressed skin Hurricane production, with the factories and RAF fitters trying to get up to speed with all that new technology, there wouldn’t have been enough British fighters in service in May 1940.
They even finessed the detail by getting interim fabric covered structure wing Hurricanes out, without waiting to finalise the stressed skin all-metal wing. Once they had the metal wing sorted, though, they produced enough to replace the fabric wings in service.
Now that’s an example of getting the tool to the customer in the right quantities in the right time to do the job. A Hawker victory few realise even happened.
Regards,
By: pagen01 - 19th October 2011 at 14:38
Prototype to production failures really come down to two things, either the aircraft is a dog and it can’t fettled, or the prevailing conditions have changed so much that the aircraft is no longer suitable for what it was designed for.
So often the latter is the case but the aircraft gets blamed, Blenheim, Battle, Wyvern, and dare I say it Helldiver are all part of that.
Blenheim and Battle were seen as the best aircraft of their class to enter RAF service in the late expansion period, but were thouroughly outclassed when it came to the war. After initail success the same could be levelled at the Stuka, certainly in its primary role.
The Helldiver reflected a determination by Curtiss to follow an outdated idea by the US Navy for a large dive bomber, Vought Vindicator/Chesapeake similar.
Wyvern was dogged by RAF and Navy indecision which stretched out its procurement, only then to be at the mercy of some pretty unreliable powerplants, not sure there was much wrong with the basic concept or airframe.
So far I don’t think we have mentioned many howlers of aircraft design (Swift, Botha, Lerwick aside) where no matter how much work was done on them by research bodies and the services they still were dangerous or otherwise unsuitable for task.
The aforementioned Javelin is a good point, as it did take several marks to get it near to the standard originally specified, and even then the RAF didn’t get its supersonic all weather fighter.
Meanwhile, despite the Supermarine acolyte view, a more balanced reading sees Supermarine as very good and very lucky with Spitfire design and that odd, but remarkably (and unforeseen) ‘stretchable’ and effective wing.
Interesting point that, if you ask someone to name a British aircraft company renowned for its fighters, chances are they would name Supermarine, yet they only produced the one (admittedly outstanding) successful fighter design.
I’m not sure what you mean about Hawker using better stressed skin construction than Supermarine point though James? Supermarine were the first out of the two to use it and both had a good enough quality of construction and understanding of aerodynamics, certainly from a usable service aircraft point of view.
I still say that not withstanding that the Spitfire represents a remarkable prototype to production achievement, the prototype itself was modified to almost spitfire Mk.I standard, in photographs of it in camo it is barely indistinguishable from its earliest form.
By: AdlerTag - 19th October 2011 at 13:32
For anyone interested in the Helldiver saga, I can recommend the article on the following link. Yes it’s a modelling article, but it would appear to be very well researched and it sums up the Helldiver’s development and service pretty clearly.
http://modelingmadness.com/reviews/allies/cleaver/tmcsb2c.htm
By: JDK - 19th October 2011 at 13:17
nuuumannn – yes; thank you; and suits me! Probably better by PM after that though.
Cheers,
By: J Boyle - 19th October 2011 at 13:11
One of the best examples of prototype to production changes is the Convair F-102.
Unable to reach Mach 1 in its original form, its fuselage was redesigned with the benfit of the “area rule” principle. That concept (by NACA’s Richard Whitcomb) changed not only the F-102 but many (all?) future supersonic fighter designs.
By: nuuumannn - 19th October 2011 at 13:08
Very interesting post there JDK; ever thought of writing for a living?;) I read your articles in Flightpath and The Aeroplane with interest. How are you enjoying living in Australia?