Sixteen Year-Old Pilot Dies In Accident

I was thinking downwind you are a wee bit faster, in a different configuration (no or 1 stage of flap) and, most important, higher.

being asked to orbit downwind is one thing, asked to orbit on final is another.

Well it’s just going round the same orbit, but in a different place? An orbit is an orbit, no matter where it is, and yes i agree, in this instance it was not a good thing to expect a 2nd solo student to carry out perfectly. Not sure what your point is. :confused:

I am not a pilot, so many on here will probably say I have no right to comment, but I have done a number of studies into “system’s failures” (in their broadest sense) both as part of my qualifications, and as part of my everyday job, so here’s my thoughts for what they are worth.

For a very inexperienced pilot (i.e. second solo), the unexpected pressure of having to understand and then act on what appears to be a “non standard” ATC instruction during finals, plus worry about the implied warnings that a faster aircraft is somewhere behind you would probably be more enough to occupy one’s mind, let alone having to work out what was likely to happen next, work out how to reconfigure the aircraft in an unusual situation, wonder what was likely to be ATC’s next instruction, try and remain on top of the map reading etc was clearly very high.

Don’t overlook the fact that he had already been given, and reacted to, “unusual” instructions during his take-off line-up phase, and that ATC had also apparently given then changed their instructions to him once the possible conflict on finals was noted. So, the inexperienced pilot had already had to deal with two sets of “non familiar” circumstances on only his second solo, and was then having to deal with a third set – out of the normal circuit pattern, heading on an unusual heading over a familiar yet somehow unfamiliar landscape, in an aircraft set up for finals, although he was now obviously being instructed to abandon the approach and somehow rejoin the circuit from an unfamiliar location/height/heading. All the time perhaps with the nagging doubt that something faster, and possibly much larger, was approaching him from behind.

I suspect many inexperienced people in this, or any similar, set of circumstances would be at very high risk of overlooking something, whether it be the need to reconfigure the aircraft, the need to seek further instruction, or the need to plan ahead for a possible rejoin. Given time, I imagine all these points would have come to him, and have been resolved, as he seems to have been a competent young man. Unfortunately, there was no way the situation could be “stopped” to give him time to catch up with everything, and an accident resulted. A very sad set of circumstances, any single one of which might have been easily resolved/overcome, but added together the cumulative effect was disasterous.

As has been said by Propstrike, hindsight is wonderful, the situation becomes easy to follow, and cause and possible effects are easy to understand. But, at the time, no-one involved had the ability to “freeze” the situation and analyse all likely outcomes before making further decisions.

Let’s hope suitable lessons are learnt such that the young man didn’t die in vain, and thus that the chances of a similar set of circumstances being repeated are reduced.

RIP Sam Cross

Paul F

Thanks for providing the link to the AAIB report Propstrike.

I don’t know why ATC didn’t send the faster a/c behind him around instead… the last thing you want on a 2nd solo is something like that! Such a depressing report to read. 🙁

It was normal practice to be asked to orbit downwind when an airliner was on the approach

being asked to orbit downwind is one thing, asked to orbit on final is another.

I learnt to fly at Southend in the early 80s when commercial airline traffic was the norm. It was normal practice to be asked to orbit downwind when an airliner was on the approach, but as it was so common, it was briefed and demonstrated by an instructor before it was required as a solo student pilot. One wonders if the pilot had been more experienced, whether ATC would have dared to suggest a go-around to accommodate a faster following aircraft, albeit one just off the airways and with a late handover…

Sounds like a tragic accident which could have been avoided had the student been allowed to fly the aeroplane without the additional pressure.

have read the report and have to ask why ATC screw with the poor sod in the 152 when he is established finals, designated no 1 to land , surely the higher, farther out aircraft should go around. at 16 the lad would not have the confidence to tell ATc to ………. and press on with his approach.
very very sad
MOREOIL

Having read the AAIB report it would appear that ATC were aware that they were dealing with a student pilot so I stand by my original remarks.

Thanks for that i’ll have a look later.

I think I’ve said enough and will wait until the AAIB report is published.

Hi Mike, it’s out.

Report now released.

http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resources/Cessna%20F150L,%20G-BABB%2007-07.pdf

Sorry if I appear to be playing Devil’s Advocate here. It could be argued that ATC were a contributory factor by increasing the workload of a young pilot with limited experience at time when the workload was already high.
I think I’ve said enough and will wait until the AAIB report is published.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing.

I would say that the comprehensive report is pretty certain about the circumstances on this accident.

Indeed a sad matter. My sincere condolences to the young man’s family. I feel that I am right to call him a young man as he showed mor maturity than many I know who are a lot older.

Whilst the reasons for this accident are, as yet, uncertain I do feel that Southend ATC may have made a wrong decision. If they were aware that he was a low hours pilot would it not have been wiser to send the faster aircraft around rather than increase the workload for an inexperienced pilot?

R.I.P Sam Cross

Report now released.

http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resources/Cessna%20F150L,%20G-BABB%2007-07.pdf

Terrible News

back in ’87 my CFI died at Norwich practicing a spin and recovery demonstration below circuit height in preperation of the Norwich Airshow, the previous week he had practiced it at circuit height, with me in the aircraft…..

I did full spin and recoveries during training, and then practiced them on my own later on, from 5000′, to make sure I was comfortable with them (against club rules for studes…). I also asked for a demonstration next time I was in a chipmunk on AEF.

Its Bad, 🙁

It can be observed that to have spinning as part of the PPL syllabus WILL cause a number of spinning accidents, and these losses will occur when some of the exercises go wrong. However, any pilot, student of otherwise, can undertake spinning training if they wish, and a number of outfits offer dedicated spining tuition.

My instinct is that people with the inclination and confidence to seek out this training are the very ones most likely to benefit from it. Conversely, those pilots who avoid unusual attitudes and have no appetite for aerobatic figures MAY be less likely to have the prompt reactions needed to recover from an accidental spin due to panic/distress at the frightening scenario which they suddenly face.

Thus to expose the whole of the aviation community to the (slight) inherent risks of spin training is probably not justified. In short, leave things as they are.

Regarding Napier Sabre’s observation ( sorry, not really having a go) this attitude seems to be a version of the ignorant element of the press sensationalising an event of which they have no understanding. In ‘tabloidese’ every pilot stays with his doomed plane, and steers clear of the adjacent orphanage.- it seems to be a default setting, and they just can not help themselves.

In the ‘meedja’ engines always cut out’ followed by inevitable plummeting and ‘nose-diving’. If this turns out to be a stall/spin accident, then despite the good intentions of any party, the aeroplane was going to strike the ground pretty much where gravity took it, and the fact that nobody on the ground was injured was the only blessing in this sad, sad episode.

Kind of moot in this case, since recovering a 152 from a spin at circuit height is a non-starter. Spin avoidance would have been the relevant skill here.

Totally agree with Moggy re the spin training. When I was sent on my first solo I had been taught how to “avoid” stalls in all the various configurations, but it wasn’t until just before the test that I did spin recovery. Would I have recovered from a spin at circuit height during my early solo’s? Very doubtful.

It also made me consider the training I had at the early stages. The ‘stalling’ lessons I had basically consisted of recovering “at the first sign of the stall”, so as the stall warner went off it was stick forward, power on and build up airspeed. This training would have left me totally unprepared should I have found myself in a fully developed stall/incipient spin. When the CFI took over my training due to my previous instructor being unavailable, I got a real shock when I found myself recovering from the incipient spin stage with the aircraft near inverted!

The point here is that there is a big difference between being taught stall/spin avoidance and stall/spin recovery. Speaking to other pilots I got the impression that avoidance is what is being taught to a large number of trainee’s. That’s fine until they are unlucky enough to find themselves in a fully developed stall or spin.

I firmly believe that there is very good reason to reintroduce spinning as part of the PPL syllabus and it would be wise to ensure that a student pilot is capable of recovering from an incipient spin or full spin before being sent solo.

I have no idea of what caused the accident this thread refers to and wouldn’t want to speculate but it did make me think back to what training I had that would help me in such a situation. As a result I think I will go up with an instructor for an hour and redo some spin training on my next flight.

Damien does though raise an interesting, and oft dicussed point – the absence of spin recovery training from the PPL syllabus.

Like him I opted to include it in my PPL training prior to the solo.

Whether any student would be good enough to identify and recover from a full spin at circuit height is a moot point, but there are many of us who feel that (despite the publicised accidents that have happened during spin training) it is still good thing to include.

Moggy