S-300PMU-1

As I recall, the FT-2000 is quite dissimilar to the S-300PMU-1, principally a Chinese design, intended for attacking radiation-emitting planes such as AWAC’s, though its range is only estimated to be 100-120km, which makes you wonder how they intend to deploy it (modern AWAC’s can loiter up to 600km away).

the information posted in sinodefence.com is off. They posted the information for the FT-2000A for the FT-2000. Go to globalsecurity.org for the Chinese missiles page to find the real source of the article.

The FT-2000A is not the same missile as the FT-2000, nor does it use the same radar controller or search radar. The FT-2000A is based on the old HQ-2 missile, and is basically an upgrade of such with passive seeker. It has a range of 100km, while the HQ-2 in its original form in the sixties, had a range of 60km. The design appears upgraded throughout the years with better propellants.

What is the real range of the FT-2000? Now that is the question. This missile is the one that appears to be based on the HQ-9. Chinese articles claim that the HQ-9/HQ-9A has a range of 200km (naval variant HHQ-9 up to 120km) and uses an active seeker.

and there are reports about them? they are one of the most unknow kind of SAMs so i am interested to know something by their use by a NATO country.

just a moment,Greece has the SA-8 Gecko? When it was happened? What particular about it?

At least some ex GDR systems were delivered from FRG to Greece in the 90s.

just a moment,Greece has the SA-8 Gecko? When it was happened? What particular about it?

Thanks Sens, you have some good point there.

Yes…it makes you think dosen’t it?

Why would the Chinese make a 100-120km range missile system for something that could loiter up to 600km away? :confused:

1) To keep it at some distance.
2) For the defender better low-level terrain-shielding from that.
Good view to fighter-size targets is up to ~ 200 nm or 370 km. (Radar horizon)
The AWACS-crew have a problem. It identifies the SAM-site over the tracking-radar there. AWACS-crew does not know fore shure, with which kind (range) SAM the site is equipped really?! That can change within hours. So safety distance is further off. 🙂

As I recall, the FT-2000 is quite dissimilar to the S-300PMU-1, principally a Chinese design, intended for attacking radiation-emitting planes such as AWAC’s, though its range is only estimated to be 100-120km, which makes you wonder how they intend to deploy it (modern AWAC’s can loiter up to 600km away).

Yes…it makes you think dosen’t it?

Why would the Chinese make a 100-120km range missile system for something that could loiter up to 600km away? :confused:

As I recall, the FT-2000 is quite dissimilar to the S-300PMU-1, principally a Chinese design, intended for attacking radiation-emitting planes such as AWAC’s, though its range is only estimated to be 100-120km, which makes you wonder how they intend to deploy it (modern AWAC’s can loiter up to 600km away).

How good is the Chinese FT-2000 when compare to the Russian S-300PMU-1?

..

Thank you for the answer. A well balanced view. congratulations. 🙂

Dear Sens

I can inform you with the very most basic media interest that the Kypriaki Stratiotiki Aeroporia has not one but two long-range pulse-Doppler early warning radars established on the Troodos range (you won’t find those on any topographic map, though you seem to be well versed, and I compliment that). The KSA has also established a centralised integrated air defence system with buried optical networking (a report appeared on this in the federation of American Scientists S-300 chronology), allowing real-time command control decisions across the island, though to what end, your guess is as good as mine.

The mountainous region on the north of the island, you are quite correct, is a topographic feature known as the Pentedaktylos range, and reaches up to 980 metres above sea-level, off the top of my head. It is quite concievable that THK recce and strike aircraft would attempt to insert themselves into the blindness envelope, though you should be aware that the Troodos EWR systems will be detecting these aircraft launching from their bases in Southern Turkey, and tracking them for some time before they lose observability. Strictly speaking, topography will be unlikely to effect the tactics of an enemy attack, on paper, and would likely involve an attempt to use UCAV’s or helicopter insertion to attack the S-300 sites, in conjunction with arty attack and any effort to launch standoff shoot-and-scoot ordinance from over 120km away. The THK, I believe, is equipped with Harpy-variant anti-radiation drones and J-type SRBM’s which could have some use in such a scenario, though I am highly sceptical to their effectiveness.

I refer you back to my original post regarding the “Tuman-S” low-level radar jammers which were offered to Cyprus via Rossonberexport. Consider a situation where GPS-spoofing equipment, decoy vehicles and false radar emitters might also be deployed, and you begin to grasp the true complexity of the plan of attack on S-300’s in a high-risk environment. Also remember the deployment of TOR’s, Aspides, Mistrals and Skyguard GBU-003, and you can better appreciate the tiering of defence for these systems.

The requirement for 12 attack helicopters by Cyprus is well known to go back to roughly around the time the S-300’s would have been considered (1996), and then you begin to see a bigger picture forming. Obviously, a degree of sophisticated air-power was being considered to exploit the air-cover provided by long-range air-defence, and also to provide defence for the systems against enemy helicopter insertions and a sudden rush of armour over the border. Each of those aircraft, to my understanding, can carry 16 AT-9 Shturm-II laser-sighted missiles, which was obviously intended to make short work of a mass of M-47/48’s coming over the border.

Why? How many incoming aircraft will fly between trees and buildings? When they come that low then MANPADs take them down and MANPADS can also be used against any RPV stupid enough to fly low.

Sitting duck for what? Cyprus’s enemies are not the US and won’t have any stealth aircraft or super SEAD penetration weapons. As long as they are supported with lower tier missile systems the S-300 would probably not have to move… lets face it, when it is set up it will be in the best place possible… so what advantage is there to moving?

In Cyprus the S-300 systems would cover any airfield in northern cyprus and even some in Turkey itself… especially with the new missiles.
It is not being used alone… it is not a Maginot line.

Hi GarryB, it seems you never was in Greece or on Cyprus. If not, why not take a topographic map before doing tall statements. Typical radars work with the line of sight. No direct view, nothing to see on monitior. Even at sea the horizion drops faster, as you imagine. Look at the formula. The ground produces echos, which is to see as clutter on monitior. Next to ground filters will not overcome this and reduce performance of radar-system. Add to this buildings and trees, which are making the situation worth. The typical minimum height is ~150 ft near by and growing with distance considerably.
You can close this lower-zone with manpads, which is done sometimes. But the problems are the same, you are still in need of a sightline to target. In most cases you will not see or hear the incoming fighter in time, to get a firing solution and most damage is done before. In a high sophisticated network you may receive a warning from ‘AWACS’ or airobserver at coastline, that something is coming and from which direction, despite that it is still difficult. The attacker has a defence-suit against this threat and can use stand-off-weapons.
If Turky has to be the attacker, I assume that for ease, the Turkish AF is trained and equipped to attack a SAM-10 cluster. F-4E ‘Terminator’ with AGM ‘Popeye’ and some F-16 with HARM. Shielded by a mountain-ridge along the northern coast of Cyprus, the F-16 and F-4s can sneak-in with ease to fire their HARM loft their AGMs, to the GPS-points.
When their targets are still in place, at the preset coordinates, maybe the people have had listen to GarryB. 🙂

Well the S-300s on Crete have 4or 5 Tor M-1s attached to them for added protection. Greece’s Air defence shield is a layered one with many different systems and don’t forget the ability to forward deploy units onto islands which are miles away from intended targets but in close proximity to the perceived threat path to those targets.

Just this year I think it was, we had some Turkish jets Locked on and tracked by SAM sites on the island of Limnos as they were infringing Greek airspace.

Below is a list of anti –aircraft missile systems used by Greece today.

S-300PUM-1
Skyguard with Rim-7Ms Sparrow missiles.
Patriot PAC2 & 3 missiles.
Stinger Manpads.
Crotale NG SHORADS.
MIM-23B Improved Hawk missiles.
Tor M-1s.
SA-8Bs Gecko.
ASRAD Hellas mounted on HMMWVs

Cheers,
Alepou 340MB

That is exactly what I mean,when it comes to cluster and netting. To this we can still add the navy-assets and the airforce. In Germany and UK there are special training areas and exercise for all NATO-AF, including Greece and Turky. Main lesson teached and trained is, how defeat SAM-systems with aircraft at hand.

Well the S-300s on Crete have 4or 5 Tor M-1s attached to them for added protection. Greece’s Air defence shield is a layered one with many different systems and don’t forget the ability to forward deploy units onto islands which are miles away from intended targets but in close proximity to the perceived threat path to those targets.

Just this year I think it was, we had some Turkish jets Locked on and tracked by SAM sites on the island of Limnos as they were infringing Greek airspace.

Below is a list of anti –aircraft missile systems used by Greece today.

S-300PUM-1
Skyguard with Rim-7Ms Sparrow missiles.
Patriot PAC2 & 3 missiles.
Stinger Manpads.
Crotale NG SHORADS.
MIM-23B Improved Hawk missiles.
Tor M-1s.
SA-8Bs Gecko.
ASRAD Hellas mounted on HMMWVs

Cheers,
Alepou 340MB

Every village/forest around the SAM-site will degrade the tracking capability further.

Why? How many incoming aircraft will fly between trees and buildings? When they come that low then MANPADs take them down and MANPADS can also be used against any RPV stupid enough to fly low.

You have to move it in short intervalls or it becomes a sitting duck.

Sitting duck for what? Cyprus’s enemies are not the US and won’t have any stealth aircraft or super SEAD penetration weapons. As long as they are supported with lower tier missile systems the S-300 would probably not have to move… lets face it, when it is set up it will be in the best place possible… so what advantage is there to moving?

In Cyprus the S-300 systems would cover any airfield in northern cyprus and even some in Turkey itself… especially with the new missiles.
It is not being used alone… it is not a Maginot line.

And if the S-300 were netted in with a few AWACS aircraft so that it can engage targets down to sea level… and of course the country with the S-300 system also has an airforce of its own…

You may detect approaching aircraft. It gives you early warning time of the approaching threat. But the limitations of physic are still in force for tracking and guideance radar, when you have to fire your SAMs. Every village/forest around the SAM-site will degrade the tracking capability further. In several cases, you have to switch to optical guideance at very low level or a SHORAD-system. A SAM-10 system in need of AD. So SAMs in modern warfare are used in clusters or “super batteries” with a network of sensors around. Most successfull in ambush tactics. You have to move it in short intervalls or it becomes a sitting duck. Similar the “Cyclop”, loosing his eye, he becomes helpless. That is why sniffing aircraft became so important. Find out how many systems at hand, where deployed and when moving. Electronic mapped with GPS-data every mayor SAM-system becomes a prime target in the zone of fighting. Those outside can be ignored at first. Most of that technology is limited to USA, NATO and allies.
Most dangerous opponents are still autonomous, mobile single systems with passive guideance system. Starting with SAM-8>, difficult to track and therefore difficult to destroy. A constant hazard to air operations at first. As long as some of that are on the move,. That can be threat is enough to reduce effectivness of air operations.

As you can see there are so many thing an attacker can do, without air support/networking options SAMs are dead and will not change the result of a war. Therefore, air superiority is very important…

And if the S-300 were netted in with a few AWACS aircraft so that it can engage targets down to sea level… and of course the country with the S-300 system also has an airforce of its own…

Sens is right on the radar detection ranges. Detection of a target depends on several factors, power/frequency of radar transmitter, location of the radar antenna, altitute of target, RCS of the target, weather conditions all can effect the first detection ranges. S-300’s 150km missile engagement range is a theoritical range that everything is in the perfect conditon. If you approach very low level 100 feet(30 meters), S-300 can not detect the target until as close as “maybe” 35-40kms depending on the height of radar antenna and obstacles on the route…This means gap filler low altitute SAMs should be set around 30km from the center point to close the approach ways and force attackers to gain altitute so that S-300s can engage targets as advertised…

Attackers probably can use several tactics simultaneously, some attackers deal with low altitute systems and open a safe coridor, and the remaining attack force that intended for S-300 can use this safe coridor and approach very low. HARM shooters and other SEAD assets and other heavy loaded(Maverick/CBU) force can pull up and fire HARM/Mavericks and drop CBU bomblets over S-300 battery rapidly, then pull down to low altitute again…Or Another approach would be fly very low, pull up to 10,00 feet altitute, when you are 70-80km away from the target and let S-300 see you, fire some RF drones(ITALD), fire couple of HARMs in a quick sequences or DELILAH type anti-radar lotitering cruise missiles to force S-300 to turn off radars, then pull down low altitutes. If S-300 dont turn off radars some of HARMs/DELILAH probably will hit them, this is the result wanted. If S-300 turns off radars, then still CBU loaded strike force coming behind will drop their loads on S-300 without being targeted…These senarios are just hypothetical and my thoughts. New generation SLAM-ER type missiles has very long ranges, given that location of S-300 known to the attacker, a couple of SLAM-ER missile can do the job from 250km way without risking lifes. S-300 producer claims that it can also shot down balistic missiles in shorter ranges, let it prove itself if S-300 can bring down approaching SLAM-ER missiles…Only one successful hit to the missile tracker will halt S-300 operations…

As you can see there are so many thing an attacker can do, without air support/networking options SAMs are dead and will not change the result of a war. Therefore, air superiority is very important…

Regarding the Cypriot S-300PMU-1 batteries now administered by Greece, it is pretty well publicised that Greek Cypriot personnel of the Air Force (Kypriaka Stratiotiki Aeroporia – NOT the National Guard) have stayed on at Thessalonika in Crete as permanent instruction / logistical support personnel. This also is provided for under the Joint Defence Dogma with Greece, and gives the Cyprus Government a constant idea of the contribution those SAM’s / ATBM’s can provide to the strategic theatre.

Regarding the mobility and performance, the Cypriots quite deliberately made negotiations directly with the Russian Government (one of her most overtly friendly suppliers) to supply two batteries of S-300PMU-1 manufactured by Almaz well beyond the specifications intended for normal export – the Cypriot version (as yet not formally classified as a sub-version), uses a custom made variant of the command system seen pictured to allow the use of up to 24 launch stations instead of just 8 as intended. In theory, this would allow up to 24 launch trailers armed with 96 of the 150km range missiles to be coordinated from a single Big Bird radar complex – a massive quantity of firepower – which one can only assume was a provision should one of the Big Bird’s, or more, were knocked out by enemy attack.

Included in the deal to provide two heavy batteries were upgraded Clamshell agile-beam low-level combat radars (thus sinking the myth of the S-300 being unable to track at low altitude), high-powered IR trackers (platform not certain) and a number of low level VHF / UHF low-level airborne radar jammers referred to as “Tuman-S” (a name used for export only – actual type not classified publically).

The Cypriots were, if you check the extensive background of the 1997-1999 process, also seeking to procure a substantial number of mobile high-speed point-defence SAM systems with the capability to engage sea-skimming and agile projectile targets. The two systems being sought were the SPADA Aspide-330 / 2000 (Italy) with the Oelikron GBU-007 35mm AAA and Skyguard radar – these systems already in use, but Italy stalled on delivery. Thus Cyprus turned to Russia for offers on the self-propelled VLS TOR-M1 Gauntlet system with agile radar and passiev capability.

Eventually, before a deal could be completed, the S-300’s shifted to Cyprus because the idiot defence minister had obviously not seriously considered that Turkey would very likely launch a pre-emptive strike on this $220mil system, a price for which could have been used on a submarine or anti air-war frigate, or other more useful defence article (at the time).

One problem with the massive batteries ordered by Cyprus are that they require an enormous commitment of personnel and investement in specialised maintenance and inspection – the missiles sealed in their containers are guaranteed for 8 years without cleaning, according to the manufacturers, but the various and numerous systems need constant looking after and are hungry for electricity, fuel and tyre pressure.

Basically everything I’ve put here is what has been made available through Greek media resources. Pictures are more hard to come by though, and I imagine that a lot of the kit is still sensitive. If Greece decides to make her own addiitons with 200km range PMU-2’s, or upgrade to the PM-1 version, then that is going to concern NATO for sure, and certainly frighten Turkey. The PMU-1 makes modern anti-radiation missiles like the AGM-88 pretty much a last resort, hence Turkey’s interest in Popeye and others.

One important point is missing. Even there is no natural obstacles in the line of sight, in Cyprus and Greece are many, every SAM-system has a minimum altitude. Horizon sinks with distance. Every radar-coverage can be underflown up to a distance < 10-20 km from battery or the other way around, the blind area starts. You are in need of some short-range systems around to protect your expensive asset. But it changes nothing about the situation, that at very low to low level, with distance up to medium, you can not detect or hit something with your expensive SAM-system. Your intended enemy is limited to lower levels around such SAM-system. Higher fuel consumption and lesser weapons-load is the price to pay in staying outside harms way. The radars are aktiv-emitters, which gives away position and is limited in number. Attractive targets to go for. With stealth aircraft or heavy ECM support you can come close at medium or upper heights too.
You are still in need of a tied net of different sensors and AD assets to be usefull in the case of war. 🙂