[updated:LAST EDITED ON 18-08-02 AT 11:43 PM (GMT)]I’ve noticed many people in this forum think China can and will take over Taiwan. This of course makes sense: History tells us that when a small guy beats a big guy, it’s an exception not a general rule. However, like there will always be superpowers and strong nations, small nations will always exist. The inherent problems of Defense is real and a matter of life and death for Taiwan, Israel, Singapore, and other small states; It’s also clear that no self-respecting nation will ignore the problem and waiting for enemy to finish them off. This article attempts to discuss how Taiwan will face the growing PLA threat.
-Crouching Tiger: The rising PLA
Ever since the Cultural Revolution, PLAAF had been trying to recover from the devastating impact the Aviation Industry and military had experienced. The siginificant modernization didn’t really begin until Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and the disintegration of USSR. The acquisition of Su-27SK certainly marks the turning point.
For the last ten years PLA has acquired many things. Local production of Su-27SK, purchases of Su-27 series and S-300, JH-7 entered service, various upgrades on existing fighters are all well-known. Even though the overall flying hours have not increased significantly (with exception of Special-Grade pilots), the training methods had improved (Notably some basic night training and better aircrafts transporting, and possible aggressor upgrades). Strategically, PLAAF changed from “Active Defense” to “Both attack and defense” (Gong Shou Jian Bei), began forming Rapid-Reaction forces (So-called “Ironfist Force” which could attack lethally vulnerable points of enemy- Dian Xue Zhan), and started the integration of a national air defense. The results of Gulf war also influenced PLA to form/improve several ideas- emphaszing EW & information warfare, using ballistic missile tactically, strenghten joint-operation, “Local war under high tech condition”.
Over the next decade, PLAAF and PLANF will continue to grow. We will probably see several types of aircrafts continues to enter service, namely J-10, A-50 or equivalent early warning aircrafts, JH-7A, more Flankers, new varients of Q-5 and J-8, more UAVs in various roles. The retirement of J-6 will go on, and the production line J-7 will probably cease. New ordnances and equipments will enable PLAAF to have both good BVR & dogfight ability, performing SEAD and precision strike. The increasing number of Ballistic missiles will solve the inaccuracy problem, combining with land-attack cruise missiles (reportedly using TERCOM technology), they will become a serious threat to Taiwan’s command structure and airbases.
Those are solely hardware, if PLAAF could actually execute the ideas related to Military Revolution, it will be very formidable. It’s sufficient that we understand PLAAF’s potential given a basic picture of future equipment, PLA’s current weakness and future problems will not be described here.
-Shape-Shifting Scorpion: ROCAF at a crossroad
Currently ROCAF is at its peak, with all three types of 320+ fourth-generation fighters (Mirage 2000-5, F-CK-1 A/B, F-16A/B Block 20) entered service. In addition, Taiwan has 4 E-2T, 25+ batteries SAM of various types (PAC2+, SkyBowI/II, HAWK) and a basic but complete integrated air defense system. Whether you want to look at BVR abilities, number of advanced fighters, situation awareness, C3, or training, ROCAF exceeds PLAAF on almost all critical factors that determine air combat.
However as I briefly discussed, the future is grim for ROCAF. PLA’s expansion means ROCAF has three main problems: 1. Threat to Air Bases by missiles 2. Weakness in dogfight, namely off-boresight IR missiles and Helm-sight equipment. 3. Growing number of new fighters in PLAAF inventory, which could result disadvantages in both quantity and quality.
ROCAF’s response to the first problem consists of many passive and active measures. Three passive measures have been partially completed- Mountain airbases on the East side of Taiwan, hardened aircraft shelters, use of runway rapid-repair tools. In the long term, ROCAF wants to buy VTOVL / STOVL fighters, and plans to deploy ATBM system based on Skybow II five years from now. ROCAF also slowly realized the importance of EW (evidently the highest spending category 2000-2002), which is very important part of missile defense. Issues of old Highway plan, dispersion, lease of Harrier have been bought up before, but none are confirmed.
There are no short term solutions to the second problem. Taiwan will not get AIM-9X for their F-16s any time soon. Plan for improving Skysword-one is highly classified, and likely not in service (probably won’t be for a while). ROCAF could only attempt to solidify BVR fighting abilities (AIFF, AIM-120), and continues to improve training.
The third difficulty could be partially solved when ROCAF purchase the replacement for the 90+ F-5E/F before the end of this decade, but it’s too early to say. The next-generation fighter buy also will not happen any time soon, therefore ROCAF focuses on learning to fight better. To achieve this goal, Taiwan seeks to integrate weapons into an effective national defense system. Current “Strong Net” system still have problems related to transmission and intelligence fusion, the recent introduction of JTIDS/Link-16 will rectify them in the future. With the delivery of Hawkeye 2000 and construction of Early Warning Radar (PAVE PAWS type) on the horizon, the current survelliance radar upgrade, the national C3 system will be improve dramatically. If everything goes well, ROCAF will clearly reach another peak around 2010, in terms of overall real fighting ability.
Just like the uncertain future of PLA’s military revolution, ROCAF’s plan isn’t guaranteed to succeed. Several factors will be the key: 1. The impact of the Force cut. 2. The effectiveness of the personnel. 3. Budget distribution 4. Joint operation. 5. The way ROCAF adapts new technology.
There is another issue to be considered: Offshore Strategy. This idea was first mentioned by Taiwanese President Chen in a speech to the Army College. No one knows whether it’s Chen’s idea, or Chen just read off a speech prepared by the Defense Department. Either way it has some serious implications, because not everyone agrees this is a good idea.
The heated debate is hardly surprising. Attacking the enemy could result in Israel’s Six-Day war victory, or Japan’s Pearl Harbor attack which led to their eventual defeat. “Attack is the best defense” is a correct principle, only if you have the resources to pull it off. “Resources” is the key.
To attack China is extremely difficult for ROCAF, to say the very least. Currently F-16/F-5 do have some basic strike abilities, and IDF could carry bombs. However, Taiwan does not have any ARM for SEAD, its fighters are limited in range, they can’t afford to lose the already-limited number of fighters, and they do not have any smart weapons like US. On top of that, PLAAF has a large number of interceptors and air defense units, even J-6 would be a threat at their home turf. It’s no wonder that some Taiwanese heavily critisize the Offshore Strategy and consider it to be insane. Of course, other people argue that what’s impossbile for now isn’t impossible in the future. They point out Taiwan’s lack of Strategically depth, and insist that Offshore Strategy is the only way for survival in the long term.
Strategically it’s diffcult to say what direction Taiwan will take eventually, but it’s clear that the Military is taking the idea of Offshore Strategy seriously and preparing it tactically. The Strike IDF (Officially “Joint Counter Platform”) is such an example. The plan began in 2000, the R&D and planning is set to complete in seven years. The upgrades includes strengthen the structure, new avionics, increased fuel capacity. Officials declines to comment on the weapons, but the TC-2A ARM (Skysword-II varient) is known to be on the list. For F-16, it’s public knowledge that Taiwan requested JDAM and HARM in 2001, both were turned down by the Bush Administration. There were also some rumours about possbile Mirage2000 upgrade to the MK2 standard (not likely).
In addition, there are two possible missile programs repeatedly denied by the Officials. First one is a land-attack cruise missile base on the Hsiung Feng-II (Strong Wind). Second is a ballistic missile program possibly base on TK-2 (Skybow II) SAM (short range) or the cancelled Skyhorse (long range). If these programs indeed exist, the missiles could be based on offshore Islands such as Kimmen to provide the maximum coverage.
Appendix 1. Estimated Current PLAAF/PLANF Inventory
——————
PLAAF:
120 H-6
? H-5
400 Q-5
80 Su-27SK/UBK
80 Su-30MKK
? J-10
300 J-8
500 J-7
1500 J-6
2 Tu-154M/D
? HD-5
? HD-6
? Y-8ELINT
2 Y-8AEW
40 HZ-5
100 JZ-6
150 JZ-5
—————
PLANF:
50 H-5
25 H-6
30 JH-7
40 Q-5
130 J-8
250 J-7
100 J-6
10 HZ-5
5 SH-5
5 Be-6
————–
Appendix 2. Estimated Current ROCAF Inventory
136 F-16A/B
58 Mirage2000-5
129 IDF
100 F-5E/F
58 AT-3
1 C-130HE
4 E-2T
10 RF-16
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August 18, 2002 at 11:08 pm