Sweden's SEAD capability against S-300/400?

Below is Google translation of “Strategisk utblick 2011 (Strategic Outlook 2011)” published by the FOI (Defence Research Agency) of Sweden in June 2011.

There, “Kan Nato försvara Baltikum? (Can NATO defend the Baltics)” written by Karlis Neretnieks argues Sweden should help NATO fight Russia in case Russia tries to repeat what the USSR did in 1940.

How would the Swedish air force measure up against Russian S-300/400 SAM batteries?

Can NATO defend Baltics?

The three Baltic countries have no realistic chance to form its own military capability that would deter Russia from an attack, or military pressure, either individually or together. In the case of so-called “Hard” security – military defense – NATO is the most crucial component of Baltic defense planning. However, it is doubtful whether NATO during the next decade will have a credible ability to defend Baltic territory. The risk is that a crisis affecting one or more of the Baltic countries, and in which Russia is involved, will affect Sweden. This means that the stability we have become accustomed in our region can not always be taken for granted.

(snip)

Conclusions

Available Russian resources would most likely suffice to DESTROY the Baltic country’s own armed forces the relatively short time. Early support from NATO to avoid this is a must. An early presence of two to three qualified brigades would probably cause the risk of an attack from the Russian point of view would be too great. Opportunities to ask NATO with a fait accompli would be drastically reduced. NATO have sufficient resources for such an enhancement operation. The prerequisite is that the determination and courage are to implement large air transport in a very tense situation.

The crucial factor is how big the threat is assessed be from the Russian air defense system, combat aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles. It is very doubtful that the U.S. would risking a large number of transport aircraft, with soldiers on board; in an airlift to the Baltic states if you took the risk that large to meet modern air defense systems. If the breach has not broken out maybe you would be willing to take the risk. It would if so, to promote crisis dampening. In the event that Russia already attacked the Baltic region may probably be regarded as impossible that NATO undertaking their air transportation at all before they Russian air defense systems are defeated. The latter can be an operation that can take anywhere from days to weeks, if it is at all feasible.

Furthermore, it is likely that the Russian air defense system drastically would reduce NATO’s ability to provide air support to the Baltic countries’ own forces. This is perhaps the biggest weakness of NATO’s ability to protect Baltics. Air power is the fastest that can intervene. They may be based outside the Baltic territory. They would may be able to intervene in a decisive way in conventional ground fighting if they had operational freedom. They have not in the this case, unable for reasons threat from the Russian air defense system.

From a Swedish point of view there are three obvious challenges analysis linked to a possible NATO operation in Baltics. First, it would in all respects the best and perhaps the only reasonably safe anflygningsriktningen for different types of NATO aircraft division to go over Sweden. this will require In this case a very high level of coordination with the Swedish air combat command. Secondly, Gotland is not well defended in a situation where there would be a serious crisis in our neighborhood danger island to immediately become a primary objective in the event of a Russian operation directed against the Baltic states in order to create a flank protection for the operation. Thirdly, we should ask ourselves if we are somehow themselves engage actively in NATO operations in support of the Baltic States. There are good operational reasons for a possible Swedish involvement: Sweden is close and thus can act quickly, access to Swedish air and naval bases would greatly facilitate the NATO operations, we have resources, such as heavy mechanized units, that NATO may find it difficult to bring in an early stage. At the same time means the risks. A transfer of resources to the Baltics allows the possibility to defend Swedish territory, if would be needed, decreasing drastically. The availability of qualified units in the Swedish organization is limited.

All in all, if there is a situation in which NATO need to defend the Baltic states, so is the military alliance for very great difficulties. It is very likely and probably inevitable that Swedish territory in that case affected by such an operation. In many respects, parts of Swedish territory play a critical role for NATO to successful or not. Regardless of what Russia’s intentions in a unknown future is so Sweden can contribute to the stability of our neighborhood by making it plausible that we can and intends to defend all parts of our territory, and by having a ability to work with NATO.