Report on China's ASBM worth a read i guess

Not a direct comparison of any submarines or even i guess giving any useful performance figures for submarines however

as the debate between SSK etc is going it might be interesting for people to read the artical below.

http://apac2020.the-diplomat.com/feature/the-next-arms-race/

I don’t mean to interfere, but I think the term kt refers only to blast power/radius of the shock wave. But a nuclear bomb’s destructive power is made up of the shock wave (primarily, some 30% IIRC), heat emission (another 30%) and radiation fallout (20%). In this sense, the H bomb is indeed more destructive. I may be wrong though, someone could perhaps confirm?

Kt is Kt – even TNT will do if you can produce enough Kt with it.

Hydrogen (fusion) bombs allow higher Kt with smaller size bombs. Otherwise you will need large transport aircraft to deliver each bomb.

The Dragon’s new claw

BY : Rajeswari Rajagopalan (The writer is a senior research fellow at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi)

The US office of naval intelligence report of August 2009, titled ‘The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics,’ reveals that China is close to developing the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) system. If China succeeds, it could alter the military equation in the Asia-Pacific region.

Development of ASBM systems is particularly significant given that it will have the capability to defeat US carrier strike groups operating in the region, making it a ‘no-go-zone’ for the US and other advanced navies.

The anti-ship missile systems are believed to be using the modified DF-21 missile that has better accuracy and can carry nuclear warheads big enough to inflict damage on large naval vessels. The missiles, reportedly with a range of 2,000 km, covering the second chain of islands, are aided by a network of satellites, radar and unmanned aerial vehicles that can locate US ships and then guide the weapon, enabling it to hit moving targets.

The employment of a complex guidance system, low radar signature and maneuverability makes its flight path unpredictable, thereby making the tracking systems ineffective.

While there may be scepticism among analysts as to whether China has advanced to such a high level of sophistication, Dai Xu, a Chinese military expert, who spoke to ‘Global Times’ (China) said, “China is indeed developing anti-ship ballistic missiles. It is not a secret. During the 60th anniversary National Day military parade, China exhibited such missiles.”

He however added that these systems need not necessarily have a ‘killer’ effect, capable of defeating the US fleet, as has been made out in several reports. While one may agree with such an argument, what has been worrying is Beijing’s increasingly aggressive behaviour in the seas even against the US and Japanese naval vessels and thereby the potential of these missile systems to create difficult situations in the future.

One of the latest instances of such aggressive behaviour is that of the March 2009 incident in which US Navy reported that five Chinese ships harassed the US submarine surveillance vessel ‘USNS Impeccable’ in the south China area.

Pentagon reports suggests that there were at least half a dozen such incidents in the very same week, where US surveillance vessels were “subjected to aggressive behaviour, including dozens of fly-bys by Chinese Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft.”

Chinese assertiveness, based on China’s claim to the entire South China Sea as its territory and creating conflictual situations with several countries, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, could lead to increasing tensions and possible accidents in the seas.

Need for agreement

Although there is scope for these discussions in the 1998 US-Chinese military maritime safety agreement, the two sides have not been able to address these incidents in a useful manner. The US has been seeking an incidents at sea agreement, similar to the 1972 US-Russian Incidents at Sea Agreement.

The trend in Chinese military strategy is worrisome. One of the key areas that China has focused on in the last few years relates to the area denial strategy. Such a strategy, restraining the ability of another country to use a particular space or facility, will allow China to create a buffer zone around its land and maritime periphery which in turn will increase the difficulty for other states to operate close to Chinese mainland.

Chinese sea denial capability is essentially enforced through its growing submarine force. China has a force of 62 submarines, including 12 new and advanced Kilo-class Russian submarines, in addition to different classes of domestically-developed diesel submarines and several nuclear-powered attack boats.

It also has a significant number of surface combatants, including air-defence guided missile destroyers such as Luyang-II and Luzhou class vessels, several powerful multi-role vessels (Sovremenny class destroyers) like Hangzhou, and a large number of different anti-ship missiles that can be launched from submarines, surface ships and airplanes and even shore-based launchers, such as the SS-N-22 Sunburn and SS-N-27 Sizzler systems procured from Russia.

The US Navy does not yet have an effective way of defending their aircraft carriers against these missiles. In a potential conflict on the Taiwan Straits, the PLAN could possibly destroy some ships of the US carrier battlegroups, including US aircraft carriers.

Development of these weapon systems has upped the ante in the region and beyond. First, development of such capabilities by China could potentially lead to arms race in Asia, with countries wanting to develop systems that can counter Beijing’s ASBM capabilities.

The US Navy is already looking at responses, in terms of building deep water ballistic defence destroyers. It is moving away from a strategy of building a fleet that would operate in shallow waters near coastlines to developing capabilities for deep sea anti-ballistic defences.

Similarly, Chinese assertiveness in the Indian Ocean region, its increasing presence in all the littoral states, could create tensions with India. Additionally, the Chinese approach to finding techno-military solutions to these problems can lead to a destabilising situation emerging in Asia.

http://idrw.org/?p=195

10kt is 10kt. :rolleyes:

I don’t mean to interfere, but I think the term kt refers only to blast power/radius of the shock wave. But a nuclear bomb’s destructive power is made up of the shock wave (primarily, some 30% IIRC), heat emission (another 30%) and radiation fallout (20%). In this sense, the H bomb is indeed more destructive. I may be wrong though, someone could perhaps confirm?

A 10Kt Atom Bomb is less powerful that a 10kt HydrogenBomb
the bomb droped on Hiroshima was a 10kt Abomb and it destroyed 1/4 of a mile, so you can just imagine what a 10kt HBomb would do exploding 150 meters from, a U.S.B.G.

10kt is 10kt. :rolleyes:

Lastly what where the conditions of the transit….was the boat on a deliberate endurance run or was it tactical on the voyage?. Changing depth frequently, tactical manoeuvering, pumping tanks, driving the periscope etc all takes battery charge – if they weren’t running exercise serials its hardly representative.

AIP shouldnt be considered as anything more than a fairly modest strength battery-charger. It would wrong to think that it confers anything like SSN mobility even for just a period of 60-odd hours..

afaik they didn’t post any details about this transit and the transit route nor did they quote if/how many hydrogen was left when they arrived at rota.

i think nobody here thinks that a ssk with aip is comparable to a ssn but a ssk with aip has huge advantages compared to a ssk without aip. from my point of view patroling in an operation area with 5 kn for 2 weeks without snorkling is an advantage compared to conventional ssk’s.

A 10Kt Atom Bomb is less powerful that a 10kt HydrogenBomb
the bomb droped on Hiroshima was a 10kt Abomb and it destroyed 1/4 of a mile, so you can just imagine what a 10kt HBomb would do exploding 150 meters from, a U.S.B.G.

10KT is child’s play.

The Russians installed 500KT thermonuclear warheads on the SS-N-19.

I believe the smallest warhead on the Kh-22 was 350KT.

:diablo:

CEP of ballistic missiles are what ? 150 meters at best ? Assuming the ship stands still from the time the missile is launched ?

Not a missle expert, but sounds silly when everyone else is developing long range supersonic cruise missiles.

Unless it has megaton nuclear war heads that takes out the whole area. That would be interesting against a US carrier group!!

A 10Kt Atom Bomb is less powerful that a 10kt HydrogenBomb
the bomb droped on Hiroshima was a 10kt Abomb and it destroyed 1/4 of a mile, so you can just imagine what a 10kt HBomb would do exploding 150 meters from, a U.S.B.G.

the german navy itself quoted that during the transit of a u212 sub (u32) from germany to rota (spain) the sub was operating submerged two weeks without snorkling. this happend back in 2006 and i would assume that they also used their computers during the transit 😉

and afaik the german u212 got a towed array sonar. first they planned to use a clip-on solution but later this was changed to a “normal” retractable tas.

From the German coast to Rota is only a 2 week transit if you ARE submerged on AIP!. Also its cold water damn near all the way. HVAC is a major load on an SSK battery and in the warmer climates performance is significantly reduced on the strength of it.

Lastly what where the conditions of the transit….was the boat on a deliberate endurance run or was it tactical on the voyage?. Changing depth frequently, tactical manoeuvering, pumping tanks, driving the periscope etc all takes battery charge – if they weren’t running exercise serials its hardly representative.

AIP shouldnt be considered as anything more than a fairly modest strength battery-charger. It would wrong to think that it confers anything like SSN mobility even for just a period of 60-odd hours..

Yep the 212/214 has a TAS or, at least, the ability to accept one. The CSU90 suite aboard is gradiated out to 48k yards or about 24nm, IIRC, so that puts it at about the 1st CZ in sensor footprint. Good for an SSK.

You need BAMS-equivalent to do the job. Nowhere did I say scrap all existing assets and just use BAMS?. Not sure how you have misread a very simple premise?.

Well, you said “you need BAMS to do that job.” followed by “That being extra and over conventional assets.” Extra normally implies supplementary, not essential. But whatever… I think we’ve recycled the BAMS argument to death now and I’m not interested in pursuing it further.

Are you saying that the fleet boats of the Kriegsmarine didnt have superior transit range than modern SSK’s and didn’t predominantly travel on the surface just because I didnt quote the numbers?.

Let’s rewind this. You said that WW2 subs could “cover far more ocean than today’s boats.” That does not just involve transit time. It also involves the ability to detect targets over a wide area. A MiG-21 can have a much faster transit time than an A-50, but no one would say that a MiG-21 can “cover” anywhere near as much airspace as an A-50. So whether a WW2 U-boat can transit faster than a modern SSK is not the primary indicator that a WW2 U-boat can “cover” as wide an area of ocean. I’ll also note again that the WW2 U-boat is far more vulnerable to aerial and surface detection (via radar or visual) during transit, which means that in wartime it may be forced to spend a great deal of that transit time submerged at a much lesser speed than a modern SSK. That may significantly increase its transit time.

To summarize, whilst a modern SSK may not have the transit speed of a WW2 boat, its capability to detect non-stealth platforms in an area of ocean is many times greater due to improved sensors. So for example, just a few U-212s could potentially do the job of dozens of VIIC’s in terms of monitoring an area of ocean for the presence of aircraft carriers.

The same modern sub can now be detected at a vastly longer range than in WW2 as well.

First of all, even if that statement was true, it would not change the fact that the SSK can detect a carrier at vastly longer ranges and proceed to report its presence.

Now, taking U-212 as an example again, you are going to have an *extremely* difficult time convincing most people that a U-212 at low speeds on battery power is going to be detected at “vastly” longer ranges than a WW2 u-boat. Of course, you can use active sonar – that has improved considerably – but by doing so you present yourself as an obvious target thereby greatly increasing the chance that the SSK will get the first shot… and unlike most WW2 SS a modern SSK actually poses a formidable threat to an escort. He doesn’t have to close in to <1000 meters and fire a spread of straight-running torpedoes whilst praying for a lucky hit. Additionally, you have no idea how effective even Sonar 2087 (in active mode) is going to be against your opponent’s latest anechoic coatings. It’s like asking how an S-400 will perform against an F-22… good luck.

Escorts have gotten significantly stealthier by the way and counter detection/signal intercept systems have increased at the same pace as search sensors.

They have? By how much? Have they increased in acoustic stealth proportionally to submarines, or even a fraction of that? Just taking an example of a common (albeit dated) ASW escort today – the FFG-7: It’s got (comparatively noisier) gas turbines driving a variable pitch propeller (that’s always moving… even at “zero” knots). It has limited sound isolation, no active noise cancellation and no anechoic coating and that’s naming just a few potential acoustic reduction measures. So with that in mind, how does it compare acoustically to a common (but dated) SSK like a Kilo? Let’s not even mention RF stealth…

As for counter detection/signal intercept – what does that have to do with this? The SSK will not be emitting.

Airborne sensors in WW2 were in their infancy. Detection chances against a surfaced U-boat were proportionately lesser than they would be today plus the boats back then had snorts just as todays do.

A modern SSK will not be surfaced unless there is a problem, so surfaced detection range is meaningless. The vast majority of boats in WW2 did *not* have snorkels. Neither the USN nor the RN nor the Soviets ever equipped them, and the Japanese only did small numbers near the end of the war. Only the Kriegsmarine had a significant number – and even then it was about 200 iirc late in the war… still only a small fraction of the total U-boat force.

Then we come back to the simple range equation that the WW2 boat is out on station longer and covers more territory.

See points above.

A modern SSK can monitor a larger area than a WW2 boat could do submerged – even now though an SSK’s footprint is pretty much limited to direct path on the bow, flank and intercept arrays.

Some SSKs have a towed array. Even if they don’t, I hope you aren’t implying that an SSK is incapable of maneuvering on occasion to cover blind spots… an aircraft carrier or escort is unlikely to sneak up behind an SSK.

German U-boats had ESM which sufficed to the threat level posed by the ASV radar of the day

Errr.. for a critical portion of the war the Germans did *not* have esm capable of detecting allied radar. It was one of the most important reasons for the U-boat’s defeat. The Kriegsmarine did not start equipping U-boats with radar detectors until late 1942, and radar detectors capable of intercepting centimetric radars were not available until a year later iirc. That’s a huge amount of time that U-boats had none or limited esm gear – and especially bad when you’re on the surface at night!

As stated above – the advantage in submarine sensors is easily offset by surface vessel sensors and escorts with organic aviation today.

Again, you’re going to have a very hard time convincing people of that… especially when you’re talking about modern 3-4 generation SSKs like Kilos or U212. Escort sensors have improved greatly, but contrary to your claims they have not gotten particularly stealthier (at least nowhere near the extent that SSKs/SSNs have). This means that in most situations the SSK is going to be the one to get the first detection, and likely the first shot, which can often mean the first kill. That is unless you happen to get lucky and catch it while it is snorkeling. To be fair, this is a 1 vs 1 scenario, and since surface ships have a much easier time working together, things will be more “even” if it’s “lone ssk” vs convoy or battle group. But in this context with the SSKs merely acting as sentries that’s not particularly relevant.

Pedantry. The ASBM is a wasted investment if it is ONLY applicable to a situation which isnt even close to being likely in the first place!.

Oh come on. I’ve asked you this countless time now: If Taiwan or Korea is unlikely to happen, then what is?

I actually agree with you that Taiwan is unlikely to turn into a military confrontation… but out of all the possible scenarios, I (and many others) still believe that it’s by far the most probable to occur.

You think you are reading actual real-world performance specifications in the glossy brochures?. OK. You think that the Germans, Greeks, Italians, Koreans and all the rest dont have the experience to factor in a modifier based on their own operational environments?. You think a sub sailing in the Baltic gives identical performance to one operating in the Eastern Med?. More fool you if that is what you think!.

I really don’t care about small performance differences. I do care when someone’s performance figures are off by – quite literally – orders of a magnitude – which yours were (hours vs weeks).

I never said single hours – you just assumed that – I said hours because that is the time unit that battery charge on the boats is usually calculated in and they dont go up as far as weeks with it!.

You said “hours”. I replied with “try weeks.” Instead of clarifying that that’s what you had meant (i.e. Dozens or hundreds of hours), you again replied with “hours.” So there is no need to “assume” what you said. Now, you are simply trying to find an excuse.

Nope. Is one bomber capable of destroying the oppositions capacity to fight?. No it isnt. Is the bomber, individually, a strategic weapon. Nope. Its range allows it to be used to deploy weapons strategically and, if you have WMD in your arsenal, it can be used to deliver strategic weapons. The aircraft itself though is not a strategic weapon.

Vehicle types are often named based on their primary mission. A strategic bomber is a strategic bomber because it is primarily intended to perform the mission of strategic bombing (chiefly destruction of enemy infrastructure), in the same way an interceptor is primarily destined to intercept, tank destroyer to destroy tanks, etc…

Anyway, I really don’t care what your definition is anymore… to me it makes no difference as to the feasibility or infeasibility of an ASBM.

Bottom line though Wilk if this is going to just come down to more pedantry and a thorough investigation of semantics I cant be bothered with it. You also argue with the same style as someone I thought was an utter moron when I argued with him under his original posting name and I have no time for muppets who keep coming back to forums, where theyve been banned, under different posting names.

For the record, I have never posted in this forum under any other name – and I’m being very sincere about that.

I never said single hours – you just assumed that – I said hours because that is the time unit that battery charge on the boats is usually calculated in and they dont go up as far as weeks with it!.

the german navy itself quoted that during the transit of a u212 sub (u32) from germany to rota (spain) the sub was operating submerged two weeks without snorkling. this happend back in 2006 and i would assume that they also used their computers during the transit 😉

and afaik the german u212 got a towed array sonar. first they planned to use a clip-on solution but later this was changed to a “normal” retractable tas.

Your statement contradicts itself. You say “you need BAMS to do that job.” followed by “That being extra and over conventional assets.” So now BAMS is both needed and yet extra? Previously you said BAMS was critical. However, the job could clearly be done without the aid of BAMS. Therefore, BAMS is not critical. “Simple.”

You need BAMS-equivalent to do the job. Nowhere did I say scrap all existing assets and just use BAMS?. Not sure how you have misread a very simple premise?.

The Japanese were an exception as most of their boats were focused on achieving maximum surface performance, but this often came at the expense of submerged performance. They were also one of the least successful sub forces. You conveniently omitted the 9-10 knots cruise speed of U-boats because it proves my statement to be correct.

I didnt omit them I just couldn’t be bothered looking the precise details up so I noted that they were less long-legged than the Japanese boats but much more so than a conventional SSK of today. Are you saying that the fleet boats of the Kriegsmarine didnt have superior transit range than modern SSK’s and didn’t predominantly travel on the surface just because I didnt quote the numbers?.

Utterly absurd statement! For the most part, aircraft carriers (and many other warships) haven’t gotten any stealthier, but the sonar and radar systems capable of detecting them have improved enormously. Find me WW2 hydrophones or airborne radar capable of detecting a carrier at hundreds of kilometers! You can’t. A modern SSK can detect a carrier at ranges that WW2 SS’s could have only dreamed of. As a result, a modern sub can monitor an area vastly larger than one of WW2.

The same modern sub can now be detected at a vastly longer range than in WW2 as well. Unless you will point out where SONAR2087 was fitted to period escorts?. Escorts have gotten significantly stealthier by the way and counter detection/signal intercept systems have increased at the same pace as search sensors. The analogy you are trying to make is deeply flawed.

1) Far lesser susceptibility to air attack, so in contrast to a WW2 SS, it is capable of maintaining speed throughout the day thereby increasing area covered.

Airborne sensors in WW2 were in their infancy. Detection chances against a surfaced U-boat were proportionately lesser than they would be today plus the boats back then had snorts just as todays do. Then we come back to the simple range equation that the WW2 boat is out on station longer and covers more territory.

2) Dramatically improved sensor area. A modern SSK can monitor a vastly larger area than its WW2 predecessor thanks to huge improvements in sonar and esm.

A modern SSK can monitor a larger area than a WW2 boat could do submerged – even now though an SSK’s footprint is pretty much limited to direct path on the bow, flank and intercept arrays. Japanese and Aussie boats with tails change that of course, but, we arent talking about Aussie and Japanese boats here are we!?. German U-boats had ESM which sufficed to the threat level posed by the ASV radar of the day and the visual horizon is pretty much the same limiter now that it was 65 years ago!. As stated above – the advantage in submarine sensors is easily offset by surface vessel sensors and escorts with organic aviation today.

You should take your own advice and not put words into someone’s mouth. I never stated that Taiwan is the only scenario that applies (again, see my mention of a Korean scenario). Taiwan is focused on because it is by far the most likely scenario and hence any use of the ASBM is most likely to be in that situation. I’ve asked you several times now and I’m going to ask you again: Outside of Taiwan and possibly Korea, what other scenario is likely to occur? Why is the ASBM a “wasted investment” if it is applicable to the two most likely scenarios?

Pedantry. The ASBM is a wasted investment if it is ONLY applicable to a situation which isnt even close to being likely in the first place!.

You made a silly generalized statement that “ARH missiles dont get launched and left to do the discrimination all by themselves!. That is a great way of wasting missiles.” I noted an example of where that does happen and thereby proved your statement false. Instead of simply acknowledging that you were proven wrong or ignoring the point thereafter, you go on a tirade which has nothing to do with my response to your original post.

Pedantry. The context was clear and you conjured up some tenuous linkage to a completely different operational environment. So, yep, points for technical accuracy but well done for the display of small-minded pettiness.

1) If proven wrong by actual specifications, you’ll turn around and pretend that they are a conspiracy. Yes, let’s all believe Jonesy’s conspiracy theory that Kockums, HDW/TNSW, DCNS, etc have all independently managed to fool the Germans, Greeks, Italians, Koreans, Turks, Indians, Portuguese etc. Must be one of the greatest conspiracy theories ever devised!

You think you are reading actual real-world performance specifications in the glossy brochures?. OK. You think that the Germans, Greeks, Italians, Koreans and all the rest dont have the experience to factor in a modifier based on their own operational environments?. You think a sub sailing in the Baltic gives identical performance to one operating in the Eastern Med?. More fool you if that is what you think!.

2) Even the figures you present are in the days, not hours as you originally claimed.

I never said single hours – you just assumed that – I said hours because that is the time unit that battery charge on the boats is usually calculated in and they dont go up as far as weeks with it!.

Repeating this over and over does not remove the huge dependency on luck from your strategy.

I never said that it did. I noted the difference between a defensive deployment of a weapon system that depends on luck and an attack strategy that balances risk and reward. Ignore what I write as much as you like, but, dont try to deny that I wrote it!.

Common misunderstanding? You meant to tell us that the Americans, Russians, Germans, British, etc. have had a common misunderstanding all these years? Better let them know that!.

Just because you dont understand it means that they dont?. Thats a fairly big claim to make!.

As for the strategic bomber, its primary mission falls under the definition of strategic bombing (bombing to destroy the opponent’s capacity to wage war) therefore it’s – shock and awe – a strategic bomber!

Nope. Is one bomber capable of destroying the oppositions capacity to fight?. No it isnt. Is the bomber, individually, a strategic weapon. Nope. Its range allows it to be used to deploy weapons strategically and, if you have WMD in your arsenal, it can be used to deliver strategic weapons. The aircraft itself though is not a strategic weapon.

The two phrases do not mean the same thing. English Comprehension 101. A weapon can be part of a larger system and not alter the planning of an opponent.

Again I never said they did mean the exclusively the same thing?. They dont have to for the point to be valid?.

Yes, you did infer it. Which means that, to you, if the weapon fails to deter it becomes useless. In which case, it might as well be dismantled.

Dismantled means they built it in the first place. I’ve already stated just above that I dont believe they would build the weapon unless it could do the job that would be needed of it – that job not being to scare a CVN out of the Taiwan straits but, rather, to stop USN carriers from breaching the first island chain without tacit agreement!. That is what an ASBM, done properly, would be capable of!.

Bottom line though Wilk if this is going to just come down to more pedantry and a thorough investigation of semantics I cant be bothered with it. You also argue with the same style as someone I thought was an utter moron when I argued with him under his original posting name and I have no time for muppets who keep coming back to forums, where theyve been banned, under different posting names. So reply if you wish, but, I’ve made all the points I need to on the original topic so dont be suprised if you get the last word ok?!

Carriers. Theatre entry. Both cases. Simple.

If only all problems could be reduced to one or two word sentences…

I dont recall saying that ALL you needed was BAMS….I said you need BAMS to do that job. That being extra and over conventional assets.

Your statement contradicts itself. You say “you need BAMS to do that job.” followed by “That being extra and over conventional assets.” So now BAMS is both needed and yet extra?

Previously you said BAMS was critical. However, the job could clearly be done without the aid of BAMS. Therefore, BAMS is not critical. “Simple.”

Look at the equivalent sized WW2 German and Japanese boats. The Japanese were doing 14,000 miles at 16knts on the cruise, German boats less but still far in advance of an SSK of today because their mission back then was different.

The Japanese were an exception as most of their boats were focused on achieving maximum surface performance, but this often came at the expense of submerged performance. They were also one of the least successful sub forces.

You conveniently omitted the 9-10 knots cruise speed of U-boats because it proves my statement to be correct.

Sensor efficiency is meaningless because that of surface vessels has kept pace with that of submarines.

Utterly absurd statement! For the most part, aircraft carriers (and many other warships) haven’t gotten any stealthier, but the sonar and radar systems capable of detecting them have improved enormously. Find me WW2 hydrophones or airborne radar capable of detecting a carrier at hundreds of kilometers! You can’t. A modern SSK can detect a carrier at ranges that WW2 SS’s could have only dreamed of. As a result, a modern sub can monitor an area vastly larger than one of WW2.

To state that an SSK of today is covering more territory than the old wolfpack hunters of WW2 is simply a false statement.

The only statement that is false is yours. In your quote of my post, you deliberately omitted the part where I stated why a modern SSK can monitor a far larger area of ocean than its WW2 counterpart. Here it is again:

1) Far lesser susceptibility to air attack, so in contrast to a WW2 SS, it is capable of maintaining speed throughout the day thereby increasing area covered.
2) Dramatically improved sensor area. A modern SSK can monitor a vastly larger area than its WW2 predecessor thanks to huge improvements in sonar and esm.

If you are going to try putting words in my mouth dont blame me if they are wrong!. You said that this system was relevent only to Taiwan. I pointed out the fallacy in that logic. The system would, by necessity, have to have a wider employment i.e anti-access otherwise the failure to materialise of the one-specific scenario, that is an enabler for the weapons system, reduces the weapon to wasted investment. The notional ASBM, naturally, has wider theatre impact that just Taiwan and the attempt to skew the argument to just that one scenario is stupid.

You should take your own advice and not put words into someone’s mouth. I never stated that Taiwan is the only scenario that applies (again, see my mention of a Korean scenario). Taiwan is focused on because it is by far the most likely scenario and hence any use of the ASBM is most likely to be in that situation. I’ve asked you several times now and I’m going to ask you again: Outside of Taiwan and possibly Korea, what other scenario is likely to occur? Why is the ASBM a “wasted investment” if it is applicable to the two most likely scenarios?

A bloody air-air missile?

You made a silly generalized statement that “ARH missiles dont get launched and left to do the discrimination all by themselves!. That is a great way of wasting missiles.” I noted an example of where that does happen and thereby proved your statement false. Instead of simply acknowledging that you were proven wrong or ignoring the point thereafter, you go on a tirade which has nothing to do with my response to your original post.

You read that in a magazine did you?. Using HVAC in this region, if for no other reason than keeping the computers cooled, you contend that you get 6 days on a full battery charge at a steady 4-5knts before a snort?.

OK, there is no corroboration possible here because this kind of performance data is not public source. So I’ll leave it to say that I believe your figures sound like brochure values of ‘test conditions’ and not operational figures with hotel loads imposed – in reality you are looking at high discretion periods of 60-70hrs, at a few knots, between snorts and that doesnt cover much territory!. Also note that prevailing currents, like the Kuroshio out to the west, can get up to 2-2.5knts. Steaming in to 2.5 knts on the bow with revolutions set for 4-5knts doesnt get you much more than steerageway!.

Wow. You’ve only shown two things here:

1) If proven wrong by actual specifications, you’ll turn around and pretend that they are a conspiracy. Yes, let’s all believe Jonesy’s conspiracy theory that Kockums, HDW/TNSW, DCNS, etc have all independently managed to fool the Germans, Greeks, Italians, Koreans, Turks, Indians, Portuguese etc. Must be one of the greatest conspiracy theories ever devised!
2) Even the figures you present are in the days, not hours as you originally claimed.

I had said that I’d explained it as simply as possible several times. I didnt quote anything because if you are not understanding the concept by now its likely a few more lines of copied text aren’t going to help!. I’ll try and put together a reading list for you so the concepts become clearer if you like?.

You didn’t quote anything because you were unable to prove that your strategy did not rely completely on luck. If you had been able to do so, you would have quoted my five points and presented a clear counter-argument. Instead, all you’ve been able to do is spout rhetoric.

Sarcasm again?. Deceptive maneouver is an elementry part of naval warfighting and has been for centuries. Assigning resources to such a tasking in support of strategic objectives is hardly a revolutionary concept?.

Repeating this over and over does not remove the huge dependency on luck from your strategy.

Common misunderstanding. The term ‘strategic bomber’ is a contraction. It is more properly ‘strategic-range bomber’ as the individual bomber itself is scarcely a strategic platform. It just has the range to be considered as a platform capable of employment in a strategic system i.e within the framework of the Strategic Air Command.

Common misunderstanding? You meant to tell us that the Americans, Russians, Germans, British, etc. have had a common misunderstanding all these years? Better let them know that!

As for the strategic bomber, its primary mission falls under the definition of strategic bombing (bombing to destroy the opponent’s capacity to wage war) therefore it’s – shock and awe – a strategic bomber!

OK you clearly need the help!

Says the guy who is inventing conspiracy theories.

Weapons ‘that alter the strategic planning of an opponent’ ARE ‘weapons that are part of a strategic system’.

The two phrases do not mean the same thing. English Comprehension 101. A weapon can be part of a larger system and not alter the planning of an opponent.

Did I say that or even infer it?. Nope.

Yes, you did infer it. Your own posts:

You need to understand that the power of the weapon is not in sinking carriers, but, in keeping them so far offshore that the carriers are rendered impotent. If they cant do that they offer nothing more than the conventional missiles

To develop a weapons system like the ASBM and use it to try and take potshots at carriers steaming around Taiwan is preposterous. That is why the system would not be used for that. The Chinese understand that just as the Americans do. This is why it is talked about as an anti-access weapon.

Which means that, to you, if the weapon fails to deter it becomes useless. In which case, it might as well be dismantled.

Jonsey, you appear to be wasting your time.

I just asked you: If it’s not Taiwan, then what is it? In the Soviet case, national survival was at stake. In the Chinese case, it’s additional US air support for Taiwan. Colossal difference.

Carriers. Theatre entry. Both cases. Simple.

Fighters and bombers, surface warships and submarines are not “squadrons of MPA aircraft and UAVs.” Even if we pretend that fighters and bombers are, that still doesn’t account for a large portion of carriers/capital ships detected/sunk that they were not responsible for… and even some of those that were sunk by air power were in fact initially detected and tracked by submarine or other sources (e.g. the Yamato). Clearly the fact is that these assets were capable of doing the job you claim couldn’t be done, and they did it with far lesser capabilities than their successors possess today (not to mention the variety of new systems which can also do the task eg. Long range passive sonar).

I introduced the need for long range passive sonar as part of the detection assets required for one!. I dont recall saying that ALL you needed was BAMS….I said you need BAMS to do that job. That being extra and over conventional assets. You can try and make out that surface ships and submarines are every bit as important as a BAMS-like system if you wish, but, to that I’d point out the limited sensor footprint of those assets and, especially in competent blue-water capable surface platforms, the paucity of assets the PLAN has to call on.

Sensor efficiency is extremely important. Claiming otherwise indicates that you have no real understanding of this topic. Even the “covers far more ocean” claim is far from the truth. The typical fleet boat, for example, had a cruise speed of 9-10 knots. Exceeding this speed for any significant amount of time would dramatically increase the risk of running out of fuel….As a result, a modern SSK will be far more effective in detecting enemy movements than the WW2 boats before it.

No. Look at the ‘average’ SSK today – a Type 209. Bout 1800tons displacement – good for about 8000 miles on surface transit at about 10knts. An uncomfortable 8000 miles too. Look at the equivalent sized WW2 German and Japanese boats. The Japanese were doing 14,000 miles at 16knts on the cruise, German boats less but still far in advance of an SSK of today because their mission back then was different. They were designed to run on diesels on the surface – they were Submersible Ships, SS’s, as opposed to the true submarines we have today. Sensor efficiency is meaningless because that of surface vessels has kept pace with that of submarines. The gradiant that existed in WW2 still exists today more or less. To state that an SSK of today is covering more territory than the old wolfpack hunters of WW2 is simply a false statement.

So now your argument has come down to “the war is not going to happen so this is a waste of money!”.

If you are going to try putting words in my mouth dont blame me if they are wrong!. You said that this system was relevent only to Taiwan. I pointed out the fallacy in that logic. The system would, by necessity, have to have a wider employment i.e anti-access otherwise the failure to materialise of the one-specific scenario, that is an enabler for the weapons system, reduces the weapon to wasted investment. The notional ASBM, naturally, has wider theatre impact that just Taiwan and the attempt to skew the argument to just that one scenario is stupid.

An AIM-120C has been pitbulled. In it’s fov it sees several clouds of chaff and a MiG. It ignores the chaff and proceeds to hit the MiG. What did it do? Well, whatever it did, it must be impossible since Jonesy said so!

A bloody air-air missile?. No difference between a ship target in a cluttered enviroment against a mulitpath reflective backdrop and an aircraft in flight is there?. Mix some civil air traffic in the vicinity of your BVR AAM shot – you still take it do you???.

Fixed for you.

My point has been made on that score.

This is completely false:
1) Even non-AIP diesel-electric SSKs have days (usually about 4-6) at ~4-5 knots on batteries.
2) On AIP, it is weeks (~2-3 weeks depending on the system/submarine) at ~4-5 knots.

You read that in a magazine did you?. Using HVAC in this region, if for no other reason than keeping the computers cooled, you contend that you get 6 days on a full battery charge at a steady 4-5knts before a snort?.

OK, there is no corroboration possible here because this kind of performance data is not public source. So I’ll leave it to say that I believe your figures sound like brochure values of ‘test conditions’ and not operational figures with hotel loads imposed – in reality you are looking at high discretion periods of 60-70hrs, at a few knots, between snorts and that doesnt cover much territory!. Also note that prevailing currents, like the Kuroshio out to the west, can get up to 2-2.5knts. Steaming in to 2.5 knts on the bow with revolutions set for 4-5knts doesnt get you much more than steerageway!.

So instead, you’re going to risk elements of your national defense on an attack strategy that relies totally on luck! Brilliant!

This is sarcasm I assume?.

Perhaps you should realize that any weapon system may turn out to be ineffective, regardless of it being offensive or defensive. That’s why redundant systems exist!

Ahh yes it might all never work in the first place?!. Does kind of limit debate that one doesnt it?. For the purposes of the exercise, to study system effects, I think it fairly elementary that we assume all components work and do the jobs they are advertised to. Only then can the system be analysed and functional weaknesses identified.

In other words, you have no way to counter my five points which proved your plan was entirely dependent on luck. That’s why you didn’t even quote them.

I had said that I’d explained it as simply as possible several times. I didnt quote anything because if you are not understanding the concept by now its likely a few more lines of copied text aren’t going to help!. I’ll try and put together a reading list for you so the concepts become clearer if you like?.

Yes, let’s wave our hands around and say “it’s all part of the plan” and therefore there can’t be anything wrong with it!

Sarcasm again?. Deceptive maneouver is an elementry part of naval warfighting and has been for centuries. Assigning resources to such a tasking in support of strategic objectives is hardly a revolutionary concept?.

The classic “standard” definition of Strategic Weapons is weapons that strike at the source of an opponent’s power – his cities and economy. Hence, strategic bombers.

Common misunderstanding. The term ‘strategic bomber’ is a contraction. It is more properly ‘strategic-range bomber’ as the individual bomber itself is scarcely a strategic platform. It just has the range to be considered as a platform capable of employment in a strategic system i.e within the framework of the Strategic Air Command.

These days the definition is generally applied to WMDs – see the SALT treaties for example. Again, defining the term as “weapons that alter the strategic planning of an opponent” is silly since it can apply to anything in that case.

Once again it can’t apply to anything – only systems capable of altering the strategic balance – of which there are very few.

Hilarious! You’ve just changed your own definition of strategic weapons. First, it was “weapons that alter the strategic planning of an opponent”, now it’s become “weapons that are part of a strategic system.” But please, keep going! Maybe at some point you’ll finally stumble upon the correct definition.

OK you clearly need the help!. Weapons ‘that alter the strategic planning of an opponent’ ARE ‘weapons that are part of a strategic system’. See the example above. B-52’s raining JDAM’s on Iraqi positions in 03 were acting in a tactical role….when tasked to SIOP with a fleet of bombers supported by defence suppression assets etc they become strategic as part of a strategic system. Its really quite simple if you take the time to study real warfighting doctrine instead of looking at the pretty pictures in the magazines!.

So according to Jonesy, the Chinese are going to dismantle their (real or not) ASBMs if a carrier is not deterred from trying to enter the Taiwan theatre.

Did I say that or even infer it?. Nope. I dont think that the Chinese would deploy it until they could field a BAMS-peer system capable of exploiting the weapons assets. I dont think they are so stupid to develop a weapon and then see what they could try and do with it!. I’m utterly amazed that, in the absence of such a targetting system, that anyone gives these ASBM stories any credence whatsoever. Guess PT Barnum had it right?!.

What has Taiwan got to do with this?. You are simply trying to obfuscate the fact that, in both cases Chinese and Soviet, the challenge they faced was to prevent USN theatre entry with their carrier groups. As a technical problem the situation is identical. Throwing up all this nonsense about nuclear or conventional attacks is not going to work.

I just asked you: If it’s not Taiwan, then what is it? In the Soviet case, national survival was at stake. In the Chinese case, it’s additional US air support for Taiwan. Colossal difference.

I said, from the kick off, that squadrons of patrol aircraft and UAV’s i.e BAMS-like components were necessary. You howled and said that wasnt the case. WW2 showed this apparently. When it was pointed out the assets that were used in WW2 were precisely squadrons of aircraft you now try taking the point down to the fact that we were talking solely about carriers and not the general problem of finding ships at sea in WW2.

Fighters and bombers, surface warships and submarines are not “squadrons of MPA aircraft and UAVs.” Even if we pretend that fighters and bombers are, that still doesn’t account for a large portion of carriers/capital ships detected/sunk that they were not responsible for… and even some of those that were sunk by air power were in fact initially detected and tracked by submarine or other sources (e.g. the Yamato). Clearly the fact is that these assets were capable of doing the job you claim couldn’t be done, and they did it with far lesser capabilities than their successors possess today (not to mention the variety of new systems which can also do the task eg. Long range passive sonar).

You are the one trying to make a comparison between WW2 sea denial and that of today so you can forget comments of sensor and weapon efficacy!. The simple fact is that WW2 subs were surface raiders running on diesels predominantly. They could cover far more ocean than todays boats, designed for discrete submerged performance, could achieve. Your attempt to draft them in to support your argument about BAMS is exactly ‘bizarre’.

Sensor efficiency is extremely important. Claiming otherwise indicates that you have no real understanding of this topic. Even the “covers far more ocean” claim is far from the truth. The typical fleet boat, for example, had a cruise speed of 9-10 knots. Exceeding this speed for any significant amount of time would dramatically increase the risk of running out of fuel, so patrols were generally conducted at this speed or less. Moreover, due to the constant occurrence or threat of air attack, submarines often spend the better part of the day submerged at a speed of ~2 knots. The modern SSK patrols at about 4-5 knots (although transit is often undertaken at speeds of up to ~8 knots), but has two major advantages:

1) Far lesser susceptibility to air attack, so in contrast to a WW2 SS, it is capable of maintaining speed throughout the day thereby increasing area covered.
2) Dramatically improved sensor area. A modern SSK can monitor a vastly larger area than its WW2 predecessor thanks to huge improvements in sonar and esm.

As a result, a modern SSK will be far more effective in detecting enemy movements than the WW2 boats before it.

Irrelevent is what it is. Unless you are going to say that the weapon system is purely intended for the Taiwan scenario…when its blatantly obvious that Taiwan is not going to be a militarily resolved issue…so the missile is a collossal waste of time and money by your reckoning is it?!.

So now your argument has come down to “the war is not going to happen so this is a waste of money!” Why are you even on this board then? The great majority of weapons and platforms discussed here will likely never be used for anything more than peacetime patrols and blowing up huts! So really they’re all “a colossal waste of time and money!”

Usually because you cant predict the theatre of operations with 100% certainty.

In this case, why would you need to predict it? If Taiwan declares independence, then the road-mobile launchers are moved into that theater. Korean war erupts, and the launchers are moved there. This is not difficult to understand.

Try the obfuscation all you like but the fact is that ARH missiles dont get launched and left to do the discrimination all by themselves!. That is a great way of wasting missiles.

An AIM-120C has been pitbulled. In it’s fov it sees several clouds of chaff and a MiG. It ignores the chaff and proceeds to hit the MiG. What did it do? Well, whatever it did, it must be impossible since Jonesy said so!

So its not required…..unless you want an increased probability of a hit?.

Fixed for you.

As to SSK’s they have very little threatre mobility if they wish to stay discrete – even AIP only gives them a certain number of hours at low power levels before it is depleted and needs refueling.
Hours. All AIP does is charge the battery remember – the more you use the battery the quicker you drain the AIP tanks. Bottom line you get to stay discrete but you dont cover much territory.

This is completely false:
1) Even non-AIP diesel-electric SSKs have days (usually about 4-6) at ~4-5 knots on batteries.
2) On AIP, it is weeks (~2-3 weeks depending on the system/submarine) at ~4-5 knots.

I actually gave you the opportunity to correct yourself when I said weeks. Of course, you decided not to take that opportunity. How someone who repeatedly and arrogantly touts “warfighting 101” does not know such simple facts is beyond me.

You cannot hinge your national defence on weapons that may or may not be effective!. The difference is that attack strategy’s can, and do, balance varying degrees of risk against varying degrees of reward.

So instead, you’re going to risk elements of your national defense on an attack strategy that relies totally on luck! Brilliant!

Perhaps you should realize that any weapon system may turn out to be ineffective, regardless of it being offensive or defensive. That’s why redundant systems exist!

Warfighting 101.

Did you flunk it?

Its been explained to you in very simple terms. If you have a comprehension problem I’d suggest a spell in remedial education.

In other words, you have no way to counter my five points which proved your plan was entirely dependent on luck. That’s why you didn’t even quote them.

The attacker is forced to commit resources, of course, but those resources are committed in support of the strategic aim which is the general idea anyway.

Yes, let’s wave our hands around and say “it’s all part of the plan” and therefore there can’t be anything wrong with it!

Its a standard definition. I said any weapon can be strategic in context not just that any weapon can be strategic!. Convenient misinterpretation on your part?. IF the weapons system is powerful enough to alter the strategic planning of an opponent then, by definition, it is a strategic weapon. If it is not powerful enough then it is not.

The classic “standard” definition of Strategic Weapons is weapons that strike at the source of an opponent’s power – his cities and economy. Hence, strategic bombers. These days the definition is generally applied to WMDs – see the SALT treaties for example. Again, defining the term as “weapons that alter the strategic planning of an opponent” is silly since it can apply to anything in that case.

You really dont understand this do you?. The ‘fighters’ you talk about were the effectors in a strategic system which was the British integrated air defence system. The fighters were tactical but the system they were part of was strategic.

Hilarious! You’ve just changed your own definition of strategic weapons. First, it was “weapons that alter the strategic planning of an opponent”, now it’s become “weapons that are part of a strategic system.” But please, keep going! Maybe at some point you’ll finally stumble upon the correct definition. Not that it will help you, since it still won’t have any effect on the actual capabilities of an ASBM.

No. To develop a weapons system like the ASBM and use it to try and take potshots at carriers steaming around Taiwan is preposterous. That is why the system would not be used for that. The Chinese understand that just as the Americans do.

So according to Jonesy, the Chinese are going to dismantle their (real or not) ASBMs if a carrier is not deterred from trying to enter the Taiwan theatre.

Then by that logic we are perfectly safe from nuclear weapons, since if they fail to provide deterrent everyone will just dismantle them because they failed to deter! Pure lunacy!

This is why it is talked about as an anti-access weapon.

Interesting that you say that considering China’s rapidly growing SSK force is talked about as an anti-access weapon… but those aren’t BAMS so you’ll just pretend that they don’t exist.

This USN is only “kidding around” unless it’s firing nukes? The USN is going to start a nuclear war over Taiwan? If not Taiwan, then what situation do you expect the US to be nuking China that doesn’t involve a Chinese ICBM launch?

What has Taiwan got to do with this?. You are simply trying to obfuscate the fact that, in both cases Chinese and Soviet, the challenge they faced was to prevent USN theatre entry with their carrier groups. As a technical problem the situation is identical. Throwing up all this nonsense about nuclear or conventional attacks is not going to work.

Please point out where I said that their contribution (to the war effort) was meaningless. You made the claim that they were critical in sinking carriers. You were clearly wrong. Now you’ve changed your story into “well they made a contribution doing other stuff.”

Pedantry and obfuscation. I said, from the kick off, that squadrons of patrol aircraft and UAV’s i.e BAMS-like components were necessary. You howled and said that wasnt the case. WW2 showed this apparently. When it was pointed out the assets that were used in WW2 were precisely squadrons of aircraft you now try taking the point down to the fact that we were talking solely about carriers and not the general problem of finding ships at sea in WW2. If you want me to be equally pedantic look back at my post – I stated ‘capital ships’ in my post as there was so, relatively, little anticarrier work done in WW2!.

Bizarre references? Submarines provided one of the greatest contributions to detecting and sinking carriers. According to you, that’s impossible since they are not BAMS! As for operating patterns, do I need to explain to you that sensor and weapon ranges have increased dramatically since then?

You are the one trying to make a comparison between WW2 sea denial and that of today so you can forget comments of sensor and weapon efficacy!. The simple fact is that WW2 subs were surface raiders running on diesels predominantly. They could cover far more ocean than todays boats, designed for discrete submerged performance, could achieve. Your attempt to draft them in to support your argument about BAMS is exactly ‘bizarre’.

If it’s not Taiwan, then what is it? Korean conflict? In either case the theater of operations is relatively small in comparison to the size of the Chinese coast.

Irrelevent is what it is. Unless you are going to say that the weapon system is purely intended for the Taiwan scenario…when its blatantly obvious that Taiwan is not going to be a militarily resolved issue…so the missile is a collossal waste of time and money by your reckoning is it?!.

Why would they need to be spread out to cover the entire coast if the theater of operations only accounts for a portion of the coast?!

Usually because you cant predict the theatre of operations with 100% certainty.

Nope, wrong. Please try again. What part of “supplementary system to improve target identification in a situation where many vessels similar to the target would be in the scan area” is difficult to understand? Obviously, if you’ve got two small frigates and you want to differentiate between them, SAR helps greatly. But this discussion is irrelevant. I presented Moskit as an example that even a small radar decades ago was capable of accomplishing things you implied were impossible.

Small radar….Moskit….really?. What you have inadvertently managed to do is confirm what I was saying. Try the obfuscation all you like but the fact is that ARH missiles dont get launched and left to do the discrimination all by themselves!. That is a great way of wasting missiles.

Even IF the RV seeker has an ISAR mode to correctly define the target in its FoV the fact remains that the missile would need to be launched on a confirmed target box in the first place. That means your ISTAR must be up to the job I originally stated – it HAS to complete the targetting cycle.

Yes, additional information before launch can increase PK. So for any autonomous weapon, it is desirable, but not required.

So its not required…..unless you want a high probability of a hit?.

Hours? Try weeks.

Hours. All AIP does is charge the battery remember – the more you use the battery the quicker you drain the AIP tanks. Bottom line you get to stay discrete but you dont cover much territory.

If if if… funny that for a guy who bashes any strategy that seems to rely on even a hint of “luck,” your own is totally dependent on it.

…and still more obfuscation. I ‘bash’ defensive plans that rely on luck. You cannot hinge your national defence on weapons that may or may not be effective!. The difference is that attack strategy’s can, and do, balance varying degrees of risk against varying degrees of reward. Warfighting 101.

Even if all of that miraculously works out, that STILL doesn’t answer how the SSKs are as valuable to the attacker as to the defender.

Its been explained to you in very simple terms. If you have a comprehension problem I’d suggest a spell in remedial education.

The SSKs are not going to go down without a fight and the ASBMs are still going to hit something. In addition to that the attacker has been forced to commit and perhaps lost a significant number of ASW assets/decoys/SSNs.

SSK’s against SSN’s the gradiant generally favours the SSN….especially if the SSK screen has to come out of the shallows to undertake sea denial. The attacker is forced to commit resources, of course, but those resources are committed in support of the strategic aim which is the general idea anyway.

No one in their right mind uses that as an overall definition of “Strategic Weapons” because, as you yourself agree, any weapon can be used to do that. Therefore by your definition any and every weapon can be defined as a strategic weapon!.

Its a standard definition. I said any weapon can be strategic in context not just that any weapon can be strategic!. Convenient misinterpretation on your part?. IF the weapons system is powerful enough to alter the strategic planning of an opponent then, by definition, it is a strategic weapon. If it is not powerful enough then it is not.

Did you see the Germans and the British redefine their fighters as “strategic fighters” when they forced the other side to switch to night bombing? Of course not! And even if they had, that still wouldn’t have removed their capacity to be used tactically!

You really dont understand this do you?. The ‘fighters’ you talk about were the effectors in a strategic system which was the British integrated air defence system. The fighters were tactical but the system they were part of was strategic. It is a failed comparison with the ASBM because the fighters could be used independently outside of the IADS in tactical roles. The ASBM has no role outside of its system. It is designed for a task – access denial – not just potting ‘small frigates’ 100km downrange!.

Your assertion that a weapon becomes valueless if it fails to alter an opponent’s strategy is preposterous!

No. To develop a weapons system like the ASBM and use it to try and take potshots at carriers steaming around Taiwan is preposterous. That is why the system would not be used for that. The Chinese understand that just as the Americans do. This is why it is talked about as an anti-access weapon.

YOU made up the context of theater denial. I think I’ve repeated this a dozen times now: an ASBM does not become worthless just because a carrier has entered the theater. Claiming otherwise is total nonsense.

You have repeated it a dozen times and been wrong a dozen times. Go and learn something about the nature of warfighting. Understand what anti-access systems are and what their value is. Then you might just expand your mind to the point where you understand why this is not just another antiship missile….IF it is anything more than a Chinese fantasy that the USN have latched onto for a 21st century Missile Gap scare story!.

So because the USN is only ‘kidding around’ and not planning to go nuclear or anything then its fine for the Chinese to just let them into weapons range is it???. That does seem to be what you have written?. I trust you meant something else and its just a little cryptic finding your real meaning?.

This USN is only “kidding around” unless it’s firing nukes? The USN is going to start a nuclear war over Taiwan? If not Taiwan, then what situation do you expect the US to be nuking China that doesn’t involve a Chinese ICBM launch?

They were critical. Squadrons of aircraft were critical in finding all manner of naval targets and identifying them. You are the one trying to make out that if they weren’t trying to find a carrier per se then their contribution was meaningless?.

Please point out where I said that their contribution (to the war effort) was meaningless. You made the claim that they were critical in sinking carriers. You were clearly wrong. Now you’ve changed your story into “well they made a contribution doing other stuff.”

As for your continual bizarre references to submarines do I really need to explain to you the difference between the operating patterns of WW2 boats and today’s submarines in terms of theatre mobility?. You understand what is meant by theatre mobility?.

Bizarre references? Submarines provided one of the greatest contributions to detecting and sinking carriers. According to you, that’s impossible since they are not BAMS! As for operating patterns, do I need to explain to you that sensor and weapon ranges have increased dramatically since then?

Whats the fixation with Taiwan?. I’m talking about defending the Chinese coastline. You NEED to start that a lot farther out than Taiwan!.

If it’s not Taiwan, then what is it? Korean conflict? In either case the theater of operations is relatively small in comparison to the size of the Chinese coast.

What other benchmark is there – the PRC dont tend to build large numbers of advanced missiles when there is a limited scope target set. The USN has less than a dozen CVN’s these days – I’d say thats a limited target set. The whole point about the limited number of missiles is that they need to be spread out to cover the coast ok?

Why would they need to be spread out to cover the entire coast if the theater of operations only accounts for a portion of the coast?!

by all means, keep calling me an idiot!

No thanks, you’re doing a fine job of it yourself.

So what you are saying, just so I get this right, is if Moskit wanted to discriminate targets it needed offboard targetting support via datalink right?!

Nope, wrong. Please try again. What part of “supplementary system to improve target identification in a situation where many vessels similar to the target would be in the scan area” is difficult to understand? Obviously, if you’ve got two small frigates and you want to differentiate between them, SAR helps greatly. But this discussion is irrelevant. I presented Moskit as an example that even a small radar decades ago was capable of accomplishing things you implied were impossible.

True. That is why their users are trained not to volley fire missiles off in the hopes that the onboard seeker will undertake all the discrimination itself, but, rather have a POSID on the target before launch.

Yes, additional information before launch can increase PK. So for any autonomous weapon, it is desirable, but not required.

So are mines. Influence mines are very, very sophisticated these days they can not only tell who friend and foe is, but, distinguish between types of ship and whether the target is advancing or retreating. Maybe you need to brush up on your mine warfare – its not all mooring chains and contact exploders these days!.

What? YOUR example was:

Just like a defensive minefield can be used by an attacking force, on land, to convince defending ground troops of an attack from a false threat axis.

You were comparing SSKs to a defensive minefield on land, not advanced naval mines!

As to SSK’s they have very little threatre mobility if they wish to stay discrete – even AIP only gives them a certain number of hours at low power levels before it is depleted and needs refueling.

Hours? Try weeks.

OK then, slowly, an established SSK barrier line is set out screening for opposition vessels in classic sea denial. It is expecting an attempt to be made to cross its line at some point along its length. If the boats along the line are detected, either by SSN towed-array or SURTASS etc, and attacked at one point….but nowhere else that will be reported back.

If a decoying group start simulating carrier ops near that same position, relying on the inherent low-res of the OTH systems monitoring them that is reported back also. Two seperate reports – one of a hole punched in the SSK barrier line and another of suspected carrier operations at a posit roughly in the same area. How do you think those reports get analysed?. That is how you make the SSK line work for you. If you still cant grasp this then the problem is yours!.

If if if… funny that for a guy who bashes any strategy that seems to rely on even a hint of “luck,” your own is totally dependent on it. Basically, you’re hoping that:

-The SSKs don’t succesfully evade your forces
-Your ASW forces/SSNs prevail against the SSKs, and aren’t destroyed by them
-You’ve identified the line correctly.
-All the SSKs will be attacked and destroyed, and that a single SSK doesn’t survive to deny the presence of a carrier
-The defender decides to launch, despite his strategy being NOT to launch unless there is a confirmation.

Even if all of that miraculously works out, that STILL doesn’t answer how the SSKs are as valuable to the attacker as to the defender. The SSKs are not going to go down without a fight and the ASBMs are still going to hit something. In addition to that the attacker has been forced to commit and perhaps lost a significant number of ASW assets/decoys/SSNs.

OK, more basics it is then, a weapon is strategic when it causes an opponent to alter their strategic planning. Therefore what you say is partially true in that ‘any weapon’ can be strategic, dependent on context,

No one in their right mind uses that as an overall definition of “Strategic Weapons” because, as you yourself agree, any weapon can be used to do that. Therefore by your definition any and every weapon can be defined as a strategic weapon! Did you see the Germans and the British redefine their fighters as “strategic fighters” when they forced the other side to switch to night bombing? Of course not! And even if they had, that still wouldn’t have removed their capacity to be used tactically!

Your assertion that a weapon becomes valueless if it fails to alter an opponent’s strategy is preposterous!

the context is the theatre-denial of carrier strike groups due to the significance of the weapons system needed to challenge such a strike group.

YOU made up the context of theater denial. I think I’ve repeated this a dozen times now: an ASBM does not become worthless just because a carrier has entered the theater. Claiming otherwise is total nonsense.

There has been talk about trying to breach the Three Gorges dam (which would kill millions), & less dramatic talk about destroying as much civilian infrastructure as possible.

Do you think that is appropriate? Or likely to trigger a nuclear response?

In a Taiwan situation I’d try to stay away from civilians as much as possible. Destroy their ability to take Taiwan but don’t **** them off so much they’ll be tempted to do something stupid. Stuff like dam-busting does get looked at though. I read in Schwarzkopf’s biography (think that’s where it was) that during Desert Storm it was planned to knock out dams on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and put Baghdad under water if Iraq used chemical weapons.

Thing is, you either fight to win or you don’t. Now ask yourself what it would take to win conventionally against China and whether they’d put up with it. …

There has been talk about trying to breach the Three Gorges dam (which would kill millions), & less dramatic talk about destroying as much civilian infrastructure as possible.

Do you think that is appropriate? Or likely to trigger a nuclear response?