RAF vs Japan, 1945/46.

On this Aero forum we must keep a sense of proportion. Ike named 5 utensils as War-winners; none was a weapon: jeep, DUKW landing craft, bulldozer, 2½-ton truck and a variant of a 1932 airliner: DC-3 as C-47: 10,349 built in US (>485 in Japan; >6,000 to 1960 in USSR). (A US Pacific Commander had a similar list). WW2 was won by Ivan and Rosie.

(Then, G/C) Harris scoured US, 4/38 looking for good things to buy. He took Harvard and Hudson, but was widely unimpressed. Remember how new was, say, Northrop, how slim and near-bankrupt was Boeing. US had reverted after WW1 to its natural state as an extractive, primary economy. But in 1940 FDR extracted tax-$ to move to a 2-Ocean Navy, 50,000 aircraft p.a and on, as the arsenal of democracy. Some tools and plant were funded from France/UK’s expiring stash: Gunston, Aero-Engines,1986,P.113: Pratt/Hartford: “1939 business (had) been depressed but the French orders had paid for a plant addition of 280,000 sq.ft. Then “The British Wing”, paid in £, added 425,000sq.ft from June,1940″. Rosie the Riveter came in to do all this and, for me, an unsung key was the notion of “Production Control”, taken from Chevrolet. Sir Roy Fedden visited US in late-1942, wrote this up, and was scorned by his UK industrial colleagues. “Dilution..” no: delivery…yes. UK mobilised female labour, too, and could not have built Munitions in quantity without them.

USSR however did even more than all this. As Barbarossa neared Moscow, much of Soviet-in-Europe industry was put on carts and sledges, pushed and pulled across the Volga and beyond the Urals. Agricultural and rudimentary, inventory came back within months into Ivan’s hands, to be put to very good use.

No, of course it wasn’t, but judged by my ratio, which is as good a way of describing matters as any – which was the point that I made – the Mossie was the most efficient.

Interestingly, on a ratio of aircrew to bombs carried, the most efficient bomber of the war was the Mosquito; two tons of bombs, two crew. Which makes the B29 – average bomb load, six tons; eleven or twelve crew; inefficient.
John Green

Congratulations…you’re qualified to run Ryanair!
Unfortunately, war isn’t run on cost per seat mile basis.:rolleyes:

You’re mistaking efficiency for capability.
The Mosquito was a great plane, but it was no replacement for the Lancaster, B-17, B-24 or B-29 in many of their roles.
A Mossie in the Costal Command replacing the Liberator?
Replacing the B-29 in the Pacific? I don’t think so.

Production/Logistics ? Yes, I know about that.

5,000 tanks and 3000 Hurricanes produced and sent to Russia plus artillery and motor vehicles. All of this while we were arming ourselves.

An understanding of production & logistics. I’ll be corrected by alertken if I stray, I’m sure, but – Apart from bribing Stalin to stay in the war, with obsolete material (Valentine tanks, thanks!) Britain was using US material and Canadian and Empire cash and resources well beyond Britain’s capability to repay for decades.

The Royal Navy’s standard to ‘be the equal of any other two navies’ was long gone, but the presumption of being able to send an adequate naval force to Singapore beyond other commitments was still believed right up to becoming one of the Empire’s biggest disasters ever, and a massive waste of material and, tragically men delivered straight into becoming Japanese POWs. It’s not surprising that the British and Commonwealth forces were overstretched, it was in many measures the biggest war ever to that date; but to pretend that British logistics were adequate is unsupported by evidence or any non-partisan analysis.

Couple that with the active discouragement of major heavy military industry in the Colonies prior and into W.W.II, Britain’s logistical basics also scored several own goals. [Ref Wackett’s 30s tour of Europe, the UK and the US. His friend at Bristol couldn’t explain why Bristol engines could be licenced to Eastern Europe but not for production in Australia. SBAC (according to Wackett) wanted customers in the Empire, not shadow factories. When war came, Britain was unable to meet their own schedule for sample and pattern Beauforts to Australia (and, IIRC, Blenheims to Canada – certainly CanCar Lysanders awaited Bristol built engines for completion.)]

Britain had to give stuff to Russia; making shortages at home, and critically in the Empire. Understandably, Britain failed to supply pre-war commitments of munitions to Canada and Australia, while attempting to block the acquisition of US munitions to Australia. Canada had to fight tooth and nail to get obsolete Stranraers and then soon-obsolete Lysanders and Hurricanes into production. C.G.Grey castigated Australia for licence producing the NA-16 as the Wirraway despite Britain being unable to suggest any alternative British design to produce. He didn’t seem to mention that Miles’ later shortfall in Master production (whose fault I don’t know) meant the UK had to stock up on pre-lend-lease Harvards at cash-on-the barrel prices that couldn’t be afforded. Some of these transactions were paid for by Naval bases.

Likewise Hudsons, as the UK failed to produce enough adequate maritime reconnaissance bombers for home or the Colonies; Look to Lockheed for leadership there.

I certainly wouldn’t castigate the British planners for being unable to fight both Japan and the Axis in Europe – it was a bigger war than any feared and a worst case scenario; but to pretend – even for a moment – that resources were adequate with enough over for temporary mate Joe is simply insupportable.

Bomber Command mounted the first 1,000 aircraft raid.

Bomber Command dropped almost four times more tonnage of bombs than the US 8th

Unfortunately prior to Butt’s report, most of that was used unearthing potatoes in German fields – despite the bravery of the men of Bomber Command, they didn’t have the training, equipment or analysis to have any meaningful effect for the most part.

I’m no advocate of the excess claims of accuracy made for the Eighth Air Force, but prior to 1942, due to the inability to press home attacks in daylight as planned and intended, Bomber Command was mainly a boost to Allied morale and was far from doing the damage even the most sceptical British planners minimally hoped for.

Even photo recon was a disaster initially, famously and embarrassingly RAF Blenheim shortfalls were made good by that awkward privateer Sidney Cotton and his civil, American, Lockheed 12 with a photo-raid for naval pictures just after the war’s start.

70% of German fighter production confronted the Allied bombers

Any inclusive analysis of the German war recognises the Germans lost their war on the Eastern Front, despite our best efforts in the west. That’s where the majority of their resources were directed and lost from Stalingrad onward.

Interestingly, on a ratio of aircrew to bombs carried, the most efficient bomber of the war was the Mosquito; two tons of bombs, two crew. Which makes the B29 – average bomb load, six tons; eleven or twelve crew; inefficient.

You missed my reference to the Mosquito earlier? Be that as it may, the Mosquito couldn’t have done what B-29s did do in crippling Japan. The US used the remarkable Mosquito, but in the PR role, as they used the Beaufighter in the night fighter role. This was less to do with logistical success (see alertken’s earlier on the Beau) and everything to do with the US missing specialised types for those roles.

As I mentioned earlier Australian Mosquito production was a disgrace; in Australia there were some pretty stunning blunders too.

I’d be interested in alertken’s input but the entire Empire’s effort in switching from a peacetime economy in the 1930s to full war production was outstripped massively in speed and size by the US starting later.

Logistics and production fact – Britain could not and did not produce enough advanced trainers; maritime reconnaissance types or enough bombers to divert to use to keep the U Boats down, and Britain fed and oiled. The provision of adequate aircraft in adequate numbers for the RN was a disaster, thankfully alleviated by US supply, as all the other shortfalls were.

I’m no uncritical fan of the US (or anywhere else) but when it counted they gave the UK and the Empire the tools to do the job.

Happy to debate and discuss the story, histories and views, but sorry, not interested in simplistic one-eyed parochialism from cherry picked partial data.

Regards,

(The Wiki Operation Downfall is helpful).

UK also ordered in 11/44 2 Wyvern prototypes to RAF escort standard. Then there’s the precise duplication of Centaurus/Hawkers by Griffon/Supermarines, Seafang/Spiteful, all overlapping proven Pacific Corsairs/Hellcats, more imminent Cats. UK clearly would not have produced and deployed all of these things. Industrial “Insurance” was standard UK practice…but by about 10/44, the German War likely to be over by Christmas, UK started to de-militarise its industrial effort. The London Production Group, for example, ceased Halifax, (c.)11/44, and returned to Buses. Yet we pressed on with new aircraft types, and that massive Strike Carrier build programme, which clearly could not be in Theatre for the schedules of Operations Olympic (Oct.’45) and Coronet (Spring,’46).

So, either: left hand: right hand comms. error. Or…strong Force out East would be needed >1947…facing off against…whom? FDR had no intention of ever “losing” China, nor Churchill of leaving India or Malaya, nor the Free Administrations of France/Netherlands of leaving Indo-China/Dutch East Indies. In all those places Uncle Joe was sponsoring local “Freedom Fighters”, despite being neutral re. Japan.

If I were a What If fiend I would revise OP’s Q to “how would they all fare” against 1946/47 “Secret Projects” from another place.

Interestingly, on a ratio of aircrew to bombs carried, the most efficient bomber of the war was the Mosquito; two tons of bombs, two crew. Which makes the B29 – average bomb load, six tons; eleven or twelve crew; inefficient.

But incredibly effective, especially in the fire bombing and A bomb missions – and that’s what counted.
Counting which type of bombers dropped which amounts of bombs doesn’t always work out, for example the B-29 didn’t enter service until 1944 so it could be said to have achieved a huge amount in the year plus that it saw of WWII.
I guess it’s ironic that the Superfort saw about its own downfall glory wise, it ended a war which if it went on longer would have proved how good it really was.

Production/Logistics ? Yes, I know about that.

5,000 tanks and 3000 Hurricanes produced and sent to Russia plus artillery and motor vehicles. All of this while we were arming ourselves.

Bomber Command mounted the first 1,000 aircraft raid.

Bomber Command dropped almost four times more tonnage of bombs than the US 8th

70% of German fighter production confronted the Allied bombers

Two million German personnel were engaged on the ground against the Britisah and Americans aircraft.

Yes, the Americans did fight the good fight in the Pacific. They didn’t need our help in the air/sea war but, they did on land. The British & Commonwealth 14th Army in Burma irrespective of American propaganda, took on and defeated 750,000 Jap soldiers.

Interestingly, on a ratio of aircrew to bombs carried, the most efficient bomber of the war was the Mosquito; two tons of bombs, two crew. Which makes the B29 – average bomb load, six tons; eleven or twelve crew; inefficient.

John Green

The industrialisation points, and types’ comparative merits.

Lincolns, when encountered by the SAC B-29 crews deployed for the Berlin Airlift, were dubbed Abrahams. RAF was very happy to receive B-29 in 1950, even though AWA Lincoln remained in new-build production into 1951! Pressurisation, big-Power, improved nav/comms: this was a remarkable achievement for a design based on 1940 technology. MAP in 1942 explored licence production (as Vickers V.441), but settled on Windsor. UK assumed that USAAFE Very Heavies (others were in hand – Martin XB-33A (briefly), Convair B-32) would operate here (Langford Lodge, Stansted and, subject to the conspiracy theory, ex-Fairey Great West) and (may) have presumed some would be in RAF Service in the spoof/snoop/mine roles assigned to RAF B-17/B-24.

The King’s Forces received 2,445 B-24, but did not use them as Strategic Bombers ex-UK. UK’s industrial effort on Heavies was massive: 2/3/44 SecState. for War: “RAF programme is already employing more than the Army(’s) I dare say that there are as many engaged in making heavy bombers as on the whole Army programme”. 7% of UK war effort {12% in ’44/5 “measured (as) production and combat man-hours” R.Overy,Why the Allies Won,P128}. It dipped into the same pool of Allied-controlled materials that became B-anything. The ak theory why we persevered, expensively, when B-s would have been free, is that the Combined Bomber Offensive was core, key, central to the politico-strategic Top Table notion that was later the key to a solo-UK Bomb. In ways opaque to humans, but clear to Mandarins, UK “influence” would have been diminished if we were mere mercenaries in US kit.

Australian manpower was of more value to the Allies as Diggers: shifting stuff over sub-infested oceans, and all the rest of industrial pain need not be taken, just to convert some material into product down under, by fit young men better employed using, than making, kit. So Oz Aero-output was less than Canadian – sitting shippingless on, e.g. bauxite.

The Official History/Civil Series Volume on N.American Supply is the least cited: is it sufficient here to note that Canada’s financial contribution, in Lend/Lease and in UK’s 1946 Reconstruction Loan, was very heavy, expressed per capita?

It’s a safe bet that no one in Seattle or San Diego ever expected that the US would be launching raids from the UK.
So both aircraft traded boms for fuel, as would be expected.
And it goes byond the 17 and 24…the B-36 was designed on the same assumption…long range ops from America.

& more recently, B2’s…

Yes, but not in the bomb bay, which was my point.

Doesn’t matter where they’re carried, as long as they could be carried.

Cheers,
Matt

As always, we can count on JDK for a well-reasoned answer free of nationalistic nit-picking.

He’s very correct about the design of the B-17 and 24. When both were on the drawing board, America was not in the war, and because of America’s isolation form Europe and the Far East, any war it might expected to fight was expected to be launched from North America.
Remember the B-17s intercepting the Italian liner Rex, as a demonstration of the USAAC’s capability of destroying an enemy fleet?
It’s a safe bet that no one in Seattle or San Diego ever expected that the US would be launching raids from the UK.
So both aircraft traded boms for fuel, as would be expected.
And it goes byond the 17 and 24…the B-36 was designed on the same assumption…long range ops from America. It was adapted to its SAC role as the political landscape had changed by the time it was ready to be fielded. In other words, it was not designed for the “Cold War”.

As far as two pilot crews, remember the Americans had the luxury of a large population…it could not only afford to put two pilots in a plane, but to require (usually) that both had two years of university.

Did the RN have carriers earmarked for a Pacific (as opposed to a SEA) war?
I’m not aware of any RN ships or aircraft used in the “island hopping” campaign towards Japan.
Please correct me if I’m wrong..

RN had ships attached to the big US fleets. I read something recently that listed some of them, but I can’t tell you which ships right now.

Edit, here ya go:
http://www.ww2pacific.com/britships.html

The fleet included 17 aircraft carriers (with 300 aircraft), four battleships, 10 cruisers, 40 destroyers, 18 sloops, 13 frigates, 29 submarines, 35 minesweepers, other kinds of fighting ships, and many support vessels.

What a good thread. Full of geeky facts and figures.

Yup!

I know a bit more about the B17 and the B29. As bombers – their design purpose, they weren’t much good. It seems to me that they were designed to provide comforts for the crew rather than an unhappy time for Jerries and Japs. Their payload was limited. In Europe, the Lanc could carry over twice the load of a B17.

Which means you’ve misunderstood their design purpose. The B-17 was designed as a long range bomber to fly from the continental US and attack overseas. The British bombers in contrast were ‘short legged’, but more heavily armed as the British expectation was for a European continental war so where they were used as per design, they were both fit for their purpose.

Thank heavens for the B-24, which you don’t even mention, but literally saved Britain’s Bacon coming to the UK with the VLR maritime patrol, and all the other roles it undertook for the US and Commonwealth.

As to the B-29, I’m not even going to argue the quibble over internal or external payload – you may as well cast all British bombers as failures as they didn’t carry two Tallboys!

The point (in W.W.II) for the B-29 was that it was able to be adapted to drop the right kind of bombs to lay waste to Japanese cities in some of the largest raids in history – outstripping anything done in Europe by Bomber Command. Add to that its adaptation to dropping two different kinds of atomic bombs in action, one of the few occasions a single bomber has had a decisive role in the conduct of the war, and the dismissal drops away.

As to crew comfort, all the US types and the only British four-engine heavy were designed with two pilots, while the Lancaster and Halifax used once for all-night raids. We are all aware of valiant pilots flying their aircraft back against huge odds, or untrained crew taking over – the corollary, of how many aircraft and crews were lost because of the loss or fatigue of that single pilot is rarely considered.

British bombers had long bomb-bays rather than tall because they were expected to carry torpedoes (but AFAIK, never did in action) and open fuselage areas for a secondary role in trooping. The B-17 could carry torpedoes underwing, and didn’t need the configuration the British heavies did. Because Short decided to have a divided bomb-bay and Handley Page used wing cells for some of the load, both types were restricted in the loads they could carry once bombs got bigger. In all cases, each bomber US and British found new uses – some planned, some not that the original design.

Had Tiger Force become real (as another poster has asked) the critical question is where it was going to operate from – the range question had been partly solved by better fuel management in design and operational technique, training and fuel quality. Flight Refuelling was never needed in reality for those reasons, although it might’ve answered some other questions (Atlantic VLR, but at the cost of two bombers for one patrol).

The real location issue was that the Commonwealth didn’t have SeeBees, and while the Commonwealth was as capable of capturing Islands to become bases as the US, the potential conversion rates was nothing like the same. While MacArthur was a personal glory-hunter and actively sidelined non-US participation, it would’ve taken a very magnanimous US organisation to provide the British and other allied with bases ready to use when they already had B-29s ready to go on them, rather than inferior albeit ‘debugged’ British bombers.

FWIW, I also rate the British designs as important and significant as well, but the nationalistic ‘ours good, theirs inadequate’ on either side I don’t care for, especially when patently untrue.

One can also argue the single pilot question both ways up, in terms of losses-cost of trained pilots, but the real punchline their was to go to only two crew with speed, and we know what that was.

As has been previously mentioned the B29 suffered dreadfully from reliability and maintenance problems due primarily to it having been rushed into service before all the gremlins were eliminated. Considering this point, the B29 was a bit of a liability

The Battle of Kansas was a particular example of the US’ rapid industrialisation, something no programme in the UK came near, IMHO (over to alertken) and again, I don’t agree. The B-29 was in effective frontline service as a next-generation bomber in 1944. Barnes Wallis’ bomber to carry his big bombs never left the drawing board; the Lincoln was a bigger Lancaster, not a new generation type, and the Air Ministry were still funding the Windsor – a fantastic waste of resources. I think the Lancaster and Lincoln would’ve been great bombers in the Pacific, but not decisive.

Note also that the Canadian contribution in production and Squadrons would have been one of the two largest national efforts; but whatever way you cut it, nothing the size of the US naval and army / air force contribution.

Tough though it might be to swallow, the Commonwealth’s potential contribution was neither essential nor likely decisive. Australians learn that Britain was fundamentally overstretched by the loss of Singapore and the bombing of Darwin and Broome. Canadians note that Britons fail to remember much of the funding of Lend-Lease came from Canadian coffers and their production of Corvettes and Lancasters is often overlooked. As the Australian PM Curtin said, “We look to America” and we were able to get the munitions to do the job from there. There may still be some illusion of production adequacy in the UK, despite lend lease Libs for the RAF et al, but it’s not shared elsewhere.

The fact remains the US won the Pacific war by logistics. The Commonwealth wasn’t capable of doing so in the time, or probably even a lot longer. Logistics might not be as glamorous (like fuel management skills) as experimental jet fighters and flight refuelling, but it’s what wins – or loses – wars.

Regards,

Considering this point, the B29 was a bit of a liability.
John Green

I think you’re too harsh.
Simply…could any other bomber do what the B-29 did?

I don’t see Fortresses, Liberators or Lancs doing it. And if they tried, what would their losses be?

Yes, but not in the bomb bay, which was my point.

Hate to tell you this, but there was a B-29 configured to carry Grand Slam, and another that carried two Tall Boys under the wings (pic half way down this link http://www.google.co.uk/imgres?imgurl=http://en.valka.cz/files/b29_se_dv_ma_pumami_tallboy.jpg&imgrefurl=http://en.valka.cz/viewtopic.php/t/35123&usg=__qXtThTw06CmTL7svttaxkt4BfGE=&h=370&w=470&sz=33&hl=en&start=13&zoom=1&um=1&itbs=1&tbnid=SP9ARQtbtnq0mM:&tbnh=102&tbnw=129&prev=/search%3Fq%3Db-29%2Btallboy%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DN%26rlz%3D1T4ACAW_enGB337GB337%26tbm%3Disch&ei=o0IKTrKiOonAhAeO_pz0Dw). One offs yes, but proved the feasibility of carrying the weapons.
The Americans did seem to favour the shorter bomb bays, but they were taller than the British counter-parts, maybe carrying more but smaller bombs was the USAAFs’ favoured approach. Crew comfort, and thus ease of working together as a team to help toward the mission objective and the aircrafts’ self defence was very important.
the B-29 firebombing campaign aguably caused more physical damage than the Atomic bombs and one of the raids is regarded as the most destructive in history.

What a good thread. Full of geeky facts and figures. I don’t know much about the Lincoln. I know a bit more about the B17 and the B29. As bombers – their design purpose, they weren’t much good. It seems to me that they were designed to provide comforts for the crew rather than an unhappy time for Jerries and Japs. Their payload was limited. In Europe, the Lanc could carry over twice the load of a B17.

The two biggest and most powerful bombs in the world were Barnes Wallis’ Grand Slam and Tallboy. The Lancaster was the only bomber in the world with a bomb bay big enough to carry both these weapons. The B29 couldn’t. As has been previously mentioned the B29 suffered dreadfully from reliability and maintenance problems due primarily to it having been rushed into service before all the gremlins were eliminated. Considering this point, the B29 was a bit of a liability

John Green

Flight Refuelling

Apparantly in 1944 the the Air Ministry issued a contract for the conversion of 600 Lancasters and 600 Lincolns in the flight refuelling role. This was to form the Tiger Force for use against the Japanese mainland.
We did think big back then.:D

As would any piston bomber designed in 1941-42.
IMHO, The B-29 doesn’t get the recognition it deserved because of its connotation with the nuclear attacks and perhaps a bit of jealousy because it was so far ahead of the other allied heavy bombers icons.

I can’t say that I have ever heard anyone with the remotest interest in military aviation history consider the B-29 in that way.

It is widely recognised and acknowledged as being hugely technically advanced and really being the way forward in bomber design.
personally speaking I think of it more for operating off those remote Pacific islands in poor conditions while involved in the massive bombing campaign against Japan, and as a post-war trail blazer in NACA X-plane tests, flight refuelling, and ELINT work as much as the two atomic bomb drops.
However in history you can’t ignore the struggles of a particular design and it did have servicability problems in theatre, not through fault of design, but through having to rush a very advanced bomber into use in very poor ground and servicing conditions with labour used to working on ‘non-electric’ aeroplanes.
Korea obviously was a turning point as the jet fighters became dominant, and this did catch up with the B-29 on day light raids.

I would say that it is possibly the single most advanced design of any military aircraft (first flight only 18 months after Lancasters’), when the RAF introduced the Washington into service in 1950 as a ‘stop gap’ it made the Lincoln appear stone aged!

Making the assumption in OP’s post where would the RAF have been based at that point in the war? And how would that have affected what was used? And how effective would it have been against mainland Japan. I am trying to draw lots of diverse bits of information together here.