Revisionism in History ~ discuss

To Bomb, or not to bomb?

The timing was: August,1942, Dieppe Raid rehearsal for assaulting the Atlantic Wall: v.painful. November,1942, v successful landings in Morocco despite assumed attentions from 70 U-boats…but no real opposition on land. December,42 Allies agree Sicily next, expecting to lose 300 vessels, on way to the next one closer to the Heimat, defended even harder: Casablanca Summit agreed the Combined Bomber Offensive to soften up for these landings – only Harris thought it would replace them. If the enemy guessed the beach it would not be as easy as Torch. So let Harris/Eaker try to detach supply: if so, good, if not, turn Heavies into interdictors – which is what Tedder did either side of Overlord. Before mid-44 we could only hit a big target; from late-44 we had some chance of precision, increasing daily as defences were overwhelmed…because they had run out of skilled men, ammo, fuel, food. This becomes a circular argument.
Opponents of area-bombing of Germany/Japan must produce their alternative:
– wait for the atomic Bomb? Adm Leahy, FDR’s right hand, a gunnery man, said it would be a dud;
– wait for starvation by blockade, like last time? We would have to walk in and they would try to make it hurt very hard ;
– go for Counter-Force only: the King’s Bombers lost 55,000 men, 8/9th USAAF much the same, and that was going in high for big targets. Don’t wish to be politically incorrect, but the quality of these young men was of the very highest – more in Bomber Command than all officers of the King in WW1, which drained the flower of a generation. How many more would you spend?
There Was No Alternative.

No apologies for bringing back this interesting thread.

While looking for something else… 😉 I found this footnote on Wikipedia here. The interesting point is a couple of quantifications of German resource devoted to anti-bomber operations; one by Speer. While he was certainly not a witness without agenda, the data is still interesting I think, in light of some of Schorsch’s points.

Gunzinger, A. p.3 The air front played a decisive role in the defeat of Germany. Allied air attacks forced Germany to dedicate vast amounts of manpower and resources to continental air defense, reducing the Germans’ ability to fully support land operations. By 1944 over 800,000 Germans were committed to air defense, including the crews of about 54,000 antiaircraft guns; furthermore, a million Germans were engaged in repairing damage caused by air strikes. In fact, Germany dedicated more forces to air defense than it deployed to counter the Allied campaign in Italy. The air war also caused a significant shift in Germany’s resource priorities. In 1944 more than half of Germany’s industrial base was working to satisfy the Luftwaffe’s needs. Albert Speer, architect of the German war economy, estimated that 30 percent of artillery, 20 percent of heavy ammunition, and over 50 percent of electronics production were dedicated to air defense, depriving frontline ground forces of critical antitank munitions and communications equipment. Production of antitank guns was halved in favor of building more antiaircraft guns.

Fill their boots

We seem all to have said our piece here. Maybe no-one on the “immoral” side has been converted; nor any who believe it had to be done. The point of revisiting all this is to try to understand why these things happened. In the time this thread has run, 3 more UK publishers have invited us to spend £20 to read that today’s RAF fly dinosaurs including useless F.3, ceiling 30,000′, that Dresden was evil, and the CBO was “criminal lunacy”. It is quite easy to get printed to say these things, even if you are a remote philosopher. I have seen nothing to match the tone here, which has been to try to put ourselves in the boots of decision-makers under threat: was it a good idea with the Intelligence to hand? If my job in the Balkans Spring 1941 had been to boot the Brits into the sea quick so my lot could get on with eradicating the bacillus of Bolshevism, I would have razed Belgrade too. Greeks were not keen on Athens being next.
If my job today was to repel Threat to hearth and home, I would need all the help I could get. Some who tell us that Bombing, all Bombing, is wrong are pacifists: that is honourable – turn the other cheek, shame the devil. What is reprehensible is a stance that Bombing is wrong… unless most MPs, voters, members of UN General Assembly study the evidence against the rogue, give 3 written warnings and escalate slowly. Both sides must play by those rules.
Who else remembers a spoof Western movie where a martial arts baddie went into his swirling,yelping routine ready to strike…and the guy in the white hat said aw shucks, pulled out his 6-gun and put an end to it.

Hi Schorsch,

The war would perhaps have ended in August ’45 even without nuclear bombs.

We don’t know. But it didn’t end before, and it didn’t continue after. That’s all the evidence we are going to get, and it’s enough for me – I guess we’ll have to agree differ on this one!

Likewise I don’t agree with your view that the strategic bombing campaign had as little effect on the German war effort as you believe. I do accept that the efforts the Germans achieved were amazing, and the manufacture of Ersatz fuels etc. was also a major achievement; but without the degradation of the bombing, the diversion of men and munitions from the fronts to defending the skies, they would have achieved more with more conventional technology.

We can differ on the degree the bombing campaign had on Germany; but there was an effect. I believe it a significant one without achieving the aim of the total collapse of the German state; you set it much lower – fair enough, we’ll differ!

However, what are your views on this?

Going back to the point […] made at the end on ‘moral erosion’ the start of this thread links to that in that ‘revisionism’ could be seen in part as the regaining of a more peaceful liberal standards outside wartime.

Hence the modern diastase for dropping the atomic bombs when it unarguably saved allied (and probably Japanese) lives, today we can argue or believe there were moral choices that they (particularly Truman) did not see as we do.

I think he was a normal man, but in a wartime situation; he would have seen it as ‘right’ to hit hard to win the war, then to be merciful and compassionate afterwards (witness US efforts at reconstructing Japan, as did the other allies). Today it is easy to agonise over such decisions, thinking: “Did we have to drop the bombs?” – decisions as we look from a society no-longer on such a war footing.

JDK,
I think the bombing campaign on Japan contributed to its surrender, especially because there was nearly no defense against it in the later war stages (while in the beginning the B-29 got considerable losses). We should note here that in summer ’45 battle ships were bombarding the coast and navy fighters joined in for attacks.
But it worked in conjunction with other factors, so especially the total blockade of Japan. The nightmare of the Japanese leadership was that USA continueed war but would not invade, so leaving Japan starving without any possibility to strike back. Additionally the Russians declared war on Japan.
Therefore the surrender of Japan was caused by the overwhelming perception of helplessness. The bombers played a part. The war would perhaps have ended in August ’45 even without nuclear bombs.

Oops!

Sorry, Don, I wasn’t implying that the two things were the same – ‘suicide rather than surrender’ was one cultural issue, and a consequence of the Bushido code; the Cowra breakout was a demonstration of this.

The Kamikaze was something else as well.

Cheers

Special Attack ~ KAMIKAZE

Kamikaze – also “Divine Wind” and “Special Attack”

Although not CBO/ETO, but very much in the context of revisionism in history (or should I more accurately say: one party’s world-view vs another’s), I note James’ passing remark above: “Kamikaze, suicide rather than surrender” (granted, explicitly in the context of the Cowra Breakout). I think it is fair to say Kamikaze is generally thought and spoken of in that language/meaning by the Western mind. Suicide rather than surrender. I have a different take on it.

I assume we all know of the background to Kamikaze in (a) the Samurai tradition [noble warrior who, inter alia, will die for his lord rather than accept defeat] and (b) the legend/fact of the various “Divine Winds” that saved Japan from invasion/defeat from time tom time. In 1995 I spent about 10 days on holiday in Tokyo; my far better half was working and I got to meander about the city. Great fun. One day I wandered into the Yasukuni Shrine. If you ever get a chance to visit this place – DO – it’s remarkable, for its serenity; for it’s museum, history and artifacts (very, very different collection/display philosophy better left for another thread); and for it’s world view. It will take your head away.

There is a section in the museum on “special attack”. It discusses the background, training, tactics and efficacy of “special attack”. I’m relying on memory here, but basically the argument/history presented is …
– Japanese forces were having a hell of a time keeping US forces at bay, their sea and island hopping forces were making inexorable progress
– in particular, damaging US seaborne forces (particularly carriers and invasion fleets) was extremely problematic; the combined defensive firepower of the carrier fleets (AA and carrier based interceptors) was such that Japan’s aviators were suffering enormous losses for little effect
– ie., it had become clear that if you went out in a bomber to attack a US ship, the most likely outcome was that you would be killed and would not damage your target
– some bright spark (or maybe some collective thinking process) came up with a far more efficient and effective solution – given that you were almost certain to die anyway, why not draw on tradition and legend (above) and let a handful of people place single aircraft (and later other things) straight into the target? Only one aircraft/life would be lost with a far higher strike rate
– in other words, it was an efficiency play; and it was remarkably effective; it raised morale on the “defending” (= Japan’s) side, scared the living daylights out of those being struck, and actually caused some significant damage at relatively low cost of the defender’s lives and material

I wonder, isn’t that the stuff of a VC?

http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/

Hi Schorsch,
you’ve made some excellent points (again) as has Ken.

It is more that strategic bombing only works in very special conditions. An enemy embedded in a total system lead by leadership which either wins or dies, will not be scared by bombing. You have to burn them out of the trench.

In most cases, it seems true. But the Military-led totalitarian Japan is the most extreme example we have seen of your definition of ‘enemy’ here. Kamikaze, suicide rather than surrender (look up the Cowra breakout for a really terrible story). Yet a strategic bombing campaign was unarguably successful in forcing the Japanese to sue for unconditional surrender.

The evidence is that there would have been futile but dedicated fighting of an invasion. They would have fought on, to the end. Both the allies and the Japanese recognise this, then and now.

The Japanese were in no way militarily or tactically effected by the atomic bombs; they had not come to terms as a result of the proceeding firestorm bombing, so it can only be regarded as a (perhaps the only) success of strategic bombing.

I do think that was black and white.

Going back to the point you’ve made at the end on ‘moral erosion’ the start of this thread links to that in that ‘revisionism’ could be seen in part as the regaining of a more peaceful liberal standards outside wartime.

Hence the modern diastase for dropping the atomic bombs when it unarguably saved allied (and probably Japanese) lives, today we can argue or believe there were moral choices that they (particularly Truman) did not see as we do.

I think he was a normal man, but in a wartime situation; he would have seen it as ‘right’ to hit hard to win the war, then to be merciful and compassionate afterwards (witness US efforts at reconstructing Japan, as did the other allies). Today it is easy to agonise over such decisions, thinking: “Did we have to drop the bombs?” – decisions as we look from a society no-longer on such a war footing.

Still interesting!

Cowra Breakout

Hard Rain Doesn’t Work Very Effective

– 1939/40: Light Bombers on Warsaw and Rotterdam did the job, and merely by Threat, on Belgium, Denmark and France;

This is a question of definition. Ask the Luftwaffe and I guess they would be surprised of hearing that they had a strategic campaign running. All “strategic” attacks were more or less tactical outreaches. The Luftwaffe was at that time much too busy supporting the army’s ground offensive.

– 1944/45: fire from the air – phosphoric, then atomic – made it impossible to stop invasion of Japan. Expensive no doubt, but the Emperor knew he would lose, so folded;

This is questioned by many. I read historians who said that the direct outlook of being without food and any energy supply in late 1945 actually convinced the Japanese government. Once again, it was not the bombing of the city but mainly the interdiction of transport activity. However, the atomic bomb abd the “terror” attacks on Tokio definetely increased the acceptance of defeat.

– 1944/45: ETO CBO, together with other arms, Intelligence and Economic Warfare, interdicted men and materials, constraining German strength-in-the-field. If Luftwaffe had deployed an UralBomber and/or an AmerikaBomber, the Allies’ decisive logistics advantages would have been eroded;

Topic of discussion and not an easy claim as presented from you. I just state my conditionalised disagreement.

– 1953/90: nuclear MAD worked (this is really 2 Campaigns, ours and theirs, because USSR did not know that NATO would not strike first: indeed archives show discussion several times);

No campaign and no bombers. The deterrence was mainly based on subs and ICBMs and actually really started working after the high age of the Bombers. However, the reason of the “defeat” of SU was economical and deterrence would have been achievable with much smaller defence expenditure. Even a 5000 nuclear warhead SU would have enough power to prevent any NATO attack.

The failed Campaign was on my Mother’s head in London, incendiary/HE, 1940/41, V1/V2, 1944/45 (which also hit Antwerp and Lux – did they panic?) Why so? Feel free to post that she was dim – I won’t take offence; or was putty for profiteers/what you will.
Was there a common factor in the payoff Campaigns, absent in this? Was it belief we would win? Surely not, early-1941?

The Luftwaffe’s campaign definetly was a failure in 1940/41. In 1944/45 it wasn’t realy a campaign, more a retaliation (V-Weapon = Vergeltungswaffe). But still, a failure.

It is not that carpet bombing is uneffective. Vietnam and Gulf War showed its effectiveness in some situations. It is more that strategic bombing only works in very special conditions. An enemy embedded in a total system lead by leadership which either wins or dies, will not be scared by bombing. You have to burn them out of the trench.
Abou immorality: Moral is definition and that changes considerable over time. A likewise campaign against population today as done 1944/45 would raise serious concerns. Most people even denied it before the war. War leads to erosion of moral and justice, that is one reason Western societies generally reject war.

And produced some panic, and awe of massive Zeppelins, until some fell firey. I suggest it failed like the 1940 iteration, but do not wish to lead into the notion that it’s only against lumpen/stubborn Brits that the “ungovernable” point fails – 1930s Brit politicians believed their people would revolt: Churchill’s Memoirs show astonishment at dehoused EastEnders’ cheerfulness. Is it that these 2 Campaigns, Germany v.UK, ceased too soon? If V2s had fallen on us a few months earlier, say just before D-Day, what then?

You’ve not included the German bombing campaign on Southern Britain during W.W.I. It wasn’t tactical, so presumably has a strategic dimension; and it certainly brough back fighters, guns etc from the front to defend the UK.

Hard Rain Works.

There have been 6 1/2 Strategic Bombing Campaigns: 5 1/2 delivered (most) of their sponsors’ aims:
– Vimy/HP V/1500, Western Front, 1919 (yes, 1919): a factor in the Central Powers folding in foreign fields was imminent attrition;
– 1939/40: Light Bombers on Warsaw and Rotterdam did the job, and merely by Threat, on Belgium, Denmark and France;
– 1944/45: fire from the air – phosphoric, then atomic – made it impossible to stop invasion of Japan. Expensive no doubt, but the Emperor knew he would lose, so folded;
– 1944/45: ETO CBO, together with other arms, Intelligence and Economic Warfare, interdicted men and materials, constraining German strength-in-the-field. If Luftwaffe had deployed an UralBomber and/or an AmerikaBomber, the Allies’ decisive logistics advantages would have been eroded;
– 1953/90: nuclear MAD worked (this is really 2 Campaigns, ours and theirs, because USSR did not know that NATO would not strike first: indeed archives show discussion several times);
– 1984/90: Star Wars, scarcely underway so half a Campaign, was a factor – decisive for Ron & Maggie – in causing the Evil Empire to fold in face of the mere Threat.
The failed Campaign was on my Mother’s head in London, incendiary/HE, 1940/41, V1/V2, 1944/45 (which also hit Antwerp and Lux – did they panic?) Why so? Feel free to post that she was dim – I won’t take offence; or was putty for profiteers/what you will.
Was there a common factor in the payoff Campaigns, absent in this? Was it belief we would win? Surely not, early-1941?
The relevance of all this, is that media/chattering wisdom in the West is that carpet-bombing is both immoral and ineffectual. I think it’s neither.

Thank you XN923 – the intent of this thread is to discuss the intent of the campaign (which I note was then called the Combined Bomber Offensive – three words each with meaning you’ll note). An effect of this thread has been, as is too often the case, to stray towards the moral issues at hand.

I repeat my exhortation to all contributors to read Ashe’s analysis (Alertken’s recent post above). There is much more to it than the paragraph I excerpted. Explicitly he discusses the issues, of war at large and of the CBO in particular, arising in the targeting of morale, aiming for negative morale in the target and positive in those effecting the attack. He thoroughly discusses the vagaries of +ve/-ve morale in both parties and argues (to my mind conclusively) that the primary intent of the CBO was to influence morale. Other aspects were useful additional benefits. It is in my opinion the most thoughtful and incisive analysis I’ve read on this topic.

If we go right back to the Dambusters raid that kicked off this thread – we see the positive morale benefits of a daring, precision raid, and the intention that the damage to industrial capacity, to workers and their families, to the German population witnessing such daring competence, should have negative morale consequences to the defenders. That this didn’t occur is understandable – the attack was far from severe enough.

This last point is Ashe’s observation in the excerpt above – unless one strays perilously close to the point of overkill, it’s hard to significantly dent the defender’s morale. And as James noted above, this was both the intent and the effect of the atom bomb raids.

I think perhaps here we have a case in point, and a problem with history. Various parties are arguing that bombing had various different effects and levels of success. Trying to recover the original purpose of the thread, the revisionist version of this debate is quite simply that bombing alone did not win the war, which some parties at the time thought it might. However, bombing did contribute to the winning of the war and perhaps its chief value was in maintaining the morale of the allies’ civilian population at a time when there was no realistic alternative to carrying on the war.

We can dispute the effects of the campaign until we are blue in the face but it is getting rather off topic IMO.

Umm. It is true that area bombing was hardly precise, by day or night, but I think you have a lower opinion of the achievements of the bombers than the history indicates. A sweeping statement as ‘day bombers were hardly able to hit factories’ isn’t either true or helping the discussion.

So, off the top of my head… the Dams raid (precision) the Grand Slam and Tallboy raids (an area bomb used in a precision sense), the Polesti raids, and the Operation Jericho, the Amiens Prison raid, the raids on the German U-Boat pens or the Turpitz raids by No.9 and 617 Sqns…

By the time of the Pathfinders at night, an ‘objective’ (such as a marshalling yard or factory) could be totally destroyed in a raid, and often was. The dispersal of much German war production and the building of secret and/or underground factories indicate that Germany had no effective defence or protection or expectation of the survival of these targets.

The described attacks surely were good examples for precise attacks. Don’t forgot that the Tirpitz was attacked with good weather, no fighter interdiction and only limited AAA on a stationary target.
The problem was less aiming than simply the weather. That is sometimes unpredictable and having a cloud bank over the target actuallty ruins the complete attack.

Read foolowing statement from Robin Olds (P-51 pilot during WWII):

“When the lead bomber dropped his weapons, the rest of his formation released their bombs on his smoke trail. Out of thousands of bombs dropped,” Olds observed during raids on German targets, “as few as 50 percent hit within 3,300 feet of the aim point.” As a result, post-war studies revealed German war plants were dispersed and often increased production despite the raids.
Olds began developing his own ideas about tactical air power. “It occurred to me that if they wanted precision bombing on a ball-bearing factory they could load P-51s with 500-pounders, and 70 of us could have done just as much damage as 1,000 bombers.”

David,
I think you miss the point. You as some here point out the drastic effect on the German economy which obvioulsy did not exist. The bombing interupted civil life but military organisation was nearly unharmed. From the point of military usefulness the night bombing campaign was with few exceptions a complete no-go.
The fact you can afford an offensive doesn’t mean it makes sense. Neither in the aftermath nor at the time it was undertaken. How much effort went into the production of 4-engined bombers in UK, how much pilots were trained, how many soldiers lost?

Is it worth spending billions of pounds/dollars and losing so many bombers just to increase the moral of forced workers and of Dutch people (most bombers normally flew into Germany via Holland)?

Could the events of Dunkirk and the carnage of the BEF in Europe have any other outcome than the desire to destroy Germany as a whole?

Yes, I hope so. Or am I wrong? Destroy a country as a whole because you lost a battle (mostly due to own failures) with actually relativly small losses in life?

Charley – What is also worth pointing out is that the Allies could afford to loose the vast numbers of bombers which reigned down into the fields of Europe. How demorralising would that be to an enemy who could see no end to it.
As for the points on retribution. I think possibly people are missing the point somewhat. The war waged against Germany had to be ruthless and I cannot see how it could be anything other! Was there a desire in society to ‘go softly’ on the German’s ? Could the events of Dunkirk and the carnage of the BEF in Europe have any other outcome than the desire to destroy Germany as a whole?
There is always the inferences that we shouldn’t have attacked this town or that because they were defenceless or of no strategic value – the simple fact is that we needed to disrupt the ability of Germany to function . Whether that was through civilian casualties which clogged up the health system or purely the reconstruction effort. There was no part of Germany that wasn’t supporting Germany’s military ambitions – if we chose to ignore one town because it was of little strategic value you can be sure that advantage would be taken of that and some kind of covert production would be commenced there . People might regret the civilian casulaties – it’s far easier to regret the support given to Hitler’s regime that allowed the needless slaughter to begin in the first place.

I am interested in the previous comment about the sight of bomber streams raising the morale of occupie people. I am sure this is correct and the sight of the Allied bombers must have reassured the occupied peoples that the war was still being carried to the Nazis. I seem to recall reading an account in Flypast about 20 years ago by someone who was held as a slave labourer. One day late in the war his working party walked past the remains of a crashed B24. The slave labourer saw the advanced design and materials of the bomber (in comparison to other aircraft he had seen) and realised that the Nazis could no longer compete with Allied productivity and design. He was reassured that the Axis were doomed. I also remember a basic military maxim I was once taught: carry the fight to the enemy.

Thank you ‘gnome’, very useful passage.

The better ‘morale bombing’ would aim on the leadership. That was not possible in second world war as day bombers were hardly able to hit factories.

Umm. It is true that area bombing was hardly precise, by day or night, but I think you have a lower opinion of the achievements of the bombers than the history indicates. A sweeping statement as ‘day bombers were hardly able to hit factories’ isn’t either true or helping the discussion.

So, off the top of my head… the Dams raid (precision) the Grand Slam and Tallboy raids (an area bomb used in a precision sense), the Polesti raids, and the Operation Jericho, the Amiens Prison raid, the raids on the German U-Boat pens or the Turpitz raids by No.9 and 617 Sqns…

By the time of the Pathfinders at night, an ‘objective’ (such as a marshalling yard or factory) could be totally destroyed in a raid, and often was. The dispersal of much German war production and the building of secret and/or underground factories indicate that Germany had no effective defence or protection or expectation of the survival of these targets.

You’ve made some great points, but I think you are only considering RAF Bomber Command circa 1941 or the 8th AF 1943, both of which were hopelessly inaccurate. A while later that wasn’t the case.

Can you rephrase your last paragraph, please? I’m sure there’s a good point there, but I don’t get it!

Cheers

Thank you ‘gnome’, very useful passage.

The better ‘morale bombing’ would aim on the leadership. That was not possible in second world war as day bombers were hardly able to hit factories.

At the time of the CBO, such apparent ruthless retribution as part of a strategy was more understandable to decision makers and Allied societies than it is to students of history who have not lived through the blitz and faced such an enormous task and uncertain outcome.

This issue is very important to consider when talking about history of warfare. Although the Second World War is considered a ‘legitimate’ war and normally considered ‘according to the rules’ (as far as the western fronts are concerned), we have a completly different background today which does not ease to understand the decisions at that time.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj99/win99/ash.htm
Published Aerospace Power Journal- Winter 1999
Terror Targeting – The Morale of the Story, by Lt Col Eric Ash, USAF

Thoughtful piece.

Alertken that is an extraordinary reference piece … it’s extensive but accessible and IMHO a “must-read” for contributors to this thread.

For those who can’t find the time to read it … a taster

“World War II’s [Combined Bomber Offensive] was successful in setting the stage for the success of Overlord, but the terror bombing of civilians was not very successful. As a strategy, it caused negative morale among bomber crews, and it failed to target the Schwerpunkt of German morale, just as firebombing Japanese cities failed to break the Japanese will to resist. Why then did Allied decision makers go for the terror-bombing option? There are many plausible reasons: desire for revenge and “eye-for-an-eye” retribution, inability to do anything else while facing a daunting enemy and a very uncertain future, perceived opportunity to prove the raison d’être of the air forces, avoidance of friendly ground casualties, and belief that it would break enemy will. All of these and other reasons aside, the important point for today is knowing that targeting morale requires precise aerial bombing of [command and control] and leadership to disrupt the linkage among leadership, morale, and organization success. Damaging a populace’s living conditions may not break its will to resist unless carried to the morally questionable extremes of killing most of the people or completely destroying their ability to survive. At the time of the CBO, such apparent ruthless retribution as part of a strategy was more understandable to decision makers and Allied societies than it is to students of history who have not lived through the blitz and faced such an enormous task and uncertain outcome.”