Stalins post war naval revival and the RN response.

Just to dust off this old thread, I thought I’d take a fresh look at it.

As I see it, as alluded to in Sealord’s post, the best bet for taking out the mythical Sverdlov massed fleet lies with the nuclear anti-shipping missile. It is probably the only realistic way to do it in those days.

For this role, I would propose that the best bet would probably have been to build a series of new helicopter cruisers, along the same lines as the Italian Vittorio Veneto. These would use a British modified version of the Tartar/Terrier missile system; which frankly beats the heck out of the daft Sea Slug, which was incapable of being updated, and was out of date by the time the ships were in full service!). There would hopefully then be an air-launched version, much like the AGM-78 Standard ARM, but as an anti-shipping missile. There would be nuclear and conventional versions, and this could have yielded something not too disimilar to the American SRAM for land-based use. This way, a basically standard (pardon the pun) missile can be used for ship-based anti-air and anti-ship, and air-launched anti-ship and anti-radar, as well as give a good tactical nuclear missile.

The cruisers would then form an important part of both ASW and carrier groups, carrying advanced AAW systems, and also embarking a good number of ASW helicopters. An ASW group of one cruiser and two frigates would be workable, and enable eight Sea Kings (six on the cruiser, one each on the frigates). The carrier groups would have one cruiser, two smaller destroyers, and a pair of frigates (plus the carrier of course!).

Update:
The book Raising the Red Banner is scheduled for a January 20th release, much sooner than I expected. If you’re interested, you can pre-order at Amazon.uk or almost any other Amazon except Amazon US, for some reason.

Thanks for that Tiornu, I will have to make yet another procurement.;)

Update:
The book Raising the Red Banner is scheduled for a January 20th release, much sooner than I expected. If you’re interested, you can pre-order at Amazon.uk or almost any other Amazon except Amazon US, for some reason.

The 1945 Neeptune design: 15,000 tons with 4 triple 6inch turrets, these weapons were supposed to be fast firing but I doubt that they would have achieved the 20rpm that the weapons eventually installed on the Tigers got. The treasury demanded specific approval for them.

1946: The design was revised to one with 5 twin turrets and the class was renamed the Minotaur.

1948: they raise their heads again.

1950: The Minotaurs were tacitly abandoned.

Late 1940s early 1950s: The “1960 cruiser” designs are started, they evolve into GW96A with a Type-984 3D radar, a Sea Slug launcher aft and two 6inch turrets forward. The vessels were meant to be easily converted so as to have a second Sea Slug launcher forward in place of the 6inch turrets when Blue Slug became available. This design was finally cancelled in 1957.

In effect we have 3 different designs but they are part of a common thematic history. They are all intended to for roughly the same role and are more or less chronological.

Rick, just a quick reply before I will do a more detailed one later,

Remember that the Sverdlovs dont start entering service until the early 1950s, thus they are not properly responded to until then. The RN’s dedicated new build cruisers are a constant theme until they are finally killed in 1957, they were in the 1945 estimates too.;) I will give more detail later!

Does anyone have an armor schematic for the Sverdlovs?

“The ten Didos were not far short of being a waste of space and only under the most favorable of circumstances could they be expected to stand up against a Sverdlov,…”

LOL Yes Im well aware of those ships wouldnt be a match for the Sverdlov’s I listed them for comparison to the USN cruiser inventory which included a similar ship still in service although five had been in service a year earlier just as had 12 6″ light cruisers but quickly reduced to one also.

Even the 8″ gunned cruisers were reduced from 16 to 6 in the late 1940s although 3 new construction were commissioned. along with two new 6″ gunned AAW cruisers.

Sorry for any misunderstanding

My point is on paper and compared to the USN the Royal Navy order of battle doesnt appear at first glance to be all that bad.

And again the Sverdlovs were a response to the RN/USN cruiser and to be sure the RN did look for a new design to deal better with the perceived Sverdlov threat.

But according to Conways those ships would not have been in service until around 1960 and maybe more important that construction was never “seriously planned”.

The USN OTOH apears to never have paid much attention to the Sverdlov class or surface combatant vs surface combatant warfare in general.

As they slowly cut their cruiser force while at the same time optomising those that remained for AAW and mostly looking at the remaing guns more as fire support assets than any other use..

Being nearly totally fixated on AAW missile systems although to be sure they also had a secondary Anti-ship capability.

And in fact guns were “little more than an after thought.”

The Long Beach was originally designed w/o guns as were the Albany class missile cruiser conversions.

The ten Didos were not far short of being a waste of space and only under the most favorable of circumstances could they be expected to stand up against a Sverdlov, in reality they could at best be used as destroyer killers. Of the 6inch cruisers the majority were down to just 9 guns, a 25% reduction over their original design and 25% down on the Sverdlovs. Apparently there was a study at one point into converting all the colony class ships and onwards to the Tiger standard that would have provided 15 ships capable of Sverdlov killing (of course this never happened and only Tiger, Lion and Blake were completed to this standard). However the British produce two potential panaceas (neither of which actually enter service). One Blue Slug, a nuclear armed surface to surface version of sea slug, should have given the county class destroyers the capability to take out a Sverdlov. Green Cheese/Green Flash launched from the Buccaneer should have been similarly effective.

On the other hand the USN heavy cruisers were more than capable of dealing with the Soviet 6inchers.

“The issue for the RN is the appalling state of its cruiser force.”

“and for the most part those ships that did survive would have been unable to stand up to the new Soviet light cruisers.”

Hmmm none of the below cruisers are a match for the Sverdlovs is your contention.

I quess Im (was?) looking at things from a bit of a different perspective:

The RN had 18 cruisers in-commission on July, 1 1950 maybe 19.

The USN by contrast had only 13: 9 8″ gunned Heavy Cruisers, 1 6″Light Cruiser, 2 6″-gunned AAW cruisers and 1 5″-gunned AAW

In-service of 7/1/ 1950. Others in reserve.:

Fifteen 6″ gunned and three(maybe four) 5.25″ gunned AA warships were in-commission. (K) Denotes they served in Korea.:

Southampton Class(Some call them the Town Class )

Birmingham(K)
Sheffield
Glasgow
Newcastle(K)

Gloucester Class

Liverpool

Edinburgh Class

Belfast(K)

Fiji Class (Colony)

Bermuda
Gambia
Jamaica(K)
Kenya(K)
Mauritious
Nigeria

Ceylon Class

Ceylon(K)

Swiftsure Class

Swiftsure
Superb

All of the above were or were variations of the first listed Southampton “Treaty” cruisers.

Dido Class (AAW)

Phoebe
Euralys
Cleopatra

Maybe:

Bellona Class

Diadem (Paid-Off in 1950 but I dont have exact date.)

In addition the RN had 11 carriers in-commission, 1 battleship and approx 100 Destroyers/frigates.

The USN had 15 carriers in-service 3 Midway class, 4 Essex class large fleet carriers, 3 light carriers and four escort carriers.

Plus 1 battleship and approx 150 destroyers/destroyer escorts.

From looking at just the #s the Royal Navy is little inferior numbers wise to the USN at this time.

But given that the USN is a much larger nation would we not expect this?

Although as you seem to indicate the quality of some these ships may have been somewhat suspect and in some instances are older.

But again the RN has more cruisers.

The USN has historically been plagued with the so-called “cruiser gap”.

In 1975 most of the DLGs were redesignated a CG to close a similarly viewed gap with the USSR.

rickusn: nonsense/shame. It’s a politically-led thread: why did Uncle Joe want to spend so much at sea? Maybe because he remembered 1918/20: http://www.naval-history.net/WW1CampaignsRNBolshevik.htm. And the RN Division on the Trans-Siberian Railway.

An academic viewpoint is that WW1, WW2 and the Cold War were one European Civil War. SLL is exploring RN’s response to Sverdlovsks &tc. Until Berlin Airlift it was US intent to depart from Europe. He says RN was obliged to respond…or be very lonesome. Marxist Revisionists have it that our actions provoked Stalin – Berlin Blockade, for example, to shut off resurgent, aggressive W.Germany enjoying Marshall Aid and a new currency: US surrogate to try to do better than in 1920 or 1941. This argument can be credibly presented…but for me is undermined by…250DDGs.

rick, I agree entirely.

The point of the Alaska’s and the Iowas is that they exist and could have been put back into service if required. Their existence would have made the Stalingrads lives very difficult.

The issue for the RN is the appalling state of its cruiser force. It suffered a very high rate of attrition during the war and for the mos part those ships that did survive would have been unable to stand up to the new Soviet light cruisers.

You should be able to just order it of Amazon. It is a truly great read.

Not without a greditcard…:(

I quess your talking about this.:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish-Soviet_War

Why try to ruin this thread with this nonsense?:

“let us not forget that in 1920 UK, USA, France, Japan, Poland…had all invaded the Motherland.”

For crying out loud have you no shame?

Isnt it interesting that these are the same nations Putin and Russia right now wish to incinerate ASAP.

Yes I understand.

Although I think the Sverdlovs were a response to the large number of existing six inched gunned cruisers in both the Royal Navy(RN) and USN.

The two Alaskas were decommissioned in 1946 the third though launched was never completed.

Although the prewar battleships were all decommissioned in 1946(possibly some in early 1947 I havent looked at all the dates recently).

And the three of the four Iowas were decomissioned in 1948/9.

The USN was quite unsure of which crusier was the best to keep in the post war ie the six inch or the eight inch. Settling on the eight inch ships circa 1948/49 as being far more useful and flexible. At the same time also rejecting the 5″ AAW optomised classes.

The wisdom of this decision was borne out by the Korean War experience and the excellent capabilities of those ships as flagships, fire support, ASuW and AAW. As none of the six inch gunned cruisers were activated for the conflict although six were later converted to missile cruisers four of which had the dual capability of flagships they were never liked as much as the eight inch gunned missile conversions or the all-gun unconverted ships that were kept as flagships.

The Skorys were certainly also a response to the USN/RN destroyer classes of WWII.

Some of the information you presented dovetailed nicely with my ongoing study of the USN/RN/USSR history.

To be sure I have studied both UK and Russian surface combatant histories and the UK destroyer/frigate conversions, modernization and new construction and post-war DESRON assignments/employment (along with RN cruiser assets) in some detail and written essays on the subject.

Particularly as the similarities between the UK/USN along with the contrasts are quite interesting.

In fact Ive written a number of essays on the RN that have been well received by RN historians. I broach nothing new but am able by building on others work distill the essence of events into much shorter and focused looks at force stucture and deployment formations or independent employment.

Their really is no one stop or even consistent treatment of the subject matter.

Time, space and brevity issues override any truly definitive work and that always leaves some questions unanswerd.

Of course I have a less than optimum access to all volumes written on the subject nor the funds to buy them all.

But I d love to go to a section say on “CA” class destroyers that lists the class with the class details ie LaidDown//Launch/decomission/recommision dates and final disposition. Gives a detailed overview of the ship classes design history. With hyperlinks to each ships history that includes the formations both tactical and squadron/division each ship was employed in and a link to those formations listing the other units involved.

With links also to pages detailing the weapons/sensors/aircrafts/machinery mentioned in the ship class details.

Im probaly not explaining this well and certainly dont mean to disparage any of a number of very valuable and important books and websites.

Just that as I search and read looking for answers Im always left with more new questions than old ones I had answered.

Someday my dream is to produce such an effort as unlikely as it is to ever come to fruition.

The post-war history of world navies is a rather esoteric subject.

Ive devoted less time to the USSR as their requirements that in many ways are dissimilar but were not made in a vacuum and bare relation to developments in the US and UK.

As the premise of the thread you started clearly indicates.

And these three nations along with somewhat lesser contributions but no less important of countries such as France, Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Canada and Japan during this period that also deserve careful scrutiny.

There are a dearth of sites to discuss the period between 1945 and 1970.

But this was the critical period and the issues of this period are still extremely relevant today.

Then USN Major Fleet Escort Study of 1967 is still much referred to and relevant even 40 years later in general although of course some specifics are not.

In fact actually in many ways very little has really changed in the USN since late 1941/early 1942.

There have been ups and downs to be sure and new technology but the basic premises of carrier and escort issues then being defined are still in place 65+ years later.

AAW/ASW/AsuW/land-attack/MW tasks and issues relevant then are still being debated and refined today.

As are blue water vs green water vs brown water, multi-purpose/general-purpose vs single-purpose, high-end vs low-end, cost vs capability , strategic vs tactical issues among others.

“Cold War Studies” now vies in UK with “Holocaust Studies” for “popularity” as Modern History courses, age 15 through post-graduate. “Did Stalin have expansionist intent, or did he perceive encirclement? Discuss.” An expected answer presents both sides as “to blame”.

Look around from a N.Polar projection: colour in NATO/CENTO/SEATO States. US kept Improved Fat Men and B-36 in build after VJ Day: what target lies 5,000nm from the Mid-West? Which victor was excluded from Occupation in Italy, Japan? But…am I right that amphib. Force was deployed around Vladivostok 1949, just after USMC left its China posts? No purpose but to vault into Japan or Alaska.

Strong land and Air Defence Forces are proper to deter/repel another incursion – let us not forget that in 1920 UK, USA, France, Japan, Poland…had all invaded the Motherland. But why would a defensive-led USSR need any maritime Power beyond inshore work? 250 DDGs, for a land-locked nation! Hungry, burnt, bereaved, with no Trade Routes to protect. Useless against a resurgent Germany. Does not this defeat the apologists: this fiddler intended to rule the world? And/or: intel of what SLL et al. here are recording obliged (the West) to assume he did, and so to spend and deploy accordingly.

Thats one of the books I really would like to get my hands on…but unfortunetly those type of books are extremely hard to obtain from here:(

You should be able to just order it of Amazon.:confused: It is a truly great read.

The best source that I have come across so far is ‘Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programs, 1935-1953’ by J. Rohwer and M. Monakov.

Thats one of the books I really would like to get my hands on…but unfortunetly those type of books are extremely hard to obtain from here:(

“‘Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programs, 1935-1953’ by J. Rohwer and M. Monakov.”

Thanks for that!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Rick

No problem at all.

I should just point out that the reason I am interested in RN response is becouse the RN actually has to respond. The USN on the other hand comes out of the WW2 in a very good state with a powerful fleet of very capable heavy cruisers, the four Iowas and the Alaskas.Nothing in Stalins naval revival really responds to these ships in a viable way.

“‘Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programs, 1935-1953’ by J. Rohwer and M. Monakov.”

Thanks for that!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Rick