Russian Space & Missile[ News/Discussion] Part-3

[color=red]21 pages (oops), thread closed.[/color]

S-400 with BAZ-6402 tractor:

Russia: Upgrading its Precision-Guided Munitions

Summary

The Russian military may soon add satellite navigation to its small portfolio of precision-guided munition (PGM) capabilities. Russian Deputy Defense Minister for Armaments Vladimir Popovkin drew attention to efforts to install receivers for Russia’s Global Satellite Navigation System (GLONASS) on new “smart” weapons June 17. However, Russia faces immense challenges in its efforts before it truly turns a corner in operationalizing PGM capabilities.

Analysis
Russia is installing receivers for its Global Satellite Navigation System (GLONASS) on “smart” weapons, according to June 17 comments from Russian Deputy Defense Minister for Armaments Vladimir Popovkin. While specific information is unavailable, it is clear that Russia faces significant difficulties in operationalizing its efforts to incorporate satellite navigation guidance into its weapon systems. Nevertheless, the Russian military could be on the verge of turning a corner with precision-guided munitions (PGMs).

Modern PGMs are an American invention rooted in U.S. military wartime experience. This is not to say that the Soviet military lacked guided weapons or failed to develop them during the Cold War. Rather, Soviet military doctrine relied on a large, conscript-based military — a reality rooted in Russian geography — so weapons had to be simple, cheap and mass-produced in order to provide sufficient numbers for a large force and to be maintained and operated by poorly trained conscripts. The Soviet answer to accuracy was massed fire, and the Red Army became particularly adept at bringing combined arms to bear with devastating effectiveness.

It was only after observing the U.S. Air Force employing laser-guided bombs in Vietnam that the Soviets began working on their own laser-guided bomb, the KAB-500L. And while Soviet efforts continued, it was the Americans who truly embraced, doctrinally integrated and operationalized PGMs, as evinced so clearly by the stunning success of Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Later, the U.S. military integrated precision guidance with satellite navigation to produce a low-cost precision capability known as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). The JDAM is actually a cheap tail kit with a GPS receiver that can be fitted to a variety of U.S. ordnance. The first kits cost only $18,000 — less than half the initial estimate and a fraction of the cost of laser guidance kits.

The JDAM is simple and affordable and just the sort of weapon that would appeal to a Russian military struggling with modernization efforts. But Russia faces a series of challenges in bringing precision-guided munitions to fruition.

One of these challenges has been GLONASS itself. Russia has been working for years on putting new satellites into orbit and other upgrades to the GLONASS constellation. Today, the constellation consists of only 17 operational and three inactive satellites. (Eighteen operational satellites are required for full coverage of Russia; 24 are required for global coverage.) Two launches are currently scheduled to add six additional satellites to the constellation by the end of the year. But even at full capacity, GLONASS is at least a generation behind the U.S. GPS (which will upgrade eventually to GPS III) technology, and the limits of GLONASS place restrictions on the accuracy that PGMs guided by it can achieve.

For this reason, Russia appears to be favoring dual-band receivers that can use both the Russian GLONASS signal and the American GPS signal. Though the American signal theoretically can be shut down or encrypted, it may also remain active and freely available in many cases — favorably affecting the accuracy of Russian guided munitions. In addition, the dual-band capability would make the various navigational signals harder to jam.

Russia’s use of dual-band capability depends on whether it can get the chipsets. Early in 2008, a civilian company was unable to get the dual-band GPS/GLONASS receiver chipsets from its supplier, suggesting that there may have been a wider shortage or other bottleneck in chipset production. It is unclear whether the military also experienced this difficulty, or if perhaps the military orders were monopolizing production. Two variables are unknown: the rate at which the Russian military can receive the chipset it needs (the PSN-2001, made by a company called Kompas) and the rate at which those chipsets can be integrated into munitions — both significant questions for a struggling defense industry.

Russia’s two main efforts for installing GLONASS receivers appear to be the KAB-500S, a derivative of the original Soviet laser-guided bomb, and a derivative of the Kh-25 (NATO designation AS-10 “Karen”), a guided air-to-surface missile originally designed with both radio-command and laser-guided variants. It is likely that Russia is modernizing the guidance systems in stockpiled munitions, though there may be limitations to the maneuverability of these older munitions, which might place additional upper limits on accuracy. Russia may also be working to supplement the guidance systems for its re-entry vehicles with dual-band GPS/GLONASS.

Although many older Russian fighters and fighter-bombers might be able to use the older variants of these munitions, only the newest aircraft currently appear to be slated to deploy the upgraded satellite navigation-guided munitions. The majority of these fighters have not yet been fielded operationally with the Russian air force, meaning that in the near future, Russia’s PGM capability may be limited to an elite squadron or two and represent a national or strategic — as opposed to tactical — capability.

Another challenge confronting Russia is intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance — and consequently target selection. Reports from the August 2008 invasion of Georgia suggest that Russian air force target selection (as well as accuracy) was abysmal. A PGM is useless if appropriate targets cannot be designated, prioritized and communicated to pilots.

Though doctrinal integration and effective operational employment are significant challenges beyond the technical, the Kremlin has seen the value of precision guidance and is moving in that direction. The Russian military is clearly working to field the capability in a deliberate manner. And in the next five to 10 years, PGMs may be deployed with a variety of Russian air force units. Indeed, if the rate of production improves significantly, these munitions may even appear on the international market.

Russia will never give up its deterrent forces

No world nuclear power will strip itself of nuclear forces as long as America pursues global military dominance and wars like Yugoslavia and Iraq, considers Andrey Kokoshin, former First Deputy Minister of Defense.

RT: The Russian air force chief has said recently that by 2030, the United States will have developed missile systems in space capable of hitting targets anywhere in Russia. How real do you think such a threat is?

Andrey Kokoshin: I could say that in the 1970s and even a little bit later, in the 80s, we developed plenty of countermeasures against potential space-based systems which could be neutralized or destroyed by different means, including the means of radio-electronic warfare or just anti-satellite weapons. And these technologies are well-known and available. The question is that it costs a lot of money. It will cost a lot of money for the other side to deploy such systems, to test them, to prove they really work, because there are a lot of questions about it. It is less costly, of course, to have countermeasures. That’s why I think that if they proceed with such development, we will find a way how to cope with this threat. And not only us: it could be done by the Chinese, by the Indians, and even by some other countries, not speaking about more developed countries.

RT: We’ve also heard that Russia will create a new air and space defense system by 2020, which some of the Western media have already dubbed “Russia’s very own star wars missiles”. How realistic is that, given that some Western experts have been saying that the Russian military has been slowly degrading since the breakup of the Soviet Union, and that process still hasn’t quite stopped.

AK: First of all, the Russian defense system is not degrading any more, and in recent years we have had a lot of serious achievements: technological achievements, achievements in operational thinking, in tactical thinking. We can demonstrate to any opponent that we can do the job in case of a crisis. Of course, our forces are not perfect and a lot of things should be done. Air and space defense…one should understand, what space defense is. First of all, space defense is an early-warning system regarding ballistic missiles incoming from the other side, be they land-based, sea-based or air-launched, plus cruise missiles of course. I think there is nothing new in this task. It is only the new situation, new technology on both sides, that’s one thing. If you take the so-called attack weapons, interceptors of different kinds, we have had serious achievements recently, especially for air defense. The S-400 for example, I think that it is much better than the American Patriot-3, for example. We were always very good in this area, plus we have some other technology. But the most important thing of all of these developments is radio-electronics, the new radars, the new networks of these radars, computing and super-computing, which could be distinguished between the real targets and false targets and so on. That’s the key question, and I think that the biggest investments in each country are coming to this area.

RT: But do you think it is valid to say that Russia is engaging in a new round of star wars.

AK: No, no, star wars from the very beginning was a misleading term. It was because of the famous movie at that moment. Of course, if the Americans proceed with anti-satellite weapons, of course we should do something the same. But I see that both the Chinese and Americans, and us, are very cautious about it. Everybody understands that we all live in a glass house, as the British say.

RT: Since Obama came to power, there has been a lot of talk about potential cooperation between the United States and Russia on the ABM in Europe. What are the real chances of getting an agreement on such of co-operation?

AK: Putin, and later Medvedev, made a proposal to have joint efforts to cope with a potential Iranian threat. If they really come to the stage when they are going to have full-scale capacity in ballistic missiles – and this proposal is still on the table – I think we could even add some components. But that’s it. But the most promising, I would say, interceptor position would be not in Poland, but in Turkey, for example. Why aren’t the Americans asking the Turks to put, for example, twenty or thirty interceptors which could intercept Iranian rockets in the boost phase? Why? I don’t know why. Maybe because the Turks did not allow them even to use a lot of their facilities during Iraqi war, you know, and demonstrate their own way of strategic thinking. Maybe, maybe. But to put it in Poland – that’s stupidity from a military-technological point of view and quite politically annoying. In my view, in many respects it was done just for pure political reasons and against the basic national interests of the United States. And I hope that now in the United States, in Obama’s team, there are more realistic and more, I would say, professional people who are more thinking about the national interests of the United States than those guys who were in the previous administration.

RT: Do you think the United States will agree to link the ABM issue with the negotiations on a new START treaty?

AK: I think that there are a lot of people in Washington who think it would be a reasonable position. But who will prevail? – I don’t know.

RT: So should we sign the new START treaty now given that many think that if there is not such a link between the ABM and the new START treaty, it could be detrimental to Russia’s security?

AK: In my view, we should not be in a hurry. We should not be under the influence of the magic of this [expiry date of] December 2009 – forget about it. We should work together. We should work very seriously. It’s an extremely important matter. Of course, we should think about diminishing our nuclear arsenals, but all the time we should keep in mind other guys, both those who are potentially there – boys with nuclear sticks – and about the boys who already have those nuclear sticks. And all these boys with nuclear sticks are mostly around the Russian Federation. One shouldn’t forget about this. Or quite close to the Russian Federation. That’s why we have more reasons to have deeper concern about this kind of things. And more reserves. We should think about other technology, other means for deterrence. And I always remember when, at one conference during the American war against Yugoslavia, one of our participants was saying, “Look, now you are bombing Yugoslavia, next day you will probably bomb us or Belarus, for example, our closest ally”. “No, no, no, never, never, you are a nuclear power”. That was the answer. That’s why I think that, of course we should think about diminishing nuclear arsenals, step by step, maybe at some point to get rid of them. But maybe when they come very close to it, the Americans should get rid of their aircraft carrier battle groups, they should get rid of their predominance in conventionally-equipped cruise missiles and global dominance in aircraft forces.

RT: Do you believe that it is possible?

AK: If not, then nobody will get rid of their nuclear weapons. First of all other guys, and of course not Russia.

RT: And finally, given your experience with the United States, can Russia be sure of its security, if it doesn’t have its own means of containment?

AK: Containment is one thing, deterrence is another thing. There is a serious semantic difference between them. Containment is more of a political term, which was devised by George F. Kennan and his famous long telegram from Moscow. Deterrence is, I would say, a more brutal thing. It is also political, but with a very heavy military content. And Russia will never give up its deterrent forces. I am absolutely sure about it. We have good reasons – we are the country which had the greatest devastation during World War II, we had great devastation during World War I. We defeated Nazism and saved mankind, and we have every right to have our deterrent forces, nuclear forces, and non-nuclear forces. And we have every right in this world to raise our voice for our national interests and for the interests of the international security.

From RIAN

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Ilya Kramnik) – By 2030, the United States will be able to strike from space on a global scale, including Russia, Air Force Commander Alexander Zelin told journalists.
“Development of air and space attack weapons by foreign countries shows that by 2030 air and outer space will turn into a single sphere for armed struggle,” he said.

Zelin said that to counter this threat, Russia is planning to build a fundamentally new force of air and space defense (ASD) by 2020.

This defense force will be equipped with anti-aircraft missile systems – upgraded S-300s, S-400s, which have recently been launched into production, and eventually with S-500s, which are currently under development. It is reported that the S-500 will not be based on its predecessor, the S-400, but will represent an entirely new system capable of effectively countering ballistic targets.

In addition, ASD will be armed with aviation systems. Zelin announced the decision to reinitiate the program to develop anti-space systems based on the heavy fighter interceptor MiG-31.

But how serious is the aforementioned threat? At the turn of this century, a number of authors wrote about U.S. plans to create expeditionary aerospace forces (EAF), which would combine space vehicles and aircraft of various designations, and would be capable of mounting precision strikes on a global scale.

However, today even the United States cannot deploy an EAF system. It is not clear what will change by 2030. Experts believe that given the inertia of research and time-consuming development and adoption of new hardware, an EAF system is not likely to be built within the next 20 years.

It is also important to consider the problems in relationships between the Pentagon and those who design modern weaponry, as mentioned in a recent report by the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA). In effect, the engineers have accused the Pentagon of an inability to grasp what industry and science can realistically develop, and of staking too much on global technological supremacy.

Many specialists believe that 2030 may only see the emergence of the first prototypes of flying vehicles capable of attacking targets on a global scale in a suborbital ballistic and aerodynamic mode. Supersonic vehicle research is playing a considerable role in this respect, and is being developed in Russia among other countries.

Flying at much higher speeds and deployed at much higher altitudes than conventional aircraft, these vehicles will have an impressive capability both militarily and otherwise.

Judging by all that we know, Zelin’s recent statement on the development of a fundamentally new high-altitude reconnaissance plane which would be immune to air defense would proceed under the same reasoning. In addition, according to some sources, this technology could be used to develop a strategic bomber under the PAK DA project (perspective long-range air hub). Its appearance is expected in the late 2010s-early 2020s.

To sum up, American and Russian military plans are designed with a very long perspective, and the terms of their implementation may change substantially under the impact of various factors including the global economic crisis.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

MOSCOW, August 7 (RIA Novosti) – Russia will spend 470 billion rubles ($15 billion) on arms, equipment and maintenance of its Armed Forces in 2010, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said on Friday.

He specifically mentioned advanced strategic missiles, warships, submarines, and Sukhoi warplanes.

He told an inner Cabinet meeting chaired by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin that a draft defense order would be received by the Finance Ministry before August 20 and subsequently incorporated into the 2010 budget.

Putin said that the 2010 state defense order would increase 1.2% on 2009, adding that was “one of the budget priorities.”

He identified the following priorities for the Armed Forces: “Maintenance and development of the nuclear capability and missile and space defense forces, providing troops with modern offensive weapons, as well as command and control, communication and intelligence systems, and strengthening military infrastructure in key strategic sectors.”

Angara started graound-tests 🙂

2009 July 30, 17:15 Moscow Time: Angara’s URM-1 rocket booster (Article I1A1S) test fired for the first time at the IS-102 test stand in Peresvet near Moscow at NITs RKP test facilityt (former NIIKhIMMash). The engine was burning for 232 seconds, essentially imitating the entire process of the first stage operation during the orbital launch. According to preliminary information, no major problems arose during the firing. At the time, the second firing was expected at the beginning of September 2009. The total of three firings of the same booster were originally expected.

http://www.russianspaceweb.com/angara.html

Hitting the wall with the head again and again. Perhaps is time to transfer the Bulava program to Makeyev. Just an opinion.

KHABAROVSK, July 31 (RIA Novosti) – The Russian Defense Ministry said on Friday it would not abandon the development of the troubled Bulava ballistic missile, and that tests could resume in August.

The missile, which is being developed by the Moscow-based Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), has suffered six failures in 11 tests. The general director of the institute resigned last week over the failures, which are believed to represent a severe setback in the development of Russia’s nuclear deterrent.

“Everything depends on the conclusions reached by an investigation commission,” Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin said, adding that the probe could be finalized as early as next week.

The Bulava (SS-NX-30) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) carries up to 10 MIRV warheads and has an estimated range of over 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles). The three-stage solid-propellant ballistic missile is designed for deployment on new Borey class nuclear-powered strategic submarines.

The Russian military expects the Bulava, along with Topol-M land-based ballistic missiles, to become the core of Russia’s nuclear triad.

Popovkin said more work has to be done to correct flaws in the Bulava’s development, but that there was no alternative to the missile for a number of reasons.

“We have no choice – we already have one [Borey class] submarine, and have laid down more, so to start a new R&D project would be unrealistic,” the official said.

Russia’s newest Borey class strategic nuclear submarine, the Yury Dolgoruky, has completed the first round of sea trials in early July.

Two other Borey class nuclear submarines, the Alexander Nevsky and the Vladimir Monomakh, are currently under construction at the Sevmash plant and are expected to be completed in 2009 and 2011. Russia is planning to build eight of these submarines by 2015.

“A submarine costs about 60 billion rubles [about $2 bln], and the development of a new missile would cost up to 30 billion rubles [$1 bln] – these are serious expenses.”

“But the most important thing is the years [spent on development], because we urgently need to change our sea-based strategic delivery vehicles,” Popovkin said.

The future development of the Bulava has been questioned by some lawmakers and defense industry officials, who have suggested that all efforts should be focused on the existing Sineva SLBM.

The RSM-54 Sineva (NATO designation SS-N-23 Skiff) is a third-generation liquid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that entered service with the Russian Navy in July 2007. It can carry four or 10 nuclear warheads, depending on the modification, and has a maximum range of over 11,500 kilometers (about 7,100 miles).

Russia carried out successful test launches of two Sineva missiles from two Delta IV class nuclear-powered submarines in service with the Northern Fleet, located under an ice floe near the North Pole, on July 13-14.

The results of the tests confirmed that the Sineva would stay in service with the Russian Navy until at least 2015.

It was the Russian Doomsday Machine real after all? :eek::confused:

http://www.slate.com/id/2173108/pagenum/all/

There is nothing to explain: “Anatoly Tsyganok, head of the Moscow-based Military Forecast Center” says it all. It’s one of the better forecast centers worldwide: when it declares something, you can be almost totally sure it won’t happen or it’s not true. Only Pavel Felgenhauer is better (he has a 100% negative forecast value).

Thanks! That does explain a lot 😉

Could somebody who understands …

There is nothing to explain: “Anatoly Tsyganok, head of the Moscow-based Military Forecast Center” says it all. :diablo: It’s one of the better forecast centers worldwide: when it declares something, you can be almost totally sure it won’t happen or it’s not true. Only Pavel Felgenhauer is better (he has a 100% negative forecast value). 😀

He’s not totally wrong about the MIASS, however.

But there is no logical or practical way the project could be transferred to anyone else. Of course, they can halt the first series production and order a few Sinevas instead, but it will be a new missile again (Makeyev has marketed years ago a new RSM-54RM3 variant with “cold start” and new command-control modules/MIRV stack as a cheap alternative to the Bulava – as it purportedly does not require any structural or hardware changes to the sub itself – except some software updates – but I wouldn’t believe either MIT’s or MIASS’s P.R. without further proof 🙂 ).

MOSCOW, July 23 (RIA Novosti) – Further development of Russia’s failure-prone Bulava ballistic missile could be assigned to another design bureau if the project remains in the works, a Russian military expert said on Thursday.

“For 15 years the money [for the project] has been thrown down the drain. I think [work on] the missile will be ultimately given to another firm,” said Anatoly Tsyganok, head of the Moscow-based Military Forecast Center.

The missile, which is being developed by the Moscow-based Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), has had six failures in 11 tests, and the general director of the institute resigned on Tuesday over what is believed to be a serious setback in the development of Russia’s nuclear deterrent.

Yury Solomonov, who occupied the posts of MITT general director and general designer, is the most senior official to date to take responsibility for a series of failures in the development of the project.

Tsyganyk said that Solomonov would most likely retain his job as the chief designer of ballistic missiles, and the decision to separate administrative and R&D responsibilities at MITT was long overdue.

“However, it is hard to say who will carry on the Bulava’s development,” the analyst said in an exclusive interview with RIA Novosti.

The MITT got the task to develop Bulava after the Makeyev Design Bureau in the city of Miass in the Urals, which specialized in designing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), failed to produce a prototype of its own Bark SLBM.

The MITT, on the contrary, had just produced a winner in the mobile, land-based, single-warhead Topol-M. But the Solomonov-led institute had little or no experience in SLBM development.

“At present, the Makeyev design bureau is practically nonexistent. The average age of the staff is 55-60 years, and it poses a big problem,” Tsyganok said.

In addition, the expert confirmed reports that the future development of the Bulava has been questioned by some lawmakers and defense industry officials.

“I heard that some lawmakers have been mulling folding the Bulava project and focusing on the existing Sineva SLBM,” he said.

The RSM-54 Sineva (SS-N-23 Skiff) is a third-generation liquid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that entered service with the Russian Navy in July 2007. It can carry four or 10 nuclear warheads, depending on the modification, and has a maximum range of over 11,500 kilometers (about 7,100 miles).

Russia carried out successful test launches of two Sineva missiles from two Delta IV class nuclear-powered submarines in service with the Northern Fleet, located under an ice floe near the North Pole, on July 13-14.

The results of the tests confirmed that the Sineva would stay in service with the Russian Navy until at least 2015.

The Bulava (SS-NX-30) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) carries up to 10 MIRV warheads and has an estimated range of over 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles). The three-stage solid-propellant ballistic missile is designed for deployment on new Borey class nuclear-powered strategic submarines.

The Russian military expects the Bulava, along with Topol-M land-based ballistic missiles, to become the core of Russia’s nuclear triad.

Since the latest failure, the Russian Navy has reiterated that the Bulava tests will continue and the missile will inevitably be deployed on Borey class submarines.

Could somebody who understands the ins and outs of Russian missile design bureaus explain the significance of this (to someone who doesn’t understand the ins and outs of Russian missile design bureaus at all)?

SAROV (central Russia), July 22 (RIA Novosti) – Russia’s Security Council will discuss a series of projects on the development of supercomputers to test the effectiveness of the country’s nuclear deterrent, President Dmitry Medvedev said on Wednesday.

“Under the global ban on nuclear tests, we can only use computer-assisted simulations to ensure the reliability of Russia’s nuclear deterrent,” Medvedev said at a meeting of a commission on the modernization of Russian economy.

“Therefore, the most powerful supercomputers will be placed in federal nuclear centers,” he said.

Medvedev said the All-Russia Research Institute of Experimental Physics in Sarov, where the meeting took place, will develop by 2011 a computer capable of simultaneously conducting one quadrillion operations.

“We have allocated the necessary sum of over 2.5 billion rubles [about $80 mln], which is no small sum of money, and we are planning to develop this direction along with technological advancements in computer sciences,” the president said.

As long as they don’t put them in control…

Russian Bulava missile designer quits after failed tests

MOSCOW, July 22 (RIA Novosti) – The head of the research institute that designed the Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile resigned after a series of unsuccessful test launches, a defense industry official said on Wednesday.

“Yury Solomonov tendered his resignation right after the latest unsuccessful launch on July 15,” the official said.

The Russian Federal Space Agency Roscosmos confirmed Solomonov’s resignation on Wednesday and said a new head of the MITT would be appointed in September.

Solomonov, who occupied the posts of general director and general designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), is the most senior official to date to take responsibility for a serious setback in the development of Russia’s nuclear deterrent.

The Bulava (SS-NX-30) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) carries up to 10 MIRV warheads and has a range of over 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles). The three-stage ballistic missile is designed for deployment on new Borey class nuclear-powered strategic submarines.

The Russian military expects the Bulava, along with Topol-M land-based ballistic missiles, to become the core of Russia’s nuclear triad.

Six of the 11 Bulava test launches have been unsuccessful, including the latest test on July 15, when a Bulava SLBM self-destructed after blasting off from a nuclear submarine in the White Sea. The launches were suspended after the previous test, which ended in failure on December 23, 2008, and the missile components underwent lab tests.

Since the latest failure, the Russian Navy has reiterated that the tests will continue and Bulava missile will inevitably be deployed on Borey class submarines.

SHTIL naval VLS missile 9M317ME.

More photos at: http://pvo.guns.ru/expo/tagil2009.htm

It’s not unusual to have a high failure rate during missile development.

… The SS-N-20 carried by the Typhoon had a difficult development as well, it had even more failures than the Bulava. They had something like 14 out of 15 failures, although that was followed by 15 or so successful launches before it entered service. So in a way the Bulava is not yet as difficult as the SS-N-20 development wise.

Source: void – militaryphotos.net

Interesting comparison between the Sineva and the Trident II :

Sineva vs Trident II
Weight: 40300kg … 58500kg
Throw-weight: 2800kg … 2800kg
Warheads, when in maxed MIRV config: 10 … 12
Range: 11500+km (11547km confirmed in a test) … 11300 km
CEP w/o satellite navigation: 250m … 350m (but 100m with GPS)
Which one is more resistant to intrerception is of course not known. If comparing raw performance, Sineva is definitely more effective (lightier yet with the same damage capability, longer range and speed, and better raw guidance). Its two disadvantages are:
– having no satellite guidance (but GLONASS wasn’t even around when it was designed… so little surprise there. This one is easy to fix should GLONASS reach full operational capacity).
– being liquid-fuel and all the associated drawbacks. …

Source: KilRemgor @ militaryphotos.net

Bulava failed again 😡

http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20090716/155543654.html

Reminds me of the first round of THAAD testing. All kinds of different problems that (in general) could be traced to poor quality control. Maybe the Bulava program needs to take a few years off to do some house cleaning.

Bulava missile self-destructs due to malfunction

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik) – The latest test launch of the new Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile has failed. The missile self-destructed after its first stage malfunctioned when it was fired on July 15 from the submerged Dmitry Donskoi strategic nuclear-powered submarine in the White Sea.

In all, seven of the 11 test launches of the Bulava have ended in failure.

Russian Navy chief Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov ordered the creation of the Bulava SLBM in 1998 after three failed tests of the experimental Bark solid-fuel, sea-launched ballistic missile of the Makeyev design bureau. The order was placed with the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which promised to create a cheaper and smaller system comparable to another project by the Institute, the Topol-M ground-based ballistic missile.

Of the 11 test launches of one mockup and ten live missiles, only three test launches of live missiles succeeded. Therefore, the missile will not yet be put on combat duty.

The Bulava has a record low safety ratio, approximately 30%, which is even lower than the ratio of the D-19 launch system with the R-39 SLBM – nine failures out of 17 test launches. After the bugs had been removed from the D-19 system, it showed reliable safety – 11 successful launches out of 13.

Russia has an alternative to the Bulava missile, the RSM-54 Sineva (NATO codename: SS-N-23 Skiff), a third-generation, liquid-fuel ICBM that entered service with the Russian Navy in July 2007. It was created at the Makeyev design bureau and can carry four to 10 nuclear warheads, depending on the modification.

Currently, the Sineva missile has been supplied to three Project 667 submarines – K-114 Tula, K-117 Bryansk, and the recently modernized K-18 Karelia.

The Sineva has a longer range than the Bulava – 8,000 km, or 4,972 miles – and a larger payload. But the Bulava has a number of advantages, such as a much smaller takeoff trajectory, which complicates its interception by air defense systems, a smaller weight and dimensions, and solid-fuel engines. The latter simplifies its maintenance and use.

However, all these are only theoretical advantages compared to the Sineva, which has recently had two successful test launches, on July 13 and 14.

There are quite a few examples in Russian history when seemingly promising projects were curtailed after unsuccessful trials. One of the best-known examples is the N-1 booster designed to deliver 40-50 ton manned spacecraft into space, to orbit and then land on the Moon.

The stubbornness with which the military continue the test launches of the Bulava makes one think that it is not engineers, scientists and the military, but auditors who should analyze the reasons for its failure.

They should not look for “subversives” among workers and engineers, who are working hard to create the country’s military systems for a meager monthly pay of 10,000-20,000 rubles ($631). Instead, they should call to account the highly paid directors of defense enterprises, who watched impassively as years of hard work and tens of billions of budgetary rubles were squandered.

In the Soviet period, when the government closely monitored research and technical projects using methods that have since been denounced as inhumane and unjustified, plant directors and heads of design bureaus were sometimes victimized for lesser failures.

Somehow, it seems improbable that anyone will be as much as fired for the failure of the Bulava.

The Bulava (SS-NX-30) missile carries up to 10 MIRV warheads and has a range of over 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles). The three-stage ballistic missile is designed for deployment on Borei-class Project 955 nuclear-powered submarines.

Bulava failure must not stop tests – Russian arms sector official

Seems like Bulava failure is more to do with rivalary with the missile design bureau then any technical problem , some one needs to be accounted for if its a genuine act of sabotage.

Its good they are not still Soviet Union , else some one would have got shot by now 🙂