TAM A320 crashes into gas station

http://www.atwonline.com/news/story.html?storyID=9768

A handy set of golden rules. Applicable to just about any aircraft I’d say.

On a more personal note, I am not too convinced about the official findings for the Habsheim incident. The fact that the data recorders were in Airbus’ hands for 2 weeks before being handed over to the investigation and the discrepency in the markings (The paint on the boxes and synchornisation of the boxes lead me to believe that there may be more to tell than the official findings tell us.

There is a picture of a man in a grey suit making off with the data recorders while the wreckage still smolders beside him. Yet, in the photo of the two recorders released during the investigation, the white stripes do not match those seen on the recorders the suited man is making off with. One photo show 2 strips on the recorders, the other just one stripe. This alone is cause to doubt the recorder data submitted.

Now, I have no idea what Airbus may or may not have done with those recorders in those two weeks. They might just have been locked away in a safe somewhere. But its just as possible that they fiddled with them, perhaps even substituted them? Which would explain the white stripes.

What exactly the truth may be, I do not know.

Disclaimer: My own PERSONAL take on the situation. Not something I’m infering as truth.

So, exmpa, in essence the complex systems in place with the FBW on Airbus aircraft to protect the aircraft are in fact offering a whole new avenue for mistakes?

There was nothing complicated about what happened at Habsheim. In effect he turned the aircraft into a glider, with predictable results. He also ignored the FMA which was displaying all the information required. Part of the reason for this may have been distraction because the display axis was different from the one he expected, that was down to inadequate briefing. There are SOPs in place to prevent what occurred at Habsheim, the primary one being that you switch off the Flight Directors when carrying out a visual approach that would have put the AT in to Speed mode, problem solved. By that point he didn’t require the FDs anyway as they wouldn’t be diplaying any useful information.

It’s worth considering the following, Airbus produced little cards with these “Golden Rules”:

1-The aircraft can be flown like any other aircraft.
2-Fly,navigate,communicate in that order.
3-One head up at all times.
4-Cross check the accuracy of the FMS.
5-Know your FMA at all times.
6-When things don’t go as expected-TAKE OVER.
7-Use the proper level of automation for the task.
8-Practice task sharing and back up each other.

exmpa

So, exmpa, in essence the complex systems in place with the FBW on Airbus aircraft to protect the aircraft are in fact offering a whole new avenue for mistakes?

Now, we no longer have to worry that the Pilot is pushing the yoke/ stick to far forward, we have to worry if he set the thing on the correct mode?!
Perhaps there are too many modes? Just TOGA, Cruise and Descend modes along with 1 simple control law might, in my leymans understanding, suffice.

Disclaimer to avoid getting my head ripped off by fanboys: I’m not doubting the benefits of FBW as I believe it is the ONLY way forward. I’m doubting the methodology and logic used.

I’m not clued up enough about Boeings FBW methodology to compare. But I do know that it allows for a greater level manual control and less “interference”. Which could be good and bad, depending on which way you look at it.

As stupid as this may sound how does the pilot exactly engage reverse thrust. Is it just a case of pulling the TL’s back from Idle to reverse?

FCOM 1.70.35

There is no reverse idle detent. When the pilot moves the lever out of the idle stop by pulling up the reverse lever on the front of the thrust lever, he selects reverse idle.

That should answer your question

exmpa

in theory that plane should have responded to the throttle input by the skipper but the computers continued in the landing mode hence the collision with the trees

Habsheim was the result of mishandling, plain and simple. The PF descended in “Open Descent” mode, in this mode the thrust is at “idle” and speed is controlled by pitch attitude. The descent was continued in “Open Descent” at approx 600fpm until 30ft agl when an attempt was made to level off by raising the nose. Note that the low speed protection mode “Alpha Floor” that prevents flight at excessive angles of attack is inoperative below 100ft agl otherwise you wouldn’t be able to land the aircraft. The intention had been to carry out a low, slow fly by along the runway and climb away but because of the “Open Descent” mode all that happened as the nose was raised was the RoD decreased slightly and the speed, unconstrained by “Alpha Floor” decreased rapidly. PF’s response was to select TOGA thrust but because of the response time from idle this was too late and insufficent to prevent the aircraft hitting the trees beyond the runway. The engines responded correctly, in fact accellearting slightly faster than specification. The FADEC did not prevent the pilot achieving the demanded thrust setting, he demanded it too late.

The root of the problem was an imperfect understanding of the Airbus Vertical Flight Modes. In “Open” modes with Autothrust active; Climb or Descent; the thrust setting is constant at either Climb Thrust or Idle. The aircraft speed is controlled by varying the pitch attitude by elevator input. In “Speed” modes the system attempts to maintain the selected speed by varying thrust, thus a selected RoD or FPA can be maintained at a desired speed. The active and armed modes are displayed on the Flight Mode Annunciator at the top of the Primary Flight Display. What PF expected to happen was whne he raised the nose, the aircraft would apply sufficent thrust to enable him to maintain the desired flight path at the selected speed. To achieve this he would have had to have been in a “Speed” mode and this would have been displayed in the top left window of the FMA, it wasn’t, “Thr Idle” was there. To get into the “Speed” mode there are two options, select Flight Directors Off or pull the V/S knob on the Flight Mode Panel. Had PF done this then as he applied elevator input to raise the nose and reduce rhe RoD then the AT system would have smoothly increased the thrust to maintain the speed but at “Thr Idle” all he got was speed decay and by then it was too late. FWIW it was Mode Confusion that resulted in the loss of the Indian Airlines A320 at Bangalore. They tried to fly a visual approach in “Open Descent” with predictable results.

exmpa

Hi All

Sorry to go off the subject but wanted to quickly ask one question about the throttle system on the airbus A320 series aircraft.

When looking at cockpit picture of the airbus A320 posted by Charlie Echo it got me wondering.

As stupid as this may sound how does the pilot exactly engage reverse thrust. Is it just a case of pulling the TL’s back from Idle to reverse? Do any buttons have to be pressed in (Like TOGA mode)

Also (for example) if the pilot was taxing around and then he Idled the engines, would it be possible to ‘Accidentally’ pull the TL’s back to far and engage the reverse thrusters. Or is there a catch or a stop point on the levers to stop him doing this.

Sorry for the vague questions and queries.

Adam

Well the pilots flew an aircraft full of passenger’s 30 feet above the runway at slow speed low power and nose high, I think banging on full power at the last moment to save themselves from disaster is asking a bit much of any aeroplane.

That plane was being flown by one of Air France’s most experienced captains..in theory that plane should have responded to the throttle input by the skipper but the computers continued in the landing mode hence the collision with the trees

Transcription of the voide recorder:

http://render.estadao.com.br/cidades/not_cid28234,0.htm

Both pilots knew there was an unactivated reverser, this didn’t seem to be a problem at all. Everything went fine until the touchdown. Then, the aircraft failed to brake, due to the wrong throttle setting. *** The debris of the throttle were found, and they confirm the wrong position. The conversation after the touchdown was:

– No spoilers.
– Brake brake
– I can’t
– Turn turn
(soud of collision with the runway end, before the flight over the avenue)
– oh no
end of trancription

New Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, in charge of reforming the country’s troubled air traffic system, inspected the main runway at Sao Paulo Congonhas Friday and cleared its reopening 10 days after the fatal TAM A320 crash that killed 199 people.

Jobim took charge of the military-run ATC system last week in the aftermath of the accident and as thousands of passengers were stranded at airports plagued by rampant flight delays and cancellations (ATWOnline, July 26).

With the country’s two worst-ever air disasters occurring in a span of 10 months, Brazilian officials are scrambling to restore public confidence in air travel. But in an extraordinary public admission during Jobim’s swearing-in ceremony last week, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva confessed that he fears for his life when flying under the current conditions.

“It’s no secret to any Brazilian that we have an aviation crisis,” he said. “Personally, when the airplane door closes, I deliver myself to God. Even with my luck in the hands of God, I confess I’m afraid. I confess this publicly because I am not embarrassed to say we are afraid.” Silva vowed to “do what has to be done and spend what has to be spent” to make air travel safe in Brazil.

Jobim said safety would be his top priority and passenger amenities at airports will take a back seat. “If discomfort is the price of safety, we will stick with discomfort,” he said. Referring to complaints from air traffic controllers that have escalated into several temporary work actions disrupting air traffic in Brazil over the past 10 months, he insisted he will take a no-nonsense approach. When he issues orders for reforms, he said, he will tell controllers and other aviation officials: “Act or leave. Do it or get out.”

“Veja”, the most important magazine in Brazil, claims to have had access to FDR data, and according to them, the blame is on the pilot, who didn´t set the throttles appropriately. The picture above was taken from their website. Please note the throttle settings on the right. It´s written “ERRO DO COMANDANTE”, which means “The pilot´s mistake”.

According to them, the right throttle should have been put on IDDLE, since the thrust reverse was deactivated, and not on REVERSE, the usual landing position. The autothrottle is deactivated when the aircraft touches the ground. Their theory is that the pilot put the right throttle on “FULL POWER”, instead of “IDDLE”.

It may be true, it´s a matter of time for us to know. But it´s important to say that a crash doesn´t happen with a single cause. The airport, with its short runway, and surrounded by buildings, seems to be part of the cause. I mean, it wouldn´t happen in Guarulhos, or other long runway airport.

I lived very close to Congonhas airport (five minutes by car). I travelled so many times through this airport, For those who don´t know Congonhas it looks like an aircraft carrier, with no escape areas, completely sorrounded by houses, buildings and big avenues with huge traffic almost every day, specially at the rush hour when you can see the planes passing right above your head (specially when you cannot drive due to the traffic jam).

It is not allowed for a pilot make mistakes on approach to land on this airport. But it always was safe to operate (this airport is almost 70 years old). The government do not installed the grooving on the runway which would help, specially with rain, the aircrafts to stop at a safer limit at the end of the runway.

As this is the busiest airport in Brazil, used as a hub for the major companies such as Gol and TAM, they pushed the government to reopen the runway. It was good up to the first rain, which caused the skid of a Pantanal ATR-42 and the very next day this tragedy with the A-320.

According to one top Air Force Brigadier (equivalent to General) the A-320 made the correct landing approach with the correct speed. But one important thing that was not mention in this thread yet. The same A-320 had presented problems in the week before the accident. According to one captain from TAM, who gave an interview on TV, they managed to stop the same airplane, three days before the crash, at the very end of the runway and the runway was totally dry.

Now you are the one making assumptions.

Nevermind. I’m not going to get into an argument about this. You have your info and most importantly your interpretation of it. I have my info and my interpretation of it.

FWIW, I never said pilot error did NOT play a factor.

Take one incident and sweep the issue under the rug.

Going for Leahy’s job?

Another pathetic post free of any real will to discuss or increase knowledge.

Actually quick googling could provide you with huge amounts of data about the accident, which is (like most accidents in Western Europe and USA) well documented. But you rather choose to stick to your ready-made conclusions, which are unfortunately incomplete. The pilot did several wrong decisions, most notably did he approach much too fast and did not go-around after he failed to touch down after about 700m.

John Leahy does – as far as I know – not comment accidents of Airbus or Boeing aircraft.

Blaming the EFCS for those accidents is way short of the real reason. The Lufthansa accident for example was a classic overrun irregardless of the EFCS. If you land with 170kts groundspeed 700m behind the runway treshhold on a 2400m runway, your chances of having just another landing are low. Make more Go-Around!

Take one incident and sweep the issue under the rug.

Going for Leahy’s job?

Well the pilots flew an aircraft full of passenger’s 30 feet above the runway at slow speed low power and nose high, I think banging on full power at the last moment to save themselves from disaster is asking a bit much of any aeroplane.

Removing some safety systems via fuse and violating the minimum altitude is also something not supposed to happen with Paxe on board.

The thrust reverses account for about 30% of an aircrafts braking capability. The other 70% is in the wheel brakes.

I’m not saying this has anything to do with it – Not at All.

Just wanted to point it out

Adam

Nope. Normally 10% reduction in landing distance is given for T/R. In practical application this might be more when pilots are encouraged to use less brake and more T/R.

I think you might be thinking of one of the three overruns known to be caused by the FBW systems not permiting thrust reverse.
This happened on at least 3 seperate occasions with brand new A32X (or nearly new, 9 months at the oldest I think) aircraft with Lufthansa, Air France and Philippine Airlines. All three of which were write offs, with varying degrees of unjuries and/or deaths. But neither as deadly as this TAM crash.

Airbus are supposed to have fixed it and sure enough there’s not been another incident since.. but, who knows.

Blaming the EFCS for those accidents is way short of the real reason. The Lufthansa accident for example was a classic overrun irregardless of the EFCS. If you land with 170kts groundspeed 700m behind the runway treshhold on a 2400m runway, your chances of having just another landing are low. Make more Go-Around!

It seems to be an automatic reflex: if something in Airbus goes wrong, it must be the EFCS to a varying degree. It came so far that even for the S7 crash EFCS was blamed, although the A310 doesn’t have one.

I’m thinking of the AF A320 crash at Habsheim where they were doing a touch and go and ended up in the trees..the computers continued to land even though full power was applied

Well the pilots flew an aircraft full of passenger’s 30 feet above the runway at slow speed low power and nose high, I think banging on full power at the last moment to save themselves from disaster is asking a bit much of any aeroplane.