RAF bombing campaign in 1920s Iraq

Hang on, Gulf War II was in 2003. The anniversary today is Afganistan. I’m getting confused with all these wars in ME.

Today is the anniversary of Gulf War II in 2001. I think the article is wrong, this is the fourth time the RAF have been involved in Iraq since 1991. Now, Gulf War I, Gulf War II; but they are missing Operation Desert Fox in 1998.
And yes, the RAF has been Bombing Iraq on and off since 1920, and no, the politicians learn nothing.

New dog, old tricks

An interesting piece on the BBC website today, showing how things in the region have changed very little since the 1920s in some respects.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-29441383

I have pictures of my Great Uncle, stationed in Iraq with the British Army in the 1920s and 1930s in places like Basra and Fallujah, the same places that were on the news showing the British Army there once again some 70-80 years later.

The BBC article and the modern use of air power in Iraq and Afghanistan show that contemporary decision makers have absolutely not read the history of the RAF in interwar Iraq and the North Western frontier. The key contemporary doctrine is stealth. The key historical doctrine was communication.

Nineteenth century British military doctrine in Afghanistan found its basis in the disaster of the initial Afghan Wars, when ground troops march out to decimation by the Afghan tribes. The key evolution was the colonial ‘political officer’, brave, intelligent, streetwise non conformists who found good employ wandering out into the desert on a pathway to create relationships with local, indigenous authorities. No nineteenth century taxpayer found better return than the investment in the political officer, who could understand the topography of the local politics and sense out what was about to happen and why. In his back pocket he held the might of gunboats, airforces and artillery, but was entirely nuanced in finding it unnecessary to state such an obvious fact.

It is incredible to understand that the RAF ran a country, Iraq, in the 1920’s. In the post Cromwell tradition, no military force should ever run a British possession, but exceptions like this form within the weft and weave of British colonial history. In respect of a threadbare asset base in the the 1920s the RAF evolved a standard procedure, directed by the political officer. If face to face negotiations with uncooperative elements did not succeed, after the political officer had removed himself from the threat of being taken hostage, leaflets were dropped, warning that in one to two days, crops would be fire bombed. This was profound economic warfare, difficult to ignore. If this was ignored, crops were bombed, and this was often enough. If not ,the next step was to drop leaflets warning that the town/village would be bombed, with the focus on architecture sensitive to reception by the recalcitrant parties. This form of communication held the North West Frontier and Iraq in equilibrium during the interwar years, until German initiatives in early WW2 forced the RAF to more conventional warfare dealing with an Axis aligned government in Iraq.

Today, UAVs circle stealthily above these countries and visit death with ‘shock and awe’ , and the expenditure of billions of tax payer funds and act to recruit volunteers to increasingly gruesome responses to Western technical superiority. Amorally, there is nothing wrong with UAVs, and there is no difference in outcomes to being accounted for by a Vickers gun or laser guided munitions. Morally, there is something wrong in the hands that guide this technology, on our behalf, if their use is in preference to the simple human fairness of at first listening to the targets point of view.

It is too easy to criticise, so I will try and imagine something that could evolve in reference to the old tradition. Today, a UAV may, proximate to a perceived threat, transmit locally to TVs, radios and mobile phones messages explaining what might happen to a town if the positions of militants are not known. It could encourage townsfolk to use a range of methods to communicate a range of information. Hopefully this information could be interpreted by intelligence operatives who, like the political officer of old, know the area. The UAV should NEVER release a laser guided munition by surprise. This is different to conventional war, where the rules are different.

I have every confidence the lessons of history will be ignored. I am sick of this thoughtless, terrible conflict.