Taiwan will run out of munitions if China attacks

Invisible deterrent forces thus gain increasing importance, like the four Ohio-class nuclear ballistic-missile submarines now being converted to carry 154 Tomohawk LACMs each. But this number can only support one LACM submarine deployed, when the US needs at least four on continuous duty, meaning that about 12 LACM carriers plus escorting attack subs should be built — unlikely given the Navy’s current budget woes.

Given their nature I don’t think it beyond the realm of possible they’d just surge a few and have two or three at sea. Also they could just fire one dry and bring it back and replace it with a second. Plus you forget that SSBNs (US ones at least) have two crews per sub (they still do that don’t they?). Which means at any given time most Ohios are at sea. Having two or three of the SSGNs at sea during a conflict is probably nothing.

I wonder how many of these new missiles Taiwan would be able to manufacture – that’s the $6 million question I suppose.

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/edit/archives/2005/06/11/2003258875

Turn missile buildup against China
By RichardFisher, Jr

Saturday, Jun 11, 2005,Page 8

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Revelations in last Sunday’s China Times that Taiwan has tested a 1,000km-range capable land attack cruise missile (LACM) proves an axiom: China’s military buildup will not stop an Asian defensive response. Taiwan is merely joining a list of other countries, which so far include India and South Korea, in developing their own capabilities in response to China’s deployment or proliferation of missile or nuclear weapon technologies.

Compared to Beijing’s mounting ballistic and cruise missile threat, Taipei’s missile development programs are miniscule. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense claims China now targets over 700 DF-15 and DF-11 class short-range ballistic missiles at Taiwan, a number that will exceed 800 next year. By the end of this year, China’s new class of LACM could reach 200 deployed. At this rate, by 2010 China could have up to 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles pointed at Taiwan. And as they are all road or rail mobile, if they are not used against Taiwan, they could be rapidly re-targeted against Korea, Japan, Vietnam, India or Russia.

For Taiwan, China’s growing missile threat requires a different calculus to achieve “defense.”

Buying ever greater numbers of missile defenses like the US PAC-2 and PAC-3 systems is financially prohibitive, and next-generation energy-based weapons like lasers, which could “fire” thousands of rounds for the cost of electricity, will not be available until later in the next decade. The only affordable near-term alternative is to develop “offensive” systems to target Chinese military capabilities and contribute to deterrence.

For example, if Taiwanese missiles were able to destroy most Chinese forces massing for an invasion, then Taipei could probably survive Beijing’s missile and air attacks, meaning Taiwan would “win” the war. As the regime in Beijing would likely not survive such failure, not to mention the global economic embargoes and decades of political ignominy to follow, “offensive” Taiwanese missiles could achieve decisive deterrence.

Taiwan’s missile effort remains tightly guarded, but open reports note Taiwan’s ability to convert its Sky Bow anti-aircraft missile into a multi-stage ballistic missile, while the Hsiung Feng II-E, a 1,000km-range LACM, is reported to have just completed a successful test. Taiwan has also tested the 300km-range Hsiung Feng III, a supersonic ramjet-powered anti-ship missile.

Of these, only the latter is said to be nearly ready for production. But the reality of China’s growing missile, air-strike, naval-blockade and airborne/amphibious invasion capabilities requires that Taiwan intensify its missile programs, especially when considering China’s increasing ability to impede or prevent US and Japanese military forces from reaching Taiwan.

Other countries long ago started developing missile and other weapons to defend against Chinese nuclear missiles and their proliferation. India’s robust ballistic missile, cruise missile and submarine-launched missile programs are designed to deter Chinese weapons deployed on two fronts: those in China that could be targeted against India, and the Chinese-designed nuclear-armed missiles “manufactured” by Pakistan.

India is also interested in missile defenses, which are being encouraged by Washington. South Korea and Japan face a significant North Korean nuclear weapons threat, which was made possible with discreet Chinese support. Seoul is a reluctant and recent investor in missile defenses, but is also developing ballistic missiles to deter Pyongyang.

Earlier this year former Japanese Defense Agency director Ishiba Shigeru said that in 2003 Japan had considered buying US Tomahawk cruise missiles, mainly to counter North Korea. Japan instead opted to accelerate missile defense development with the US.

Washington has three options to counter China’s regional ballistic and cruise-missile threats. The first and preferred US option is to deploy sufficient deterrent capabilities in cooperation with allies. Washington is now in the process of increasing visible forces like the 7th Fleet in Yokosuka, or air and naval forces deployed on Okinawa and Guam. But these are increasingly vulnerable to Chinese missile and air attack.

Invisible deterrent forces thus gain increasing importance, like the four Ohio-class nuclear ballistic-missile submarines now being converted to carry 154 Tomohawk LACMs each. But this number can only support one LACM submarine deployed, when the US needs at least four on continuous duty, meaning that about 12 LACM carriers plus escorting attack subs should be built — unlikely given the Navy’s current budget woes.

A second option would be to vastly increase US investments in the development of energy-based weapons like lasers, high-power microwaves and rail guns. While high-power microwaves may be deployable in bomb form by the end of this decade, laser and rail guns may not be ready until later in the next decade.

Both lasers and rail guns hold the potential to instantly change the strategic balance in the Taiwan Strait to favor defense, with their ability to fire thousands of bursts or rounds capable of intercepting Chinese missiles. With a potential range of 370km, rail guns could also quickly defeat surface naval blockade forces and both naval and air invasion forces.

To accelerate the development of these systems Washington might welcome Taiwanese, Japanese and Indian investments in specific US programs.

A third option would be to follow China’s example and assist Taiwan, Japan, India and others to develop better deterrent capabilities, or even to provide technologies that indirectly support their existing national efforts.

Washington should be flexible. Assisting regional allied defensive deterrent capabilities should be an option if Washington cannot afford sufficient new regional deterrent capabilities or if it is not able to field new advanced technology defensive technologies soon enough.

The US should turn Beijing’s massive missile buildup against itself by enabling the targets of Beijing’s missiles to defend and deter. In the Taiwan Strait, this might severely undermine Beijing’s coercive “reunification” strategy, which could also diminish the regime’s militarist-nationalist basis for legitimacy and stability. Unless it reverses its missile proliferation and buildup, China should be made to reap what it sows.

Richard Fisher, Jr is the vice president of the International Assessment and Strategy Center, a Washington-based think tank.

I think it is all about deterence..the current taiwanese military presents a deterence to the chinese as an eventuall victory (without US intervension of course) would cost the chinese dearly in terms of equipment/manpower lost…however the same deterence cannot really be deemed credible if the taiwanese decide to declare independence!

Yes, Taiwan will need US help to go the distance. Regardless of the missile situation, China has numbers on its side. However China wouldn’t necessarily have it all its way to begin with, as it lacks the air and sea-lift capability to deploy large enough numbers of men and equipment for a quick victory. So I think there would be time for the US to intervene.

Please, no one start talking about the “fishing boat” strategy. It’s just plain evil to suggest that poor peasant boys should be made to sail over the Straits in open, unarmed boats. It’s like the WWI tactic of rushing soldiers at machineguns. Let’s assume the CMC won’t care so little about their men that they would do that at the start of the invasion.

Taiwan cannot win a convential war of defence. There are two options:

1. Nukes

2. US help

Failing these two, Taiwan has little chance if PRC attacks. As people have aid before, PRC will not attack unless it is prepared to spend anything and lose any number of assets to gain victory. An attack without total victory will be the end of the Chinese Communist Party. Besides, given that the Commies in PRC have never hesitated to kill millions of their own in the past “for greater good,” they will not hesitate to wipe out Taiwan if their invasion efforts falter.

What…not having 3000 AIM-9s is not going to be the problem. Not having enough SAMs to defend against the incoming saturation of TBMs? That will be the problem.

They will use PAC3s and PAC2s in major northern areas and domestically developed ATBM for the southern areas to replace hawks. So, ATBMs are/will be there for point defenses on major areas. If i were the planners, i would protect only military and fuel/power supply/generators. One hit on the major metropolitan area will bring a few possible effects.
1)the people loose their will and call for surrender.
2)the people will unamiously back the government to fight China (something not possible in peacetime, the norm of a democratic/free society).
3)Huge international outcry for deliberate acts of war crimes.
Remember the battle of Britain, that’s definately not a way for them to attack.

Any continuous bombardment of metropolitan areas can be considered as ethnic cleansing (since China claims Taiwan as part of China, and the island as a whole is a majority ethnic group). Given that the amount of ATBM for point defense is actually sufficient….for a few weeks.

The ROCAF has 960 MICA missiles for its Mirage 2000-5s.
But if that inventory is correct…………they sure had a bad policy during their shopping spree.

its completly inaccurate the list was derived based on single procurments not the total operated by taiwan. The sipri has list of procurements by RoC last 10 years.
sipri arms transfer:taiwan it verfies my data on agm-84 apart from that, also it shows that another 120 AIM-9s have been ordered along 900 ordered in the 90s. I believed Taiwan had also procured AIM-9s in the 80s (which sipri doesnt have data on since it covers last 15 yrs only).

What…not having 3000 AIM-9s is not going to be the problem. Not having enough SAMs to defend against the incoming saturation of TBMs? That will be the problem.

China will not attack unless it think that it can win. It does not take a genious to figure why it has not done so yet.

For one thing the whole Taiwan issue generates a lot of emotion on the mainland. If the CCP launched an attack on Taiwan but was defeated/had to admit defeat, they might lose permanently – by being kicked out of office. Sam’s right – they won’t attack until they think they can pull it off and until the right circumstances present themselves (domestic pressure of a declaration of independence).

China will not attack unless it think that it can win. It does not take a genious to figure why it has not done so yet.

and why would F-15s and B2s flying from okinawa, mainland japan, guam and farther afield take all of 5 days to respond ?

a terrible price can be extracted – like putting all of PLAN at the bottom for instance. who knows how many SSNs lurk in the west pacific these days.

I had enough of this talk, if someone is interested in attack they should just go ahead and attack rather than just talk.

The ROCAF has 960 MICA missiles for its Mirage 2000-5s.
But if that inventory is correct…………they sure had a bad policy during their shopping spree.

thats still a quite a lot i guess media needs something to whine about anyway i believe those facts are wrong dont have time to look up each one just looking at AGM-84s:

58 AGM-84 Harpoons for ground targets

taiwan purchased 38 Harpoons in 1992, ordered 52 in 1997, 58 in 1998 (which is were they got that no i guess), 71 in 2001, 22 in 2003. Also it purchased around 500 gaberial IIs and there is also HF-II, so thats a lot of AshM right there. Even if it were to use 12 harpoon for each PLAN vessel there is enough to sink the whole fleet with AGM-84s alone.