Should Pakistan go for the U214,Scorpene or Turquoise subs?

First of all, as speculated by some of the immense pressure put by the Russians on GoI for purchasing Amur’s, the plain fact is that just no submarine to put up a decent match to what the Russians are offering — Amur with a 8 cell VLS for PJ-10.

Even w/o that Amur stands out default knowing that it is a generation ahead of the Kilo’s which in itself is a very good sub. As for the AIP, the Russians have their own AIP and what needs is the funding and with a finance support, the AIP Amur wud be a reality. But an Amur with AIP section and a 8 cell VLS section does not seem very desirable, so hopefully it wud be a torpedo tube launch for Klub (or PJ-10, with the caliber being increased)

For the 8 cell VLS section to be fitted, there is possibly two option , as far as I can see – ie, 8 cell VLS for PJ-10 on a non-AIP Amur or a N-powered Amur with a 8-cell VLS. Now the second option is what I’m keeping my fingers crossed, to see it happen, as I believe it wud be a real killer in all sense. As for the suitable reactor, the Russians had much earlier tested small reactors like 45-60 MW (?) in some of the smaller subs and a reactor suitable for Amur’s is simply not out of question.

On the other hand lies the more media covered and media backed French Scorpene, which is another new generation of very capable French killers. This can also be said to be the conventional variant of the French N-Sub. But a deal for scorpene w/o integration into its arsenal Klub and PJ-10 cruise missiles is not worth it. If the deal is to be done, it has to be made sure that the Russian weapons is integrated with the submarine and a possibility for also the Brahmos Amur Complex or the 8-cell VLS.

The AIP for this sub cud be the one that can be made available for the Amur’s, if the Russians get the funding. As for the superiority of the German Fuel cells or AIP, well I’d like to tell that the Russian system is the same, which they call as EG or electro-chemical generators and was an outcome of their space flights. As for the French MESMA, it’s simply out of question.

Now, for the question of which sub for PN, I’d only like to add that, take into account the reality of the finance and the political atmosphere of the nations producing subs and all it gets reduced to the best option being continuing with a rather capable Agost-90B with AIP.

If still not satisfied, I’d say, go with the Dutch for the Moray submarine (Moray stands for – Multi Operational Requirement Affected Yield) as I think, it offers good weapons load of 20 torpedoes and also can get AIP. To top it all is that the submarine uses HY-100 steel (sea wolf & Virginia?), which gives it a very good diving depth, though the max stated is 360m. PN can also cash in on the good relation that Mushy have with the Unkil and Unkil more so having the Dutch in bed and taking them all along in their world premiers and other occasions that the world saw in past lot of months.

Going with the Dutch means that they wud be happy to get some good bucks and PN happy with the subs. But then be prepared for a good bill too, like in excess of $500 million per sub, even though the sub may not be on par with their Russian and other European counterparts, it wud be worth the amount in augmenting the sub fleet and list of things that cud come along during license production. Also coz of no orders (yet?), Dutch wud only be happy to make deal with PN.

The other simple way to get any stuffs that PN, PA or PAF wants that too at a fraction of the cost wud be to go in for a pro-active covert action (diplomatic or any other) so as to put back on track the Indo-American relationship as was before 2001. Which means that both Pakistani and Indian military wud be happy, Pakistani military coz the draught wud end and Indian coz at least the defence budget wud be raised and required priority wud be given to the defence services.

I do see your point about how the SSKs, as they are today, will fit into a more networked navy. As more and more navies get budgetary and technological access to at least some of the key aspects of netcentricity, I believe that it would be too tempting to pass up. Especially if it means that their SSKs can cover a larger volume/surface area. Maybe not with its own sensors but with the combined sensors of off board platforms and the SSK’s own weapons.

Of course the increase in connectivity does increase the sub’s susceptibility to being discovered but if that susceptibility is offset by the sub’s increased area of control and a much larger stand-off and most importantly greater situational awareness, navies that can afford it may gravitate towards it. Also, these subs are getting more expensive to procure and own, therefore, if a single sub can cover a larger volume, as a longer range weapon allows, then the need for greater number of subs decreases… in theory.

But the SSK itself is evolving and its operational and tactical doctrines will evolve with them. We are already seening hybrid behavior from the SSKs with them emulating some aspects of SSNs. They may even start emulating some aspects of surface vessels…

You do recall correctly Vic. VLF can handle relatively fast A1A Morse for example but its by no means what we’d understand as a high datarate in any terms that would fit today!. It is a high datarate compared to ELF though – once read it took 29 minutes for a Sov sub to recieve a short letter group from their ELF rig up near Murmansk!!!.

I know what your talking about in terms of netcentricity and, yes, I agree that is where ultimately those with the assets and pockets for it will end up. Global reach netcentricity, as opposed to ‘local node’ netcentricity, is the step beyond that thats now started to whet the appetites of certain parties. Parties that, IMHO, need to remember the line about the eggs being in the one basket – thats another debate though!.

What I’m disputing, theoretically, is that submarines and SSK’s in particular will ever form a true component of the netcentric warfare model. The value of netcentricity is the information edge it gives to your planners and shooters – obvious!. If your information edge allows you to position your shooter optimally for its weapon system to defeat the opponent before his sensors provide him the same information on you victory is yours every time.

In naval warfare this is all about manoever and cutoffs. If you can detect, identify your targets and their range of motion before they know who or what you are – you win. The critical factor, of course, is if you can provide that operational intelligence to the shooting assets within the time frame that allows their weapons to bear or gives them useable positional data for the intercept. If you cant disseminate that inteligence quickly enough then you may as well not have it!.

This comes back to what I was saying earlier about surface assets and aircraft. A 25-30 knot fleet steaming in may get out of range of an SSK 100km or more off its course track before it could get the targetting downlink and make an attempt at the shot or the cutoff. It is unlikely that fast escorts or alert strike aircraft would be equally unable to react or reach the target though.

What I meant by SSKs being supplemented, was by air as having other sub or surface assets there complicates the matter and even make the SSK’s job harder. Sorry for the confusion. With MPAs and UAVs, a better 3D pic is created by sharing info across platforms. Ultimately, that is where naval warfare is headed, even in the subsurface kind.

VLF, AFAIK doesn’t have the baud rate to supply or recieve situational wareness updates in a near realtime conditions. Also, VLF comms is a “long” and drawn out process for the sub, If I recall correctly.

Not really the way most do it Victor. The IN has VLF transmission capability using freqs between 16 and 18Khz from its site at INS Kattabomman and a couple of adjuncts. VLF will penetrate up to about 30ft depth and allows an SSK to remain discrete, i.e all masts retracted, if there is no message for it.

Comms schedules for patrol subs was standard procedure in the RN SSK fleet when we had them. Anecdotally its the same for Canadian, Aussie and Dutch boats. I’m presuming therefore that its pretty much the same across all SSK operators simply as the alternative forces, as you illustrate, boats to remain shallow far too frequently for comfort.

As to SSK patrol zones being ‘shared’ by other units, well, we didnt do that and, AFAIK, the Soviets didnt do that either. An SSK zone was the sole preserve of that boat for the duration of the patrol.

I agree with all you say about the reasons antiship missiles were adopted by the submarine community but far from the next step being, definitively, long-range missiles with offboard targetting dependency several fleets are actually removing sub-launched ashm’s from their boats as they are felt inappropriate for the current predicted target sets. As no fleet currently deploying such long-range sub-launched antiship weapons has the ability to actually target at long-range I think its an interesting experiment, but, far (as in VERY far) from being a demonstrated useful capability.

Just my opinion of course!.

As you pointed out, SSKs don’t chase, they set up kill boxes or cubes and wait. But they don’t wait alone, they are also supplemented with other assets, assuming the navy has other assets. SSKs also do go to PD, stick out a little antenna and Tx/Rx burst comms, on a pretty frequent basis especially in areas with high ambient noise because the noise that hides the sub also masks potential target’s acoustics.

It is through these burst comms that the sub is vectored into position, usually by aircraft. Of course, this is assuming the sub has long range missiles. The long range missiles actually utilize the SSK’s strenghts better while reducing its own susceptibility than short ranged missiles.

The main reason why the SSK was fitted with the missile in the first place was to reduce the sub’s susceptibility. The torpedo required the sub to get too close and the torpedo was slow and loud enough to make the firing sub very vulnerable after firing. In comes the missile, which reduced time for the target to react while giving a greater stand off b/w target and sub. The long ranged missile with off board targetting is the next step in that evolution.

Its in the basic nature of SSK ops Vic. SSKs are patrol units and they deploy with a comms policy. This policy is a schedule of comms periods when they approach the surface and ‘phone home’.

To get a long range shot in on a target identified by ‘other means’ this means that, unless the sub happens to be approaching its comms interval within a short window of opportunity of the target being located and identified, that the target has an odds on chance of moving away from the submarine before it can be alerted and cued to shoot.

If the submarine is only updated as to the target location, course and speed say 4 hours AFTER the target is verified then the chances of the Klub being employable are marginal. Especially if the target is moving at anything near or above 20knts. The mantra is SSK’s dont chase.

Its a tradeoff really, but, coming to PD every hour on the hour in the hope that offboard assets will provide something to take a long range shot at is very unwise as it increases the chances of something detecting the sub and, on an SSK, you strive for discretion.

Network centricity, in terms of reaction to emerging targets like this, is much better suited to surface vessels and aircraft. If you can develop the capability to positively target at long range and if you must have these long range weapons it makes much more sense to mount them on those platforms and leave the SSK’s to the job they do best.

Nope. Coop engagement works when youre tied in to the net. Submarines by unfortunate virtue of their operating medium must spend long periods divorced from external comms.

Some of the major navies are moving towards fully autonmous long-range land-attack weapons but significant problems exist using SSK’s in this role without having dozens of SSKs to cope with the overhead of strike tasked units.

We are talking about long ranged missiles, right? So…

Prior to SSK engaging, i.e. firing the missile, the SSK is already at or near PD. Which means that it is fully capable of “interacting” with the outside world. And in today’s environment and particularly the environment that exists in that part of the seas, mainly the high merchant traffic, the shooter has to get a confirmed ID on the target. Where does the “divorced from external comms” aspect come into play?

It only comes into play during the stalk and transit into and out of the OPS area, not during the shoot.

Indian

Oh right – so you weren’t talking about the actual topic of the thread i.e the potential necessity for Pakistan to acquire a ‘higher-tech’ alternate to the Agosta90’s.

You wanted, instead, to remind me that the Indian Navy is bigger than the Pakistan Navy?. Well as an old friend like to say ‘duh, big wed twuck’.

Victor,

Long ranged weapons on short (sensor) ranged platforms is the future. That’s where coop engagement comes in. The major navies are moving in that direction, the days of lone sharks prowling the waters by themselves are gone.

Nope. Coop engagement works when youre tied in to the net. Submarines by unfortunate virtue of their operating medium must spend long periods divorced from external comms.

Some of the major navies are moving towards fully autonmous long-range land-attack weapons but significant problems exist using SSK’s in this role without having dozens of SSKs to cope with the overhead of strike tasked units.

The sonar suite they possess is comparable to that of most current SSK’s, the weapons capability is similarly comparable and I applaud their refusal to be forced down the ludicrous long-range AShM route that others are seeking to try and establish on an inherently short-ranged sensor platform.

Long ranged weapons on short (sensor) ranged platforms is the future. That’s where coop engagement comes in. The major navies are moving in that direction, the days of lone sharks prowling the waters by themselves are gone.

er, where did I say anything at all about Scorpene/Amur/Kilo or anything else ?

was just saying 4 SSKs just aint going to cut it if we decide to pay a house call 😀

as the incumbent hegemon of the region, “we” hold all the cards.

If thats necessity pal they’ve done bloody well out of it!. A circa 1800 ton patrol submarine with lean manning (36 man crew is remarkable!), high endurance, diving depth in excess of 350m, towed-array capability, SUBTICS management suite and AIP.

This is the point mate….what more do you need spend the money on?. Everything critical to an SSK’s operational competency is listed above. Scorpene may offer a couple of extra torpedo tubes, isolated decks and all the passive noise reduction in the world, but, its bloody little advantage if youre operating in noisy waters anyway and/or are going to come up against low-freq active sonar – which doesnt care how quiet you are it’ll get you anyway!.

Just out of curiosity what practical advantage do you think that the Scorpene/Amur hulls offer over Agosta90 Indian?

Looking at the numbers of arrested India illegal fishers inside Pakistani territory shows that not only do these products stop terrorist but also normal criminal activities. With the modest funds PN is able to setup a decent force. With those extra planes and vessels Pakistan will be able to clear the territory much faster.

well Jonsey seeing a virtue in necessity (as in they cant buy anything more) is the true key to happiness 😉
if one sub is in refit and one kept for training, around 4 SSK-AIP would be available.

not much of a fat-cat fleet, but will have to do.

The point of the thread being, I had assumed, that their may be some requirement to supplant the 90B’s with some ‘newer-tech’ solution like a Scorpene etc???.

Their fleet, seemingly, is intended to number 6 Agosta 90B as primary combattants with the Daphne’s retired and the Agosta 70’s going into second-line and training taskings. Seems an emminently sensible procurement strategy to me!.

but I guess they dont have the funds to splurge on anything, and PN gets the crumbs.

LOL there are VERY few navies worldwide that get a chance to ‘splurge’ as you put it Indian. If the PN are going to achieve the delivery of a modest coastal patrol surface fleet and an efficient, capable, submarine arm on ‘crumbs’ you may just have given them a great compliment however inadvertently.

By ‘infiltration’ I didnt mean SF infiltration by the way, although an AIP SSK is good for that too, I meant infiltration into heavily patrolled waters i.e port approaches etc.

PN has 2 new subs, 1 building, the rest of it – the two older Agostas are today both 25 years old, and the four Daphnes are 35 years old . so I dont think
they are very worthy of emulation.
but I guess they dont have the funds to splurge on anything, and PN gets the crumbs.

> infiltration taskings ?

for what ? they can just fly into nepal or bangladesh and walk across the border.
atleast 10,000 pakistanis are known to have overstayed their visas and vanished into
the indian economy and this is those that came directly with legit visas.

[source Hazegray]

Precisely right Burger!. What is the source for the belief that the Agosta 90’s are anything other than perfectly suited to the tasks that will be required of them?.

The sonar suite they possess is comparable to that of most current SSK’s, the weapons capability is similarly comparable and I applaud their refusal to be forced down the ludicrous long-range AShM route that others are seeking to try and establish on an inherently short-ranged sensor platform. The AIP will be useful to a degree against hostile airborne ASW and very useful for covert infiltration taskings.

Technically there is little wrong with the boats and, factoring in the economics and logistics/operational advantages of single class/established technology fleet, the Pakistan Navy’s submarine service looks to be a very neat, efficient, force worthy of emulation by other small navies.

they should get what they can afford

The 212 needs less crew, is more roomy (->more comfy for the crew),
has shorter reload times, is more manouverable (X-helm, new hull shape), is faster, is quieter and got partly better sensors.
Then the tanks for the hydrogen is stored between primary and secondary hull, for safety reasons. It uses the better, but more expansive, type of PEM’s in their fuel cells.
In the 214 the hydrogentanks are inside the hull, it uses if possible parts from the 209. This saves for shure money and gives a better availability for spares at the moment.

Thanks for the info, I wasn’t aware of that.

Still, the U-214 has an advantage over the U-212 that might prove important that is its longer range.

insha-allah, the PN shall get 25 seawolf subs soon and rule the arabian sea. I hereby demand that our pak members contribute to a beer-n-mutton biryani feast for the rest of us here. and please hurry up, I am hungry 😉

Should it be called a Seawolf class contribution or a Los Angeles class contribution?

I mean, the PN may not get Seawolfs in the numbers they desire, the US not being able to keep up with demand and all that..so a few Los Angeles class subs should be good enough?

Dont you think thats reasonable?