SLightly old by interesting article from Jane's Navy Int. Sept. 23rd

JANE’S NAVY INTERNATIONAL – OCTOBER 01, 2003

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Russia’s anti-ship arsenal targets export markets
Richard Scott

With state orders slow to emerge, Russia’s missile industry is now vying to export a range of technologically advanced anti-ship cruise missiles. Richard Scott reports

Future advances in technology and continued worldwide proliferation will result in next-generation threats that fly lower, faster, and are stealthier and more manoeuvrable,” warns the US Navy briefing document, ‘Ship Self Defense: An Imperative for Littoral Warfare’. Underscoring the continuing threat posed by the modern anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), it adds: “Technological advances will further shrink the littoral battlespace, reducing reaction time available to defenders, while making [ASCMs] harder to defeat and easier to hide electronically. Continuing proliferation will ensure the availability of this technology to a vastly wider range of potential adversaries.”

Indeed, in its 1997 report, ‘Challenges to Naval Expeditionary Warfare’, the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) noted that “over 75 countries possess over 90 different types of anti-ship cruise missiles”. Of course, this simple statistic disguises the fact that many of the ASCM inventories of so-called ‘states of concern’ comprise older variants of the ubiquitous P-15 (NATO reporting name SS-N-2 ‘Styx’) and its various Chinese and North Korean clones.

This genre of weapons is obsolete by current standards on account of its substantial size (a legacy of using liquid-fuel rocket propulsion), slow speed, high cruising altitude and dated seeker technology. Rather, it is the aggressive marketing and continued proliferation of advanced ASCMs – those that provide the most stressing threat to shipborne defences – which give the ONI most cause for concern. “Competition for sales, especially in the developing Middle East and Asian markets, is intense,” it says. “Cruise missiles are not considered strategic weapons, and so limits on technology levels are virtually non-existent. Current cruise missiles are largely subsonic. Future missiles will include longer ranges, greater speed, stealthy designs, advanced seekers and onboard digital computers.”

The ONI’s report classifies the next generation of ASCM developments into two distinct classes. “First, stealthy subsonic missiles… which are difficult to detect. Second, supersonic ASCMs such as the Russian SS-N-22 ‘Sunburn’ (3M80 Moskit).” It continues: “The trend in ASCM improvements increases their ability to: approach swiftly with little warning time; and process their homing data with more sophisticated processing algorithms, making countermeasures more difficult.”

Undoubtedly, it is the proliferation of a new generation of highly advanced Russian ASCMs that weighs most in the ONI’s thinking. Russia’s military industrial complex is today actively marketing a range of weapons that began development during the Cold War – or that leverage technology from weapons fielded during that era.

This desire to secure exports for the latest high-technology weaponry is in marked contrast to the Soviet era. It is noteworthy that during the Cold War the Soviet Union largely restricted the transfer of ASCMs to ship- and shore-launched ‘Styx’ variants. This was for two reasons: first, the sheer size and complexity of many missile ‘complexes’ meant that they were completely unsuited to client states in the developing world; second, there was a reluctance to export the most advanced weapons on the grounds that their technology might be compromised to the West.

That reluctance to export high-technology ASCMs has today disappeared. The financial situation in Russia has reduced state funding for weapons programmes, leading to delays in development and the deferment or cancellation of prospective orders for the domestic customer. As a result, design bureaux and manufacturing enterprises have in recent years devoted internal funds to completing development and qualification of a range of ASCMs, and are now looking to recoup their investment – and retain their design, development and production capacity – through export sales. And intriguingly, the funding problem has brought rival engineering enterprises into direct, and sometimes acrimonious, competition for sales.

Supersonic ‘Sunburn’

Developed by the Raduga Design Bureau, the 3M80 Moskit (SS-N-22 ‘Sunburn’) supersonic ASCM entered service in 1984. As well as equipping Russian Federation Navy Project 956 Sovremmeny-class destroyers, a single Project 1155.1 Udaloy II frigate, Project 1241.1 ‘Tarantul III’ corvettes and Project 1239 Dergach air-cushion corvettes, Moskit has also been exported to China aboard two Project 956E Sovremmeny-class destroyers.

3M80 is powered by a ramjet sustainer with an integral solid-propellant booster – a combination known as ‘matreshka’ – delivering a maximum speed of Mach 2.3 at low altitude and a maximum range of up to 120km (depending on flight profile). The later 3M82 Moskit-M version is thought to extend range out to 150km. Associated with the missile is the Mineral-ME targeting radar and data exchange complex.

Aerodynamically, Moskit is distinguished by a clean cylindrical forebody tapering to a sharp point at the nose. Moving aft, the missile incorporates four mid-body air intakes, and cruciform wings and tail surfaces

Fired from either the KT-190 quadruple launcher or (in the case of the ‘Tarantul III’) the KT-152 twin launcher, Moskit is powered by the solid rocket booster for three to four seconds after launch (wings and tail fins extend following egress from the launch canister) before burning out. Its remains are then jettisoned and the kerosene-fuelled ramjet sustainer is ignited. The cruise phase of flight is flown at an altitude of 20m.

Mounted in the forward part of the nose, Moskit’s Altair-designed multichannel seeker employs active radar, anti-radiation and home-on-jam modes. Approaching its target at an altitude of around 7m, Moskit executes a terminal ‘S’ manoeuvre (pulling up to 15g) to evade close-in defences. The 300kg penetrating warhead contains 150kg of high explosive.

Raduga has publicised a number of further improvements to Moskit. These include more internal fuel (pushing range up to 200km), an improved warhead and seeker updates. China, which originally acquired Moskit as part of a deal to acquire two Project 956E destroyers from Russia, is now procuring an upgraded version, known as the 3M80MBE, with range extended out to 200km. It is also buying two additional Project 956ME destroyers for delivery in 2005, and it is speculated that 3M80MBE may also equip some indigenously built surface combatants.

A proposed air-launched variant of 3M80, known as the Kh-41 or ASM-MMS, was displayed in the early 1990s, with the Su-27 ‘Flanker’ envisaged as the carrier aircraft. However, development did not proceed.

Yakhont acceptance

The protracted gestation of the 3M55 Oniks (SS-N-26), better known by its export name Yakhont, reflects the challenges that Russia’s missile design houses and engineering enterprises have faced in recent years. Its origins lie very much in the Soviet era, with initial proposals for a ramjet-powered supersonic missile emerging from NPO Mashinostroyenia (formerly OKB-52) in 1983 as the Reutov-based research and production enterprise lobbied hard to the right to develop a next-generation ASCM to succeed 3M80 Moskit. Development funding was authorised in 1985.

What is now clear is that Yakhont’s design antecedents lie with the 3M45 missile associated with the P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 ‘Shipwreck’) system, one of the most feared Soviet ASCM complexes of the Cold War era. While Granit entered service with the then Soviet Navy as long ago as 1983, it remained veiled in secrecy long after the demise of the Soviet Union. Given the paucity of technical data, together with not a little disinformation, the 3M45 missile had generally been assumed to be a development of the NPO Mashinostroyenia P-500 Bazalt (SS-N-12 ‘Sandbox’) system, itself an advanced evolution of the earlier P-5, P-6 and P-35 (SS-N-3 ‘Shaddock’) line.

Granit was finally unveiled to the world in 2001 when pictures were published of the weapon being removed from the wreck of the Project 949A (‘Oscar II’) submarine Kursk. NPO Mashinostroyenia also released factory photographs of 3M45, which showed that, rather than the ventral air-intake and large wing surfaces associated with Bazalt, the 3M45 missile in fact adopted an annular front air intake, a cylindrical missile body (bulging slightly outward in its mid-section), two small upper body wings, cruciform tail surfaces and an in-line solid rocket booster.

The appearance of the 3M45 missile suggested a liquid-fuel ramjet sustainer. However, NPO Mashinostroyenia maintains that it is in fact a high-speed turbojet-powered missile, albeit configured very differently to SS-N-3 and SS-N-12. And so as ‘Shipwreck’ lost its shroud, the ancestry influencing the design of Yakhont became apparent.

Yakhont was conceived by NPO Mashinostroyenia bureau chief Vladimir Chelomey, one of the most influential figures in Soviet post-Second World War missile development, as a ‘universal’ supersonic anti-ship missile suitable for launch from ships, submarines, aircraft and coastal batteries. His concept proposed the use of a standardised transport container/launch tube within which the missile round could be stored and transported. Chelomey also proposed that the missile should be capable of vertical launch.

Chelomey died in December 1984 and thus did not live to see Yakhont reach fruition. But NPO Mashinostroyenia – now led by Director General and General Designer Herbert Yefremov – set about realising his vision.

In appearance, Yakhont resembles in many senses a scaled-down 3M45. The missile body is a slim cylinder, tapered at the front to an annular air intake in the nose, with four cruciform mid-body wings and, just aft, four tail fins. The missile is fitted with a protective nose cap, ejected just after launch.

While Chelomey had, at an early stage, proposed reusing the seeker and powerplant of the 3M80 Moskit for Yakhont to reduce development time and cut cost, it was ultimately decided to develop an all-new missile. That said, the Plamya powerplant adopted for Yakhont is similar in configuration to that used by Moskit, being initially powered by a solid rocket booster and then switching over to a ramjet sustainer. The Plamya engine uses a liquid-fuel ramjet to achieve a maximum speed of Mach 2-2.5, reaching a range of 300km with a hi-lo trajectory (cruising at an altitude of 14,000m) or 120km with a lo-lo trajectory.

In the final stage of flight, Yakhont descends to make a terminal approach at an altitude of 10-15m. The missile carries a 200kg warhead.

Flight control and initial guidance are provided by a Siberian Devices and Systems ShYu80-066B three-axis gyro-stabilised inertial navigation system. Data on the general vicinity of the target is fed into the flight control system prior to launch, using positional data from helicopters, shore radars and other sources.

Building on a long relationship with NPO Mashinostroyenia, the St Petersburg-based Central Research Institute (CRI) Granit has been responsible for the development of Yakhont’s active/passive radar seeker head. According to CRI Granit, advances in micro-electronic technology over the lifetime of Yakhont’s development have allowed the institute to evolve the seeker head through two distinct iterations, the current production-standard seeker being significantly smaller and lighter (at 85kg) than early development hardware.

In contrast with previous anti-ship missiles, the seeker is designed to operate primarily in the passive homing mode, switching to active mode only in the final stages. This is designed to significantly reduce warning time and hence vulnerability to ship defences. In active mode, the coherent monopulse seeker has a maximum range of 50km, and can detect targets +/- 450 off boresight.

Development of Oniks/Yakhont has been extremely protracted, a victim of the funding blight that befell many new programmes following the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, money has been found to complete the testing programme at the Russian Federation Navy’s missile test range in Nenoska, with land-based, ship-launched (from the Project 1234.7 ‘Nanuchka IV’ corvette Nakat) and submerged firings all successfully demonstrated.

As of mid-2003 NPO Mashinostroyenia was still awaiting a state production order for 3M55 Oniks/Yakhont. However, the type has now received state acceptance and, according to bureau chief Herbert Yefremov, has been declared operational aboard Nakat (which carries two sextuple launchers in place of the triple P-120 missile launchers).

The air-launched Yakhont-M is due to begin trials in early 2004. Officials from NPO Mashinostroyenia have also confirmed that study work is under way to develop a land-attack version of the missile, using an updated guidance and seeker package.

Drawing extensively on technology developed for Yakhont, NPO Mashinostroyenia and India’s Defence research and development Organisation entered into an agreement in February 1998 to jointly develop the PJ-10 BrahMos missile. Successful flight tests have been conducted at the Chandipur test range in India, and in February 2003 a successful launch was conducted from the Indian Navy Project 61 destroyer INS Rajput.

BrahMos production is expected to start in 2004, with work being split 50:50 between Russian and Indian industry. In Russia, work will be concentrated at NPO Strela in Orenburg, with semi-complete missiles being delivered to NPO Mashinostroyenia for final assembly

Novator innovation

At the same time that NPO Mashinostroyenia has been striving to nurture Yakhont through its development programme, so the rival Novator experimental engineering bureau has pushed forward with two new ASCMs that have their origins unmistakably rooted in the 3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 ‘Sampson’) nuclear-armed cruise missile. Forming part of the Club complex of anti-ship and anti-submarine guided weapons, variants of the 3M54E and 3M54E1 missiles have already made their first inroads into the export market.

Novator first unveiled a product development known as 3M51 Alfa (SS-N-27 ‘Sizzler’) in 1993, revealing an ASCM that leveraged the turbojet propulsion, flight control surfaces and launch booster of Granat. However, Alfa introduced a new inertial guidance system and a separating ‘dart’ (containing an active radar seeker and 200kg conventional warhead) for the sea-skimming terminal phase of flight.

Cruising to a range of around 200km at subsonic cruise speed, the missile ‘pops up’ to search for its target and then releases a terminal supersonic ‘dart’ at a range of about 20km from the target. Powered by a solid-fuel rocket, this latter section can accelerate to a speed of Mach 3 to penetrate shipborne defences.

Novator has subsequently offered an Alfa variant for export under the designation 3M54E, and also announced the 3M54E1 variant, a subsonic cruise missile (using a booster and a cruise sustainer) with a 400g warhead. Its maximum range is put at around 300km.

The 3M54E and 3M54E1 missiles are today associated with the submarine-based Club-S complex, with both being fired through standard 533mm torpedo tubes. For the surface ship Club-N system, the analogous 3M54TE and 3M541TE weapons are differentiated only by the use of a transport launch container, which is loaded into the 3S14 vertical-launcher cell.

Both missiles use the Radar MMS ARGS-54 active radar seeker. Offering a maximum range of 65km, the seeker head scans +/- 450 off boresight in azimuth, and +100 to -200 in elevation. The Agat Research and Production Enterprise supplies the fire-control system associated with both Club-S and Club-N, providing pre-launch tactical and navigation inputs into the missile inertial guidance system.

India has ordered 3M54E1 for installation aboard its Project 877EKM ‘Kilo’-class submarines (being fired through standard 533mm torpedo tubes). The supersonic 3M54TE – fired from eight-cell vertical launchers – arms India’s three new Russian-built Project 1135.6 Talwar-class frigates.

Eight new Project 636 ‘Kilo’-class diesel-electric submarines being built in Russian shipyards for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy are also to be fitted for the Club-S complex. However, Novator officials insist that no contract has been signed to date for the supply of either 3M54E or 3M54E1 missiles to China.

Since 2001, Novator and NPO Mashinostroyenia have traded claims and counter-claims over the relative merits of 3M54E and Yakhont. Novator argues that 3M54E is less susceptible to detection because it flies a sea-skimming flight profile throughout its mission, suggesting that Yakhont’s high-altitude cruise trajectory leaves it vulnerable to early detection.

However, NPO Mashinostroyenia claims that, in the face of intense electronic countermeasures, a missile relying on a detaching supersonic payload may be denied target range information, thus delaying stage separation. It also argues that 3M54E’s supersonic combat stage would be more susceptible to chaff, and would have insufficient fuel to reacquire a target after passing through a chaff cloud.

‘Switchblade’ success

The Kh-35 Uran (or Uran-E for export) anti-ship missile complex (SS-N-25 ‘Switchblade’) originally developed by Zvezda-Strela – now part of the Tactical Missile Corporation Joint Stock Company (JSC) – is another product that has its origins in the Cold War. Development began in the 1980s, and the missile – designated 3M24 – was first observed aboard an East German patrol craft in the Baltic in late 1988 (being identified as Balcom 10).

Trials were undertaken in the Black Sea aboard the Project 206MP missile hydrofoil R 44. One Black Sea Fleet ship – the Project 61M destroyer Smetlivy – has received the system, but no other installations have been observed to date in the Russian Federation Navy.

Fired from the KT-184 quadruple launcher (manufactured by the Machine Building Design Bureau Federal State Unitary Enterprise), the 3M24 missile (3M24E for export) is a subsonic turbojet-powered weapon superficially similar to the US-built Harpoon (and hence nicknamed ‘Harpoonski’). Fitted with a 145kg high-explosive warhead, and able to engage targets over ranges of 5-130km, the 3M24 missile flies at a cruise altitude of 10-15m before dropping to a sea-skimming height of between 3-5m in the terminal approach.

Target acquisition is achieved using the Radar MMS-developed ARGS-35 active radar seeker – a coherent J-band seeker using a slotted flat-plate-array antenna. The 3R60 shipboard mission-planning and fire-control system associated with Uran has been developed by CRI Granit.

To date, the Uran-E export system has been sold to the navies of India (equipping Project 15 destroyers, Project 16A frigates and Project 25A corvettes) and Algeria (for retrofit to Project 1234 ‘Nanuchka II’-class corvettes).

An air-launched variant of Uran, known as the AS-20 ‘Kayak’, has also been advertised. Although no sales have been confirmed to date, this variant has attracted strong interest from India as a possible anti-shipping armament option for Su-30MK and MiG-29K aircraft.

The Tactical Missile Corporation JSC has proposed to develop Uran further with the improved 3M24M1 missile (3M24E1 for export). This version is advertised as incorporating a GPS receiver, and more fuel in order to extend maximum range to 250km. A variant of the existing 3M24 using an infrared seeker is also advertised as under development.

‘Shipwreck’ gives up its secrets

The P-700 Granit system (SS-N-19 ‘Shipwreck’), combined the resources of NPO Mashinostroyenia and CRI Granit to create a ‘reconnaissance and strike complex’, which in some regards was a harbinger of the network-centric strike concepts expounded today.

Development of Granit began in 1969, the system being conceived specifically to interdict US carrier battle groups in keeping with the sea denial mission of the then Soviet fleet. P-700 was developed for both surface ships and submarines, equipping Project 1144 ‘Kirov’-class cruisers, the Project 1143.5 aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and Project 949 ‘Oscar’ and Project 949A ‘Oscar II’ cruise missile submarines. Both conventional and nuclear-tipped warheads were developed, although the latter are now believed to have been withdrawn from service.

Capable of striking targets at ranges in excess of 500km, Granit was developed as part of a wider reconnaissance and strike complex that assimilated and integrated intelligence and targeting data from a variety of sources (such as shipborne sensors, reconnaissance aircraft, helicopters and the Legenda satellite target designation system). This information was used to localise the target set, plan the mission profile, and feed bearing and range data into the missile inertial navigation system.

The concept of operations, developed during the Cold War, sees the missiles themselves launched in salvo. Following launch, the missile’s protective nose cap is blown off to uncover the annular intake. Once the solid-rocket tandem booster is expended, the missile transitions to its KR-93 turbojet sustainer to cruise at a speed of about Mach 2.5.

According to NPO Mashinostroyenia, the lead missile will climb to acquire the target group, with targets then assigned between the salvo via a communication link. The corporation also claims that logic within the missile can accurately determine the type of formation being attacked (for instance, a convoy, a carrier battle group or an amphibious landing group).

Video presentations shown by CRI Granit suggest that the 3M45 missile’s seeker is a multichannel system combining both active and passive radar homing techniques. The institute has acknowledged experience in the development of millimetric-wave radar and laser radar technology for terminal guidance, and it is likely that the former is a feature of the SS-N-19 homing system.
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I will post a few, but not all of the pics.