Swordfish replaced Shark. Why?

pagen01: I don’t believe Canada (or Oz) acquiesced in UK “passing” Shark or anything to them; nor do I believe favouritism, Blackburn v. Fairey, nor materials prioritising conflict – for to be land-based or to be carrier-based types, was the cause of Shark being displaced by Sword/Blackfish. It was the higher priority of work on heavy Coastal Area boats.

Sunderland was not intended to be what it became – core to 1959. It was chosen as quick, easy adaptation from Empires, to be built in new Harland and Denny yards as coursework for conversion from maritime to aero techniques (the new Boeing Vancouver plant, whose staff was not so much aero-diluted as aero-alien) was given Shark as its mock template simply because 7 had already been bought from Blackburn: a convenient exercise, to lead into the proper type, which emerged as Canso). Bespoke-MR inshore and deep water types would soon replace Sunderland. They emerged as Saro Lerwick, and Saro/Short Shetland. Short-at-Rochester was to build Stirling and would be well-poised for a Super-variant. The best laid plans…I recall a pic of part of the Sydenham site which was evidently Shetland-specific.

Blackburn’s retractable hull B-20 lost to Lerwick, but it was that design which caused Blackburn to be Supervisor of the Air Ministry’s Rhu Agency Factory administered by Denny, into which Botha was assigned to liberate Brough to do the higher priority MR type.

Swordfish businesss success was determined in part by engine-sourcing logistics, and in part by RAF’s airborne torpedo… which was awful. No Long Lance, this, but a frail device demanding precise entry speed/angle, for which Swordfish was seen to be suitable (not necessarily moreso than, but no worse than, Shark). Hence replacing one “obsolete” biplane with another: an autogiro-with-payload+range would have been ideal. So the sequence of events was: Bristol’s Accrington Agency Factory set up to build Pegasus; Blackburn manifestly out of their depth in original design (Botha/Roc/Skua), but well-orientated to Fly Navy; Fairey tasked with the attack type, Barracuda, around which funding had been secured for the 6 Illustrious; Agency Factory constructed at Sherburn to build the Torpedo-Spotter. That hand of cards came out in 1938, very logically, as:
– Blackburn to manage Sherburn, under nominal Fairey Supervision, to build Blackfish, with engines trucked over from Accrington;
– Blackburn to be UK Sister Firm for much/most US acquisitions for FAA;
– Fairey to attend to Swordfish’s replacement, Albacore, and to Barracuda.

re;

does any example survive in wreck form?

Something like the Vought Vindicator would have sent them into palpitations!

See the Vought Chesapeake and pilots accounts (inc. Eric Brown). To be fair, that wasn’t a torpedo bomber.
Regards

More discussion, though no clear conclusion, here:
http://warbirdsforum.com/showthread.php?t=4576

Not a lot of sense being spoken there, the only thing of value being the Shark pilots’ account of testing.

SteveP puts if quite snappily, at a very basic level why persist with two types in the same role, and the associated spares support etc (at a premium on a carrier) that entails, when one design was more reliable and dependable than the other.

did Blackburn have the capacity to build the Skua/Roc and Botha, as well as the Shark? I have always assumed, perhaps wrongly. that production of the Shark ceased because Blackburn needed to conentrate on the next generation of maritime aircraft. There was no need to continue building the Shark when Fairey were building a very similar alternative.

If only one company was to manufacture a torpedo biplane for naval use, it made sense for Fairey to be that company.

More discussion, though no clear conclusion, here:

http://warbirdsforum.com/showthread.php?t=4576

Whilst this site ,from the RCN Shearwater Museum, blames engine troubles for the Shark’s early replacement:

http://www.shearwateraviationmuseum.ns.ca/aircraft/shark.htm

DD

Re your 2nd para of post #8, the Admiralty were nothing to do with these types at inception, but I would agree that it seems unlikely that the construction element was that important, though in actuality quickly patching up a Stringbag during battle must have had a small advantage.

Possibly the Swordfish/TSR.II was in too much demand for re-equiping the FAA sqns to be considered being offered to the RCAF/RCN at that time, though obviously later on it was used well in Canadian service.
JDK raises good questions about overseas licence producing of British types in another post.

I do get the impression that the AM didn’t really know what to do with the Shark, a couple of different specs and orders were later raised, it seems in an attempt to justify production and a use for it in service. Production was in small batches at first and many later examples were delivered straight into storage. Maybe passing on the type to Canada was convenient, with their services benefiting from the Pegasus powered examples.

Paging XN923 & Alertken…

That all said, perhaps a more important question (in actual procurement and efficacy) is why you’d be looking at an obsolete biplane, or – an obsolete biplane in 1939. Discuss, as they say.

Haha! It’s actually scary to read through the Flight articles on the FAA in the 1937 – 39 period. Never once I have seen obsolescence being mentioned. For example, this article could well have been written 10 years earlier…

Jolly good fun landing on carriers, what

Something like the Vought Vindicator would have sent them into palpitations!

It seems to me that the Swordfish was just one of those outstanding designs, and although old fashioned in 1939, it was used along side two of its replacements (Albacore & Barracuda), and that the Shark had problems, not very desirable on a a pitching carrier deck in the N.Atlantic, there was good logic in just having the one good design in service and fulfilling the torpedo/spotter role.

Thanks for the thinking-points. It will probably come down to something as basic as that. I notice that the Swordfish had a much greater wing area than the Shark, so perhaps it was superior for carrier ops. I’d love to read the memoirs of a someone who flew both.

In his Blackburn Putnam book A J Jackson suggests the the Swordfish was preferred as it required less strategic alloys in its construction, but I’d be surprised if the Admiralty were that forward-thinking in 1937! Blackburn had to build an entirely new factory to fulfill the Swordfish contracts which must have been galling.

The RCAF were “recommended” to purchase the Shark by the British but again there seems to be little record of why the TSR II wasn’t offered.

Did the FAA just prefer Fairey products? Blackburn didn’t have any success with the FAA in the period of the Shark to the Buccaneer.

There’s very little proof for this, as I mentioned above the Air Ministry came up with the S.15/33 requirement that both the Shark and Swordfish fulfilled, it was pre the Admiralty control of the Fleet Air Arm (May 1939).
Both Fairey and Blackburn were always renowned for their carrier based and FAA related designs, each was as successful as the other in obtaining orders, though each were as capable as coming up with rapidly obsolete designs aswel.
The Blackburn order for Skuas and Rocs was a major success at the time of issue, and shows little favouritism in favour of Fairey. As it happened they became obsolete very quickly, the Fulmar wasn’t hugely successful either but the Firefly became more and more successful (due in part to RR Griffon success).

Shark & Swordish same spec.

I think it’s a bit too easy to let hindsight affect our judgement here.

Firstly the Fairey Swordfish was designed to replace the Fairey Seal in service, but far more importantly is that the Swordfish design was offered to the same S.15/33 (related to S.9/30) Air Ministry spec (not FAA or Admiralty at that stage) as the Blackburn Shark was, so they were both designed and built to the same requirements and first flew within eight months of each other.
Interestingly both started out as private ventures, the Fairey as the TSR.II and the Blackburn as the B-6, Gloster also submitted its TSR.38 design to the spec.
Both types replaced Blackburn Baffins, Fairey IIIFs and Seals in service.

So really it was a case of the Swordfish outlasting the Shark, comparing specifications is useful but doesn’t always paint the full picture, especially when it comes to the day to day operations of an aircraft in severe conditions. For instance could it be that the Swordfish was easier to operate off carriers, or was more durable/reliable is service? Certainly its operational history would suggest high durability of design with few vices in use.

The Shark had the misfortune to be powered by the Armstrong Siddeley Tiger, which had both poor reliability and didn’t develop the power that was promised, indeed some Canadian Sharks had the Bristol Pegasus, in common with the Swordfish.

It seems to me that the Swordfish was just one of those outstanding designs, and although old fashioned in 1939, it was used along side two of its replacements (Albacore & Barracuda), and that the Shark had problems, not very desirable on a a pitching carrier deck in the N.Atlantic, there was good logic in just having the one good design (with the appropriate stores/logistics involved) in service and fulfilling the torpedo/spotter role.

As for the Roc and Skua, when they were first tendered to the spec they were seen as very advanced aircraft, but like many other just pre-war types became rapidly obsolete.

Paging XN923 & Alertken…

XN will have some words to say on the Skua – don’t knock it.

As to the Swordfish / Shark, a good question indeed, and some of the aviation press tries to tackle questions such as this in between Spitfire and Mustang features that actually sell the magazines.

That all said, perhaps a more important question (in actual procurement and efficacy) is why you’d be looking at an obsolete biplane, or – an obsolete biplane in 1939. Discuss, as they say.

Good ask!

Admiralty & Skua (& Roc)

Wow, that was a great decision. Keep building the Skua (& Roc) as they are such outstanding aircraft that are needed to defeat the Luftwaffe!!
Sometimes you wonder who was in charge?

Funnily enough, I’ve often wondered about that as well.!

DD

So I’m not alone 🙂

I do wish the aviation press would look into odd stories from history such as this.

This page suggests that there were problems with the Tiger engine and that the Admiralty wanted Blackburn to concentrate on the Skua.

http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/16541/Iron-Duke-conversions?page=2#.TnXP6j3681J

But that doesn’t really explain why Fairey weren’t just given a contract to build Pegasus-engined Shark IIIs, since the Shark spares were already in the logistics chain. And then Blackburn were contracted to build Swordfish…

I wonder if there was some deeper friction between the Admiralty and Blackburn.

Funnily enough, I’ve often wondered about that as well.!

DD