Stupid truckers

Did bombs dropped from large loads sometimes strike each other, while tumbling out of aircraft anyway ?

They sometimes dropped onto other aircraft below

Did bombs dropped from large loads sometimes strike each other, while tumbling out of aircraft anyway ?

There was nobody else around to blame…

So all plane crashes are pilot error? :dev2:

The quote from the above post is interesting:

They scorned the use of cranes, preferring rather to roll the unfused bombs to the tails of their lorries and allow them to drop off. They chose an open area of ground for this risky business, and proceeded to unload their 500-pounders. Apparently the ordinary type of bomb could be handled with comparative safety in this way, but the bombs they had brought were of a new and very sensitive type.

If the RDX-filled bombs weren’t marked with the painted yellow band and dropping ‘ordinary’ bombs from the tailgates of trucks was a normal practice are the drivers still to blame?

It is also interesting that the quote mentions an ‘open area of ground’. My guess is that a normal RDX-filled bomb shouldn’t have exploded when dropped from a truck onto the ground (even if it hit another bomb). That being the case then there was something wrong with the filling of the bomb.

As is often the case with preventable accidents it is usually a combination of factors that turn normal practice into a tragedy but it is usual to blame the pilots…..I mean the drivers.

Fascinating stuff, thanks for that.

Moggy

An eyewitness account of the aftermath of the explosion by Douglas Bailey who was a civil engineer working on the airfield construction programme.

(I have read somewhere that the accident was most probably caused by faulty explosive filling in one bomb. I also read somewhere rthat a grisly souvenir was found on the site many years later – a shard of bomb casing and the remains of the sole of a boot embedded in it)

“As I scraped the Halesworth mud from my shoes I heard the rumble of returning American bombers, and saw their silver bodies gliding across the clear sky. The noise died down, and I was preparing to take my finished work upstairs when a deep roar shook the air, and the old windows rattled under the vibration of an explosion. Somebody crashed, I thought, and forgot the incident; explosions were common in those days.

On the following day I arose early with the intention of learning more of the countryside around Bungay. Breakfast over, I walked into the yard and met the paper boy, who handed me the three Sunday papers and asked me if I had heard the explosion on the previous evening.

“Yes, I thought it was a Lib. crashing at Bungay,” I replied.

“It was Metfield,” said the paper boy, “a lot of bombs gone up; hardly a shop window’s left in Halesworth.”

Metfield was one of my stations, but I had not been able to visit it in my first week. I decided that perhaps I should be wise to go there and see if matters were serious, so I rang up Halesworth from a call box and ordered transport. The van collected me within half an hour and we made for Metfield across Bungay Common. There were no signs of damage as we entered the station, but I noticed Pickering’s car stood outside the Clerk of Works’ office. Pickering was standing at a drawing bench in shirt sleeves beside Platten, the Clerk of Works. Two U.S.A.A.F. officers were in the room, and all four were studying a plan of Bomb Stores.

When I enquired what was amiss, Pickering explained that an unknown quantity of high-explosive bombs had blown up in bomb stores, and extensive damage had been caused. I got in the van and inspected the field. Two huge craters had been blown in the ground, and charred bombs were scattered amongst massive sheets of concrete and piles of debris. A cornfield adjacent to the storage room had been stripped clean as if by a scythe, and there was no sign of the crop which had stood there. The next field appeared to be untouched but closer examination showed that although the stalks were still standing, not an ear of corn remained. A farmhouse on the edge of the Bomb Stores had been demolished. All the Nissen huts nearby had caved in, and a timber and asbestos armoury building on the airfield was a heap of matchwood. A hangar was standing with all the sheets blown off one side and a quarter of an acre of roof sheeting missing. Some of the large hangar doors were lying on the ground, the others hanging dangerously by one corner in their overhead tracks. A distant cottage had been stripped of its roof tiles, and its timbers stood out like the bleached ribs of a skeleton. Everywhere was the smell of burnt earth.

On returning to the office I was told that part of a bomb lorry had been picked up on the main runway, at a point almost a mile from the explosion. Search parties had been organised to pick up fragments from all runways, and to collect the large amount of T.N.T. which had been scattered over the site. An emergency meeting had been called in the Colonel’s office, and we made our way to Station Headquarters wondering what would be the outcome of the grim occurrence.

As we filed into the Station Headquarters and down the narrow corridor I saw a lean man with closely cropped grey hair standing amongst a group of officers inside the meeting room doorway. It was my old enemy, Lieutenant-Colonel Seashore. He saw me approaching along the corridor, and a brief smile and nod indicated that he remembered me. There was no time for greetings, for Colonel Miller, the Commanding Officer, entered the room and took the chair. We placed ourselves in a semi-circle round the Colonel and the meeting commenced.

Representatives of the Bombardment Wing and 2nd Bombardment Division were there, as well as an officer from the District Engineer’s Headquarters at Newmarket. The main question was how long the job of repair would take, and whether or not active operations could continue. Twelve Liberators had been rendered unfit for use by the explosion – mostly owing to twisted frames – so that the Group would have to fly with depleted numbers until replacements could be brought in. Access to the Bomb Stores was blocked by an old barn which had been shattered by the explosion. The ring road which served all the bomb storage areas had been blown up at two points. An unknown number of bombs had been buried in earth and debris. A certain amount of risk had to be taken, as disposal of the bombs would be a slow and delicate operation. The repairs were discussed and it was agreed to form a temporary connection between the sound lengths of road with tarmacadam, to clear the barn debris, and to pull down the Nissen component stores and stack their contents under tarpaulins whilst new huts were erected on the old bases. Two of the four large bomb-storage areas had been rendered unserviceable so that bombs would have to be stored on the open ground wherever possible.

After the meeting I made a point of speaking to Seashore. He was polite but cool, and I wondered how we should stand with each other at Metfield. Back at the office I asked the Clerk of Works how he found the Colonel, and was informed that Metfield was a very happy station, with the A.M.W.D. on excellent terms with the unit. I met the Utilities Officer, a Captain Smith, and we went together to the Officers’ Mess for lunch. The Mess was clean and tidy, the atmosphere cordial, and the food prepared and served with care and good taste. As I sat at the table Colonel Seashore came over and asked if we could inspect the Bomb Stores together after lunch, to see what could be done to hasten the emergency repairs. I agreed to join the party of inspection, and when the meal was finished the Clerk of Works and myself returned to the A.M.W.D. office to await the party of officers. Seashore and Smith drove up in a jeep with the two other officers, and the Clerk of Works and I got in the car and followed them round the track. We alighted at the entrance to the Stores, and exchanged a few words regarding the debris blocking our way. Our small vehicles were able to get round the obstruction by running on the grass, and we cruised slowly along the concrete road towards the scene of the explosion. There we left our vehicles and picked our way cautiously over the charred earth, avoiding an area which had been flagged off, until we stood on the top of a bomb stores earth traverse. We agreed the route to be taken by the temporary tarmacadam link which was to restore the ring road to a workable condition, and a discussion followed regarding the permanent repairs we should need. One complete bomb storage area was required, and we decided to set out the new roads to it so that they skirted the edges of the two craters. The second area of concrete standings could be formed out of one of the two which had been put out of action, but this could not be done until the buried bombs had been dug out or steamed out and the larger crater partly filled in.

A sudden shout interrupted our discussion, and we swung around to see a handful of G.I.s running from an incendiary bomb store. A sheet of white flame sprang up, and we ran down the traverse and across the field to a friendly ditch, expecting to hear an explosion as we scampered over the spiky stubble that had once been corn. Seashore was nearest to me as we made for cover, and he picked up his long legs like a young colt as he galloped over the uneven ground. We crouched in the ditch, panting with the sudden exertion, and emerged after a few moments to see if the bomb had burned out. Platten, the Clerk of Works, was a little distance away up the ditch, and he called out to say that the coast was clear. As we walked back to our former vantage point we saw the G.I.s playing on the smoking bomb with snow extinguishers, and it was clear that the danger of further explosions was still possible. A large body of ground personnel came on site and ranged themselves along one side of the field where we were going to construct the new concrete standings and road. They walked slowly and very carefully across the stubble, picking up yellow scraps of T.N.T. and half-burnt anti-personnel bombs, stacking them every few yards under the protection of red warning flags. We were told that the small anti-personnel bombs were a source of anxiety, as they were fused and would explode at a touch. As we stood on the traverse two officers walked past us, each with one of the anti-personnel bombs balanced carefully in gloved hands. The officers were specialists in bomb disposal and Platten and I had a few words with them concerning the work we wanted to start. They agreed that men could enter the Bomb Stores on the following day to lay tarmacadam, but they were dubious about starting work on the new storage area. T.N.T. and damaged bombs still lay scattered over that part of the stores. They decided that temporary passes should be issued to authorised workmen, and pickets would be posted at the entrances to check all persons entering the danger area.

We returned to the office. Seashore asked me what I thought of our prospects, and I promised that the tarmacadam temporary road would be in by the end of the following day. The Group would thus be able to resume operations. After that I said that progress on the new stores would depend on whether or not the bomb disposal people would let us work. We needed at least two excavators and a bulldozer, and plant of that kind could not be let loose amongst piles of debris which might contain bombs. Seashore told me to work closely with him and tell him of any hold-up which might occur, and this I agreed to do. It seemed to me that the Ground Executive Officer was a different man from when I first knew him. Remembering our undignified flight for cover when the incendiary burst during our inspection, I realised it at least the Colonel would not be able to stand on false dignity with me again. Perhaps we had met in circumstances which had drawn us more closely in sympathy but I am inclined to think that Seashore had developed a better understanding of English methods since leaving Attlebridge. Whatever the reason, we became quite good friends as the days passed.

A gang of workmen started on the demolition of the damaged buildings, and another gang entered the Bomb Stores to prepare the site for tarmacadam. Pickering and I went home after arranging to go to Newmarket on the following day, for a full report would be required by Headquarters.

We set off to Newmarket early on the next morning, and met the Superintending Engineer. He sent us back with Mr. Hill and a Major from the District Engineer’s office to go over our requirements on the site. On arrival at Metfield we heard the story of the explosion, pieced together from information given by the only survivor. A number of bomb-laden lorries had arrived at the Bomb Stores from the nearby central dump. All the station ordnance personnel were in their Mess having a meal, and the drivers of the lorries had decided to unload their cargoes unaided. They scorned the use of cranes, preferring rather to roll the unfused bombs to the tails of their lorries and allow them to drop off. They chose an open area of ground for this risky business, and proceeded to unload their 500-pounders. Apparently the ordinary type of bomb could be handled with comparative safety in this way, but the bombs they had brought were of a new and very sensitive type. One exploded, the others were blown up with it, and a number of bombs must have been thrown a hundred yards or more into the end of one of the large storage dumps. The lorries and drivers disappeared in the explosion and the sole survivor escaped death simply because he was standing behind a tall stack of bombs in a nearby dump. He was deafened and suffered severe shock. Six drivers were killed; in fact no trace of them was ever found.

As we went over the site once more I listed my requirements for Hill’s benefit, and he told me where I could obtain hutting and the necessary plant. At the end of the day he instructed Pickering to leave Metfield to me, as it would be a full-time job for one man to survey and set out the new work and arrange for men and materials. Pickering agreed to run Halesworth until he left, and it was as well that there were two of us for the next few weeks,

There was nobody else around to blame.

It would appear that if they had waited for the base personnel to arrive back from the mess hall the bombs would have been craned off, they could have got their respective ends away in Ipswich that night (all be it a little late), and might possibly even now be sunning themselves at their Florida Condo.

Moggy

Undoubtedly, and, as so often in wartime, it was possible that the results of the enquiry were more concerned with something other than the absolute truth.

Imagine that the crews carrying RDX filled bombs into action started to become nervous about the ‘sensitivity’ of RDX? Apparently the bombs were already marked with the yellow painted band because of some existing concerns. Aircrew morale was probably the biggest concern for the commanders of the bomber offensive at this crucial stage of the war…

…maybe blaming the ‘stupid truckers’ was a reflection of this?

I’m guessing with the casualties that the 8th were taking in combat at that time of the war, the enquiry would be less searching / more of a formality than had it happened at Lakenheath yesterday.

Moggy

I do not want to sound like I suspect some great secret conspiracy is being kept in this case but it just seems such a subjective conclusion to draw from so little evidence.

Given the millions of these RDX filled bombs, torpedoes and mines that were manufactured, transported, stored and deployed during World War Two (never mind those that did not explode when dropped as intended) the evidence would seem to indicate that they were inherently safe (even if sometimes they were abused).

Would have been seen as a reasonable conclusion I suppose and the dead guys were not around to argue the case !!

He recalled hearing the trucks rev up their engines, brakes screeching, and bombs falling out –then the explosion.

So it is speculation that a bomb-to-bomb contact caused the explosion!

…a spark…would that ignite RDX?

Nope.

This may explain why the other driver survived…ie possibly the normal sequence and not because he thought the others were doing a dangerous procedure !!

When the five drivers decided to roll their bombs out, the driver of the sixth truck which carried fuses and fins, moved off to a seperate area where those items were stored. He dismounted his vehicle and sat on the running board so the truck was between him and the bomb unloading area. He recalled hearing the trucks rev up their engines, brakes screeching, and bombs falling out — then the explosion.

Sometimes people are caught out by circumstances that prove impossible to re enact,possibly a ‘leaky’ bomb or one with an undetected casing fault ? and a spark ? …would that ignite RDX ?

I hope RDX isn’t that sensitive!

I took the orders as intended to stop any ‘hung-up’ bombs dropping onto the runway during a landing or any bombs becoming involved in a crash during landing.

Speaking from personal experience it is very rare to create an enormous bounce on take off.

Landing, on the other hand, is a completely different story 😮

Moggy

Curiously one of the posts above mentions Tallboy or Grand-Slam bombs being deliberately dropped from (parked) Lancaster bombers…

…and what are these bombs filled with? Well, Torpex…..which is about 40% RDX.

I am not sure if mixing RDX and TNT in Torpex makes it less sensitive…..presumably so, but by how much?

I cannot imagine that Torpex is particularly sensitive to shock since it is primarily designed to be used in torpedoes (TORPedo EXplosive) and depth-charges; you would not want any of these to ‘sympathetically’ detonate due to the shock of a near-miss depth-charge or magnetic-mine!

Valuable Tallboy or Grand-Slam bombs were brought back unused but I can understand the orders to jettison more common RDX filled bombs; problem solved for landing but what about take-off?

I am just reading an 8th Airforce history and one quote in there is that no aircraft was allowed to land back carrying RDX-filled bombs.

Did the surviving driver see what was being done and decide to retire to a safe distance (where he could not see the bomb-to-bomb impact)?

From what I read his truck was carrying tail fins so was in another part of the dump. I would guess he testified to hearing the ‘clang’ shortly before the explosion?

It would be interesting to read the whole enquiry transcript. I wonder if it is available?

Moggy

I still think there is more to this than the reports would suggest.

The sensitivity of RDX as an explosive is only relatively high compared to other bomb fillings such as TNT. Literally thousands of bombs failed to explode when dropped from 20,000 feet or more onto built-up targets; surely some of these would have been RDX filled?

And yet the report seems to suggest that the thing that made the difference in this case was that one of the (unfuzed) bombs was dropped from the tailgate of a truck onto another (unfuzed) bomb. Are they seriously suggesting that a relatively predictable ‘freak’ occurrence, during an apparently (fairly) routine handling method, made all the difference between the bomb exploding or not? Would the shock be that much greater? What would the bombs normally have landed on: mud, sort earth, hard earth or even concrete? If RDX filled bombs were that sensitive wouldn’t there be more protection provided than a yellow painted warning band? And more care exercised?

I would love to know how anybody actually knew that one bomb landed on another. Would not anybody close enough to see have been killed by the explosion? Did the surviving driver see what was being done and decide to retire to a safe distance (where he could not see the bomb-to-bomb impact)?

I think this report leaves more questions than answers.

One of the books on 617 Sqn describes dropping ‘tallboys’ or ‘Grand Slams’ from parked Lancasters. Can’t remember which one just now.

There were five fatalities. I think I read that three truckers are commemorated from that day on the Wall of the Missing at Madingley. Presumably the USAAF made up two coffins with all the pieces they found and buried those?

I’ve posted this elsewhere before, but it’s worth repeating here:

The 2218th Quartermaster Truck Company (Aviation) unit diary refers to six drivers killed in the explosion at Metfield.
They would have been based at the Earsham ordnance depot at the time.

Checking the ABMC roll for that unit gives only three of the names, all were killed on the 15th July 1944 and have no known grave.
All three are recorded on the Wall of Missing at Madingley Cemetery.

Private Donald P. Adkins, U.S. Army Air Forces
Service # 35350614
2218th Quartermaster Truck Company, Aviation
Entered the Service from Indiana

Private First Class Donald L. Hurley, U.S. Army Air Forces
Service # 35619775
2218th Quartermaster Truck Company, Aviation
Entered the Service from Ohio

Private Steve W. Suchey, U.S. Army Air Forces
Service # 34197931
2218th Quartermaster Truck Company, Aviation
Entered the Service from Alabama

All the best,
PB